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Preface 
This study is a result of a process that could be described with such adjectives as 'long', 'bumpy', 
'challenging' and, finally, 'rewarding'. I first came up with the idea of investigating British 
propaganda in Finland in 2000 when studying for an MA in International Communications at 
the University of Leeds. The course included modules on propaganda and public diplomacy, 
which stirred a great deal of interest among fellow students as well as members of staff. After 
that, however, work outside academia pushed any ambition I had on undertaking further 
research on the subject to the background for several years. Even when working full-time, I did, 
however, start to gradually collect material for a study on first British and then American 
propaganda activities in Finland during the early Cold War. In 2011, I finally managed to win 
my first scholarship for conducting full-time doctoral research, which enabled me to take study 
leave and start a more thorough project on the subject.  
Even though doing research is often lonely and frustrating, there are many people and 
organisations whose help and support have made a great difference to my project, and all of 
whom deserve to be mentioned. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my 
supervisors, Professor Emeritus Hannes Saarinen and Professor Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, for 
supporting me through the writing process and giving me feedback of the highest standard. I 
would also like to thank Professor Emeritus Erkki Kouri, who acted as my first supervisor and 
backed my initial interest in dwelling into my selected research topic. The external examiners, 
Professor Timo Soikkanen from the University of Turku and Docent Mikko Majander from the 
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, provided many critical and useful comments, 
which helped me in the final part of this project. My sincere thanks go out to them, as well. 
I would also like to thank the examiners of my Licentiate Thesis, which I wrote on the same 
subject, Docents Juhana Aunesluoma and Vesa Vares, whose comments on my work provided 
me with plenty of useful ideas on how to expand my study. Furthermore, the late Philip Taylor, 
who worked as Professor at the University of Leeds, deserves a mention for inspiring me to 
take a closer look at the field of propaganda in the first place. As for staff and students at the 
University of Helsinki, I found the numerous seminars I attended under the wings of 
Professors Erkki Kouri, Markku Peltonen, Hannes Saarinen and Laura Kolbe all highly useful 
for learning more about how to conduct historical research and, above all, for sharing ideas. 
The many fellow post-graduate students I had the pleasure of acquainting during my research 
process, most of them by now doctors, also played a great role in my project both by making 
study-related observations and by offering moral support. I would like to specifically thank Juho 
Kotakallio, Elina Melgin, Samu Nyström, Henrik Tala and Seppo Vepsäläinen for their fruitful 
comments as well as excellent company. 
I am also deeply grateful to the numerous other people who helped me with several 
research-related and technical matters. Above all, I would like to thank my sister, Marion Fields, 
for proofreading my thesis and engaging in, at times heated, debate with me over questions 
related to the English language and linguistics. Jukka Rislakki played an important part in my 
project by providing me with copies of documents he had studied in the US for a book of his, 
for which I am grateful. Furthermore, I would like to specifically thank the following persons 
for their help and guidance during my long process: Joonas Ahola, Nicholas Cull, Jussi-Pekka 
Hakkarainen, Antti Hattula, Riku Mäki, Mikael Nilsson, Erkki Teräväinen and Antti Veijola.  
As this study has required an enormous amount of research in archives and libraries in 
Britain, the US, Finland and Sweden, the help I received from the staff in all these institutions 
proved vital for making a thorough study on my topic possible. I am particularly grateful for all 
the help and information provided to me by the three most essential archives for my study: the 
National Archives, Kew, the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, and 
the Finnish National Archives, Helsinki. Of all the institutions I have visited over the years, I 
would like to give special credit to two Finnish archives, the Päivälehti Archives and the 
Archives of President Urho Kekkonen, whose directors Pekka Anttonen and Pekka 
Lähteenkorva not only provide visitors with professional assistance, but also make sure that 
working in their archives is a pleasant experience.     
When conducting archive research in Finland, it was also highly important for my project to 
receive separate research permissions for the archived material of a number of organisations. I 
would like to thank the Finnish-British Society, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the 
Fulbright Center Finland, the IofC Finland Foundation, the League of Finnish American 
Societies and Juha Vuorinen, who all kindly granted me the permission to study documents that 
proved greatly valuable for my thesis.  
As the extent of research conducted for this study indicates, this project simply would not 
have been possible without the financial support offered to me by the Eino Jutikkala Fund, the 
Emil Aaltonen Fund and the Kaarlo Koskimies and Irma Koskimies Scholarship Fund. The 
latter, together with the Finnish Doctoral Programme of History and the former Department of 
History, University of Helsinki, also awarded me with travel grants that enabled me to fund at 
least a part of my trips to England and the US. I would like to express my gratitude to all of the 
aforementioned organisations. 
On a more personal note, I would like to thank all of my friends for sharing also the difficult 
moments during the process of this study. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my 
family: my mother, Leena, and my sister, Marion, who have always supported and encouraged 
me even during times of uncertainty. I would like to dedicate this study to them, and to my late 
father, Donald. 
 
Helsinki, February 28, 2015 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Research Topic 
 
This thesis deals with British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland 
during the first decades of the Cold War, more precisely between the years 1944 and 1962. The 
study explores the nature and scope of Britain's1 and the United States’ (US) propaganda and 
cultural operations in the challenging Finnish Cold War environment. Moreover, it discusses 
how the prevalent characteristics of Finnish society in this era, such as the widely accepted 
practice of self-censorship, affected the Western powers’ operational methods in their quests 
for winning the Finnish people’s support for their Cold War cause and providing the country 
with encouragement in its struggle with the Soviet Union. The thesis also aims to investigate the 
extent to which British and American cultural and information activities in Finland followed the 
more general operational policies in these fields and explains how the chosen methods reflected 
their broader Cold War strategies as well as general international developments.  
Available archived documents related to the subject reveal that the two Western powers 
were more interested in expressing their support for the northern country in the early Cold War 
decades through various informational and cultural channels than it has previously been 
conceived. The study argues that both the British and US governments were relatively 
successful in achieving this general objective largely because of their ability to launch a great 
variety of related activities, many of which were exclusively adjusted to the demands of the 
Finnish environment. As a consequence, the thesis also suggests that when executing their 
informational and cultural campaign in a country such as Finland, officially neutral and located 
between East and West, both the British and Americans were willing to follow more flexible 
policies than in many other parts of the world in which the activities often followed a more 
predetermined pattern. In addition to providing a new angle to Finnish history, a parallel 
examination of the two Western powers’ operations in Finland also offers an interesting 
dimension for extending our understanding of their roles and objectives during the Cold War. 
In spite of being close allies, the British and the Americans often had their own distinctive goals 
and methods for their achievement also in informational and cultural activities. 
 In recent decades, there has been a growing tendency to examine the Cold War as an 
ideological and cultural contest as well as a political and economic one. Indeed, far greater 
emphasis is now laid on the psychological dimension of the conflict, and international relations 
in general2, which means that not even the most traditional of diplomatic historians can leave 
                                                 
1 In this study, 'Britain' rather than the 'United Kingdom' has been used when referring to the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, mostly because the full official name was not very commonly used during the 
study period, as official documents used for this thesis confirm. 
2 Recent studies emphasising the significance of psychology, ideology and propaganda in the Cold War battle 
include, for instance: Berghahn, Volker R., America and the Intellectual Cold War in Europe (Princeton, NJ 2001); 
Caute, David, The Dancer Defects. The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford 2003); Falk, 
Andrew J., Upstaging the Cold War. American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy, 1940-1960 (Amherst, MA 2010); 
Hixson, Walter L., Parting the Curtain – Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York 1997); 
Lucas, Scott, Freedom’s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union (New York 1999); Osgood, Kenneth, 
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such topics as international cultural exchange or communication policy entirely unnoticed. This 
leads us all to a situation in which our understanding of the scope and scale of the Cold War 
grows at a relatively rapid pace. In this development cultural historians and communications 
scholars have played a major role by conceptualising the struggle as an essentially rhetorical one 
based on the war of words, images, perceptions, motives and expectations.3 As a consequence, 
the conventional examination of the ‘high politics’ of the Cold War now overlaps with areas 
previously known as ‘low politics’ and it is, therefore, harder to distinguish between the two.4 
This rather recent development has to a great extent resulted from the declassification of 
formerly classified official records around the world. Even though some of the key documents 
even from the early Cold War period are still categorised as secret, and the recently declassified 
files are highly scattered and inadequately organised, the evidence shows us that the struggle 
between the East and the West was very much so a ‘war of the mind’ or a ‘contest for the 
hearts and minds’, as the most popular interpretations of the conflict are known.5 Indeed, the 
sheer volume of resources and effort channelled into the presentation of words and images 
with the goal of changing people’s perceptions and attitudes is quite staggering to today’s 
observer, even though barely twenty years has passed since the conflict ended. New possibilities 
in mass communication played a key part in ensuring that almost every aspect of political and 
cultural life in most parts of the world was somehow affected by the bi-polar framework of 
international relations. This framework was built on the fear of war of an apocalyptic scale, a 
situation that has widely been referred to as ‘the balance of terror’.6 Thankfully, both 
superpowers, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union, became to realise, especially after the 
expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals in the 1950s, that direct military conflict between 
them would be devastating. The resulting psychological and cultural conflict, an alternative to 
'real war', was unparalleled in scale, ingenuity and power.7  
It did not take long after the situation between the two blocs had intensified for both sides 
to realise that the total nature of the Cold War would considerably increase the importance of 
public opinion home and abroad. Both the East and the West perceived that various 
communication techniques, such as propaganda and public relations, would serve their foreign 
policy interests. As influencing international public opinion evolved into a major objective of 
international relations, propaganda became such a significant element of foreign relations that 
                                                                                                                                                   
Total Cold War – Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS 2006); Rawnsley, 
Gary (ed.), Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s (London 1999); Stephan, Alexander (ed.), The Americanization of 
Europe. Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945 (New York 2006); Taylor, Philip M., Global 
Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945 (London 1997). Apart from the more specific 
studies, more general works on the Cold War now acknowledge, almost without exception, the significant role 
ideology and culture played in the conflict. See, for example, Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold 
War History (New York 1997). 
3 Vaughan, James, ‘’Cloak Without Dagger’: How the Information Research Department Fought Britain’s Cold 
War in the Middle East 1948-56’, Cold War History, Vol. 4, No.3 (April 2004), p. 56. 
4 The terms ’high politics’, including strategy and conflict, and ‘low politics’, consisting of, for instance, social, 
cultural and economic matters, became commonly used during the Cold War. 
5 See, for example, Osgood 2006, pp. 7-9; Taylor, Philip M., British Propaganda in the 20th Century: Selling 
Democracy (Edinburgh 1999) (Taylor 1999a), p. 228.  
6 Taylor 1997, p. 28. 
7 Shaw, Tony, ‘The Politics of Cold War Culture’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 2001), p. 59. 
 
 
13 
 
many started referring to it and any other action taken to affect public opinion as the ‘fourth 
weapon’ or the ‘fourth dimension’ of foreign politics, which complemented the political, 
economic and military components of policy.8 As words and images were seen as the principal 
weapons in the struggle, both sides invested in developing effective channels of communication 
for the distribution, control and manipulation of information about themselves as well as the 
other side to such an extent that the Cold War publicity battle affected almost every field of 
human activity for over forty years. As historian Tony Shaw puts it: “Virtually everything, from 
sport to ballet to comic books and space travel, assumed political significance and hence 
potentially could be deployed as a weapon both to shape opinion at home and to subvert 
societies abroad”.9 In addition to bringing propaganda closer to the core of Cold War studies, 
this way of examining the conflict has increased scholars' interest in more popular forms of 
culture and people's everyday lives, partly at the expense of more traditional 'high culture'.10  
The accelerating pace at which new studies on Cold War culture and the East-West 
propaganda battle are published has also led to a somewhat universal acceptance over the 
decisive role the ideological and cultural dimension played in influencing the conflict’s outcome. 
Although the failure of the economy has frequently been accepted as the main reason for the 
collapse of communism in the late 1980s, several authoritative commentators have also stressed 
the significance of, for example, Western radio broadcasting to the Soviet Union and its 
satellites.11 According to their viewpoint, Eastern Europeans’ knowledge of freedom and the 
perceived contrast in living standards between East and West, shaped by for instance Western 
broadcasts, eventually destroyed their support to communism.12 In this way, of course, 
economic and informational factors were closely entwined. 
While it is hard to argue with the view that overseas informational activities had an eroding 
effect on the communist regimes' control of people and their perceptions, one must be careful 
not to overemphasise the part the ideological and cultural dimension played in Cold War 
developments in relation to political and economic factors. The viewpoint of the realist school 
of Cold War interpretation, that the conflict was a continuation of Great Power politics with 
certain additions, such as nuclear weapons, arms racing and capitalist-communist ideological 
rivalry13, is in many respects valid particularly when examining the outcome of the Cold War 
through factors that are at least to a certain degree quantifiable such as the impact of the arms 
race on the failure of the Soviet Union’s economy. The growing evidence of the sheer scale of 
propaganda and cultural operations used in the Cold War battle has, however, given more 
ground for subjectivist theories examining the conflict, and foreign policy in general, through 
individual and collective perceptions and misperceptions.14 
                                                 
8 Osgood 2006, p. 4; Taylor 1997, p. 28. 
9 Shaw 2001, p. 59 
10 Johnston, Gordon, 'Revisiting the Cultural Cold War', Social History, Vol. 35, No. 3 (August 2010), pp. 291-295. 
11 For example, Nelson, Michael: War of the Black Heavens. The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War 
(Syracuse, NJ 1997), pp. xi – xv. 
12 Halliday, Fred: Rethinking International Relations (Basingstoke 1994), pp. 213-214. 
13 Ibid., p. 172. 
14 Ibid., pp. 172-173. 
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As numerous previous studies have indicated, both the British and US governments sharpened 
their machineries for propaganda and cultural activities soon after the Second World War. They 
acknowledged that both overt and covert measures had to be taken to confront the threat of 
communism and growing Soviet propaganda against the West. With this objective in mind, a 
secret anti-communist propaganda unit known as the Information Research Department (IRD) 
was established at the British Foreign Office (FO) in January 1948. In the US, the establishment 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which defined 
the terms on which the US Government could engage foreign audiences, and in particular the 
National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) written in 1950, the document giving high priority 
to containment of the expansion of communism, guaranteed that a growing share of American 
resources would be invested in informational and cultural operations carried out on a global scale. 
These developments led the two Western powers to invest an immense amount of money, and 
perhaps an even more staggering number of working hours, to ensure that their message would 
come across more convincingly than that of their Eastern rivals in every corner of the world, 
including highly exceptional environments such as Finland. 
Although often rather suspicious of the true nature of Finland’s political position during the 
Cold War, both the British and US governments felt that the country’s independence should be 
supported and that “everything possible should be done to reinforce the Finns’ attachment to 
the West”.15 As political and military measures to display this support were largely limited due to 
the Soviet Union’s strong influence in the country, the importance of cultural and informational 
operations in Finland was far greater than in most other non-communist European countries. 
Even though Finland’s unique political position placed a number of obstacles for the practice of 
Western propaganda and cultural diplomacy, British and US officials aimed to use relatively 
similar methods and distribution channels for their activities as in any other country.  
In the case of Britain, this meant the circulation of political IRD-produced content both 
directly to influential Finns and indirectly through Finnish newspapers. This activity was carried 
out alongside the distribution of more 'neutral' print material which had the objective of 
promoting Britain and aspects of the British society to the Finns. These print operations were 
complemented above all by the transmission of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) 
Finnish Service programmes and the use of the British Council (BC) for cultural activities such 
as educational exchanges and language teaching.  
As for the United States’ activities in Finland, including press, film and library operations as 
well as educational exchange, they were to a great extent carried out by the United States 
Information Service (USIS) office in Helsinki. Nonetheless, not all operations were solely in the 
hands of officials working at the USIS/Helsinki. The Americans also used various other 
channels of distribution, such as the Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcasts and a field 
magazine specifically produced for the Finnish market in close cooperation with Finnish 
contributors. Furthermore, the CIA was likely to have been involved in all American activities 
in one way or another. 
                                                 
15 'Memorandum of Discussion of British and American Information Policy in Finland', October 16, 1952, FO 
1110/481, National Archives (Hereafter NA), Kew, Surrey, UK. 
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In spite of making informational and cultural operations a high priority, both US and British 
officials saw Finland as an extremely difficult environment, especially in terms of propaganda. 
They continuously questioned the freedom of the Finnish press and felt that the newspapers’ 
cautious publishing policy seriously restricted their opportunities to give, in particular, people 
living in the provinces a less distorted picture of the world. On the other hand, the British and the 
Americans were well aware that they had to avoid doing anything in Finland that would endanger 
the country’s sensitive relationship with its giant neighbour. Both Western powers respected this 
situation and tried to refrain from spreading too provocative a message. This did not, however, 
prevent the extent of self-censorship16 exercised by the Finnish press and the anti-Western 
material published in the local communist papers from constantly puzzling and frustrating them. 
The understanding of local circumstances in Finland, in particular the nature of self-censorship, 
was the very key for successful informational and cultural activities in Finland. 
 
Research Objectives and Methods 
 
An examination of British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland during 
the first Cold War decades is particularly interesting due to Finland’s unique position between 
East and West. Although Finland's inclination to the West was strong, a large variety of official 
cultural events and ceremonies, together with the overall official policy, were more or less 
geared to praising the warm friendship the country had with the Soviet Union, making the 
situation somewhat confusing to both the Finns and Western observers. Even though the 
Western powers were always happy to recognise that a deep mistrust of Russia dominated 
public opinion in Finland, both the Americans and the British constantly feared that Finland 
would slip closer into Soviet control. As the Western powers’ use of political or military 
methods was largely limited, the examination of economic and cultural action as part of the 
governments' foreign policy gains an increasingly important role when forming an overall 
picture of Finland’s position in the Cold War.17 
The primary objective of this study is to discover what propaganda and cultural diplomacy 
operations Britain and the United States used in Finland: how broad were they, what was their 
nature, and which channels were used for their execution? The thesis also discusses the reasons 
behind the Western powers’ decision to engage in this kind of activity in Finland, explains why 
certain operational methods were preferred in this neutral Nordic country instead of others, and 
explores the effects Finland’s domestic politics and the development of the country’s 
international position had on British and American informational and cultural policies and the 
execution of related operations. 
Some emphasis has also been laid on the estimation of the operations’ overall influence, 
even if analysing the results of informational and cultural activities is almost always a highly 
                                                 
16 The concept ‘self-censorship’ has been used widely to describe the line of action adopted by the Finnish press 
during the Cold War, in particular with regard to its dealings with events in the Soviet Union. The concept is 
discussed more closely later in this chapter. 
17 Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas, Market, Competitor or Battlefield? British Foreign Economic Policy, Finland and the 
Cold War, 1950–1970 (PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science 2004), pp. 28─36. 
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speculative affair.18 A broader examination of the effects would require an altogether different 
kind of approach to the research topic and is, therefore, left for future studies. In the context of 
this particular study, however, it is possible to evaluate the operations’ efficiency through British 
and American documents discussing the number and nature of Finnish press articles that were 
based on their distributed material. The regular BBC and VOA research reports, which include 
information about listener numbers and feedback, make the estimation of the broadcasting 
companies’ impact in Finland slightly easier.  
It is also important to note that this study focuses almost exclusively on the propaganda and 
cultural activities managed by the two Western governments, not by other organisations or 
groups such as private corporations or non-governmental organisations. Therefore, the goal is 
to uncover what measures the two Western powers introduced in their attempt to create a 
fruitful soil for their policy in Finland, not to present broader theories about the triumph of 
Western culture or its impact on the broader masses.19 As a consequence, when referring to 
British and American operations or using 'Britain' and the 'US' to refer to actors behind, for 
instance, a policy or an activity, I mean the two countries' governments or government-related 
units, unless otherwise stated. 
When studying the used methods, it must be stressed that even though the informational 
and cultural operations are at times examined separately in this thesis, the two activities were so 
closely linked to each other that an exclusion of either of them would be, if not impossible, 
highly ill-advised. In other words, a separate examination of, for instance, British and American 
informational activities in Finland would be insufficient for understanding the full nature of 
Western operations in the country as it would neglect the closely-related and highly important 
cultural dimension. The fact is that both propaganda and cultural diplomacy were closely run by 
state actors, often even administrated by the same government department. All of the related 
operations were planned to complement each other for meeting the broader objective: to have a 
desired effect on the Finnish nation and Finnish policies mostly on a long-term basis.  
As for why this thesis examines both American and British propaganda and cultural diplomacy 
in Finland, the most obvious reason is that both of the two leading Western countries held an 
increasingly influential position among Finns in the first post-war decades. As we will see, during 
this time period the activities of both powers made a decisive contribution to the Finns' 
psychological struggle against the Soviet Union and formed a natural counterbalance to the 
growing impact of Moscow on Finnish affairs. While the role of the US in Cold War propaganda 
has in general, largely due to its superior resources, been considered as more decisive to the 
Western cause than the operations planned in London, it is worth noting that at least in Finland 
the British campaign was also highly important, and during the very first post-war years even 
more extensive and effective than that of its American counterpart. As the two governments' 
                                                 
18 For example, Osgood 2006, pp. 9-10. 
19 The 1990s in particular saw a boom of books on cultural imperialism accusing Western powers, especially the US, of 
dominating indigenous cultures and maintaining an imbalance in the flow of information. See, for example, Chomsky, 
Noam, Deterring Democracy (New York 1991). For a more critical examination of the cultural imperialism concept, 
see, for example, Tomlinson, John, Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction (London 1991). 
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objectives as well as the execution of their operations often overlapped, examining both Western 
powers' doings in the northern country is a rather natural approach for this study. 
The decision to focus almost exclusively on government-led operations has been made for 
several reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, an overall examination of British and American 
official propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland has so far been neglected and deserves a 
study of its own. In this respect, this thesis hopefully works as a catalyst for future and more 
detailed studies on, for instance, Western press, radio and television operations in the country as 
well as examinations on the impact the exchange of persons, language teaching and cultural 
exhibitions had on the country. By covering the most important aspects of all of the 
aforementioned topics, this study also wishes to emphasise that the leading Western 
governments’ propaganda and cultural diplomacy activities in Finland included a great variety of 
fields beyond the promotion of commercial films, which often seems to come to people’s 
minds when particularly American propaganda is mentioned. The fact that during the time 
period of this study, 1944-1962, a lion’s share of British and American informational and 
cultural activities around the world, both official and unofficial, were still at least partly 
administered and executed by their respective embassies also explains the concentration on 
state-led operations, as does the availability of research material, which is much greater as 
concerns state organisations than private actors.  
That this study examines government-managed activities does not mean that the focus is 
strictly on state-related actors. As one key aspect of the Cold War activities of the West, in 
particular the US, was the complex partnership built between state and private actors, the role 
of the latter is also examined when it closely supported the greater goals defined in Washington 
and London. Moreover, the cooperation between state organisations and the trade union 
movement was particularly distinctive in the Western Cold War effort and played a significant 
part in the campaigns directed at countries such as Finland. As a result, the activities of trade 
unions are also closely followed in this study. All this does not, however, imply that the study 
aims to provide a thorough analysis of the effects these activities and the Cold War in general 
had on Western arts such as film, theatre or literature.20 As the primary focus is on state 
activities implemented mainly on the grassroots level, the main actors in this study are usually 
civil servants such as information officers and public affairs officers as well as British and 
American ministers and ambassadors to Finland. 
By addressing the primary research questions and by using case-specific examples it is also 
possible to discuss how British and the American foreign policy, main international developments 
and broader Cold War culture were reflected in the two governments’ informational and cultural 
strategy in Finland. In order to analyse this, it is essential to first clarify the general goals of British 
and American informational and cultural policies and examine the ways in which the operations 
were coordinated and distributed between various actors. After this, it is possible to compare the 
administrations’ objectives and methods of operation. 
                                                 
20 A great share of Cold War studies has given extensive attention to the impact the bi-polar conflict had on 
Western cultural content and its presentation to domestic audiences in the US and Britain in particular. For 
example, Rose, Lisle A., The Cold War Comes to the Street (Lawrence, KS 1999); Whitfield, Stephen J., The 
Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, MD and London 1991). 
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On a more theoretical level, the content of Western propaganda is also briefly analysed and 
reflected against the most commonly used propaganda-related concepts. This can be done by 
examining articles published in Finnish newspapers that were based on materials of British or 
American origin and by examining the contents of the USIS field magazine, titled Aikamme 
('Our Time'). As the line between propaganda and more neutral information activity is 
extremely thin, the aim has been to define which kind of action or material can be regarded as 
propaganda or as simply a part of general information activities as clearly as possible. Even 
though such a definition can be given, the reality is that in many cases a distinction between the 
two is all but impossible to make. 
Another problem for making a thorough analysis on the content of the propaganda material 
distributed by Britain and the US in Finland is that neither administration kept a systematic 
record of the material or the articles that were published based on their content. Both British 
and American archives offer a relatively large number of documents on distributed and 
published material but their content and order is highly inconsistent. Defining American state-
related propaganda is made even more difficult by the extensive links the US Government built 
with the domestic private media sector when producing content for its Cold War cause. As a 
number of leading American newspapers, magazines, news agencies, radio and television 
stations as well as various non-governmental organisations had close, and often complex, 
relations with officials in Washington and were deeply involved in the Government’s 
propaganda efforts both home and abroad21, it is more or less impossible to distinguish 
between the content that was actually produced with the task of directly supporting the 
Government’s informational objectives and the material that was written more independently 
and that was less overtly biased. For these reasons a comprehensive analysis of British and 
American propaganda content in Finland is more or less impossible. In this study, the objective 
has been to trace the propaganda material that was certainly or highly likely produced with the 
governments’ broader ambitions in mind and then evaluate its contents and actual purposes. 
After this, these findings are placed into the larger context. As it has turned out, there is enough 
documented evidence available to credibly deal with all of these issues. The most detailed 
information about material distributed and published in Finland offered by the British and 
American archives originate from the 1950s; hence the content produced during this time 
period is examined more closely than the material written before or after.  
While the main objective of this study is to examine the policies Britain and the United 
States adopted for their propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations in Finland and to 
explore how these policies were put into practice, this cannot be adequately done without 
explaining the main developments in Finnish politics, society and in particular the media 
environment. Indeed, for understanding British and American propaganda in Finland, an 
examination of the nature and magnitude of the Western powers’ cooperation with various 
                                                 
21 For example, Cull, Nicholas J., The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. American Propaganda 
and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge 2008); Wilford, Hugh, The Mighty Wurlitzer. How the CIA Played 
America (Cambridge, MA & London 2008). 
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Finnish actors in promoting their message is absolutely necessary. As a result, this thesis also 
explores the ways in which the Finnish Government, state departments, political parties and the 
mass media, all hugely influential in information distribution and shaping people’s opinions, 
reacted to British and American activities and to what extent they actually found the material 
provided useful. For explaining the positions various Finnish actors took in relation to the 
operations, it is also necessary to explain the broader reasons behind such decisions: these 
include developments in Finland’s domestic or foreign policies, changes in the nature and 
extent of the self-censorship followed by the Finnish media or even more abstract factors such 
as the rise of anti-communist sentiment in Finnish society.  
While factors related to Finnish society are significant in discussing British and American 
activities in Finland, it is important to note that in this study they are only examined in a context 
relevant for the actual goal, the examination of the two Western powers’ operations. For example, 
this study does explore the main changes in Finnish newspapers’ published content during the 
study period, but only by evaluating how they affected British and American operations. While 
this thesis recognises that the domestic political propaganda battle in Finland, mainly between the 
communists and non-communists, is a relevant aspect when discussing British and American 
activities in the country, there is no need for a closer analysis of this topic. The same principle 
applies to Finnish politics. Political developments and the actions and opinions of Finnish 
politicians are more closely examined only when they are relevant to the most important research 
objectives. It is true that the Finnish political environment often determined the nature and 
volume of British and American operations in the country, but as they were directed by London 
and Washington, reflecting the two governments' broader policies, this study examines the 
developments predominantly from a British and American perspective. 
It is also important to note that the purpose of this study is to give a close examination of 
the operations of Britain and the United States, not the activities of, for example, the Soviet 
Union, the main opponent of the two not only politically, but also in the fields of informational 
and cultural operations. This does not mean that Soviet activities have been neglected 
altogether. Indeed, this would be almost impossible given the vast impact the country had on 
Finnish politics and the society, including the battlefield for propaganda. As the Soviet Union’s 
policies towards Finland, including its propaganda and cultural activities, often determined the 
way the British and Americans carried out their equivalent actions, a general examination of 
Soviet propaganda operations is also included in this study.  
In order to examine the Western powers’ informational and cultural operations as part of 
their foreign policy, this study also discusses Britain's and the United States’ general relations 
with Finland during the determined time period and identifies the most important 
developments. Since political, economic and social relations between the countries all had a 
profound impact on British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy, they also are 
briefly explained in this study.  
As already mentioned, the key to an examination of information activity in Finland is to 
understand what the Finnish environment was like for such activities. For example, in the field 
of the printed word, the way Finnish newspapers determined which articles were to be 
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published and which were not was an essential restricting factor for the operations’ success. 
While this study is neither as such an analysis of Finnish newspapers nor an examination of the 
degree of self-censorship they adopted, the significance of the Finnish media practices for 
British and American informational operations during the study period was so decisive that 
these matters are closely explored. This also enables a brief analysis on what all this says in a 
broader sense about Finland during the study period.  
The general assumption has been that self-censorship in the Finnish press was not as 
dominant in the 1950s as it was in the 1960s, not to mention the following decade.22 A study on 
British and American propaganda activities and their success tests this claim, opening up a new 
dimension. In my licentiate thesis23 I came to the conclusion that both Britain and the US 
practised broad-scale propaganda in Finland through a number of channels, but the degree of 
self-censorship practised by the Finnish press already in the early and mid-1950s made this 
effort substantially more difficult. For this study I set off, with a greater variety of source 
material in use, from the hypothesis that cooperation between British, American and Finnish 
actors on informational activities was actually much closer than it has previously been realised, 
and that for this reason self-censorship among Finnish newspapers was perhaps not as 
dominating a practice as I had earlier thought.  
The time period covered in this study, 1944 to 1962, has been chosen mainly due to the fact 
that the period in question can be regarded as especially important, eventful and sensitive not only 
in Finnish politics, but also in a global context. The ending of the Continuation War between 
Finland and the Soviet Union in 1944 gives a natural starting point for the study as this event 
marked the ending of one era and the beginning of another. Moreover, in that year the British and 
the Americans started gradually resuming their informational and cultural activities in Finland. 
The year 1962 was also something of a watershed in Finnish politics: the aftermath of the Note 
Crisis24 and Urho Kekkonen’s re-election as President saw the emergence of a new period in the 
country’s history. While this shift was taking place in Finland, considerable changes had started to 
gain momentum in international relations as well. The world not only sighed of relief after the 
serious crises in the late 1950s and early 1960s, most notably the Cuban Missile Crisis in autumn 
1962, came to a close, but it also started taking new steps towards a more stable and peaceful era. 
The foreign policies of the US and Britain also reflected this development. The two powers’ 
aggressive approach to the struggle between East and West started to give way to a strategy that 
was based more on, albeit limited, cooperation with the rivalling side. The fact that the decline of 
Britain’s position in world politics, and consequently its influence in the fields of information and 
culture, had become increasingly obvious by the early 1960s provides another reason why the 
time period covered in this study ends in the year 1962. 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Nevakivi, Jukka, Miten Kekkonen pääsi valtaan ja Suomi suomettui (Helsinki 1996), pp. 
128─131; Salminen, Esko, The Silenced Media. The Propaganda War between Russia and the West in Northern 
Europe (London 1999), pp. 18─20; Vihavainen, Timo, Kansakunta rähmällään (Helsinki 1991), pp. 46─72. 
23 Fields, Marek, Winning Finnish Hearts and Minds – British and American Propaganda and Cultural Diplomacy 
in Finland 1945-1962 (Licentiate Thesis, University of Helsinki 2009). 
24 For details of this development in Finnish history, see p. 313. 
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As for the research methods used for this study, the approach follows the traditions typical 
not only in the discipline of history, but also, for instance, communication studies. The 
dominating research method is qualitative and the study's structure follows a predominantly 
narrative style and chronological order. Closer evaluations of, for example, relevant political 
developments are given in this broader context. As the research topic concerns closely 
propaganda and informational activities mostly exploiting the mass media, certain analyses of 
media content are made based on theories mainly used in communications studies. When saying 
this, it is important to note that this study does not follow one pre-defined broader theory in 
the presentation of research results. As the main ambition is to present an account on the 
various informational and cultural operations both Britain and the US carried out in Finland, a 
topic that as such has not been studied before, it is my belief that adapting a single theory for 
explaining this activity would be rather artificial and could actually undermine the actual 
research goals. Since my task is to explore the nature, reasons and effects of the British and 
American campaigns in Finland, this study follows an approach familiar in classic historical 
research: it simply aims to answer how and why something has happened and to what effect.  
In this study, the examination of British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in 
Finland has been divided into six time frames in order to emphasise the different nature they 
had during these periods; their selection is even more greatly determined by various political 
developments in Finland and, above all, the country’s relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Together with general Cold War developments and the way they shaped the content of British 
and American informational and cultural operations, the changing degree of political pressure 
the Finns were placed under through demands made by the Kremlin gave all these time periods 
highly distinctive characteristics. As a consequence, it has been logical to construct the first time 
period (1944-1947) around the first post-war years, when Soviet presence in Finland was highly 
evident and the degree of Western activity somewhat limited. The second time period (1948-
1949) focuses on an era when the Cold War gradually landed on Finnish shores. The 
examination of the third time period (1950-1953) makes up the longest part of this thesis, 
mostly because during this period Western propaganda in Finland was at its most aggressive 
and a great number of new operational methods were introduced, also in the field of cultural 
diplomacy. The period of 1954-1957 reflects a time when Moscow eased its pressure on 
Finland, and the British and American operations enjoyed unprecedented success. The final two 
time periods, 1958-1960 and 1961-1962, are above all determined by changes in the Finnish 
political landscape and the country's relationship with the Soviet Union, which had a direct, 
mostly restrictive impact on the way the two Western governments were able to execute their 
operations in Helsinki. 
 
Previous Research, Source Material and Structure of Study 
 
As already mentioned, British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland has 
thus far not been as such the topic of closer examination. Until rather recently, research on the 
relations between Finland and the two leading Western powers focused almost inclusively on 
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the action and opinions of leading political actors. For long, such themes as Urho Kekkonen’s 
role in Finnish history and Finlandisation dominated both Finnish Cold War studies and the 
general public discussion at the expense of economic and cultural matters. Indeed, one could 
come to the conclusion that for decades Finnish Cold War history was, perhaps, too obsessed 
with examining Finnish-Soviet relations and diplomatic history with the question of 
Finlandisation lurking in the background.25 Accounts on any British or American cultural or 
informational activity in Finland were almost non-existent. The cultural impact foreign 
countries had on Finland during the Cold War has, on the other hand, been studied from at 
least two angles, albeit somewhat narrowly. These examinations have included accounts of the 
Soviet Union’s influence on Finnish cultural policies, for example concerning its role in political 
film censorship26, and statistical analyses on the hegemony of American and Western cultural 
products imported to Finland.27 To the latter group one can also include studies on the volume 
of media coverage given to foreign news material by country.28 
The last fifteen years or so have comprehensively reshaped the field of Finnish Cold War 
history, as a number of scholars have written several ground-breaking studies on Finland’s 
relations with Britain and the United States. Economic relations between Finland and the West 
have, in particular, been commendably explored in recent years.29 As economic, as well as 
cultural, methods usually held centre stage in the execution of British and American overall 
policies towards Finland, this development is particularly fruitful for forming a wider 
understanding of Finland’s relationship with the Western powers as well as Finnish Cold War 
history in general. In particular, Niklas Jensen-Eriksen's work has shed new light onto the 
development of British and American economic policies on Finland during the early Cold War 
period by providing a number of thorough accounts on previously unexamined topics.30 As for 
                                                 
25 Majander, Mikko, ‘Post- Cold War Historiography in Finland’ in Olesen, Thorsten B. (ed.), Cold War and the Nordic 
Countries – Historiography at a crossroads (Odense 2004) (Majander 2004b), p. 63. 
26 Sedergren, Jari: Filmi poikki…Poliittinen elokuvasensuuri Suomessa 1939-1947 (Helsinki 1999); Sedergren, Jari, 
Taistelu elokuvasensuurista: valtiollisen elokuvatarkastuksen historia 1946─2006 (Helsinki 2006). 
27 For example, Jalonen, Olli, Kansa kulttuurien virroissa (Helsinki 1985). 
28 For example, Kivikuru, Ullamaija, Angloamerikkalaisuus ja Suomen tiedonvälitys. Riippuvuuden muotojen ja 
sisällön tarkastelua. Oy Yleisradio Ab. Suunnittelu- ja tutkimusosasto, sarja B 1/1986 (Helsinki 1986). 
29 For example, Aunesluoma, Juhana, Vapaakaupan tiellä: Suomen kauppa- ja integraatiopolitiikka maailmansodista 
EU-aikaan (Helsinki 2011); Hanhimäki, Jussi, ‘Self-Restraint as Containment: United States’ Economic Policy, 
Finland, and the Soviet Union, 1945–1953’, The International History Review, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (1995), pp. 287–305; 
Kuisma, Markku, Kylmä sota, kuuma öljy. Neste, Suomi ja kaksi Eurooppaa 1948-1979 (Helsinki 1997); Lehtola, 
Vesa, Puuta, öljyä ja politiikkaa - Britannian ja Suomen väliset kauppasuhteet 1950-luvulla (Licentiate Thesis, 
University of Helsinki 1999). 
30 Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas, ‘A Stab in the Back? The British Government, the Paper Industry and the Nordic Threat, 
1956–1972’, Contemporary British History. Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 1–21; Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas, 'Brittisiivin 
suihkukoneiden aikakauteen: Ison-Britannian vientipolitiikka ja Suomen ilmapuolustuksen kehittäminen 1950-
luvulla', Sotahistoriallinen aikakauskirja 25 (2006), pp. 304-338; Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas, 'CoCom and neutrality: 
Western export control policies, Finland and the Cold War, 1949–1958' in Autio-Sarasmo Sari & Miklóssy, Katalin 
(eds.), Reassessing Cold War Europe (London 2011), pp. 49–65; Jensen-Eriksen Niklas, Hitting Them Hard? Promoting 
British Export Interests in Finland, 1957–1972 (Helsinki 2006); Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas, ’Just Rhetoric? The United 
Kingdom and the Question of Western Economic Aid to Finland, 1950─1962’ in Eloranta, Jari & Ojala, Jari (eds.), 
East-West Trade and the Cold War, Jyväskylä Studies in Humanities (Jyväskylä 2005), pp. 93─109; Jensen-Eriksen 2004; 
Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas, ‘Private or National Interest? British Foreign Economic Policy, Finland and the Cold War, 
1950–1970’ in Aunesluoma, Juhana (ed.), From War to Cold War – Anglo-Finnish Relations in the 20th Century (Helsinki 
2005), pp. 160–180; Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas, ‘The First Wave of the Soviet Oil Offensive: The Anglo-American 
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political developments between Finland and the Western powers, interesting studies have been 
published by, for instance, Vesa Vares and Markku Ruotsila as well as Juhana Aunesluoma, who 
has also edited a book on Anglo-Finnish relations in the twentieth century, which has been of 
great use for this study.31  
What is common for some of the more recent studies is that they have presented new 
evidence about how cooperation between Finland and the Western powers was actually much 
closer in the early Cold War decades than it had previously been realised. Kimmo Rentola’s 
study on the history of the Finnish Security Police (Suojelupoliisi, Supo)32 belongs to this 
category. In his work, Rentola has proved that within the field of national security and 
espionage Finland started to collaborate with Britain and the US already in the 1950s. The 
recent book by Jukka Rislakki33 has, to some extent, done the same as far as military relations 
between Finland and the US go by pointing out how closely Finland actually cooperated with 
the US on military assistance as well as the exchange of military information and even personnel 
not many years after the Second World War. Although focusing mostly on military issues, 
Rislakki’s book also includes new information about Finnish and American Cold War relations 
in general, including cultural relations, and has therefore been of particular value for this study. 
The clear shortage of studies focusing on Finland’s cultural relations with foreign countries 
does not mean that no general research on Finland’s relations with the West has been 
conducted until of late. The problem is that the majority of the older studies have almost 
conclusively been written from the Finnish perspective. For example Hannu Rautkallio and 
Jukka Nevakivi have given rather thorough accounts of the activities of American and British 
diplomats in Finland particularly in the late 1940s and 1950s and the two governments’ policies 
on Finland, but they mention informational or cultural activities only in passing.34 Rautkallio in 
particular mostly uses Western actors’ policies and opinions regarding Finland for examining 
the northern country's domestic politics rather than for analysing the larger policy 
developments determined in Washington and London. As background reading, the books of 
both scholars are among the most relevant ones for this thesis. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Alliance and the Flow of ‘Red Oil’ to Finland during the 1950s’, Business History, Vol. 49, No. 3 (May 2007), pp. 
348–366. 
31 For example, Aunesluoma, Juhana (ed.), From War to Cold War – Anglo-Finnish Relations in the 20th Century 
(Helsinki 2005); Ruotsila, Markku, Churchill ja Suomi (Helsinki 2002); Vares, Vesa, ‘Englanti ja Kekkonen 
1953─1954. Nousseista valtiomiesodotuksista takaisin kriittisyyteen’, Historiallinen Arkisto 109 (Tampere 1997), 
pp.183─244; Vares, Vesa; ’Is This the Top of the Slippery Slope? The British View on the Participation of 
Communists in the Finnish Government 1956─1968’, Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2002), pp. 
143─165. 
32 Rentola, Kimmo, ’Suojelupoliisi kylmässä sodassa, 1949-1991’ in Simola, Matti (ed.), Ratakatu 12. Suojelupoliisi 1949-
2009 (Helsinki 2009), pp. 9-192. 
33 Rislakki, Jukka, Paha sektori. Atomipommi, kylmä sota ja Suomi (Helsinki 2010). 
34 Rautkallio, Hannu, Alistumisen vuodet: suomettuminen vai lännettyminen? (Kirkkonummi 2010); Rautkallio, 
Hannu, Kekkonen ja Moskova – Suomi lännestä nähtynä 1956─1962 (Helsinki 1991); Rautkallio, Hannu, 
Laboratorio Suomi. Kekkonen ja KGB 1944-1962 (Porvoo 1996); Rautkallio, Hannu, Novosibirskin lavastus. 
Noottikriisi 1961 (Helsinki 1992); Rautkallio, Hannu, Paasikivi vai Kekkonen. Suomi lännestä nähtynä 1945─1956 
(Helsinki 1990); Rautkallio, Hannu, Suomen suunta 1945─1948 (Helsinki 1979); Nevakivi 1996; Nevakivi, Jukka, 
Maanalaista diplomatiaa vuosilta 1944-1948, jolloin kylmä sota teki tuloaan pohjolaan (Helsinki 1983); Nevakivi, 
Jukka, ‘The Relationship Redefined: Postwar Finnish Neutrality and US Interests’ in Rinehart, Robert (ed.), Finland and 
the United States – Diplomatic Relations Through Seventy Years (Washington D.C. 1993), pp. 65─76; Nevakivi, Jukka, 
Zdanov Suomessa – Miksi meitä ei neuvostoliittolaistettu? (Helsinki 1995). 
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Scholars like Jussi Hanhimäki, Helena P. Evans and Tuomo Polvinen have been more 
successful in drawing a picture of Finland’s relationship with the West.35 Hanhimäki and Evans, 
together with Jensen-Eriksen, are among the few scholars to write about Finland from the 
American or British perspective. While Hanhimäki has thoroughly explained the way in which 
the United States’ understanding of Finland’s neutrality developed during the first two Cold 
War decades, Evans has published a detailed study on Britain's policy towards Finland during 
the first crucial years after the Second World War. Although important for providing a new 
perspective to Finland's post-war position, many of the topics discussed in Evans's book have 
previously been covered in Polvinen's work on Finland's international relations in 1944-1947, 
which to a certain degree summarises his famous series of books on Finland’s external relations 
during and after the war.36 Neither Hanhimäki, Evans nor Polvinen has given much attention to 
cultural matters in their studies. 
As for more recent works not mentioned above, articles and books written by Mikko 
Majander and Jarkko Vesikansa have also provided highly valuable background information for 
this thesis.37 Majander has successfully studied, for instance, the international connections of the 
Finnish Social Democratic Party (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, SDP) and the Central 
Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (Suomen Ammattiyhdistysten Keskusliitto, SAK). In his 
most recent works, he gives detailed accounts of the considerable funds these two organisations 
received from a number of American actors, some of which were backed by the CIA. 
Majander’s findings on the SDP’s and the SAK’s contacts with American and British political 
parties and trade unions have been of great use for understanding the Western powers' desire to 
influence the two organisations that were both regarded as absolutely critical for the 
containment of communism in Finland. What is even more interesting for this study than the 
mere examination of the sums particularly American trade unions invested in Finland is that 
Majander has published details about how Finnish social democrats, associated either with the 
party or the trade union movement or both, were often encouraged and assisted by both the 
British and the Americans in their propaganda war with Finnish communists. As Majander's 
main interests have laid on other issues and his accounts on this particular subject therefore 
remain somewhat limited, this study complements his findings by presenting information about 
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the propaganda material American and British trade unions, as well as the State Department 
and the Foreign Office, delivered to Finnish social democrats not only explicitly for their battle 
against their communist rivals, but also for more general informational activities.  
In his study on anti-communism in Finland, Jarkko Vesikansa has presented new details 
about Finnish organisations established for anti-communist purposes during the Cold War 
years. For this thesis Vesikansa’s work is important for two reasons. Firstly, his study provides 
an excellent summary on the rise of anti-communist sentiment in Finland from the 1950s on. 
This development obviously had a profound impact on British and American informational 
activities in the country, particularly in the field of anti-communist propaganda. Secondly, and 
even more importantly, Vesikansa has presented detailed information about the propaganda 
activities of Finnish anti-communist organisations, in particular those of Suomalaisen 
Yhteiskunnan Tuki –säätiö (SYT). With the help of this information, and the documents 
available at the SYT collection, one is able to give at least an estimation of the extent of material 
the Finnish organisation used in its propaganda campaigns that had British or American origins. 
For some years Vesikansa and Majander, together with Rislakki, were more or less the only 
Finnish scholars to mention, albeit mainly in passing, British and American covert propaganda 
activities in Finland. In 2008, this changed when a master’s thesis written by Olli-Matti Nykänen 
was approved at the University of Helsinki.38 In his study, Nykänen examines British 
informational and cultural activities in Finland in the 1960s. Although Nykänen’s study is fairly 
successful, its significance for this particular thesis is somewhat limited most of all because it 
focuses in a different period. 
As for studies on Finnish media during the early Cold War decades, an important aspect for 
this study, Esko Salminen has published a number of books and articles on the history of the 
Finnish press.39 His works on Finnish newspapers’ publishing policies and Finnish self-
censorship in particular offer essential information for the evaluation of Finland as an 
environment for information activities during the Cold War. Indeed, this study partly uses 
Salminen’s analyses on the content published in Finnish newspapers for its assessment of the 
efficiency of British and American press activities. Otherwise, the history of the Finnish media, 
both in terms of general studies and more specific works on, for instance, newspapers and the 
radio, is a surprisingly neglected field. Comprehensive studies on the history and publishing 
policy of leading Finnish newspapers are rare. For studying the developments of Helsingin 
Sanomat, traditionally Finland's largest and most influential publication, the recent biography on 
Eljas Erkko40, the owner and editor of the paper during the study period, has shed new light not 
only onto journalistic issues inside Helsingin Sanomat, but also its international business 
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arrangements. As goes for studies on other newspapers as well, the biography gives little 
attention to the publication of British and American official propaganda material.41 
The history of the Finnish Broadcasting Company, Yleisradio (YLE)42, provides some details 
about how Finland’s delicate political position affected the corporation’s both domestic and 
foreign broadcast content. While making important observations about YLE’s cautious policy 
regarding broadcasts or arrangements that could have aroused political tension, the book lacks a 
systematic examination of, for example, the relationship between YLE and the BBC or the 
various ways with which the British and Americans wished to cooperate with the broadcaster 
for their informational purposes. 
The international relations of leading Finnish parties and the trade union movement have 
also been rather narrowly examined. Official party histories do give accounts of relations 
between Finnish party officials and their foreign counterparts, but only on a general level.43 An 
exploration of several archives in Finland, Britain and the US reveals one simple reason for this: 
material regarding the topic is somewhat scarce. As contacts between Finnish parties and trade 
unions and the British and the Americans were particularly important during the early Cold War 
decades, also in terms of propaganda activities, this study aims to provide new details also about 
this issue. 
As for the growing number of studies emphasising the psychological and cultural dimension 
of the Cold War, their large share focuses on anti-communist propaganda behind the Iron 
Curtain, most typically radio broadcasts.44 In recent years, however, several scholars have 
included the operations executed in Western European countries in their area of research. Some 
of them have also mentioned Finland in their studies, but their general focus has been on 
operations executed in larger European countries.45 
In Britain, the covert propaganda operations coordinated by the IRD were first revealed to 
the public in the late 1970s. However, a large share of the most essential documents was kept 
secret until the mid-1990s. When the first bulk of IRD-related documents was released, a 
couple of studies, focusing more on sensation rather than academic analysis, soon followed.46 
The story of a covert propaganda unit was also widely covered by the British press, which 
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rather emphasised the involvement of certain famous names, in particular George Orwell, in 
the department’s activities than gave broader accounts on the actual operations.47 After even 
more documents were filtered out to the open, a number of scholars have given detailed 
accounts of the IRD’s activities in specific regions, like Tony Shaw has done with regard to the 
Korean War and James Vaughan concerning the Middle East.48 Lyn Smith was the first to 
publish an extensive article on the IRD and its activities in the Journal of International Studies in 
1980.49 She has since been followed by scholars such as Wesley Wark and Hugh Wilford, who 
have both written encompassing articles on covert propaganda.50 Researchers like Richard 
Aldrich have later given more extensive accounts on, for example, youth and student 
organisations’ role in British anti-communist propaganda operations as well as Cold War 
intelligence cooperation between Britain and the US 51 
Perhaps the most extensive work on the development of British anti-communist propaganda, 
including the operations of the IRD, in the early Cold War era, has been written by Andrew 
Defty.52 His studies give a highly detailed account on the wider policies determining British 
propaganda, the main principles and organisational development of the IRD's work as well as 
British and American cooperation in anti-communist activities. Although Defty gives examples of 
the actual propaganda material distributed both home and abroad, his work does not offer much 
for forming an analysis of the operations or the actual content distributed in a specific country, 
such as Finland. The same applies to Philip M. Taylor’s various books and articles concerning 
British propaganda and cultural diplomacy, which either deal with the operations on a rather 
broader sense or give more emphasis to domestic propaganda.53 The official histories of the BBC 
and the British Council also naturally provide an insight into the two organisation's work, but 
ignore operations relevant to Finland or even Scandinavia almost completely.54 
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Since a considerable body of material concerning American overseas anti-communist 
operations was declassified in the mid-1990s, several scholars have published comprehensive 
studies on the subject. Kenneth A. Osgood’s studies regarding US propaganda activity during the 
Eisenhower Administration and Walter Hixson’s work on the propaganda and cultural battle 
between the East and West are particularly relevant for this study.55 The two scholars' works are 
above all useful for examining the USIA’s larger worldwide propaganda themes and their 
relevance to broader US foreign policy. Laura Belmonte’s book on US propaganda during the 
Cold War follows the same path, but is more focused on the actual content of, above all, USIA 
pamphlets, and therefore gives a more detailed account on how this material was used for selling 
such ideas as American freedom, capitalism and harmonious race relations to the world.56  
For understanding the broader background of the various operations, Richard Arndt’s 
studies on American cultural diplomacy have also been of great help.57 Arndt gives a summary 
of the role the numerous propaganda and cultural diplomacy-related state organisations and 
departments played before and after the creation of the USIA and explains their internal 
structural changes. As especially the State Department's organisational bureaucracy underwent 
almost constant changes during the first post-war years, Arndt’s work has brought some order 
out of chaos for those wanting to understand how tasks related to cultural diplomacy were 
actually divided between different actors. The same can be said about Nicholas J. Cull’s 
extensive history of the USIA.58 Cull not only explains the organisational structures of US 
propaganda activities, but also provides information about, for instance, how various actors 
worked together and, more importantly, how closely the American organisations followed 
broader developments in world politics and how quickly their operations reacted to them. 
Among the studies related to US propaganda that have caught the greatest attention in 
recent years is Frances Stonor Saunders’s book Who Paid the Piper?, which deals with the CIA’s 
extensive role in the cultural Cold War.59 The study gives a thorough account of the sheer 
magnitude of the CIA’s involvement in various cultural organisations and operations. Stonor 
Saunders’s main claim, belonging to a post-revisionist interpretation of the Cold War60, is that 
the CIA’s covert funding of numerous trade unions, cultural organisations and student 
movements was a well calculated move through which it was possible for the agency to greatly 
manipulate numerous organisations' activities so that they would meet the ends of US Cold War 
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strategy. For instance, Hugh Wilford has later pointed out that the picture was not as simple as 
this.61 According to him, organisations secretly funded by the CIA often actually resisted 
Washington’s view on how American values should be presented and what measures should be 
taken in this direction. Wilford, therefore, gives much more room for the cultural movements’ 
independence than Stonor Saunders, who sees that CIA to a very large extent called the tune.  
One of the very few studies to actually focus directly on American propaganda operations 
regarding Finland is John I. Kolehmainen’s work on VOA’s Finnish Section.62 Kolehmainen, a 
US-based history professor of Finnish descent, worked as head of the section for a short period 
in the early 1950s. His book gives intriguing details about both broader policies behind the 
VOA broadcasts and the way work at the Finnish section was organised. The publication, 
however, is not a comprehensive account on the matter, and needs further studies to complete 
the history of VOA Finland. 
As with the British case, country-specific studies on American propaganda and cultural 
diplomacy are relatively rare. Reinhold Wagnleitner’s extensive book on US cultural activities in 
Austria is an important exception.63 In addition to providing plenty of information about US 
activities in Austria, the study gives a broader analysis on the growing American influence in post-
war Europe, and is therefore highly helpful. This also applies to Mikael Nilsson's recent research 
on mainly USIA operations in Sweden,64 which offer a useful perspective for understanding 
American activities in Finland through examining the operations in its Western neighbour.  
Since prior research on British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland is 
more or less non-existent, this thesis is predominantly based on primary sources. For the 
examination of Britain’s policies and activities, the most important official documents are found 
in the National Archives in Kew. Foreign Office files on the IRD (above all record group FO 
1110) form the most important data for this study: they include, for instance, documents 
concerning the unit’s operations and relationship with other actors such as the BBC. The files also 
comprise information on the unit’s propaganda activity in Finland along with more general files 
on Britain’s overall policy towards Finland (FO 371). For a closer examination of IRD-produced 
content, record groups FO 975 and FO 1059 include a large number of publications and articles 
produced by the department particularly in the 1950s. As informational and cultural operations 
were also coordinated by other Foreign Office units, documents on the policies of the 
Information Policy Department (IPD) (FO 953) and the Cultural Relations Department (CRD) 
(FO 924) have also been of great value. Documents concerning the British Council can also be 
found at the National Archives (mostly in BW 30). These files consist of general correspondence 
and annual reports, which provide detailed information about the various cultural activities carried 
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out during the study period. In general, the available Foreign Office and British Council files are 
not very organised or regular in terms of the covered time period, but they do provide enough 
information for a comprehensive investigation. A great share of the available documents on 
British propaganda operations is from the late 1940s and early 1950s, while the amount of files 
regarding cultural activities is at its largest for the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
As already mentioned, studying the United States’ propaganda is a much more complicated 
affair. Even though a considerable number of documents have been opened to the public in 
recent years, the fact remains that especially CIA-related material is hard to come by. Moreover, 
State Department records at the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at 
College Park, Maryland, are poorly organised and woefully incomplete.65 For the purposes of 
this study, my main focus has been on examining NARA documents on the operations of the 
USIS/Helsinki. Documents concerning these activities are scattered around numerous record 
groups, most importantly in Record Group (RG) 306. As in the British case, the availability of 
documents in this record group varies greatly by year. The largest amount of material, which 
consists of, for instance, correspondence, country reports, evaluation reports, background 
studies, printed propaganda pamphlets as well as comments on VOA broadcasts, is either from 
the early 1950s or the following decade. This is rather understandable as the availability of 
material seems to be closely related to the operations’ actual size. In fact, one has to give the 
Americans some credit for this, as their reporting of activities has clearly been more systematic 
and extensive than that of their British counterparts. 
Apart from offering indispensable evidence on the US general policy towards Finland, State 
Department files at RG 59, both decimal files and central records of the Bureau of Cultural and 
Educational Affairs (CU) in particular, also include a great deal of information regarding USIA 
operations in the country, including country proposals and reports on activities taken up due to 
some specific developments or events, such as the 1952 Helsinki Olympics and the Helsinki 
Youth Festival held in 1962. Similar content can also be found at RG 84 and the CU collection 
held at the University of Arkansas Library, the organisation of which is much more systematic 
than of the material stored at NARA. Other valuable research material for this thesis available 
at NARA includes, for instance, documents that can be found through the relatively new CIA 
Research Tool (CREST) and the USIA-produced films that have been donated to the archives. 
The vast number of organisations taking part in the US propaganda machinery, and the 
American style of holding various state-related organisations' collections at number of libraries 
and archives around the country make conducting research in the US more laborious than in 
Britain. For this study, documents held at the Eisenhower Presidential Library and the John F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library have been particularly valuable for providing more details about 
the US policies towards Finland. Other important American archives include the George Meany 
Memorial Archives and the University of Chicago Library’ Special Collections Research Center. 
While the former holds documents related to the two largest American federations of trade 
unions, the latter is significant for its collection on the activities of the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom (CCF).  
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A great number of Finnish archives also provide some information about the reception of 
Western propaganda. As the operations have been regarded as a somewhat delicate affair in 
Finland, the material available at the archives is also highly fragmented. By going through 
archive collections of several Finnish politicians, the leading political parties, the largest 
newspapers, state departments, in particular the Finnish Foreign Ministry, and some non-
governmental organisations, I have managed to come up with a consistent picture of how the 
Finns reacted to Western propaganda work and what measures were possibly taken as a result.  
For this task, the collections held at the Finnish National Archives have proved most 
invaluable. In addition to the private collections of Finnish politicians and journalists, the 
documents available, for instance, at the anti-communist organisation SYT’s collection, have 
been important for understanding the use of British and American printed content in Finnish 
political propaganda. The collections of the Finland-Soviet Union Society (Suomi-
Neuvostoliitto-Seura, SNS) also turned out to be useful. By examining the society’s documents, 
as well as the material of the Finnish Communist Party (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue, 
SKP), held at Kansan Arkisto, one can not only become familiar with the communist reaction 
to British and American informational and cultural activities, but also find out more about the 
Western operations as such, as the opposite players often kept a close record of them. Among 
the most important collections for this study held at the Finnish National Archives also are the 
archives of the Finnish Committee on Studying and Training in the USA (FCSTUS) and the 
Finnish-US Educational Exchange Commission (FUSEEC). 
For examining the distribution of British and American material, printed, audio as well as 
visual, in the Finnish media, the archives of three leading Finnish newspapers (Helsingin Sanomat, 
Uusi Suomi and Suomen Sosialidemokraatti) have been of use, as have the YLE archives held at 
Suomen Elinkeinoelämän Keskusarkisto in Mikkeli. Documents related to Helsingin Sanomat, 
Ilta-Sanomat and their publisher Sanoma Oy, held at Päivälehden arkisto, proved particularly 
important for this thesis. Both the newspapers' external correspondence and the records 
regarding the commissions paid for published articles turned out to be especially useful for 
tracking down the stories that had been distributed through official British and American 
channels. These documents do not provide a complete figure for the extent of published 
Western articles in the two papers, but they are extremely helpful in forming an understanding 
about, for instance, at which time periods this material was particularly in favour.  
As understanding Finnish newspapers’ publishing trends is vitally important for an analysis 
of the British and American operations’ efficiency, I have also examined the content of a 
number of important papers during the study period. These publications include, in addition to 
the ones already mentioned above, a number of newspapers known for using a particularly large 
volume of Western content, such as Hufvudstadsbladet, Aamulehti and Kaleva. The leading 
communist publications, Vapaa Sana, Työkansan Sanomat and Kansan Uutiset, founded after a 
merger between the first two, have also been included in the analysis mainly to learn about their 
reactions to the policies of the West, and more specifically to British and American propaganda. 
While this thesis is not as such a study about the content of Finnish newspapers, their 
examination is also important for determining how the Western powers’ propaganda material 
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compared with the publications’ general content and met their publication policies. With this in 
mind, I have decided to examine the content of a number of leading Finnish newspapers more 
closely in three different time periods: in the summer of 1950, the summer of 1955 and autumn 
1962. As the publishing policies of the Finnish printed media, together with Finland’s political 
position, were distinctively different during these three points in time, a closer examination of 
the newspapers both gives an idea how the coverage of particularly foreign news topics altered 
through the years and reveals how the publication of British and American propaganda material 
fitted in this broader trend.  
Apart from newspapers, several magazines published in Finland have been explored for this 
thesis. The most important task was to study the entire content of Aikamme, the USIS-
produced local publication for Finland. Its articles reveal almost directly the subjects the 
Americans wished to emphasise in their print media campaign in Finland. Among the other 
magazines studied for this thesis are the influential Suomen Kuvalehti and Viikkosanomat, as well as 
Valitut Palat (the Finnish edition of Reader’s Digest), which played an integral part in spreading 
US propaganda themes throughout the country.  
As for visual content, documents held at the YLE archives provide a useful insight into the 
introduction of television in Finland and its effects for foreign powers’ propaganda activities. 
For studying film propaganda, the USIS-affiliated short movies available at Kansallinen 
audiovisuaalinen instituutti (KAVI) give a valuable addition to the films that can be watched at 
NARA. Although the number of available USIS-produced films in Finland is small, an 
examination of them does give significant information about what broader propaganda themes 
the American wished their targeted audiences to pick up.  
As already mentioned, the examination of British and American activities in Finland has been 
divided into six time periods in this study. Although Britain's and the United States’ operations are 
dealt with in parallel with each other in most chapters, I have decided to mainly discuss their 
activities separately. The main reason for making such a general division is the way the British and 
the Americans implemented their campaigns. Although the two Western powers were close allies 
and, for instance, exchanged vast amounts of information, in the execution of informational and 
cultural operations they acted very much on their own. This was also the case for activities in 
Finland, where their governments carried out almost entirely independent campaigns particularly 
during the first ten post-war years. The practice of slightly closer Anglo-American cooperation in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s has, however, been taken into account in the way the text is 
structured. As a result, the chapters dealing with the time periods in question (chapters 8-9) 
examine the Western powers’ activities from a more convergent perspective. 
This study has been divided into ten chapters. After the introduction, the aim is to provide the 
wider themes within a theoretical framework by defining terms such as propaganda and cultural 
diplomacy (chapter 1). After this, it is necessary to present the main developments in both British 
and American policy on informational and cultural operations as well as to introduce the main 
actors in the field (chapter 2). Chapters 3–9, the core of this study, focus on British and American 
field operations in Finland and assess the various channels’ roles in these activities. Although the 
main goal of the thesis is to examine the actual activities the two Western powers put into practice 
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in Finland and to explain the policies behind them, in order to understand the true nature of the 
operations it has also been necessary to briefly analyse the content of British and American 
propaganda material published in Finland. As documents from the mid-1950s offer by far the 
largest amount of information about this matter, the greatest part of this analysis appears in the 
chapter covering this particular period (chapter 7). The final chapter concentrates on making final 
conclusions and placing the research results into a wider context.  
 
Definition of Key Terms 
 
In order to understand the main questions addressed by this study and to avoid ambiguity, it is 
necessary to define some key concepts. The terms are all very closely connected to each other 
and not always that simple. 
There are a number of short descriptions for the concept of propaganda. With the term we 
usually understand the construction and dissemination of certain words and images in order to 
shape the attitudes and behaviour of populations66, or in other words, the communication of 
ideas designed to persuade people to think and behave in a designed way. It differs from 
education since as a concept ‘education’ allows for the recipient to make up his mind on a given 
issue. In propaganda, however, people are persuaded to do things which benefit those applying 
the persuasion.67 It is also distinct from information, which seeks to transmit facts objectively. 
Although using techniques familiar in advertising or public relations, propaganda is often 
strictly seen as a tool for promoting political causes or ideas, or indeed undermining them. This, 
and more particularly the large-scale propaganda operations executed by Nazi Germany under 
Joseph Goebbels’ leadership, has given the term a negative connotation as a treacherous and 
deceitful practice.68 
This negative label has led to numerous misconceptions about the nature of propaganda. 
For example, although manipulative, propaganda is not necessarily untruthful as is commonly 
believed.69 In fact, it is often pointed out that the most effective propaganda is completely 
truthful as propaganda based on fact is more likely to be persuasive than bald-faced lies.70 
Among the scholars emphasising the use of truth is Jacques Ellul who in his extensive work on 
propaganda noted that propagandists have for a long time recognised that lying must be 
avoided.71 Although this is an important point, one has to remember that the truth in 
propaganda is, of course, a highly relative concept since facts are often presented selectively or 
are actually half-truths or truth out of context.  
People who view propaganda entirely in a negative light also often ignore the points that 
communications theorist Harold Lasswell already made in 1927 in his classic study Propaganda 
Technique in the World War. According to Lasswell, democracies needed propaganda as it was the 
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only way to keep the masses informed about matters determined to be in their interest and to 
ensure their support for the greater cause. As propaganda was a mere instrument, it had no 
moral and could be used for good or for ill.72 In Lasswell’s view war-time propaganda had four 
objectives: “to mobilise hatred against the enemy, to preserve the friendship of allies, to 
preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the cooperation of neutrals and to 
demoralise the enemy”.73 Although Lasswell saw that psychological warfare against the enemy 
was important, maintaining the morale of one’s own soldiers, citizens and allies and keeping the 
neutrals from sliding with the enemy was indispensable.74 
Even though there are various acute definitions of propaganda, as already mentioned, for 
this study Jacques Ellul’s explanation is perhaps the most suitable. According to him, 
“propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organised group that wants to bring about the 
active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified 
through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organisation”.75 Ellul’s point that 
the desired activity of propaganda can be either active or passive is important for the 
examination of British and American Cold War propaganda in Finland in particular. Obviously 
neither of the countries wished to encourage the Finns to take direct action against the Soviet 
Union in particular, but rather wished their target groups to adopt a certain kind of a worldview 
and to make sure this view was supported on a long term basis. According to Ellul, this kind of 
propaganda is often not based on expressed intentions but on creating a general climate "that 
influences people imperceptibly without having the appearance of propaganda".76 A large share 
of the operations examined in this study fits into this categorisation. Therefore, what is above 
all meant as propaganda in this thesis is the activity that saw both the British and the Americans 
to try and influence the Finnish opinion leaders' and the broader public's views on topical 
events in particular by supplying them with selected news themes and opinions through a great 
number of different channels. As the Finns were already familiar with most of the topics the 
Western actors fed them with, the studied operations had more to do with redirecting the 
audience's attention to more detailed and analytical accounts on these issues rather than 
distributing direct attacks or blatant lies about the Soviet Union. 
Ellul’s work is valuable for studying Cold War propaganda also because he stresses the 
scientific nature of propaganda, a characteristic typical especially for US overseas operations.77 
While Ellul agrees that a definition on the effects of propaganda is very difficult to make, he 
sees that the increasing analysis of propaganda activity and its results at least gives us a better 
chance of understanding propaganda operations through rivalling psychological and social 
theories and systematically collected data. This is of course an important point for this study as 
well. As drawing definite conclusions on the effects of British and American operations in 
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Finland is more or less impossible, the collected data, although at times highly imperfect, 
enables us to estimate the pervasiveness and general content of the propaganda efforts. 
Many scholars have also often classified propaganda according to the source and nature of 
the message. With ‘white’ propaganda we usually mean objective truth-telling coming from an 
open source. ‘Black’ operations, on the other hand, involve planting misleading stories or 
disguising their true source. ‘Grey’ propaganda, as its title suggests, lies somewhere in between 
white and black. It usually means the dissemination of biased information from an 
indeterminate source. Naturally, the lines between the three categories are often blurred.  
In classifying propaganda by source, scholars like Ellul have stressed that while each usable 
medium has its own particular way of penetration, the way the media's effective use is mostly 
limited to their respective fields only shows the necessity of complementing with other media.78 
In other words, the modern propagandist must utilise all technical means at his disposal, such as 
the press, radio, TV and films. While Ellul points out that each medium is particularly suited to 
a certain type of propaganda, he recognises that the nature of propaganda is total. This study 
also follows this viewpoint in the way British and American propaganda in Finland is examined. 
While the media used for Western operations are often examined separately in this thesis, their 
pre-defined roles played for the broader propaganda purpose. Hence, in this study the focus is 
always on the larger context as well, i.e. on examining what the broader propaganda policies 
were and how various media were designed to complement each other in their execution.  
Determining which material is propaganda and which merely ‘information’ is often an all but 
impossible task. In the evaluation process, the source and its motives have a vital role. As one 
of the characteristics of propaganda is that it aspires to modify or control people’s opinions and 
actions to benefit the sponsor rather than the recipient, it can be said that a large share of the 
activities examined in this study can be categorised as propaganda. The informational activities 
of both Britain and the US in Finland during the first decades of the Cold War usually had the 
objective of influencing people’s opinions over some particular topic or their perceptions of the 
source itself in order to gain either some short-term advantage or benefit in the longer run. In 
this study, the term ‘informational activities’ is often used to cover both the circulation of 
material that could be labelled as political propaganda and the distribution of content that could 
be called more ‘neutral’. When talking about ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ content distributed in 
Finland, it is important to note that a great majority of this material can also be categorised as 
being white propaganda, as the distinction between white propaganda and informative 
communication is that white propaganda informs solely to promote a specific ideology.79  
To make things even more complicated, the Americans in particular often use euphemisms 
for propaganda due to its predominantly negative connotations. ‘Public diplomacy’ has perhaps 
been the most widely used one. According to one of its first definitions devised in the US, the 
term describes efforts on behalf of a government to reach foreign audiences without going 
through the government of the foreign countries.80 Such concepts as ‘overseas information 
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policy’ or ‘national self-advertisement’ have also been used to describe activities to promote a 
country’s image, for instance, through national radio or television services.81 Although public 
diplomacy is often defined to include cultural matters, such as the administration of student 
exchange programmes or overseas exhibitions, I believe that ‘cultural diplomacy’ is the more 
appropriate term to describe such activities. The concept refers to governmental activity that 
attempts to by-pass commercial media images by appealing directly to the people in foreign 
societies on an ostensibly non-political level. Its principal instruments include language teaching, 
educational exchanges and other forms of cultural contact. Even the promotion of national 
architecture, used as a tool of diplomacy and political power even before the ancient Greeks, 
can be regarded as a classic product of cultural diplomacy.82 
The objective behind cultural and educational exchange, the establishment of libraries in 
overseas countries, or the sponsorship of, for instance, drama or music tours is to complement 
the foreign policy of the government in question, in addition to the goal of increasing 
international understanding. Indeed, one could say that the key assumption behind, for 
instance, student and expert exchange programmes is that after spending time in the country of 
destination and witnessing the advantages of the society and the nation’s way of life, the visitor 
will speak highly of his or her experiences when returning and possibly even make major 
decisions in favour of that particular country. Therefore, the work of such government-
sponsored or supported organisations as the British Council or the Alliance Française supports 
foreign policy especially on a long-term basis. 
What is important to recognise also for this study is that cultural diplomacy is always 
managed or funded by state-related actors. This is the most profound difference between 
cultural diplomacy and such terms as ‘cultural relations’ or ‘cultural affairs’, which refer more 
closely to cross-border activities that grow without government intervention, such as the 
transaction of trade and tourism or intermarriage.83 As a term, therefore, ‘cultural relations’ 
refers to more neutral activity that has no purpose of seeking one-sided advantage whereas 
cultural diplomacy usually seeks to present a favourable image.84 When defining these activities, 
it is also valuable to place them in their historical context. Indeed, operations that could be 
defined under cultural diplomacy in the 1950s, dictated by government actors, were much larger 
in number than they are in the 21st century. In other words, the role of diplomats in the 
management of cross-border activities, such as the exchange of students or communications, 
has diminished in recent decades to such an extent that their great significance during the Cold 
War decades could even come as a surprise to today’s reader.  
As a term, cultural diplomacy is obviously closely linked to propaganda and it is not that 
simple to draw a line between the two. All overseas informational and cultural activities are 
often referred to as simply propaganda, regardless of them being undertaken through the 
exploitation of various media channels or through a cultural institution. It can, however, be 
argued that using the term propaganda for, for instance, culture or its promotion would be 
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somewhat deficient. With this and the goal of avoiding ambiguity in mind, in this study I have 
decided to use two terms to describe the Western powers’ overseas informational and cultural 
activities: ‘propaganda’ for activities principally aiming at influencing opinion through official 
media channels and ‘cultural diplomacy’ for the operations of, for example, the British Council, 
which include educational exchanges, language training and the projection of British culture. 
The use of the phrases ‘cultural activities’ or ‘cultural operations’ refers to cultural diplomacy.  
The two main terms, ‘propaganda’ and ‘cultural diplomacy’, are predominantly used 
throughout the study, although at times it has simply been wiser to use one of the number of 
euphemisms given for propaganda during the Cold War, as well as today. The fact that US 
government officials in particular used the terms ‘psychological warfare’, ‘political warfare’, 
‘propaganda’ and ‘psychological strategy’ more or less interchangeably in their classified 
communications85 means that these concepts are also used in this study in part because their 
inclusion reflects common usage during the first Cold War decades. 
As self-censorship is a core, albeit to some extent contested, concept in understanding the 
Finnish environment vis-à-vis propaganda and cultural activities, it is essential to define the 
term as well as the broader concept of censorship. The two notions are also closely linked to 
propaganda and also for this reason important for this study.  
Censorship has existed in various forms for thousands of years. Usually, we understand the 
term as a process where a certain authority, usually the state, prevents the transmission of 
messages and thus controls or manipulates, for example, newspaper writings. The extent of 
censorship can vary significantly, for instance in war time states have practised tight control 
over information. Censorship is often understood as the opposite to the principle of freedom 
of speech, which is based on the public opportunity and right to criticise those who are in 
power. For this reason it is no wonder that many people (often Marxists) have argued that the 
elite uses censorship as a tool to maintain or strengthen their position, acknowledging language 
as the ultimate force of power.86 
Pierre Bourdieu has successfully recognised that there exist two kinds of censorship in the 
fields of arts and politics. First, there is the manifest, traditional one based on rules, restriction 
of access and other such factors. This is the way people usually understand the word 
censorship. Secondly, there is what Bourdieu calls ‘structural censorship’, which is a much more 
complicated concept. By this term he refers to the certain linguistic codes and unwritten rules 
that determine what can be stated or expressed in each society and what not.87 Thus, censorship 
does not always mean preventing or denying the facts that are to be published, but can also 
refer to a certain code under which things are done. This code reflects any society and its 
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values, for instance in news broadcasts, since news is not, semantically speaking, solely a value-
free reflections of facts, but is also based on social and economic values.88  
One could say that the concept of self-censorship is close to Bourdieu’s structural 
censorship. Usually self-censorship is understood as unwillingness to handle certain facts or 
topics in fear of the consequences, which can be political or personal. Self-censorship can also 
be seen as a broader process in which people remain silent about certain topics or handle them 
in an uncritical way, even when a more open discussion could be possible. The way this process 
works is usually controlled by unspoken rules and norms rather than direct laws, although 
political authorities may be rather directly behind it.89  
According to Lilius, self-censorship is a concept that can never be fully defined, as it is mostly 
an ethical problem concerning sincerity and trust. In his view, self-censorship means that certain 
controversial subjects are rarely discussed and very often ignored completely.90 When this takes 
place in journalism, it is often extremely difficult to distinguish self-censorship from ‘normal’ 
journalism due to the perfectly normal procedure of self-control that every respected reporter 
practices according to the ethics of journalism. As problematic as this distinction is, one can agree 
with the view that when state authorities pick up the ethics of journalism and begin commenting 
on them officially, we are moving into the area of self-censorship.91 
The terms ‘censorship’ and ‘self-censorship’ are often closely connected with the concept of 
‘propaganda’. Indeed, one can say that censorship is the essential counterpart to propaganda 
and the manipulation of opinion. As Taylor has put it, when censorship (institutional or self) 
occurs, one needs to recognise how close one is sailing to the winds of propaganda.92 Both 
propaganda and censorship include the idea of communicating (or preventing actors from 
communicating) ideas to persuade people and are, therefore, seen as useful instruments for 
those owning the media in particular. Even if the media might not always be able to persuade 
the public directly, their impact on what people know and consider important is strong. It is no 
wonder that also the media have been seen as a powerful agency of social control with the 
function of maintaining social order and the confirmed status quo.93 Although the role of the 
media can also be seen in an entirely different light, for those examining propaganda this is a 
rather common one. 
According to a commonly shared view, the neighbouring presence of the Soviet Union had 
such an influence in Finnish society that self-censorship was broadly practiced in the country 
throughout the Cold War. While this undoubtedly was the case, it is also necessary to point out 
that there was no direct censorship of media content during most of that time. Furthermore, 
the publishing policies adopted in the country were by no means systematic and varied greatly 
according to both the nature of each medium and the broader political climate. In the Finnish 
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case, self-censorship can above all be defined as the extent to which the Finnish media left out 
information or views about the Soviet Union in their news or published views that were limited 
or ‘soft’ towards the country in the fear that some information might not have been welcome in 
Moscow, or might have stood in contradiction with the official foreign policy of the Finnish 
Government.94 It has also generally been recognised that the political leadership, Presidents 
Juho Kusti Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen in particular, played a significant role in the self-
censoring process.  
Although the term self-censorship has often been used to explain the Finnish media's 
performance during the Cold War decades, the difficulty to precisely identify its practice leaves 
some room for contemplating whether simply the word 'caution' would be more accurate for 
describing the procedure of leaving news reports that might have irritated the eastern neighbour 
unpublished. While it is true that in regard to the Soviet Union Finnish reporters mostly 
followed common sense rather than some detailed line of policy dictated from above, the 
practice of leaving certain sensitive topics aside was so common and so profoundly linked to 
the Finnish society and its history that in this study the term self-censorship can be used to 
describe this activity without much hesitation. As both American and British officials often 
chose the very same term to define the Finnish media's reluctance to cover a number of issues 
regarded as potentially delicate throughout the study period, its use is not anachronistic, either.  
As for the Finnish case and propaganda, one could call the way the media usually handled 
things as being educational rather than direct propaganda, as difficult as distinguishing between 
the two might be. Even during times when self-censorship was highly evident, people were 
usually given the facts and let to make up their own minds over any given issue. The 
relationship with the Soviet Union was also much more closely characterised by the concept of 
self-censorship rather than propaganda, even though Salminen points out that at one stage 
there was a tendency of publishing propaganda on behalf of the Soviet Union and against the 
US.95 This was done not least because of fear, which in some cases can also be directly 
responsible for propaganda.96 
Since the terms censorship, self-censorship and propaganda can be perceived as close to 
each other, at times it is extremely difficult to distinguish one from the other. They all are 
connected to one wide concept characteristic of Finland, namely Finlandisation. This concept 
will be discussed in closer detail later in this study when evaluating what the Finnish 
environment was like for British and American informational and cultural operations in the 
early Cold War decades and what the Finnish reactions to these activities say about the country 
during this particular era. Only by understanding the rather complex concept of Finlandisation 
and the special characteristics of Finnish politics is one able to present a broader analysis of the 
operations aimed at influencing Finnish opinions through various media channels. 
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2. BRITISH AND AMERICAN PROPAGANDA AND CULTURAL 
DIPLOMACY IN EARLY COLD WAR DECADES 
 
Need to Take Initiative 
 
Before we can examine British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland 
after the Second World War, it is essential to briefly present the main organisations behind such 
actions and discuss their role. The most important changes in British and American policies on 
propaganda and cultural diplomacy during the early Cold War era are also presented in this 
chapter.  
During the Second World War, both the British and the American governments introduced 
a great number of new and extensive propaganda operations to influence audiences both home 
and abroad. Since these activities were in general regarded as a successful and efficient way to 
spread government-dictated information through the increasingly important mass media, both 
administrations emerged from the war convinced of the value of permanent peacetime 
propaganda machinery. The leaders of neither country, however, actually perceived peacetime 
propaganda as a defence against hostile powers, and in the first post-war years both Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee and President Harry S. Truman reverted to concepts of government 
propaganda which owed more to ideas of national projection and advertising developed in the 
inter-war years than the lessons of the Second World War.97 Only the reassessment of the 
Soviet Union’s intentions triggered the establishment of a more aggressive propaganda 
machinery that would reach an unprecedented size. 
In Britain, post-war activities in the fields of propaganda and cultural diplomacy were 
obviously to be determined by the country’s future position in world politics. In 1945 it was 
difficult for many at the Foreign Office to see how Britain could maintain its position as one of 
the ‘big three’ in international politics. The country was close to bankruptcy and without the 
financial help of the US the possibility for the British to play an active and influential role in the 
future of Europe, let alone the world, would have been much more limited than before. At least 
the very first post-war years suggested that this role was to some extent lost. During this time, 
the British Government adopted a somewhat passive line in foreign policy that was 
characterised by greater dependency on the United States and growing fears about the true 
intentions of the Soviet Union.98  
Even if Britain's true global relevance may have declined from what it was before the war, 
the British Government was by no means willing to surrender its influence on international 
developments without a fight. Many British politicians and officials still wished to hold on to 
their country's position as a world power and tried to find new working methods to do so. With 
all this in mind, it is perhaps not so surprising that Britain, not the US, was actually the first 
Western power to sharpen its machinery for propaganda and cultural activities to meet the new 
                                                 
97 Defty 2004, p. 27. 
98 For example, Adamthwaite, Anthony, 'Britain and the world 1945-9: The View from the Foreign Office', 
International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 1985), pp. 225-228. 
 
 
41 
 
requirements of a changing world. Britain’s declining economy and position as a world power 
actually meant that the new Labour Government would place considerable faith in the 
projection of British power through propaganda. For this objective, the Government received 
strong support from FO officials, although only after a period of hesitation. 
Even before the end of the war was nowhere near the horizon, a number of military leaders 
in particular had realised that the next conflict would eventually be fought against 
communism.99 During the first post-war years, certain military circles’ insistence for action 
against the Soviet Union was an issue constantly discussed at the FO, which in general wished 
to introduce a more cautious approach to relations with the Russians. The FO's position was 
well reflected in its very first post-war policies on British propaganda and cultural diplomacy 
abroad, which followed the concept of positive national projection. According to this view, 
British propaganda was to focus on explaining British policies and ideas rather than attack any 
possible enemies such as the Soviet Union. This objective was explained in one of the first 
directives sent to British overseas information officers by the FO’s new Information Policy 
Department, which was established to give more general guidance distinct from the regional 
information departments.100 The paper emphasised the value of projecting such British, or more 
precisely Labour Government, values as social democracy and the new welfare state along with 
the more traditional promotion of Britain’s role as a world power and leading player in 
international trade.101 The projection of British achievements in, for instance, the sciences, art 
and music was not neglected either. A list of common themes for overseas publicity prepared at 
the FO in January 1946 stressed the importance of "spotlighting all those things which show 
Britain as a strong and vital factor in the world and illustrating by practical examples the 
distinctive contribution which she can make".102 
During this time, the whole of Whitehall was in the middle of readjusting its information 
machinery into a new organisational structure, which it most definitely required. The most 
important decision was to abolish the Ministry of Information (MOI) and the Political Warfare 
Executive (PWE), both central bodies for war-time information and propaganda operations. 
The new Central Office of Information (COI) inherited from the MOI the responsibility for 
the production of finished publicity materials and the preparation and issue of the official 
London Press Service.103 The integration of overseas information operations under only a 
couple of Foreign Office departments was a particularly complicated task. In June 1946, after 
some considerable readjustment, the FO information machinery still included five regional 
branches in addition to the IPD and the Cultural Relations Department, which was planned to 
be axed in due course.104 
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While FO officials were busy reorganising the British informational machinery, Whitehall’s 
general approach to the nature of overseas propaganda operations started to change. Even 
though the FO still objected to any military measures taken against the Soviet Union, even 
diplomats and politicians who had earlier called for a more constructive approach towards the 
communist power began gradually to admit the growing tension in Anglo-Soviet relations and 
that a new line of policy should be introduced. Particularly, the developments taking place in 
1945─1947 in the Middle East, Greece and, above all, Germany confirmed the increasingly 
anti-Russian mood.105 Often seen as the onset of the Cold War, Winston Churchill’s famous 
‘Iron Curtain Speech’ given at Fulton in March 1946 summarised the sentiment emerging 
among leading politicians and civil servants: Europe had been divided into two blocs, the Soviet 
Union posed a serious threat to Western democracies, and this threat had to be confronted in 
every possible way.  
Frank Roberts, the Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, was one of the first at the FO to suggest 
that Anglo-Soviet relations should be treated in the same way as major military problems during 
the war, through the closest coordination of political strategy.106 This view led to the 
establishment of the Foreign Office Russia Committee in April 1946, which then oversaw the 
gradual revival of a department for British covert political warfare.107 In the same month, 
Christopher Warner, Head of the FO's Northern Department, proposed the more aggressive 
use of propaganda in confronting the Soviets.108 The paper drawn up by Mr Warner, which 
outlined ‘The Soviet Campaign Against This Country’, easily won most FO officials' support. 
As a consequence, new instructions about the more efficient use of material on Britain were 
quickly sent to missions abroad. These instructions gave a rather detailed account on the 
distribution of the London Press Service news bulletins and feature articles as well as newsreels 
and documentaries, all produced by the COI. They also emphasised the importance of personal 
contacts with foreign political and trade union leaders, lecturers and journalists and advised on 
the arrangement of visits to Britain for the members from these groups “who can be relied on 
to take the opportunity of doing us on their return”.109 
The opposition to Soviet imperialism emerged relatively quickly also on the agenda of 
Clement Attlee’s Labour Government, in spite of a considerable number of left-wing MPs 
known as the ‘Keep Left’ group still showing some sympathy to the Soviet Union. In fact, 
during the Labour Party’s first couple of years in power, it was seriously divided over foreign 
policy matters between the idealists calling for the introduction of 'socialist foreign policy', 
which would be committed to worldwide reconciliation, disarmament and a new international 
order, and the more pragmatic wing supporting the sentiment evolving in the US particularly 
after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine that communism must be fought all over the 
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world under the leadership of an Anglo-American alliance.110 A constant dilemma for Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin was how to support the American anti-Sovietism he himself had 
encouraged since autumn 1946 without outraging his own backbenchers and British public 
opinion, which in the first post-war years had reflected a deep antagonism to American-style 
capitalism.111 As time passed, Bevin, a key figure in the creation of Marshall Aid and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), started to more openly acknowledge that both overt and 
covert measures had to be taken to confront the Soviet Union and its ferocious propaganda 
against the West.112 
A secret anti-communist propaganda unit, known as the Information Research Department, 
was finally established at the Foreign Office in January 1948. At the time, there was a growing 
realisation among FO officials that Britain’s post-war economic and military weakness required 
a greater dependence on propaganda as a means of defending the country’s interests than 
before.113 The idea of establishing the department was sold to the left-wing members of the 
Labour party by linking it with the ‘Third Force’ concept, by which the idea of 'socialist foreign 
policy' had become known. Indeed, the IRD was initially given the role of supporting this 
policy by advertising social democracy and the British way of life in a positive light against 
communism, rather than attacking the Soviet Union as such. The ‘Third Force’ idea remained, 
however, more or less mere rhetoric, and the Labour Government’s support for it soon faded. 
As a result, the ‘positive’ approach was soon rejected and the IRD’s work focused increasingly 
on revealing the weaknesses and injustices of the communist system in the Soviet Union and its 
satellites. 
 
The IRD and its Primary Objectives 
 
As the establishment of the IRD has been covered in some detail in previous studies114, it is not 
the point of this thesis to describe the process. What can be said, though, is that the 
department's first year of operation reflected closely the change taking place in the British way 
of thinking in a more general sense. At first, for instance Bevin gave declamatory statements 
about how it was for the British Government, not the US, to give a spiritual, political and moral 
lead to all Western European anti-communist elements through overtly positive measures.115 As 
Soviet propaganda against Britain grew all over the world, such declarations gave way to the use 
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of more aggressive informational strategies116 that were to be implemented in cooperation with 
other Western countries when possible. 
The IRD’s main mission was to collect information about communist policies and 
propaganda as well as co-ordinate the discreet production and dissemination of fact-based anti-
communist material to opinion formers both home and abroad. After the rejection of the Third 
Force idea, the department's general objective was defined as follows: "to pass over to the 
offensive and not to leave the initiative to the enemy, but make them defend themselves".117 
The IRD particularly focused on areas outside the Eastern Bloc that were estimated to be under 
communist threat. Ernest Bevin mostly ruled out the use of anti-communist operations in the 
Soviet satellites by taking the view that the British Government should not incite people to 
subversive activities if they were not in a position to lend active assistance in overthrowing their 
regimes.118 The Soviet campaign was combated by selecting and slanting carefully produced 
information, such as studies on Soviet policies, without revealing the original source. This 
chosen work method, based on the tactics of ‘grey’ propaganda, could be described as 
distributing truth with a certain ‘spin’.119  
For the distribution of IRD propaganda material through British missions overseas, a special 
network of ‘influential people' was built in each country. This arrangement offered a valuable 
addition to the more usual channels made available to the IRD, namely the British Overseas 
Information Service, the press and the radio. Distribution of IRD content was very much the 
responsibility of the information officers of each mission, who for the most part were former 
officers of the war-time MOI.120 The material fell into two categories: one consisted of secret 
and confidential studies on Soviet policies that were distributed to high-level politicians and the 
other of more general and less classified material sent to journalists, academics and labour 
leaders for background use.121 Missions worldwide played an active part in the production of 
this content by responding to London's requests for information about communist activities in 
their parts of the world. The bulk of the produced material was sent to highly influential figures, 
but at first the IRD defined the broader masses as an equally important target group. Even 
though the activity of reaching working class audiences through foreign social democratic 
parties and trade unions turned out to be successful in many Western European countries, in 
the 1950s the IRD often stressed that its basic method was to influence opinion leaders rather 
than to make a mass appeal.122  
Close contacts with the new COI were also important for the coordination and distribution 
of IRD material, while liaison with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), more commonly known 
as MI6, and the Chiefs of Staff (COS) was regarded as essential for the collection and use of 
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intelligence information. The IRD’s relationship with MI6 was not always frictionless, as many 
intelligence officers believed that the department was too low-key and defensive for producing 
effective results. On the other hand, the IRD’s involvement in the dissemination of ‘black’ 
material, such as forgeries, lies and fabrications for use by its own outlets as well as MI6-funded 
radio stations and news agencies also raised some doubts about the department's credibility and 
merits, especially in Foreign Office circles.123 
Although the intention was to keep the IRD small, it soon became clear that greater 
resources would be required to perform tasks of collecting information about communist policy 
and providing material for anti-communist publicity through missions and information services 
abroad. The rapidly growing number of prominent writers recruited to the cause, including 
George Orwell and Malcolm Muggeridge, also required more funds. In late 1948, the 
department’s funding was transferred to the so-called Secret Vote, the Parliamentary allocation 
of money for the intelligence services, which made it possible to receive adequate funds for the 
sharply increasing operational costs more flexibly.124 In the 1950s, the number of staff had 
already grown to over three hundred.125 
The IRD was also successful in establishing contacts with non-governmental organisations 
and private businesses, especially leading newspapers both home and abroad. Due to the IRD's 
secret nature, all journalists were told as little as possible about the department, and material 
was sent to their homes under a plain cover.126 It was stressed that the documents should not be 
attributed to HM Government as they were not official policy. Arrangements were also made 
with several British newspapers on payment of a fee to allow them to select, reprint and 
distribute suitable articles for republication abroad. The Observer, The Times and The Sunday Times 
were all involved in this way.127  
The IRD’s influence in the printed word was far greater than it would have been by merely 
supplying overseas missions with background papers or journalists with news material. The 
department for instance secretly sponsored anti-communist books by supposedly reputable 
publishers. In the early 1950s, over a dozen of anti-communist handbooks were published 
through a small firm, Ampersand Ltd. Although these books did not sell very well, some of 
them, for instance R.N. Carew-Hunt’s Theory and Practice of Communism, were used as a standard 
text in schools and colleges for many years. This evidence, together with the IRD's secret 
funding of such institutions as Reuters, could even be seen as a serious subversion of the 
democratic process, because such arrangements prevented public opinion from forming a 
balanced view on certain issues.128  
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In its first years, the IRD’s focus was very much on Europe. France and Italy were identified 
as top priority targets due to the possibility of communist success in their parliamentary 
elections. In February 1948, the FO informed its Embassy in Rome that material on the realities 
of life under communist regimes would soon be available for handing over to influential 
figures.129 At the end of the same year, after the IRD had stepped up its production, the 
dissemination of propaganda within French-based media outlets became an intrinsic part of 
work for all British Missions in France.130 From the early 1950s on, the IRD’s role in Third 
World countries became more important.131 Since around the same time IRD propaganda was 
also introduced in other British dominions, both with and without collaboration with the 
respective Commonwealth Governments132, the department's global significance grew quickly. 
The Korean War turned out to be the first major test for the IRD, as it revealed that a new kind 
of psychological dimension was becoming increasingly important when dealing with such 
conflicts both home and overseas.133  
As for the content produced by the IRD, great importance was given to finding the right 
topics and the correct political language. After the initial goal of mainly distributing material 
emphasising the superiority of the British way of life against conditions in the communist 
countries was rejected, the content turned more aggressive and dealt with such issues as Soviet 
labour camps, human rights and the treatment of national minorities. An examination of some of 
the first circulated The Interpreters, the IRD publication specialising in extensive studies of 
communism that was sent to missions abroad for distribution as background material, and Digests, 
collections of shorter news items on developments behind the Iron Curtain, reveals clearly the 
department's key focus areas. Particularly the first Digest reports show that in addition to the 
exposure of forced labour camps throughout the Soviet Union, the IRD wished to deal with a 
great variety of matters in the Soviet Union and its satellites, ranging from the inadequate freedom 
of the press, the facade of elections, the position of religion and working conditions to the 
education system.134 The Interpreter often focused on similar matters and also provided in-depth 
analyses on the way Soviet propaganda against the Free World was organised.135 As the Cold War 
progressed, the publication also started to keep a close watch on other broader developments 
within the Soviet orbit, such as Sino-Soviet relations and church-state relations in Poland.136  
In the early 1950s, the IRD gave special attention to undermining the Soviet ‘Peace 
Campaign’ by labelling it as mere Soviet propaganda137. The department also reported about the 
various crises taking place in communist countries, such as the food shortage in East 
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Germany.138 All matters of importance for human activity were covered, even the Soviet 
Union’s entry to the field of international sport and the "state-led and propaganda-seeking 
nature" of the Soviet sports machinery were given extensive attention.139 The titles of the 
shorter news published in the Digests, such as ‘Estonian Farmers Jailed’, ‘Soviet Campaign 
Against Moslem Faith in Central Asia’ and ‘Anti-Communist Peasants Forced to Pay Higher 
Prices for Bread’140 give us some indication of what the IRD-produced material was usually like.  
Due to the developments taking place in the Soviet Union after Josif Stalin’s death and 
Britain’s slightly closer relations with the Russians in the latter part of the 1950s, IRD material 
began to give increasing priority to the economic race between the East and the West141 as well 
as the question regarding atomic energy.142 This did not mean that injustices within the Soviet 
bloc were forgotten. Major incidents behind the Iron Curtain, such as protests and international 
communist meetings, were conscientiously reported by the department with the growing flow 
of refugees from Eastern Europe to the West becoming an area of special focus.143 The use of 
language in these writings gives us interesting evidence on how profoundly the IRD planned its 
output. Many of the selected words and phrases quickly entered the vocabulary of the Cold 
War.144 One of these terms was ‘Kremlin’, which was regarded as “the most useful single word 
for general audiences in order to fix in people’s minds’ the character of Russian 
communism”.145 
The IRD’s role in covert anti-communist work became particularly strong after its remit had 
been expanded in the early 1950s. At the same time, the nature of British propaganda also 
changed as Winston Churchill's Government embraced a more offensive policy of intensified 
psychological operations against the communist bloc.146 For some years, the idea of using 
propaganda to make direct appeals to the people behind the Iron Curtain was supported not 
only by leading Conservatives, but also by senior officials in the Foreign Office.147 By the end of 
the 1950s, after considerable expansion, the IRD had evolved into much more than an anti-
communist department; it was essentially a peacetime psychological warfare organisation of 
almost unlimited scope.148  
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In the 1960s and in the 1970s the IRD’s impact started to fall gradually under the political 
climate of détente. Partly due to this reason its operations were finally put to a halt in 1977. The 
IRD’s effect on public opinion in Britain, let alone abroad, is obviously hard to asses. According 
to Hugh Wilford, it is clear that the anti-communist Cold War consensus that prevailed in Britain 
after the 1950s did not simply form in response to international events, but was in part 
deliberately constructed by the British Government.149 Christopher Mayhew, Labour politician 
and one of the key figures behind the IRD, has also claimed that the operations were a huge 
success; they destroyed Stalinist illusions, gave encouragement to people who wished to tell the 
truth about the Soviet Union, and helped to blunt the impact of Stalinist political warfare.150 
In addition to the IRD, the Foreign Office coordinated its information activities through its 
overt Whitehall branches, mainly the FO News Department and the IPD, as well as the COI. 
The Overseas Information Service distributed more ‘normal’ or ‘objective’ material, as 
determined by the IPD, on British policy and other aspects of British life to the outside world. 
All in all, it is evident that a network of linkages between the FO, the official information 
agencies and the media gave, and still continues to give, the FO considerable control of the 
process of building up Britain’s image abroad.151  
It should also be noted that the IRD was by no means the only FO unit dealing with anti-
communist activities. If the Russia Committee was responsible for the overall coordination of 
anti-communist operations, the Cultural Relations Department focused on preventing Soviet 
domination in the fields of international movements, federations and festivals. It soon became 
evident for the unit that its principal battleground was to be the struggle over the minds of 
European youth.152 In order to respond to the communist-dominated World Federation of 
Democratic Youth (WFDY) the CRD first teamed up with members of non-communist British 
youth groups.153 In August 1948, the World Assembly of Youth (WAY), Britain’s first covertly 
orchestrated international organisation, was founded with the goal of objecting the spread of 
communism in Western European youth movements by furthering the exchange of ideas, 
information and visits between young people from different countries.154 British influence on the 
student front was, however, soon drastically reduced as financial problems began to make their 
mark also in this area of activity.155 By 1955, the International Secretariat of WAY had become a 
largely American-funded body, receiving subsidies from a range of US-based groups.156  
Another FO scheme was the Wilton Park forum, which was initially meant to re-educate 
German prisoners of war into democratic values. In 1947, Wilton Park's functions were 
expanded to hold courses on British institutions to other non-communist foreigners also.157 
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After this was done, organisers of the forum stressed that rather than lecturing to the 
participants, Wilton Park should encourage them to discussion through the introductions given 
often by prominent political and academic figures.158 A typical Wilton Park course lasted for 
around four weeks, and in addition to discussing the structure of British society and the concept 
of European democracy, students were taken on several visits to, for example, government and 
party offices, industrial institutions, the BBC and the leading daily newspapers.159 The 
participants for these courses were carefully selected according to their position in their 
respective societies with younger rising professionals in politics, the trade union movement or 
the media given the strongest nod.160 
As dominating as the Foreign Office’s role in the coordination of British Cold War overseas 
propaganda may have been, the operations naturally required the activities of other agencies 
besides the FO missions abroad. Attlee’s Labour Government stressed the importance of 
expanding the party’s international section and finding ways to cooperate with the Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) in their dissemination of anti-communist propaganda both home and abroad. 
Among the contributors to the activities seen as particularly valuable also were the Christian 
churches, which, according to the Government, "had a stimulating effect in Western 
Europe".161 Although in the 1940s several key values of the Labour Government were visibly 
present in British propaganda content, the Conservative Party was also kept informed about the 
new policies, and even before the Churchill Government took office in 1951, the party worked 
in close contact with Labour and the IRD in matters related to anti-communist propaganda.162 
 
The BBC: Struggle between Independence and Government Pressure 
 
The significance of the BBC’s global role in the Cold War years, as well as during the Second 
World War, cannot be exaggerated. Since it was listened to by people throughout the world, 
including those living behind the Iron Curtain, the BBC Overseas Service became a vital 
channel for the British Government to push its viewpoint through. During the war, the 
broadcasting corporation had been successful in building a reputation for providing the most 
objective and balanced news service both home and abroad.163 Although the BBC, a publicly 
owned and state-financed corporation, has until this day emphasised its journalistic 
independence and the objectivity of its news, it is evident that running Britain's interests as well 
as promoting its policies and culture have always been one of its main tasks.  
The rather vague definition of the broadcasting corporation’s role, especially when it comes 
to its Overseas Service, as given in the BBC’s charter in 1946, left the British Government, and 
the FO in particular, with plenty of loopholes should they have wished to have direct impact on 
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broadcasting material. The charter acknowledged the corporation's independence in the 
preparation of programmes for overseas audiences, but noted that it should take into 
consideration the Government's policies towards foreign countries and plan its broadcasts 
according to the "national interest".164 In hindsight, it can be said that what constituted the 
national interest varied according to the situation in question and was inevitably shaped by an 
acceptance of the prevailing Cold War culture.165 This was reflected in the propaganda strategy 
adopted by the British Government and articulated in BBC broadcasts. 
The significance of the BBC Overseas Services’ role in British Cold War propaganda was 
strongly emphasised by the Labour Government when the new policy was announced in 1948. 
The corporation was ranked as the most important British propaganda weapon in Eastern 
Europe, mainly because listeners there were under the impression that it acted independently of 
the Government.166 While it can be noted that the new propaganda policy constituted a turning 
point for BBC’s participation in the broader propaganda war, Alban Webb has pointed out that 
there actually was no single switch from peacetime broadcasting to the requirements of 
broadcasting in the early Cold War.167 The corporation was quite willing to integrate new 
foreign policy objectives into the direction and output of the Overseas Services in alignment 
with hardening Cold War attitudes. At least Sir Ian Jacob, Director of the BBC’s Overseas 
Services, and later Director-General, had no doubt that he was engaged in propaganda and 
already in 1946 noted that “any country deciding to embark on a service of broadcasts to 
foreign audiences does so because it wants to influence those audiences in favour. All such 
broadcasting is therefore propaganda”.168 
In spite of the support the BBC was ready to give to the Government’s objectives, the 
corporation was by no means willing to give up its journalistic independence. The BBC, as well 
as leading British politicians in general, understood that a commitment to presenting facts and 
broadcasting the truth was a national asset and the most effective form of propaganda. Indeed, 
the BBC rarely even admitted to be in the business of propaganda. After the Second World War 
was over, its main job was the projection of Britain and the presentation of the British 
viewpoint, as it often declared.169 Even when the Cold War reached its peak in around 1949, the 
BBC, while recognising the need to “keep the Russians and the people living in satellite 
countries in touch with the West and combat defeatism in Western Europe”, had less 
enthusiasm for the new ‘war of words’ than its American counterparts.170 
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The BBC’s close ties with the IRD not only challenged its independence, but meant that 
maintaining a credible balance between being an objective news service and a spokesperson for 
the British Government became an almost daily challenge. The IRD saw international 
broadcasting as a propaganda tool of paramount importance in reaching the broader masses 
throughout the world. Soon after the creation of the IRD, Ralph Murray, the first head of the 
new department, noted that the BBC should be persuaded to help the unit "in the task imposed 
by the new policy".171Although Foreign Secretary Bevin rejected calls for the Government to 
force the corporation “to accept definite official direction” in its foreign programming as 
potentially damaging to the reputations of both actors, he did arrange for the day-to-day 
monitoring of the Overseas Service broadcasts to be stepped up in order to find out whether or 
not the corporation was following the new policy.172 Sir Ian Jacob, who had direct contacts to 
the Foreign Office, agreed with the view that the BBC could broadcast IRD material, but was 
always willing to stress the absolute accuracy of broadcast facts.173 Jacob's approval soon led to 
regular discussions between the BBC and the FO over programme content and eventually the 
increasing use of IRD material in external broadcasts.174 As time passed, BBC reporters started 
to give great value to the IRD’s factual content and most typically used it as background 
information for their commentaries.  
The BBC's insistence on having complete editorial authority even after the new policy was 
implemented175 became less and less convincing as the Cold War intensified and the FO's 
interference with its broadcasts became more the norm rather than the exception. Documents 
reveal that in 1950 the BBC was very much taking part in the Cold War mind battle. This was 
the year when the corporation decided to transmit anti-communist propaganda on all overseas 
services rather than just the Eastern European Service.176 The BBC output dealing with the 
Cold War was by now divided into long-term political series and short-term ad hoc talks. While 
the former were mostly occupied with the positive aspects of the British way of life, the day-to-
day talks commenting on the news as they developed started to display a more critical edge.177 
The BBC's concession to use IRD output at least as background material did not prevent the 
relationship between Whitehall and Bush House from becoming rather tense in the 1950s. 
While the corporation continued to underline its editorial independence, the FO criticised its 
programming constantly. In 1953, for instance, it claimed that the BBC Russian Service was too 
critical of the US Government and not sufficiently critical of the Soviet Government.178 The 
corporation’s output during the Hungarian Uprising and the Suez Crisis also raised many 
eyebrows in Whitehall. The cautious approach adopted in broadcasts not only to Hungary but 
the whole of Europe during the uprising was to some extent accepted by the FO179, but the 
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Suez Crisis was far more serious an affair. The BBC saw that its duty was to report about the 
strong opposition developing against the British and French policy to take military action 
against Egypt. The resulting fallout between the corporation and the Government was so 
considerable that at one stage Prime Minister Anthony Eden even wanted the Government to 
take over the BBC.180  
Particularly the latter incident shows that the BBC's goal of finding a balance between 
objective reporting and the presentation of broader British objectives was under Whitehall's 
constant scrutiny. The broadcasting content was not only monitored by officials in London; 
several surveys concerning BBC’s external broadcasts were also sent to British ambassadors in 
Eastern European satellite countries in particular. The results of these enquiries tell about 
general dissatisfaction with the output. In 1948, a survey showed that the BBC was not anti-
communist enough, while in 1961 the embassies felt that the corporation was too anti-
communist and outdated and because of this made the making of friends and contacts behind 
the Iron Curtain more difficult.181  
The BBC’s task of providing reliable world-wide services was made even harder by the 
constant threats made over expense cuts. In the late 1940s, both the BBC and the FO were still 
able to reject the numerous calls for the reduction of foreign language broadcasts by arguing 
that such moves would compromise Britain's standing in the world.182 This did not quite 
convince the Treasury, which regarded the amount of money spent on overseas broadcasting as 
too excessive for post-war conditions. As the pressure grew in the early 1950s, the BBC was 
forced to make its first concessions by eliminating the majority of breakfast and lunchtime 
broadcasts to Western Europe and discontinuing its services to Belgium and Luxemburg.  
The final report of a small expert advisory body known as the Drogheda Committee 
published in 1953 acted as a catalyst for further changes. The report understood the popularity 
of the BBC’s External Services, but doubted the post-war value of several European services. 
The BBC and the FO's strong opposition to this view183 was not enough to prevent the 
Treasury from making further reductions to the BBC budget which would lead to the 
termination of more services. As broadcasts to Russia and its satellites, the Middle East, the Far 
East and South East Asia, as well as the General Overseas Service, were regarded as absolutely 
vital, more European services, such as the Dutch, Danish and Swedish services, were eventually 
closed down. In this way, the BBC followed the Drogheda Report’s argument that there were 
‘special reasons’ why some other language services, such as services to Germany, Yugoslavia 
and Finland should be retained. The reductions had such an effect to the BBC's authority that 
by 1955 the Soviet Union had wiped out its position as the world’s leading international 
broadcaster in terms of broadcasting hours.184 
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Role of the British Council 
 
During the Cold War years, as well as today, a positive image of Britain was also promulgated 
through the British Council, which had the general task of “promoting abroad a wider 
appreciation of British culture and civilisation, by encouraging the study of the English language 
and the British contribution to music and the fine arts, literature and music”.185 Furthermore, 
the Council aimed at encouraging both cultural and political interchanges between Britain and 
other countries and assisting the free flow of students from overseas. Supporting British 
institutes and societies in overseas countries, recruiting university lecturers, providing support to 
students and English teachers, distributing books and periodicals for libraries, as well as 
organising lecture tours, music performances and art exhibitions were among its core tasks. 
Established in 1934, the British Council, first known as the British Committee for Relations 
with Other Countries, had a semi-autonomous position, since even though it was partly funded 
by the Foreign Office, it had its own committee and was responsible for its own policies. 
Before the first overseas representative was sent to Egypt in 1938, the Council worked through 
British embassies and high commissions. Although the BC did manage to expand its network of 
representatives around the world to a reasonable degree, Britain was slow to enter the field of 
cultural diplomacy in comparison to countries such as Italy and, in particular, France, which had 
already in the 19th century established a clear lead in related activities.186 This was perhaps due to 
a lack of imagination. A reluctance to embrace the concept of cultural diplomacy would be 
characteristic for the British also in years to come.  
As the Second World War progressed, British Council activity had to be withdrawn from 
most European countries. In 1945, the work was restarted and expanded throughout Europe 
and other parts of the world. Back then, the FO recognised that the general aim of Britain's 
information policy was to ensure the overseas presentation of a true and adequate picture of 
British policy, British institutions and the British way of life.187 This was, of course, very much 
the area of the BC, and its grant was restored to the wartime level. At the same time, however, 
the Council’s operations were more closely monitored. The relationship between the FO and 
the BC was seen as ill-defined and unsatisfactory, and the latter was to a growing extent 
criticised for inefficiency.188 
The British Council's image of being inefficient and elitist was one reason why the British 
Government’s investment in cultural diplomacy in the first post-war years left room for 
improvement. Although the FO was happy to declare that the projection of the British way of 
life was important, it wished to invest more in psychological and political warfare through the 
IRD in particular. According to J.M. Lee, the system of government and the people who ran it 
produced few incentives to embrace the concept of cultural diplomacy simply because the 
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propaganda management experience of the Second World War influenced ministers and 
officials well into the mid-1950s.189  
The FO's Cultural Relations Department was particularly critical of Britain’s efforts in 
cultural diplomacy. The CRD condemned the Council’s overt information services, or its 
’white’ propaganda, for promoting British culture in a superficial way without proclaiming core 
British political and social values.190 In the early post-war years, a major part of CRD work was, 
in fact, associated with giving ‘political guidance’ to the BC in a number of areas ranging from 
UNESCO to overseas links with British learned societies.191 Only after the CRD’s main focus 
shifted towards the area of international organisations, the Council was given some more 
freedom to focus on what it was developed for – overt peacetime cultural propaganda.  
The British Government’s unwillingness to invest more heavily in cultural diplomacy, 
together with the taxpayers’ reluctance to pay growing sums for campaigns abroad, led to the 
first considerable cuts in the British Council’s operations in the late 1940s. Activities in 
countries like Iceland and Switzerland were put to a halt altogether, while individual institutes 
were closed for instance in Belgium. The Council also had to leave Eastern European countries 
due to political reasons.192 Work in British colonies and dominions was, however, kicked off as 
it was estimated that “the British Council can do valuable positive work in countering 
communist propaganda by showing that Britain and the Western tradition for which Britain 
stands has something better to offer than the communist way of life”.193  
The Drogheda Report turned out to be even more of a watershed in the British Council’s 
history than it was for the BBC Overseas Services. The report hit the Council’s activities in 
Europe particularly hard by noting that “we do not believe that a knowledge of the English 
language, a taste of British books, admiration for British medical science or modern sculpture are 
likely to make the slightest difference to the outlook of the average educated European on the 
subject of communism”.194 Although the most drastic proposals calling for the closure of all 
European offices never materialised, the FO grant to the BC's foreign posts was reduced 
considerably in the 1950s. Europeans were quite stunned by all this as they had difficulties 
understanding the British public’s negative attitude to the projection of their own natural culture. 
The extent of the commercial loss Britain suffered from its own cuts is impossible to estimate.195 
Although often criticised by taxpayers and even by leading politicians, the BC’s importance 
in the projection of British values and the implementation of long-term cultural cooperation 
especially during the first Cold War decades is indisputable. An undervaluation of the Council's 
true value and the often tight financial constraints continued, however, to be reflected in the 
way Britain laid greater emphasis on the short-term, immediate propagandistic role of the 
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information services at the expense of the long-term cultural activity.196 The BC’s role as a 
propaganda tool is underestimated or unrecognised even today. As Philip Taylor has put it: 
“Anyone who pretends that the British Council is anything other than a different facet of the 
struggle for hearts and minds fails to recognise the significance of operating at different 
psychological levels within the fourth dimension of international affairs”.197 
The British Council's history to some extent reflects Britain's performance in propaganda 
and cultural diplomacy in a broader sense. As during the very first post-war years British leaders 
became to understand the essential role propaganda would play in the quest of maintaining 
London’s world status, from the 1950s onwards the lack of finances hampered continuity. 
While funding for the overt information services responsible for the ‘positive’ projection of 
Britain was cut as a result of, for example, the Drogheda Report, the covert operations of the 
IRD expanded still in the early 1960s. During that decade information work underwent some 
further changes as a growing body of overseas information operations started focusing more on 
advocating British commerce rather than the British way of life.198 An even more important 
development was the gradual decline of Britain's global influence, which, particularly in the 
aftermath of the Suez Crisis, meant that in relation to anti-communist operations, including 
information activity, the British Government started to look for more assistance from the 
United States, its closest ally.  
 
The US: Containment and the Offensive against Communism 
 
Even if it took some while for the US Government to come up with coordinated anti-
communist propaganda machinery of its own, the impressively rapid growth of both overt and 
covert propaganda operations around the world made the British efforts eventually pale into 
insignificance. In the first year or so after the end of the Second World War, the administration 
was, however, left without a clear direction in its general overseas policy; this included 
informational activity. Cultural matters were not all popular in a country suffering from war 
fatigue and moving towards nationalism in its electoral politics. What is more, people like Dean 
Acheson, in 1945 Undersecretary at the State Department, had always been sceptical about the 
importance of cultural relations. All this meant that while the US was debating whether to 
continue its investment in cultural affairs, European countries, in which culture maintained its 
traditional value after the war and the role of cultural diplomacy was unquestioned, were already 
getting back into business.199 
There was, of course, nothing new about this. For decades there had been deep mistrust in 
the governmental promotion of American culture both among key decision-makers and the 
broader public. In fact, the Government in Washington had no control over any US cultural 
exports until 1938, when the first decision to deal with cultural and educational matters was 
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made. Even after this, bureaucratically directed cultural diplomacy was strongly rejected by US 
public opinion, in particular by representatives of universal internationalism. According to 
Wagnleitner, state interventionism in cultural matters strongly contradicted liberal theories of 
modernising and thereby saving the world through private initiative.200  
President Harry S. Truman, nowhere near as strong a supporter of cultural and 
informational activities as his predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt, believed that Washington still 
needed an overseas information programme after the war, but that the wartime agencies would 
have to be replaced with new services.201 In August 1945, he abolished the Office of War 
Information (OWI), with the intention of creating a peacetime overseas programme that would 
“present a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States 
Government”.202 After the general overseas policy was redefined through George Kennan’s 
Long Telegram, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid, it gradually became clear that a post-
war propaganda effort was needed to confront communism around the world, starting from 
such West European countries as Italy and France that were seen to be under serious 
communist threat.  
In particular, Kennan’s observations on the Soviet Union’s hostile strategy, and how it 
should be addressed through long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies203, became the basis for the American strategy towards the Soviet Union 
throughout the rest of the Cold War.204 The declaration of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 
and the announcement made later in the same year by George Marshall over the European 
Recovery Programme supported this view and made it more concrete. Marshall Aid in itself not 
only provided Western European countries with vital economic and cultural support, but at the 
same time bolstered the anti-communist containment policy in the whole region. The 
Americans understood that the greatest threat to Western interests in Europe was not the 
prospect of Soviet military invention, but rather the risk that hunger, poverty and despair might 
cause Europeans to vote their own communists into office.205 The selling of American goods 
and ideas in post-war Europe now started to proceed very much hand in hand.206  
Naturally, the growing overseas cultural and propaganda activities of the Soviet Union did 
not go unnoticed in Washington. The passage of the Fulbright Act in 1946 recorded the United 
States’ first effort to take the offensive in cultural matters. Although the exchange of students, 
academics and experts had a relatively modest start, the activity quickly grew into a significant 
tool in spreading US influence to foreign countries and supporting the revival of the European 
intellectual community. By 1947, more robust governmental involvement in propaganda and 
cultural diplomacy started to win the backing of leaders in Washington. The dominating reason 
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for this was the creation of Cominform (the Information Bureau of Communist Parties), whose 
totalitarian propaganda, according to Walter Bedell-Smith, US Ambassador to Moscow, could 
destroy plans for the economic rehabilitation of Europe. In response to the growing communist 
campaign, he recommended that the US Government should start to stress the inconsistencies 
between Soviet words and deeds. His suggestion, not unlike the propaganda policies discussed 
in Britain, was that US propaganda strategists should expose the real conditions of life in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe while demonstrating the advantages American capitalism 
accorded the average worker.207  
The Smith-Mundt Act, passed by Congress in January 1948, finally established a foundation 
for efforts to promote propaganda and culture on a global scale. The legislation had the objective 
of ensuring the dissemination of information about the United States with the help of modern 
communication tools, including print, radio, film, exchange programmes and exhibitions. The 
Smith-Mundt Act guaranteed a solid framework for more aggressive US propaganda activities 
both in the ‘Free World’ and behind the Iron Curtain. The legislation reflected the new direction 
in foreign policy: one could argue that from 1948 onwards, Washington’s goal was for some years 
not just mere containment, but also the promotion of freedom, which required an effort to roll 
back communism and eventually break up the Soviet bloc.208 
One of the most decisive events for US propaganda policies, and for the onset of the Cold 
War, was the Soviet Union’s first atomic test conducted in August 1949. The loss of the atomic 
bomb monopoly not only led to an even tenser world situation by triggering a massive 
rearmament race between the two superpowers, but it also brought the Cold War into the 
homes of every American. By 1950, the US had already become an altogether different kind of 
a country, with the fear of communism dominating the national agenda. Communism was no 
longer seen as a vicious plot hatched by a few men in the cellar, but a conspiracy of and for 
change, based on powerful visions and convictions and the willingness to educate men and 
women to act on those views and convictions.209  
The US Government now started hammering home the message about the evils of 
communism, while at the same time giving advice about how to act during a nuclear attack, by 
using literature, music, art and the media, in particular television. Now every American was 
expected to enlist in the Cold War, and neutrality was seen as suspect.210 Following this 
conviction, several famous artists working for the Hollywood film industry, including John 
Wayne, James Stewart, John Ford and Walt Disney, set an example of Cold War participation to 
all Americans by contributing to the anti-communist onslaught on screen.211 They were not 
exactly alone; all larger film companies started to launch propaganda movies, which bound the 
entire industry to the state and thus to the Cold War.212 
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Hollywood's declaration of full-scale war against international communism was not entirely a 
spontaneous act, but a result of the tremendous pressure film producers came under in the late 
1940s by organisations like the House of Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). By excluding all elements that might be regarded as 
suspiciously leftist, the two organisations, together with the CIA, successfully drafted the film 
industry to the Cold War cause. Hollywood’s output of explicitly anti-communist productions 
was at its highest before and after the Korean War when dozens of films were launched not 
only about the war itself but about the fear of the spreading of the evils of communism in a 
more global context. 213 While the hard-hitting propaganda films played their part in combating 
communism, the inspiration the blockbuster films selling the American dream gave people 
around the world was decisive in the Cold War cause. These films, produced by the hundreds in 
the 1950s, did not screen the country as a new, exiting, classless consumer society by 
coincidence, but because their producers wanted to present the broader 'soft power' themes 
accepted by the State Department and the CIA.214  
In addition to the conscription of numerous Hollywood actors and directors to the Cold 
War cause, and the exposure of the suspicious ones, the growing hysteria around communism 
led to the large-scale McCarthyist witch hunts also in Washington, which seem rather bizarre to 
today’s reader. A more important development was that apocalyptic anti-communism, popular 
in a country built on individualism and private enterprise, made it easier for American 
presidents to raise the vast sums required for US policy “from a citizenry notorious for its 
disinclination of to pay taxes”, as Eric Hobsbawm has noted.215 Naturally, all this gave extra 
momentum to the government machinery for propaganda and cultural activities both home and 
abroad. Amidst all of its military rhetoric, the National Security Council Report 68, the global 
blueprint for US strategy, also concluded in April 1950 that “we have no choice but to 
demonstrate our freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world 
situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the 
decay of the Soviet system."216 The rejection of the renewal of American isolationism not only 
led to a massive build-up of the US military and its weaponry, but also meant that the 
psychological offensive would receive more emphasis in government policy. As a result, the 
Truman Administration was granted with extra funds totalling nearly $80 million for an 
expanded propaganda effort by Congress approval. 
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Truman’s propaganda offensive ‘The Campaign of Truth’, also launched in April 1950, 
signalled a renewed determination to undermine communism across the globe.217 As a 
consequence, propaganda finally became a more acceptable activity among State Department 
officials who had still been suspicious of its potential intrusion upon the sensitive worlds of 
foreign policy and diplomacy which they inhabited.218 In order to secure additional funding for 
this global propaganda campaign, the State Department deliberately emphasised its offensive 
nature. Now officials in Washington stopped referring to US overseas propaganda as 
‘information activities’ and instead began to use the term ‘psychological warfare’. 219 With the 
help of this new strategy, the Campaign of Truth managed to capture public attention, and, 
most importantly, expanded the cooperation between the architects of US propaganda and 
private industry even further.220 In the following decades, this collaboration, the so-called 
private-public network, held a key position in the actual execution of American propaganda 
activities both home and abroad.  
In 1951, information, propaganda and political warfare operations were at last brought under 
a single government umbrella after the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was created. It was 
the first government agency with the task of coordinating the policies of the State Department, 
the CIA, the military service and other government agencies in a grand effort to vanquish the 
Soviet Union.221 The Cold War had turned into a total struggle demanding contributions from 
all Americans, a tendency that was only enhanced by the creation of the Operations 
Coordinating Board (OCB), PSB’s successor, in September 1953. The Eisenhower 
Administration’s appreciation of the importance of propaganda was noticeable in the new 
organisation’s goals and activities. The OCB, like its name suggests, had the objective of 
bringing greater coordination to the numerous psychological operations taking place around the 
world and of drafting detailed plans of action to implement the grand strategy formulated by 
the NSC. The propaganda effort was now taken into account in all political, military and 
economic developments as well as private activities. By the mid-1950s, the governmental 
psychological warfare machinery had developed into an enormous and complicated apparatus 
that had a profound impact on, for instance, academic research.222  
 
USIE/USIA/USIS activities 
 
If the launch of government-led propaganda and cultural diplomacy had been somewhat slow 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the structure of the State Department’s information units 
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during these years was confusing to say the least. Overseas activities were at first managed by 
the Interim International Information Service (IIS) and then the Office of International 
Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC). Between 1947 and 1949, when the administration 
applied itself to rapid preparation for the Cold War, the work was coordinated by the Office of 
International Information and Educational Exchange (OIE). After the Campaign of Truth, the 
unit had evolved into the United States International Information and Educational Exchange 
Program (USIE). The final year of the Truman Administration saw an effort to remove US 
information operations from the Department of State into its own agency, the semi-
autonomous US International Information Administration (IIA or USIIA).223  
In June 1953, the expanded resources invested in overseas information and cultural activities 
finally guaranteed the creation of an independent public diplomacy agency, the United States 
Information Agency (USIA), which quickly grew into a powerful worldwide information 
machine. The agency, and its overseas offices known as the United States Information Service 
(USIS), produced overt press, radio, film and television materials around global themes defined 
to defend the American cause. In President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s statement, the USIA, 
responsible under the National Security Council to the President, was given the general purpose 
“to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that 
the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their 
legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace”. This task was meant to be carried out 
by explaining the policies of the US Government and the aspects of the life and culture of the 
American people that influenced these policies, as well as by unmasking and countering hostile 
attempts to distort US objectives.224 These principles, followed closely in decades to come, 
determined the USIA’s role as one of the key players in the formation and execution of US 
foreign policy. 
As the Americans did not have an equivalent to the British Council, the agency’s 
responsibilities covered both informational and cultural activities, such as the organisation of 
exhibitions and the administration of certain exchange programmes. In the area of education-
related exchange, however, the main responsibility lay still in the hands of the State Department 
due to Senator J. William Fulbright’s insistence that the same people who orchestrated 
propaganda operations should not be involved in education. This rather confusing compromise 
was made even more complicated by the overseas field officers' habit of reporting about their 
activities to both the USIA and the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs.225 Even though in theory the responsibilities between the USIA and the State 
Department were divided in such a way, in real terms the two coordinated all related operations 
together. In embassies around the world, the boundaries between agency and State Department 
responsibilities became more or less distinct, and the informational and cultural operations were 
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mainly run by USIA officials. In the 1950s, as many as 208 US Information Service posts in 91 
countries, none of them behind the Iron Curtain, sought to fulfil both the USIA tasks and the 
State Department’s broader objective of increasing mutual understanding between the 
Americans and the people of other countries.226 
Reading rooms and libraries were the most obvious signs of the USIA’s presence, but the 
unit also operated in a discreet manner, quietly manipulating local circumstances to serve 
American purposes. Among the more boisterous channels used by the State Department and 
the USIA for pushing the message of democracy through to audiences behind the Iron Curtain 
in particular was the radio station Voice of America. Founded in 1942, the service fought for its 
very existence after the war, but the beginning of the Cold War saw it grow into one of the 
United States’ most significant peacetime overseas programmes. The station did not, however, 
enjoy much popularity in the US, mostly due to the nation’s old suspicion of anything related to 
government-led information operations.227 VOA’s most severe crisis took place in the early 
1953 when Senator Joseph McCarthy launched a fierce attack on the station, claiming that it 
was partly run by a communist conspiracy. This accusation led to an official investigation and a 
series of open hearings over the radio station’s activities. Although VOA once again managed 
to avoid total abolishment, these hearings did not do any good to its reputation, which had 
already collapsed into an all time low.228 This, in part, led to major reforms within the VOA that 
culminated in the abolishment of many overseas operations. 
McCarthy’s attacks against VOA seem even more curious than most of his other crusades, 
considering that VOA was generally regarded, both home and abroad, as an advocate of hard-
hitting anti-communist propaganda throughout the world that only gradually evolved into a 
more objective information agency.229 Although making a special effort for becoming as reliable 
and authoritative a source as the BBC, the service never quite reached similar universal acclaim 
for objectivity as the world-famous British service. The reason for this, in addition to its rather 
hard-hitting anti-communist programme content, was that compared to the BBC, VOA was 
more directly the official voice of government: it was a state-funded service and ultimately, as 
the entire USIE/USIA, directly accountable to the President and the State Department.230  
In the early 1950s, the propaganda techniques used by the USIA in VOA broadcasts and the 
printed material sent to overseas posts, i.e. its two main channels of communication, were still 
somewhat unsophisticated. The idea that propaganda could be adopted to 'sell' America with 
the same effectiveness as the advertising of retail goods was reflected in the rather crude form 
of output, which included the continuous gloating over US workers’ higher standards of living 
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as compared to those of Soviet workers.231 Soon it became evident that audiences were 
unimpressed and even offended by such techniques, and as a consequence operational methods 
gradually adopted a more sophisticated form. In Europe in particular, the USIA also 
emphasised covert means of influencing the region’s media. Cross-reporting, i.e. taking a news 
item from one country and publishing it in another, became a normal tactic in the region. Most 
typically, information officers would ‘inspire’ or plant a news story in the country’s media and 
then widely distribute the publication in question in neighbouring countries in order to suggest 
that the ideas originated from European rather than American sources.232  
To help their officials in both overt and covert means, the USIA’s International Press 
Service (IPS) produced news and background material up to 7,000 words a day and forwarded it 
in the wireless file to sixty-six countries.233 Although the majority of the material consisted of 
news events in the US, IPS, just like the IRD in Britain, also aimed to expose the flaws of 
communism in its books, news reports and cartoon strips. IPS’s journal Problems of Communism 
was entirely devoted to this cause and included articles on, for example, Soviet propaganda 
techniques. The difference to IRD’s The Interpreter was that the journal was openly credited to 
the IIA, and later the USIA, and freely available at American diplomatic posts. If possible, the 
publication was an even heavier read than the IRD journal. Using the writings of distinguished 
academics and journalists, it was not uncommon for Problems of Communism to include in-depth 
analyses of such topics as ‘Dialectical Materialism vs. Stalin’ or ‘China and the Soviet Theory of 
People’s Democracy’.234 Some of the distributed IPS-produced pamphlets and books, such as 
Forced Labour in the Soviet Union even exceeded these articles in detail by exposing the repressive 
nature of the Soviet system through presenting a group of historic secret documents.235 
IPS collaborated also with the International Motion Picture Division (IMP), which selected, 
acquired, produced and distributed films shown in 85 nations already under the USIE. In order 
to reach as large an audience as possible, the division tailored films for specific countries and 
translated them into local languages. As with the printed word, the largest share of these films 
presented day-to-day life in the US, often by demonstrating American achievements in science, 
technology and industry.236 Another common theme for USIE/USIA -associated films shown 
abroad was the demonstration of the economic advantages of US involvement abroad, through 
for example the Marshall Plan. A typical example of this was the short film Me and Mr Marshall, 
which explains the favourable effects the Marshall Plan had on the European economy not only 
on the macro level but also from the perspective of the individual, in this case an industrial 
worker Hans Fischer from the Ruhr area.237 The movie represents IMP propaganda well also 
because it warns audiences about what would happen without American aid (the new rise of 
fascism and communism in Europe). Although attaining considerable audiences around the 
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world already in the late 1940s, the potential of films portraying US achievements reached an 
altogether new level around ten years later when the television had become increasingly 
common throughout the world. 
A considerable share of the material produced both by IPS and IMP was based on global 
propaganda themes that were developed by the USIA, the State Department, the OCB and the 
NSC. These themes were to a great extent promoted uniformly around the world.238 Although 
local circumstances were taken into account in the so-called country plans prepared by overseas 
information officers, US propaganda policy was more or less the same around the world. 
Practically all of the global themes were based on the three main propaganda objectives: to 
denounce communism, to exalt the capitalist system and to promote democracy.239 The 
distributed USIA material, focusing on topics such as standards of living, scientific 
accomplishments, cultural products, educational systems and economic benefits, was usually 
based on the truth, but often given a certain ‘spin’.  
This approach was formulated with the aid of the USIA’s massive research and analysis unit, 
which collected information from around the globe and evaluated the results of certain publicity 
campaigns or public opinion in general. Public opinion polls and surveys were seen as an 
essential part of the US Government’s intelligence-gathering mechanism as they provided a 
more accurate measure of people's opinions than for instance diplomatic reporting.240 The 
diverse data collected from the targeted countries made the Americans gradually understand 
that local factors did hold a considerable influence on the propaganda programme executed in 
each country after all and that a more balanced presentation of their country was in many cases 
more fruitful than simple nationalistic flag-waving. The way foreign audiences helped to define 
the character and intensity of the Cold War also reminds us that the struggle was by no means a 
strictly bipolar one.241 In 1961, the use of worldwide foreign public opinion polls was 
discontinued by Edward R. Murrow, new head of the USIA, but already in 1963 the agency 
introduced a new world opinion survey, which was eagerly read by President John F. Kennedy 
himself each day.242 The creation of the concept of ‘free world opinion’ was of course very 
much in the USIA’s interest, as it could be used as a psychological tool to deepen the 
assumption of common cause in the free world.243 
In addition to words and images, many American propaganda experts acknowledged that 
exchange programmes were most effective instruments for extending American influence 
abroad. They were seen as especially vital in winning over Third World elites, as they provided 
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mechanisms for direct contact with the individuals who would determine the social and political 
fate of these newly independent countries. Most of the funds of, for example, the Fulbright 
Programme were spent on academic exchanges, but a considerable share of the expenditure was 
used for what were known as leader grants to bring influential foreigners to the US for training, 
education or travel. Certain ideological content was usually added to these exchanges, as 
Foreign Service and USIA officers gave foreigners travelling under State Department grants 
"training, briefing and an introduction" to American society. Teachers in particular were 
targeted for this kind of indoctrination.244 
 
The CIA and the Cultural Cold War 
 
When discussing US anti-communist activity, it is impossible to leave the role of the CIA 
unexamined. It is also impossible, and not the point of this study, to investigate all the massive 
CIA operations executed during the Cold War years. However, it is worthwhile to briefly 
examine the agency’s main covert activities in the European field of propaganda and culture.  
Soon after the CIA was established in 1947, its role was expanded from mere information 
collection and analysis to the conduction of numerous covert activities related to, for instance, 
propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage and assistance to indigenous anti-communist elements 
in the free world.245 When one takes a look at its long task list, it comes as no surprise that 
officials at the Pentagon and the State Department were not at first exactly thrilled with the new 
agency; they felt it lacked a clear definition of its authorisation and had too much expectations 
in relation to its resources.246  
In spite of this, it did not take long for the CIA to introduce its first measures in the fight 
against communism in Europe, first in Italy and France. The agency was fully aware of the 
power the political left had on the old continent and viewed left-wing intellectuals as important 
opinion-formers that were particularly vulnerable to Soviet propaganda. In order to win their 
backing to the US cause, the Americans founded the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which 
was secretly funded by the CIA. The CCF, seen as one the most important American weapons 
in the cultural Cold War, arranged a whole variety of activities, including festivals, seminars and 
concerts, to demonstrate the cultural advantages of political freedom. Challenging the 
intellectual basis for neutralism was one of the principal objectives of US policy, and it was also 
the official line of the CCF.247 The organisation, led by prominent figures like Bertrand Russell, 
Arthur Koestler and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., focused on the value of culture in Western Europe 
rather than political activity. Its most visible contributions to the Cold War cause was the 
publication of such highly-valued journals as the English-language Encounter, the German Der 
Monat and the French Preuves. 
                                                 
244 Osgood 2006, p. 305-307. 
245 ‘National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, NSC 10/2’, FRUS 1945─1950, Emergence 
of the Intelligence Establishment (Washington 1996), pp. 713─714. 
246 Weiner, Tim: CIA. Yhdysvaltain keskustiedustelupalvelun historia (Finnish edition of Weiner, Tim, Legacy of 
Ashes: The History of the CIA (2007) (translated by Tiirinen, Mika) (Helsinki 2008), p. 44. 
247 Stonor Saunders 1999, p. 89. 
 
 
65 
 
The fact that most people taking part in CCF events were journalists, authors, academics and 
politicians from the non-communist left, many of them former Marxists, suited the CIA’s needs 
perfectly.248 Largely due to its associates' determination to create a credible offensive against 
Soviet totalitarianism, the CCF, which at its height had offices in around 33 countries, has 
afterwards been regarded as a success. The exposure of the CIA’s secret role in funding of anti-
communist cultural organisations such as the CCF made in 1967 by the magazine Ramparts has, 
however, given the operations a somewhat suspicious image. 
In addition to European cultural organisations, the CIA provided massive support to a wide 
range of other organisations from youth movements and trade unions to political parties, 
universities and publishing houses. The use of philanthropic foundations such as the 
Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations was considered the most convenient way to pass large 
sums of money to agency operations without alerting the recipients of their source.249 CIA 
money was infiltrated to a number of overseas political parties and trade union movements also 
through organisations like the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), an agency of the 
American Federation of Labour (AFL) dedicated to fighting communism within the 
international labour movement around the world, and in particular in such European countries 
as France, Italy and Finland, where domestic communism was strong and dependency for 
undercover finance high.250  
When the close links between youth movements, such as the US National Student 
Association (NSA) and the International Student Conference (ISC-COSEC), were exposed in 
the 1960s, it turned out that in some cases CIA funds had amounted to even three quarters of 
their entire budget.251 The active role the CIA played in, for instance, the youth movements' 
recruitment processes indicates that these organisations were very much in the agency's 
pocket252 and suggests that Stonor Saunders's claim that the CIA greatly determined the use of 
the funds it channelled is valid.253 While saying this, one must stress that the relationship 
between the agency and the movements it backed varied markedly according to the organisation 
in question. Therefore, Wilford's discovery that for instance the FTUC often opposed the 
CIA's wishes and planned most of its activities independently is also plausible.254 It is also 
important not to overemphasise the CIA's role, for instance, in American art exhibitions abroad 
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as they were predominantly financed directly by a number of private foundations rather than 
the agency itself.255 This does not change the fact that a considerable number of leading actors 
inside the backed NGOs knew exactly the origins of the funds and the objectives of their use.256  
This was not an issue in the field of direct propaganda, in which the CIA’s most important 
activity in Europe was the support given to Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), 
the stations that broadcast their message to Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union 
respectively.257 As the USIA and VOA broadcasts represented the official voice of the US 
Government and hence needed to be mostly reliable, the creation of the two stations enabled a 
more direct conduct of anti-communist warfare. RFE and RL were the first broadcast services 
whose purpose was to change the form of government in a foreign nation by airing news not 
about the country from which the broadcast originated but about the target countries.258 Their 
primary target group, the popular audience rather than the elites, was attracted through both 
broadcasts aimed at a specific audience and programmes with centralised anti-communist themes. 
In the late 1950s, when the importance of American youth culture became increasingly evident 
even to the most conservative American officials, much of the focus was turned to the hugely 
popular RFE pop and rock broadcasts for which the station is probably the most famous. 
The CIA's association with the media went much further than the two radio stations. After 
initially shying away from press contacts, under the directorship of Allen Dulles the agency 
started to positively cultivate the news media. Journalists from many of the best-known 
American newspapers and magazines, such as The New York Times, Time, Life, Look, Fortune and, 
perhaps most importantly, Reader’s Digest, were often tasked both for the collection of 
intelligence and for propaganda purposes, reporting stories that showed the US in a flattering 
light.259 One of the papers enjoying covert subsidies from the CIA was The New Leader, which, 
albeit having a rather small total circulation, was widely read by labour movement circles both in 
New York and Western Europe, not least because it enjoyed a reputation as a centre of anti-
Soviet expertise and activism.260 For reaching the broader masses, the agency's close relationship 
with, above all, the news agencies the Associated Press (AP) and the United Press International 
(UPI), national radio and television channels the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), the 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and National Broadcasting Company (NBC) became 
increasingly important as the Cold War progressed. In recruiting the media to the Cold War 
cause, the CIA was given plenty of help by the State Department and its Office of Private 
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Enterprise and Cooperation, whose media connections included the likes of Time, Life and King 
Features Syndicate, which inserted anti-communist messages into its comic strips for export.261 
 The CIA’s role as a collector of intelligence through the global media expanded as the Cold 
War heated up. The agency followed Soviet propaganda techniques with great detail and 
provided Washington with regular analyses on the used methods, objectives and content. This 
work grew in size during the Korean War when the Americans had become particularly 
concerned that the Soviet use of Western rearmament as evidence of aggressive intentions 
could win some sympathy among the uncommitted, sceptical audience.262  
As indicated above, the CIA’s role in Western propaganda during the first Cold War 
decades, and especially its commitment to cultural matters, was so immense that Stonor 
Saunders’s claim that the agency was in effect acting as America’s Ministry of Culture263 is 
largely valid. At the same time, it is necessary to point out that despite their immense size, the 
agency’s operations have often been assessed as to have brought more harm than good to the 
United States’ image abroad especially after the revelations about the CIA’s direct and 
somewhat blind funding of non-governmental organisations.264 
 
From Roll-back to an Evolutionary Strategy 
 
US anti-communist operations were at first heavily weighted towards Europe and the Soviet 
Union as these were seen as the high priority areas. Through propaganda, covert operations, 
economic aid and cultural diplomacy, the Truman Administration initiated a massive 
intervention in European affairs in order to prevent communist domination on the continent. 
The Atlantic Alliance and European integration were particularly strongly promoted, while the 
formation of neutralist attitudes towards the Cold War was to be prevented. The Eisenhower 
Administration only expanded the ‘psychological dimension’ of the Cold War by making US 
operations more effective with a growing emphasis on Third World countries.  
During the 1950s, the overall strategy for propaganda and cultural activities underwent some 
major changes due to various international developments, such as Stalin’s death, the signing of 
the Austrian State Treaty and the Geneva Summits. The steps taken by the two superpowers 
towards a détente clearly undermined the aggressive approach adopted towards propaganda. 
The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's realisation of the potential propaganda value of breaking 
the Soviet Union from international isolation also contributed to turning the contest between 
the superpowers into a more cultural one. While the initial aggressive propaganda activities 
directed against Eastern European communist regimes had encouraged people to stand up 
against their oppressors and seek for ‘roll-back’ or ‘liberation’ and a new form of government, 
developments in the mid-1950s led to the introduction of a less direct approach that could be 
labelled as an ‘evolutionary’ strategy, or more generally as ‘mutual coexistence’. This was a term 
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first strongly promoted by the Soviets, yet later also used by Westerners to describe the peaceful 
but limited relations between the superpowers in a broader context. 
The events that took place during and after the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 symbolised a 
turning point in American propaganda. During the time of crisis, the hard-hitting and liberating 
message sent out in RFE broadcasts made listening Hungarians to believe that they were being 
promised US military assistance if they fought against the Soviet troops.265 The number of 
deaths and the international scandal that followed had a profound impact on American 
thinking: a more long-term strategy was introduced, aiming at encouraging satellite states to 
believe that their situation could be improved by working within the system rather than trying 
to destroy it.266 This approach was reflected in the general US foreign policy as it now focused 
on building economic order around the Soviet bloc and at the same time acknowledged that 
limited agreements on specific issues could be made with the Soviet Union. This development 
can be seen as the birth of the modern Cold War era. 
The shift to a less offensive propaganda strategy could already be noted in the Eisenhower 
Administration’s large-scale propaganda campaigns ‘Atoms for Peace’ and ‘Open Skies’, which 
the USIA tirelessly advertised throughout the world. These American initiatives promoting the 
peaceful use of atomic power and the mutual aerial inspection of military facilities had the 
objective of countering the Soviet peace campaign and showing the world the peaceful 
intentions of the US, while undermining those of its rival. The focus was now rather on 
promoting the positive than merely hammering the enemy and its actions. This also applied to 
the issue of racism in the US, the country’s biggest propaganda problem. Throughout the 
1950s, despite the damaging scenes emerging in, for instance, Little Rock in 1957, American 
propagandists wished to emphasise that slow and steady progress was being made on the race 
issue. Information packets sent to the world included feature articles and photographs of well 
dressed, smiling ‘negroes’ engaging in activities with the whites.267 A similar policy was also 
adopted in the field of film, as the propagandists' wished to plant an increasing number of well-
off African-Americans as a part of the American scene in the promoted films whenever the 
background of the production permitted.268  
Above all, the new dimension in the Cold War pushed cultural factors to the front stage in 
the superpower race. The Americans wished to ‘humanize’ the image of their country through 
cultural exchanges and the presentation of everyday life. The US was now projected as a 
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classless society characterised by spiritual vitality as well as prosperity.269 In order to successfully 
promote the country through its culture, the Americans not only produced films and TV 
programmes featuring their leading cultural celebrities, but also sent symphonies, plays, 
musicians and athletes abroad. This activity was mainly conducted under the Cultural 
Presentations Program, which during the first eight years after its establishment in 1954 
exported more than two hundred American performers to almost every country in the world.270 
Particularly in Europe, the programme mainly targeted an elite audience of opinion makers by 
giving special emphasis on the exportation of artists in the fields of classical music, modern 
dance and classical ballet.271 As time passed, however, the importance of popular culture even in 
the old continent became more evident to the Americans. Whereas rock ‘n’ roll music was only 
gradually featured by the USIA, as it was not seen as sophisticated enough an art form, jazz was 
used as a truly American product and a propaganda tool already in the early 1950s. Both music 
styles turned out to have immeasurable importance in the psychological struggle and were to a 
growing extent played by the likes of VOA and RFE/RL to an audience whose enthusiasm 
created a slowly expanding sub-culture of its own in, for instance, Moscow.272 
Although the promotion of American culture attracted more attention in US propaganda in 
the late 1950s, the use of economic issues and technological achievements were not neglected, 
either. In fact, as Andrew Yarrow has proved by studying a number of USIA publications 
distributed in the Soviet Union and Asia, during this period especially American print 
propagandists came to believe that the country’s chief selling point was its economic prowess 
and prosperity rather than the old messages about democracy and civil liberties.273 The same 
tendency can be recognised when reading USIA pamphlets distributed around the world. In the 
late 1950s, these publications often stressed the great possibilities the American consumer had 
thanks to their high earnings, affordable housing and the capitalist system in general.274 Another 
main theme in these writings was the American trade unions’ role in securing growing living 
standards, usually through collective bargaining and arbitration rather than labour disputes. 275  
The launch of Sputnik in October 1957 was generally regarded as a huge propaganda victory 
for the Russians, which caused some panic among American officials. Although the launch 
diverted greater shares of available US resources to science, technology and space 
exploration,276 it did not prevent the progress made towards an East-West cultural exchange 
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agreement, which was eventually signed between the US and the Soviet Union in January 1958. 
This agreement epitomised the shift in US policy from aggressive psychological warfare to the 
use of a more evolutionary strategy in undermining the Soviet empire. People behind the Iron 
Curtain were now increasingly being attracted with Western ideas and symbols, particularly 
consumer culture. The cultural agreement, allowing increased person-to-person contacts, travel 
and trade between the two countries, indicated that the Cold War struggle was entering a phase 
in which psychological competition would play an even greater part. This rivalry led to scenes 
that today might seem somewhat hilarious, such as the famous ‘kitchen debate’ between 
Khrushchev and Vice President Richard Nixon during the American National Exhibition in 
Moscow in July 1959. In the following year, the prospects for an East-West détente were ended 
after the American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Soviet airspace and the superpowers 
opted for a harder line in their propaganda activities. 
Unlike in the British case, the biggest problem for US overseas activities was never funding, 
but the lack of a strong coordinating authority. This often led to a lack of vision along with 
bureaucratic struggles.277 The number of organisations involved in the anti-communist crusade 
was simply so vast that the coordination of the often overlapping activities proved 
troublesome.278 It has also been argued that US propagandists were especially in the 1950s too 
unspecific in their definition of American culture.279 These views belong to a group of scholars 
who recognise the Eisenhower Administration's greater emphasis on the importance of 
psychological warfare, but question the operations' actual efficiency.280 According to, for 
instance, James Marchio, Eisenhower’s support of psychological warfare measures was merely 
rhetorical and faded after the US ran out of options for aggressive Cold War policies.281  
One could also argue, as for instance Chris Tudda has done, that while the Eisenhower 
Administration was keen to use a greater number of propaganda channels for the promotion of 
a dynamic foreign policy designed to confront the Soviet Union, the US Government in reality 
continued to practice a foreign policy that was both diplomatic and pragmatic.282 In this respect, 
the Kennedy Administration did not really rock the boat. Kennedy’s tone of foreign policy at 
first sounded fresh and strikingly different from that of Eisenhower. Yet, the administration 
was rather quickly dubbed as ‘the third Eisenhower Administration’ as it did far less to 
challenge conventional truths of foreign policy than its rhetoric initially implied.283  
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Anglo-American Cooperation 
 
It took a year or so after the Second World War ended for a common Anglo-American 
response to communism to evolve. The ‘special relationship’ between the two countries was 
going through a phase of re-examination as both powers wished to redefine their role in the 
future world. The appointment of Attlee’s Labour Government did not exactly enhance the ties 
between the two Western powers. US officials were suspicious of the socialist Government and 
the trade union movement in Britain to such an extent that for quite some years it put 
considerable effort to encourage British labour and trade union circles to launch both internal 
and external anti-communist campaigns of their own.284 At the same time, however, the 
Americans recognised Britain as their staunchest and most powerful ally.285 
The introduction of Marshall Aid, the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and the signing 
of the Brussels Treaty in March 1948, a precursor of NATO, finally signalled that the US was 
committed to a new global role and prepared to contain communism in all parts of the world. 
President Truman’s presentation of containment as a crusade to save Western civilisation and 
Christianity from an atheistic Soviet Union offered a platform on which a common anti-
communist response could be developed.286 The closer economic, military and political 
cooperation between the US and Britain in the late 1940s was not, however, reflected in 
propaganda and cultural diplomacy partly because of the British insistence to stress the values 
of social democracy in the promotion of its national interests.  
After the IRD was established in 1948, it was decided that the signatories of the Brussels 
Treaty should co-ordinate their anti-communist propaganda more closely. The British 
Government was particularly keen to take leadership in defining the ‘spiritual aspects of the 
Western Union’ and proposing measures that would make use of the countries’ common 
factors.287 In October 1948, the Western Union Consultative Council agreed that each country 
would carry out its own plans according to national needs, but an exchange of information 
useful in dealing with the ideological aspects would be instituted.288 
The exchange of information and propaganda material was later also applied to the 
Americans, who were kept fully informed of the new policy. A plan to expand Anglo-American 
cooperation on the actual field level was, however, rejected mostly by British officials due to a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it would appear that the British held a very low opinion of US 
                                                 
284 Wilford, Hugh, ’American Labour Diplomacy and Cold War Britain’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 37(I) 
(2002), pp. 45─65. 
285 An important turnabout in Anglo-American relations took place in July 1946 when the Anglo-American 
Financial Agreement passed through Congress mainly due to growing US opposition to the Soviet Union. Kirby 
2000 , p. 387. 
286 Ibid., p. 308. 
287 In early1948, the FO set up a working party on the ’spiritual aspects of Western Union’. It defined a list of 
common factors that united the countries belonging to this union, such as the freedom of choice and the support 
of arts and sciences. This union was planned to consist of the following countries: United Kingdom, Republic of 
Ireland, France, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and 
Iceland. For example, C.F.A. Warner to O. Sargeant, February 13,1948; ‘Notes on the first meeting of the Working 
Party on “spiritual” aspects of Western Union', February 27, 1948; J.O. Rennie to C.A.F. Warner, March 3, 1948, all 
FO 953/144, NA. 
288 Parliamentary Historians 1993, p. 19. 
 
 
72 
 
publicity output, doubting its reliability and subtleness. Secondly, the FO saw that positive 
advantage could be gained from both sides “shooting the target from different angles”.289 
Perhaps the most important reason for the initial rejection of common operations was that the 
strategies for countering communism differed markedly. Whereas the Americans saw the Soviet 
Bloc as the most important region for psychological action, the primary focus of British 
propaganda lay in Western Europe, South-East Asia and India. The FO’s decision not to incite 
subversion in Eastern European countries only emphasised Britain’s goal in this area, which 
was to ensure that British propaganda and the American variety would not be identified in the 
minds of the local inhabitants.290  
The two Western governments' significantly different propaganda methods also restricted 
cooperation at first. While the Americans’ two main channels were VOA and the bulletins sent 
out to US posts abroad, the British based their operations on the ‘grey’ propaganda material 
produced by the IRD and the ‘objective’ information provided by the BBC and the British 
Council. Cooperation between, for example, the BBC and VOA was not considered 
recommendable from the British viewpoint. VOA was seen as an open propaganda 
organisation, while the BBC took the greatest of pains to ensure that it was not regarded as one 
itself. Moreover, the FO felt that VOA was not only often inaccurate in substance but also 
“tactless and hectoring in tone, losing the confidence of that large body of persons who are 
neither on the extreme right nor on the extreme left but who like to listen to reason."291 The 
British also stressed the importance of material prepared for the local market by local people if 
possible, while the Americans produced the majority of their output in Washington as bulk 
material for distribution throughout the world.  
Apart from strategy and methods, the FO learnt that a big problem in attempts to cooperate 
with American agencies was their multiplicity and mutual jealousies.292 The fact that the CIA, 
the State Department and the military all had pretensions in this area did not help to make the 
situation any simpler. In the first Cold War years, cooperation on propaganda and intelligence 
operations was mainly based on the distribution of material and intelligence collection.293 
Possible cooperation in the actual field activities was to be worked out at each overseas mission 
on its merits on a rather ad hoc basis.294 
Anglo-American cooperation on anti-communist propaganda started to finally show steady 
growth in the early 1950s. The British began to acknowledge their increasingly subordinate 
position in the special relationship and understood that they could not run their anti-
communists operations without American support. Furthermore, the final abandonment of the 
Third Force foreign policy, along with international events such as the Berlin Crisis, was 
propelling Britain towards an Anglo-American partnership based on a common strategy and 
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common ideology.295 In terms of propaganda strategies, the launch of the American Campaign 
of Truth reinforced the FO’s confidence in the US operations, as it now felt that the two 
governments' ideas regarding the general need for publicity, both overt and covert, for 
counteracting the spread of communism were much the same. 296 The appointment of 
information liaison officers to the British Embassy in Washington and the American Embassy 
in London in August 1950 was an important step towards closer consultation in this particular 
field. This development led to the radical expansion of information exchange and the more 
thorough examination of cooperation between the IRD and local USIS offices.297 Although still 
feeling superior about their methods, the British were at last ready to give some credit to the 
American campaign. The FO was particularly impressed with the use of effective ministerial 
speeches, an area which the British felt they had to some extent neglected.298  
The Korean War accelerated the process towards closer cooperation in the field of 
propaganda. Although few joint operations were carried out, the regular exchange of 
information between the two Western powers ensured that the Asians were more or less fed 
with the same line of propaganda. According to Shaw, the State Department actually followed 
the FO’s propaganda lead in many areas, pooling the latter’s more discreet and personal 
approach with the greater resources of the USIS.299 This was rather characteristic for Western 
propaganda activities in the early 1950s. The Americans understood that they were behind the 
British particularly in the area of ‘grey’ propaganda, and knew that they still had plenty to learn 
from their FO colleagues. Partly because of this, as Defty argues in his article, the British 
position in joint anti-communist operations was not as subordinate in the 1950s as many other 
scholars have claimed.300  
Even though the two powers still conducted their operations independently using the 
different methods they had adopted, it was evident from the very start that the British and the 
American programmes would complement each other. Britain’s more subtle approach was 
more appropriate for countering communism in the 'Free World', while the bold propaganda 
adopted by the Americans was more suited to bolstering resistance behind the Iron Curtain.301 
There were no precise instructions for cooperation in each country, but the exchange of 
information and the need for common coordination in the fields of propaganda and cultural 
diplomacy became increasingly important as the Cold War continued. 
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3. RESUMPTION OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN 
FINLAND, 1944-1947 
 
Second World War Propaganda 
 
After the war between Finland and the Soviet Union ended in September 1944, the quick 
resumption of more normal informational and cultural operations in Finland was more 
important for Britain than the United States. The country had officially declared war against 
Finland in December 1941 and run a rather consistent propaganda campaign to undermine the 
Finnish Government’s war-time policies. The main channel for this campaign was the BBC 
Finnish Service, which had originally been established on March 15, 1940 when Finland’s 
goodwill in Britain was, according to the service’s reporter Hillar Kallas, still tremendous.302 
After the final number of The Review, a small publication circulated by the British with the aim 
of keeping the Finns informed about the British point of view as it had been expressed in the 
editorial columns of British newspapers, was published in August 1941303, the British viewpoint 
was expressed to the Finns solely through the BBC.  
The Finnish Service's war-time broadcasts reflect how quickly the understanding of 
Finland’s position suffered in London after the country had started fighting against the Soviet 
Union again in June 1941. On the day Finland declared war, the Finnish Service commentator 
‘Sanansaattaja’ noted: “The lights have gone out again in Finland for the third time in twenty-
four years. However unwillingly, you are joining hands with evil forces, who will one day exact 
their due”.304 Although this view was repeated in the daily broadcasts from London, the Finnish 
Service’s war-time programmes were initially rather neutral in tone, following the BBC’s 
broader policies according to which news reporting was to be based on objectivity and the, 
albeit selected, use of truth rather than lies.305 The BBC and PWE, which coordinated the aired 
content, regarded the broadcasts as a great opportunity to enlighten the Finns about war events 
not only from the Finnish Russian front but also around the world. As the war progressed, and 
Anglo-Finnish relations deteriorated, the Finnish Service also picked up a more aggressive tone. 
In late 1941 the broadcasts were already filled with warnings about what prolonging the war 
would lead to.306 In February 1942, Rex Bosley, who was in charge of the Finnish Section of the 
Press Reading Bureau at the British Legation in Stockholm307, determined the aims of BBC’s 
propaganda to Finland as follows: To bring about a separate Finnish-Russian peace, to cause 
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trouble between Finns and Germans, to get the German troops out of Finland and to convince 
the Finns of a German defeat. 308 
As compared to the British, the United States' decision not to declare war against Finland 
left the Americans in a much better position to influence the Finns through various channels. 
Mainly because it wished to counteract German pressure on Finland, the US decided to 
maintain diplomatic relations until the Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement was signed in June 1944. 
The US Mission formed a useful centre for the State Department’s propaganda and intelligence 
operations.309 After Britain broke off diplomatic relations with Finland in August 1941, the US 
also became a provider of much-needed intelligence for its closest ally.310 The Mission’s role as a 
collector of intelligence rather than a source of propaganda only became more apparent in 
December 1942 when the State Department informed the Finnish Foreign Ministry that it was 
to end its informational activities in Helsinki and that the Finns should do the same in New 
York.311 After this, the US continued to distribute material about Finland and American 
viewpoints in general through English and Swedish news bulletins published by the American 
Legation in Stockholm.312 
Although the US presence in Finland weakened towards the end of the Finnish-Soviet War, 
the Americans were able to defend the use of their cultural products amazingly well. This was 
most evident in the screening of American films in Finland: the US Mission fought a fierce 
battle over this issue with Germany, which wished to pressurise Finnish officials to ban them. 
This ‘film war’, which lasted from the summer of 1942 to the end of the Finnish-Soviet War, 
divided Finnish cinemas into two camps: to those willing to follow the German instructions 
and to those opposing them.313 The Americans took this issue very seriously, and in order to 
secure the screening of their films, made sure that more copies were made of them on the raw 
film shipped from Stockholm in October 1943. Although a number of American films had 
been censored by Finnish authorities during the war314, US officials could only be satisfied with 
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the outcome of their efforts: Finland was the only country fighting with the Germans in which 
American films had been shown throughout the war despite German pressure.315  
During the first years of the war, Britain's influence in Finland was much more limited than 
that of the US. British films were mostly censored316 and the BBC Finnish Service did not enjoy 
that much credibility among the Finns, either. The frequency was clearly tuned into, but both 
Finnish newspaper commentators and the general public claimed that the news reports included 
too many errors about the situation in the Russian front in particular.317 As the war progressed, 
the reliability of the news started to gradually command greater respect among the Finnish 
audience, especially when related to anything else than their own country.318 In early 1944, after 
it had become increasingly evident that Finland’s war fortunes were fading, the BBC’s 
popularity grew at accelerating pace despite the increasingly aggressive line it adopted towards 
the Finnish Government. The broadcasts were particularly direct in their approach in spring 
1944 after Finland had rejected Russian peace terms, which, according to the BBC, had been 
fair and justified.319  
Towards the end of the Finnish-Soviet War, the BBC had already reached a popularity 
which, according to the Finnish authorities, was impossible to exceed.320 Apart from the 
favourable war developments and its policy not to lie even about own casualties, the BBC had 
partly the Finns to thank for this as they did not start a coordinated campaign of their own 
against British propaganda until the summer of 1944.321 This was clearly too late for 
undermining the BBC’s position as the most trustworthy source of world news among the 
public. The popularity of the Finnish Service had turned many of its reporters, in particular 
‘London Jenny’, the pseudonym of Greta Kivinen-Armstrong, ‘Abacus', in real life D.R. Roper, 
and military commentator 'British Major', in reality J.H. Magill, future British Military Attaché to 
Finland and member of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, into household names who 
were listened to with great attention.322 
The British were by no means the only ones verbally hammering the Finnish Government. 
In April 1942, the Americans had also started to send regular broadcasts to Finland, using the 
BBC’s relays. The broadcasts, although not as popular as the BBC Finnish Service, managed to 
attract a reasonable following, as even back then a great number of Finns felt that the 
maintenance of good relations with the US was of primary importance. Although the main 
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objective of the broadcasts, known as America Calling Finland (ACF) (also identified as the 
Finnish Voice of America), was to present US policies and the country’s position in regard to 
Finland, they also offered the British propaganda campaign valuable support as their content 
followed closely the instructions sent from London by PWE to the OWI.323 These directives 
determined that the ACF broadcasts followed two general principles: the admiration of Finnish 
democratic traditions and the avoidance of giving Finns direct instructions, at least on behalf of 
the US Government.324  
When hopes for an armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union ran high in March-April 
1944, the US role became more active also on the broadcasting front. The Americans, who had 
already in the autumn of 1943 interpreted that Finnish peace sentiments had been on the rise325, 
continuously pointed out that the more Finland delayed its acceptance to an armistice, the more 
difficult it would to get out of the war with reasonable terms. After ACF started to adopt a 
more propagandistic approach in its output, following the new OWI policy of scaring the Finns 
more directly about the consequences of their actions,326 the broadcasts started to receive plenty 
of criticism in Finland for being amateurish, ill-advised and naïve.327 ACF''s rather dubious 
reputation would at least to some extent dampen the United States' credibility in the field of 
radio propaganda for some years to come.  
Even though the BBC Finnish Service had also changed into even higher gear between the 
signing of the Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement and the Finnish-Soviet Armistice, Britain would not 
suffer from a similar problem in post-war Finland. The high degree of credibility the BBC 
continued to enjoy in Finland made it possible for the broadcaster to more directly encourage 
the Finnish people to overthrow their Government without any serious consequences to its 
position. When the Finnish Parliament eventually voted on breaking relations with Germany 
and truce was agreed on with the Soviet Union in early September, the BBC naturally welcomed 
the development, but warned that Finland should now build a peaceful relationship with its 
eastern neighbour if it wished to be welcomed to the group of free and democratic countries 
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once more.328 The emphasis of the broadcaster's main message was, however, soon re-
examined, and already in early September 1944, PWE directives to the Finnish Service gave 
greater priority to underlining that Germany had already lost the war than criticising the Finns' 
involvement in it.329 The same very much applied to the ACF broadcasts. The American 
interpretation of events in Finland continued to dominate the broadcasts for quite some time, 
but gradually the commentators started to focus more on world events and domestic issues 
than merely on the Finnish question.330 By June 1945, a couple of months before the 
termination of the service, the broadcasts rarely even mentioned Finland.331 
 
Relaunching British Propaganda 
 
In the very first post-war years, Finland’s future was something of an enigma to the United 
States and Britain both in terms of overall policy and informational operations. The British 
Government, in particular, recognised that the country lay mainly in the Soviet sphere of 
influence and let the Russians play first fiddle in the Allied Control Commission. More than 
that, as promoting close Anglo-Soviet ties remained as a top priority on the FO's agenda, the 
British were even willing to make several additional concessions to the Russians on, for 
instance, their territorial rights in Eastern Finland and the degree of reparations they were to 
receive from Finland. The British Government's desire to actively use Finland as a vehicle to 
foster its relationship with the Soviet Union illustrates that to describe the country's position 
towards Finland in the first post-war years as 'a policy of non-interference', as has often been 
done332, is in fact partly incorrect.333  
Britain's lenient policy as comes to Finland would not, however, last for very long. Already 
after the armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed, it became increasingly 
clear that the British wished to secure their commercial interests in the country from which it 
imported, in particular, pulp and timber.334 As the Anglo-Soviet relationship started to 
deteriorate in 1946, Britain's policy of containing the Soviet Union also reached Finnish shores. 
Mainly because the British Government wished to secure strategic stability in Scandinavia, 
especially in Sweden, a policy according to which Soviet dominance in Finland should be 
resisted in all respects other than the military plane was gradually adopted.335 
After an initial period of hesitation, the US chose a much more positive policy towards 
Finland and started channelling humanitarian aid into the country and providing it with much-
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needed credit.336 As American foreign policy evolved into the containment of communism 
around the world, including Scandinavia, Finland's geographical position increased 
Washington's interest in the country. As a result, the Soviet Union’s constant interference with 
Finnish domestic politics and the growing popularity of communism in Finland were observed 
with growing concern among American officials. It was not desirable to see Finland slip into 
communist hands and become subjected to even stronger Soviet influence in the same way as 
had happened to several Eastern European countries. At the same time, the Americans 
recognised that preventing such an outcome would never be easy, particularly as according to 
their estimations given between 1944 and 1947 the Soviet Union’s pressure on Finland would 
only grow in the future.337 
An examination of British and American informational and cultural activities in Finland in 
the first post-war years reveals that the pessimistic evaluations over Finland's independence at 
the FO do not tell the whole story of the two Western powers' position in regard to the 
country's future. The eagerness with which both the British and US governments wished to see 
the resumption of their operations as soon as hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union 
had been concluded indicates that neither country had entirely lost hope over Finland's 
independent future. Both the British and the Americans were more than willing to have a 
strong cultural and informational presence in the country, a position they had already held 
before the Winter War and during the time of truce in 1940-1941. 
The British began to discuss the eventual resumption of MOI activities as early as in March 
1944. Back then, the task was still regarded as tough due to the apparent ‘bitter disillusionment’ 
among the Finnish public opinion towards Britain. As a direct political approach towards the 
Finns immediately after the country’s withdrawal from the war was seen as doomed to failure, 
the FO started to emphasise the future importance of indirect cultural propaganda through the 
British Council in particular.338 The British Government was clearly in a hurry to resume its 
activities in the country before the Russians and Americans would be operating there at full 
speed. To make sure everything would be ready when the time arises, British officials made 
arrangements for the production of both a Finnish edition of Nyheter från Storbritannien, a weekly 
newspaper mainly for the Stockholm press339, and a Finnish version of the daily press bulletin 
circulated in Sweden. The supply of books, seen as one of the most effective forms of 
propaganda during the time, and the conversion of the BBC Finnish Service into ‘white’ 
propaganda were also among Britain’s main priorities340, as was the presentation of British 
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commercial films in Finland with the help of Paramount Sweden.341 The MOI also stressed the 
importance of launching a window display in Helsinki as quickly as possible as well as the 
resumption of personal relations between Finns and British ‘in all walks of life’. The distribution 
of MOI pamphlets and publications was not, however, recommended, as “they are not likely to 
be very welcome to the Finns in their present mood.”342 Although willing to launch their 
propaganda campaign as rapidly as possible, the British recognised the necessity of extreme 
caution in Finland, a country engaged in a bitter war and feeling somewhat alienated by the 
Western powers after their behaviour during the Winter War and the support they had later 
given to the Soviet Union. 
The listed activities were not launched as smoothly as the British had planned even after the 
armistice was signed. First of all, as Finland belonged to the Soviet Union’s military sphere of 
influence, it was necessary to hear the view of the Russians authorities over any operations 
conducted before the resumption of ordinary diplomatic relations with Finland. Since the 
Soviet officials had few problems with British activities in Finland, such as the screening of 
British films343, the bureaucracy between British government agencies proved to be a more 
severe hindrance to an efficient relaunch of operations. For several months in autumn 1944, 
British officials did not seem to know whether operations in Finland had been passed from 
PWE to the MOI.344 Due to political reasons, nothing could be done, either, before Francis 
Shepherd, who was appointed as Political Representative in Finland, had reviewed the situation.  
For estimating propaganda opportunities in Finland, Mr Shepherd was supported by Peter 
Tennant, Press Attaché at the British Legation in Stockholm, who visited the country in 
November 1944.345 In his long report about his findings, Mr Tennant noted that the British 
would face quite a challenge in Finland, as the country had been isolated for a long time and the 
public was extremely ill-informed and ignorant about world affairs. He saw that the first short-
term objective of propaganda activities would be to counter “the fantastic underground 
whispering campaigns put around by the Germans” with something more positive and 
optimistic. Being loyal to the FO's broader policy, Mr Tennant also underlined the importance 
of giving the Finns all possible information and evidence of Britain’s cooperation with the 
Soviet Union also in the future.346 Although rather positive about British opportunities in the 
field of informational activities, mainly due to the huge demand for English books and 
newspapers, he, together with Mr Shepherd, stressed that the undetermined exchange rate for 
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the Finnish mark made purchasing books, newspapers and films for the Finnish market very 
complicated. 347 
The time wasted on organisational bureaucracy and the various technical difficulties faced in 
the production of material for Finland348 made British officials in Stockholm increasingly 
nervous that valuable propaganda opportunities would be lost.349 If Britain in general was swift 
to introduce post-war propaganda measures, in Finland’s case it lagged behind both the Soviet 
Union and the US, which had started to send newspapers and films to the country at much 
faster pace.350 The MOI finally took over the Finnish operations in December 1944. As soon as 
informational activities were resumed, the FO took care of sending all important newspapers 
and periodicals for commercial use in Finland351 as well as the usual MOI supplies of books, 
pamphlets and photographs. The Press Department in Stockholm was responsible for 
providing Helsinki with 2,000 copies of the daily review of the British press and a limited 
number of copies of Nyheter från Storbritannien for distribution among Swedish-speaking Finns.352  
The actual local publicity campaign was not introduced until late January 1945, when a 
temporary information officer was sent to Helsinki from Stockholm. Again, the procedure was 
anything but simple considering that the British suffered from serious shortages in currency and 
the delivery of books, in addition to the difficulties they encountered with facilities and staff.353 
The technical difficulties regarding film titles were solved by hiring a Helsinki-based translator, 
after which the MOI staff in Helsinki was finally able to present its short films entitled as 
'Britain Today' at two Helsinki cinemas. The very first print material the British were able to 
distribute, mainly booklets for sale at booksellers and articles distributed to the editors of 
Helsinki-based newspapers, focused mostly on promoting the war effort. The first British 
window display in Helsinki, entitled 'Britain and her Allies' also concentrated on the same 
theme.354 In spite of these first achievements, the British regarded their propaganda effort as 
unsatisfactory compared to the American activities. The opening of a British Council office was 
constantly urged, as were larger investments in the BBC Finnish Service, still seen as the main 
source of information about Britain in Finland. These views reflected a more general realisation 
evolving among British officials according to which possibilities for spreading propaganda in 
Finland were improving by the day, not least because a number of Finnish state officials and 
journalists had expressed their support for the launch of broader British activities.355 The Finns’ 
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wish that British activities would prove a counter to Soviet propaganda was becoming 
increasingly obvious. 
The British effort took another step forward in May 1945 when Mr D.R. Roper, who had 
for the past four years worked for the BBC Finnish Service, was appointed as the first 
permanent Press Attaché to Finland. In August, it was reported that the MOI staff in Finland, 
which was housed in a flat in Mikonkatu, Helsinki, consisted of seven persons. Even if 
expanding, the new department continued to face the same difficulties in the delivery of British 
books. Finnish publishers' reluctance to undertake the publication of MOI material generated 
yet another problem that forced the Ministry to perform the task at its own cost. Considerable 
progress was, however, made particularly as concerns films after Britain received a license for 
importing commercial feature films to Finland. Several British films were now rented out for 
showing around Finland, and MOI short films as well as the weekly newsreel The Free World 
were also widely screened.356  
By autumn 1945 the British had become even more positive about their future operations in 
Finland. Diplomatic relations were soon restored, and the general attitude of Finns towards 
Britain was already estimated as friendly. Furthermore, the Finnish Government’s decision to 
raise the status of English as the first foreign language taught in schools alongside German was 
seen a particularly pleasing. These developments made British officials even more confident 
about their opportunities to influence the Finns and rectify "the effects of their isolation from 
the free world during the war".357 The report Francis Shepherd sent to Ernest Bevin in 
November 1945 not only expressed the increasingly optimistic mood the British had started to 
adopt in Finland, but already reflected a broader change taking place in their position. 
According to the Political Representative, Finland would always be a doubtful ally of the Soviet 
Union and belt a resistance against Russian penetration of other Scandinavian countries. It 
would, therefore, be to Britain's advantage from a strategic point of view to encourage the 
Western form of democracy in Finland as well as Finnish cultural relations with Scandinavia 
and Western Europe, he concluded.358  
This declaration did not change the general need of caution the British felt they should 
follow when presenting their own case to the Finnish people. Since Finns were perceived as 
“sick of propaganda of the Nazi type” and the war in general, the FO saw that the publicity 
should be based more on genuine information about subjects relating to the future, such as 
British democracy, social institutions, labour management and scientific progress.359 As Anglo-
Soviet cooperation was far from over, the task of making elements of the Finnish right to give 
up their hopes of using Britain and the US against the Soviet Union also continued to be on the 
British informational agenda. 
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In determining the general policy for peacetime informational and cultural operations, the 
British Government did not have to start from scratch. It had managed an expanding 
informational and cultural programme in Finland through the British Legation, the British 
Council and the Finnish-British Society already before the war. In the 1920s and 1930s, Britain 
had paid particular attention to increasing its commercial relations with Finland. For the 
objective of promoting British products, as well as culture, the country's representatives had 
organised a special British Week in September 1933. The event, arranged in all leading Finnish 
cities, had undoubtedly increased the Finnish people’s knowledge of Britain, not least because 
Finnish newspapers took active part in its organisation.360  
By July 1939, the FO's confidence about its presence in Finland had grown to such an extent 
that its officials claimed that the Finns had clearly started to show greater interest in English 
ideas and a declining interest in German culture, which before the advent of national socialism 
had been a dominant influence in the country. The British even planned to establish a ‘British 
House’ in Helsinki for both the long-term promotion of British culture and the management of 
propaganda operations in time of war. Although this scheme never materialised, a number of 
the principles determined for British informational activities back then turned out to be valid 
even in the Cold War era. Trying to cope with the Finnish Government's power to prevent the 
local press from publishing anything likely to endanger the policy of neutrality was a theme that 
dominated the planning of overt propaganda even back then361, which meant that the British 
had gained plenty of prior experience of dealing with this national characteristic even before its 
relevance became much larger in post-war Finland. 
 
The British Council and the BBC: Restoration to Peace Time Conditions 
 
The FO's desire to launch British Council activities in Finland as soon as the Fenno-Soviet 
Armistice had been signed was above all generated by the massive demand the Finns expressed 
for almost anything coming from the West. The rapid decay of German influence in Finland 
provided a great opportunity for the British to promote their culture, and most of all, language, 
in the country. 
Competing with elements in Finland that were favourable to Germany was not an entirely 
new thing. In the mid-1930s, the British had already paid attention to influencing the opinion of 
authoritative Finns, including the Finnish Government, in a direction favourable to Britain and 
to undermining Germany’s dominant cultural position. What had made the task difficult was 
that, according to the British estimation, Finnish academic, tourist, sport, scientific, musical, art 
and press circles knew hardly anything of Britain. Furthermore, the British Council did not have 
an office of its own in Finland before the Second World War. It had made its presence felt 
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mainly by funding the activities of the Finnish-British Society in Helsinki, and such wide-scale 
projects as the British reading room and library, which was built next to the Legation’s premises 
and opened in August 1935.362 Cultural diplomacy was also enhanced by encouraging the 
exchange of students. Finland and the Scandinavian countries had been involved in one of the 
very first British Council operations when technical students from these countries were funded 
to visit Britain.363 As for the promotion of language, Britain’s main goal in Finland in the late 
1930s had been to elevate the study of English to an equal position with German in the school 
curriculum by establishing agencies in all large towns under the leadership of a separate British 
institute.364 This task had been regarded as entirely realistic since, according to the British, 
interest in their country was growing steadily at the expense of not only Germany, but also 
Sweden and Russia. 365  
The Second World War interrupted Britain’s expanding cultural activities in Finland as well as 
the growth of anglophile societies around the country. Founded in 1926, with the objective of 
“working for a more intimate intercourse between the Finnish and English people and getting 
Finnish people of different circles acquainted with the English spirit and the English way of 
thinking”366, the central organisation for these societies, the Finnish-British Society, had been 
responsible for a number of activities in Finland from importing and screening British films and 
supporting language education to promoting British artists visiting Finland.367 In all these activities 
the society had cooperated closely with the British Council in London, which provided its library 
with growing supplies of the most important British newspapers and periodicals as well as 
gramophone records of British music.368 Even after diplomatic relations between Britain and 
Finland had been broken off due to the war, the Finnish-British Society’s library in Helsinki was 
kept open, albeit in a low-key manner, in the premises of the English Church.369  
After the war between Finland and the Soviet Union had ended, the British wished to return 
the society's library services to normal as soon as possible. Among other activities, the British 
Council started sending the library, as well as the University of Helsinki, the University of Turku 
and Åbo Akademi, sets of periodicals and newspapers in the same way it had done before the 
war. The re-establishment of the smaller anglophile societies around the country was another 
task that became increasingly important to the British, particularly after the Americans had 
founded a new Finnish-American society in Turku. As with all post-war activities in Finland, 
British officials wished to proceed carefully when doing this. On several occasions the FO 
stressed that all membership lists of Finnish-British societies should be closely scrutinised in 
case they included Nazi sympathisers. The last thing the British wished to see was that 
anglophile societies were exploited as centres of attack and propaganda against the Soviet 
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Union.370 In November 1944, the FO and Francis Shepherd felt that the time was finally right 
to revive anglophile society activities around the country, not least because they offered an 
excellent vehicle for non-political propaganda.371 
The objective of opening a British Council office in Finland began to carry heavier weight in 
Whitehall after Finland was classified as one of the Council's 'priority one countries' in spring 
1945.372 Before this, the launch of cultural operations in Helsinki had suffered from many of the 
same obstacles that had hampered the resumption of MOI activities: funding problems and 
organisational misunderstanding. To observers at the FO, confusion over such issues as 
whether the British Legation should at first be responsible for the distribution of British 
Council print material was highly frustrating at a time when British culture and language should 
have been promoted as efficiently as possible.  
Some clarity was finally achieved in the summer of 1945, when Denis Frean, a young man 
appointed as English Lecturer at the University of Helsinki, took over the task of unofficial 
Council representative and saw to the initial distribution of British Council books and films.373 
Mr Frean’s report from August 1945 shows that this appointment was a shrewd move from the 
Council. In a matter of only a couple of months, Frean had, among other things, established an 
office organisation, sorted out the financial arrangements, contacted a large number of 
members of the Finnish academic and professional classes, arranged the distribution of 
periodicals and books to Finnish institutions, approached bookshops with the view to selling a 
number of Council booklets in the 'Britain Advances', 'British Life and Thought' and 'Science in 
Britain' series, helped the English School in Helsinki by providing it with books and 
administrated the application process for the first British Council scholarships.374 Denis Frean 
clearly managed to bring order out of chaos in terms of BC activities in Finland and gave the 
first official representative, J.B.C. Grundy, a much more solid platform to work on. 
The Graphic Art Exhibition, which opened in October 1945 at the Art Hall (Taidehalli) in 
Helsinki, also came as something of a godsend to the British Council. The exhibition had been 
on show in Stockholm in 1941, after which it had been shipped to Helsinki. After the outbreak 
of war, the pictures had been all but forgotten until late 1944 when Professor Bertel Hintze, 
Head of the Academy of Fine Arts in Helsinki, reminded of their existence and expressed his 
interest in putting them on show as early as in 1945.375 Francis Shepherd and the FO accepted 
the idea, especially as the Finnish-American Society had already held a popular exhibition of 
American photographs.376 After the official approval, the British spent no time in putting the 
wheels in motion. Major Alfred Longden, Director of Fine Arts at the British Council, 
contacted Mr Hintze and made sure that the exhibition would be held as soon as possible and 
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coordinated together with the BC in Stockholm.377 The exhibition turned out to be a great 
success: it attracted a total of over 10,000 visitors in Helsinki and Turku where it was also put 
on show. Furthermore, more presented prints were sold than in all the other Nordic countries 
together, and the catalogue was sold out in two weeks.378 As a result of the exhibition, and a 
number of newspaper articles covering it379, the Finnish people became for the first time 
properly acquainted with the British Council and its activities. After it became obvious that the 
Finns had a great interest in any art coming from the West, the BC started to plan new 
exhibitions. “The art iron is now hot here”, Mr Grundy enthusiastically concluded in his report 
on art exhibitions in November 1945.380 In order to make sure that cooperation with the 
Helsinki Art Hall would continue to work smoothly, the BC even invited Mr Hintze to London 
for a ten-day visit.381 
Although the British Council office in Helsinki had an encouraging start, and Finland was 
ranked as a priority one country, its core activities were constantly aggravated by the lack of 
appropriate funds and skilful staff.382 The growing pressure on Whitehall to make cuts in 
overseas information operations restricted the material investments in the BC's activities in 
Europe even before they had been properly launched. An example of how Britain’s difficult 
economic position affected activities in Finland was the closure of the small British Council 
branch in Turku in 1948 after only a few months of operation. The decision to close down the 
office was made after a simple realisation: most of the promised displays, assistants and 
scheduled lecturers never actually arrived to the old capital city.383 
The BBC Finnish Service suffered from no such problems. As its broadcasts were in the 
first post-war years ranked as the main source of information about Britain especially for the 
broader masses, the conversion of the programme content to peacetime form was started as 
quickly as possible. In fact, the first plans concerning the service’s broadcasting policies in post-
war conditions were laid out already in August 1943 when Hillar Kallas wrote a report stressing 
the BBC’s task to guide the Finns through the intricacies of post-war rehabilitation, to 
encourage British trade and to promote British culture. According to Kallas, broadcasting 
should focus more on lighter issues such as theatre and cinema reviews, music and sports rather 
than political news reports.384 These observations were put into practice soon after the Finnish-
Soviet War ended. After PWE decided to discontinue sending regional directives to Finland in 
late September 1944385, the news content became rapidly more neutral and focused on 
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international news reports rather than the political situation in Finland.386 The expansion of 
broadcasts presenting everyday life in Britain and British culture, most notably music, was 
almost as important. 
Despite these changes, or perhaps because of them, the station’s audience declined sharply 
after the war. Assurances given by public figures like MP Yrjö Kallinen over the broadcasts' 
widespread popularity among the working class and the 'enlightened bourgeoisie' were not 
enough to prevent British diplomats in Helsinki from making the conclusion that many Finns 
seemed unaware of their continuation.387 In order to re-attract its audience, the BBC sought to 
win publicity for its service in Finnish newspapers, which turned out to be a rather difficult task. 
What started winning the broadcaster more listeners was, above all, the introduction of the 
English teaching programme, 'English by Radio' and the Saturday night dance music special. 
The reason for this was that the Finnish home radio had nothing similar to offer.388 
In terms of political broadcasts to post-war Finland, the BBC staff made the same 
observations as Mr Kallas and the British Legation: the Finns were sick of the war and certainly 
in no mood for serious propaganda. In a report written after her visit to Finland in early 1947, 
Liisa Morell, Programme Organiser at the Finnish section, reconfirmed this view and suggested 
that the service should include even more light entertainment and keep political discussions as 
simple as possible. While saying this, she also stressed that there still was a clear demand for a 
service such as the BBC to give vigorous and intelligent political commentaries that would “put 
world events in right perspective”, particularly after a large number of Finns had developed a 
somewhat antagonistic approach to YLE, which they saw serving the interests of the far left.389 
The Finns' growing interest in all things related to Britain also helped the BBC to increase its 
profile among the public, as did the Finnish Service’s strategy to interview practically all 
prominent Finns visiting Britain.390 
 
American Presence: Quick but Reserved Start 
 
If Britain was relatively slow to launch its informational and cultural activities in post-war Finland, 
the United States was able to keep its presence felt in the country through the US Legation in 
Stockholm even before hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union had ended. As the US 
had never been at war with Finland, the expansion of American informational operations did not 
suffer from similar bureaucratic constraints that held the British campaign back, either. According 
to British reports, the Americans started to import and distribute newspapers in Finland already in 
the early months of 1944. In September 1944, the US Legation in Helsinki obtained permission 
for the export of commercial films to Finland from the Trading with the Enemy Department, 
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with the support of the State Department.391 This led to the rapid launch of, particularly war-
related American films to the Finnish market, which was something that the audiences, wishing to 
see more 'normal films', were not entirely happy with.392 
By early 1945, US propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland had become increasingly 
evident, for example, through the sale of English and Swedish versions of Time magazine in 
leading bookshops and the opening of the American Architectural Exhibition, which was 
attracting large crowds. The Americans also made a specific effort to provide Finnish newspapers 
with a daily news bulletin both in English and Finnish as soon as possible.393 The rapidly growing 
number of Finnish-American societies also proved that the Americans had got off to an almost 
flying start in post-war Finland as far as informational and cultural operations went.  
As the Americans were in the first post-war years reluctant, to say the least, to engage in full-
scale government-led propaganda, it did not take long for the US to lose its lead in informational 
activities also in Finland. Even if the Americans had managed to precede the British in the 
country, the scale of their informational activities remained modest for quite some time. State 
Department reports from early 1945 reveal that this was a perfectly conscious decision. In a 
summary of future OWI operations in Finland, written in March 1945, US officials noted that it 
was neither desirable nor possible to introduce proper peacetime operations in the country. For 
the time being, American informational activities were restricted to the distribution of the press 
bulletin, feature articles and picture material to Finnish newspapers via Stockholm and the 
placement of commercial books and films to the Finnish market. 394 
Maxwell Hamilton, the appointed US Minister to Finland, summarised the US 
Government's position towards informational activities well in one of his first reports from 
Finland. In the report, Hamilton, not unlike the British, stressed the importance of Finland 
developing friendly relations with the Soviet Union. In Hamilton’s view, massive distribution of 
American informational material would only make it more difficult for the Finns to adjust 
themselves to informational and cultural contact with the Soviet Union and, more seriously, 
develop a hope that the US was sufficiently interested in Finland to save the country from the 
Soviets if the need should arise. Even though Hamilton listed a number of proposals about how 
American presence in Finland could be strengthened, for example through establishing an OWI 
reference library and distributing non-political material to Finnish individuals, he did emphasise 
that the US informational programme should be “affirmative and positive in character but at 
the outset proceed slowly and quietly”.395 Officials in Washington agreed with Hamilton’s views 
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and confirmed that the Finns would for some time still be predominantly reached through the 
US Legation in Stockholm.396  
Of course there was nothing new about the Americans making only a limited effort in the 
field of information and culture. Although US officials in Helsinki acknowledged that before 
the outbreak of war Finnish people had been particularly keen on anything American, their 
predecessors had little to do with it. The State Department had not run a highly planned 
informational and cultural campaign in the small northern country either, and the pre-war work 
of the US Legation focused on protecting American political and economic interests 
predominantly though more traditional methods, namely by creating close contacts with 
political leaders and business groups.397 American culture was naturally promoted, but usually 
only by supporting commercial activities in the country, most importantly those of the US film 
industry. Even in this field, the US Legation's role had remained rather limited due to the simple 
fact that the popularity of Hollywood-produced movies had already grown at a staggering pace 
in the early 1920s after American film studios had reduced their sale prices and as a 
consequence become more competitive in comparison to Germany, which until then had been 
the largest exporter of films in many European countries, including Finland.398 The expanding 
funds invested in the production and marketing of Hollywood films, the large popularity of 
blockbusters like Dr. Jekyll & Mr Hyde and the new and successful way of promoting films 
through world-famous film stars, such as Charles Chaplin and Mary Pickford399, had all played 
their part in turning Finland into such a fertile country for the American film industry that it 
had hardly required much help from US officials posted in Helsinki. In the 1930s, American 
dominance in the Finnish film scene had already been such that as much as 70 per cent of 
screened films had been imported from the US and distributed by as many as four American 
businesses in the country.400 Another form of American culture becoming increasingly popular 
among younger Finns during that time was jazz music.401  
The promotion of films was an obvious focus area for the Americans after the Finnish-
Soviet War ended, not least because of the war-weary Finnish public’s huge demand for both 
domestic and foreign movies. Although the country suffered from a chronic shortage of raw 
film after the war, the number of Finnish cinema audiences reached an all-time high in 1945 
when each Finn saw ten films on average.402 The American quest of pushing new films into the 
market as quickly as possible was to some extent decelerated by the control practices introduced 
at the State Department. In early 1945, the export of American film prints to Finland was 
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managed by the US Legation in Stockholm, which assessed which films might be harmful to US 
interests in Finland.403 For instance, such films as Paramount’s Standing Room Only and Fox’s The 
Gang's All Here were not recommended to the Finnish market by Stockholm.404 This 
arrangement was not to last very long, as already in June 1945 the Legation in Stockholm 
suggested that American film distributors in Helsinki should submit information about the 
films proposed for distribution directly to the Mission in Helsinki and follow its instructions.405 
As the US Legation remained reluctant to expand its activities in the very first post-war years 
in Finland, the Finnish-American Society's role in promoting American culture grew in 
importance. The society, founded in July 1943 mainly for political reasons, had already played 
its part in American war-time cultural propaganda by screening a number of films mainly in 
Helsinki.406 It had also managed to quickly increase its membership and establish a first local 
chapter in Turku at the end of 1944. During the following year, the number of local chapters 
rose to thirteen, while the overall membership figure exceeded 7,000. 407 Although the US 
Legation in Helsinki was naturally pleased with the growing activities of The Finnish-American 
Society, which in 1945 included the screening of films and organising the America Builds 
Exhibition in Helsinki, the Americans were not at first unreservedly enthusiastic about the 
organisation and, in particular, some of its members. Several reports from 1945 reveal that the 
Americans were initially highly suspicious about supporting the society, as it discovered that a 
considerable number of its new members had leftist sympathies. In May 1945, the US Legation 
was convinced that an intentional communist party infiltration was taking place and 
contemplated the possibility of founding another friendship society that would be dominated by 
members of conservative business circles.408 Towards the late 1940s, however, the Finnish-
American Society was able to win the trust of the Americans, and gradually became one of the 
most influential channels for promoting American culture in Finland. 
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Removal of ‘Nazi Elements’ in Finnish Media 
 
As much as the US Legation was concerned about communist infiltration in the Finnish-
American Society, the initial objective for the leading Western powers after the Finnish-Soviet 
War was to remove Finnish people with Nazi sympathies from public posts, including the 
media. For US officials, the most important task was to get rid of the people whose firms had 
boycotted the screening of American movies during the war. As a result, they, together with the 
British, blacklisted a number of prominent players in the Finnish film industry for engaging in 
Nazi propaganda during the war. At the top of the American list were Adams Filmi and Suomi-
Filmi, which according to the Americans had taken strong stands against the exhibition of 
American films.409 US mistrust of the future of Suomi-Filmi was so deep that according to 
diplomatic correspondence Paramount even considered the possibility of buying out the 
company.410 British officials' attitude to blacklisting Finnish film companies was somewhat 
more flexible, perhaps due to the arguments made by Suomi-Filmi representative Risto Orko, 
according to which the Germans had forced the company to boycott Western films. The British 
realised that if they wished to screen their films at the premier theatres with good distribution, it 
might be better to reconsider some companies’ position on the list.411  
In April 1945, the Americans started plans to remove Adams-Filmi from the list. Soon after, 
Suomi-Finland's position was also normalised, not least because of the large number of theatres 
it owned throughout the country.412 Similar arrangements were also made in other fields of 
media. In the publishing sector, the British in particular were at first highly suspicious of the 
companies Otava and Werner Söderström Oy, which had “indulged in pro-Nazi, pro-Japanese 
and anti-allied literature”. For this reason, in the first post-war months the British Legation 
recommended that such rising publishers as Tammi should also be considered when selling 
translation rights for British books.413 Tammi took full advantage of this and quickly turned into 
an important partner in the promotion of Anglo-American books. Already in 1948 over 40 per 
cent of the titles it published were translations, an exceptional figure for a Finnish publisher.414  
As Britain had been at war with Finland, it was natural that the country was more active than 
the US in pressuring the Finns to oust people who had been in close contact with the Germans. 
One of the most prominent Finns the British piled pressure on was Eero A. Berg, Editor of the 
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news agency Suomen Tietotoimisto (STT). Francis Shepherd was particularly active in 
demanding the removal of Berg due to his general sympathies towards Germany and his war-
time association with Hans Metzger, who had been Germany’s Press Attaché in Finland, and 
presumably a SD (Sicherheitsdienst) agent.415 In April 1945, Eero Berg categorically denied that 
he had promoted Nazi propaganda in Finland by claiming that despite his close ties with Mr 
Metzger he and STT had acted perfectly impartially in regard to Germany and that he 
personally had demanded the right for the distribution of Allied war reports.416 Apparently, Mr 
Berg managed to convince his impartiality, as he kept his position as main editor for another 
fourteen years. Although this outcome can be regarded as somewhat surprising, considering 
both the Allied Countries' and Finnish communists'417 desire to oust people with any wartime 
association with the Germans from public positions, it also indicates that, in particular, Anglo-
American enthusiasm for such action waned rather quickly.  
When the removal of Finns with suspicious sentiment was still very much on the agenda, it 
was not restricted to the management level, either. When recruiting a new announcer for the BBC 
Finnish Service, the FO had to advice the broadcasting company to postpone the appointment of 
a journalist with the name of Mr Hiisivaara (most likely Tapio Hiisivaara, journalist, wartime 
correspondent and author) after the British Legation in Helsinki had received information about 
his wartime reporting tendencies. According to the Finnish sources, "two prominent ladies from 
the left circles", Mr Hiisivaara “was very fascist".418 After a thorough inquiry, Francis Shepherd 
saw it inadvisable to employ Mr Hiisivaara as announcer at the Finnish Service because his 
writings suggested a definite sympathy for Germany.419 As the BBC was highly anxious about 
hiring anyone who was politically active, the broadcasting company followed the advice and 
arranged a new recruitment process through the British Legation in Helsinki. This turn of events 
illustrates how sensitive the British were at time about having to deal with anyone with a 
suspiciously pro-German background. The initial candidate had received several favourable 
references from both Finnish and British circles420, but in the end a local complaint led to the 
termination of his employment and the recruitment of a new candidate, the young and able Max 
Jakobson, who after the war had been working for STT and UP.421 
 
Steady Growth of British Impact  
 
As mentioned, the desire among the Americans and British to punish Finns with supposedly 
pro-German attitudes did not last very long. This not only suggested of a gradual turn in the 
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general policy towards Finland, but also reflected the two governments' increasing desire to 
establish more positive relationships with prominent Finns, including those working in the 
media. For achieving this goal, informational and cultural activities held a key position. 
Particularly the British information service began to perform more smoothly in 1946-1947. First 
of all, the funding arrangements that in 1945 had held its activities back were considerably 
improved after the Bank of Finland became better supplied with sterling. This helped the 
purchase of British books and films in particular. The issue of the daily Press Bulletin, which 
was published in Finnish since late 1946, also absorbed a growing proportion of the 
Information Office’s, as the information department was now known, total man-hours.422 The 
importance of the bulletin as a channel for the British point of view was often stressed, as was 
the liaison with the new British Council office, which took over, for example, film and music 
record distribution activities and the conduction of regular broadcasts with the Finnish YLE.423 
As for the general political objectives in 1946-1947, the British regarded the reassurance of 
their goodwill towards Finland as especially important before the discussions leading into the 
Paris Peace Treaty. British officials recognised that widespread pessimism among the Finns had 
only grown after the war partly because they were, rather understandably it has to be said, afraid 
that Britain had no interest in their country and that they would be left to face the Russians on 
their own. The FO noted that a public statement of British concern for Finland’s sovereignty 
and independence would only arouse Soviet suspicions and “cause a stiffening of their 
attitude”. The British Legation in Helsinki was, however, encouraged to bring this message up 
in private conversations. It was again viewed that the best way to help Finland was to promote 
trade between Finland and the West and, thus, reduce Finland’s dependency on any market or 
source of materials without saying too much about the intentions in public.424  
The concessions Britain had given to the Soviet Union with regard to Finland did not mean 
that the Soviets were left to increase their political and cultural dominance in Finland entirely as 
they pleased. The FO kept a close eye on Soviet activities in Finland, reporting in detail about 
such major events as the Red Army Choir’s concerts in February 1945, and analysing how 
Britain’s presence in the country could be increased. Although the British wished to avoid doing 
anything that would upset the Russians too much, they also started to take some first, albeit 
cautious, steps to oppose the Soviet campaign already during the first post-war year mainly by 
countering some myths of Soviet propaganda in verbal form.  
When the British Government's attitude towards the Soviet Union hardened in early 1946 
and British diplomats were encouraged to counter Russian propaganda, following the principles 
determined by the FO’s Russia Committee and the IPD , the British Legation in Helsinki faced 
the same dilemma as it would do for many years to come: to what degree it would be wise to 
counter Soviet propaganda in the country? In July 1946, Mr Shepherd gave his view on what 
would be sensible. According to him, it would be unwise to try and get anti-communist articles 
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published in Finnish newspapers even if the Finns had the courage to include them. In 
Shepherd’s view the Soviets could still be best countered by “encouraging the Finns to proceed 
with the development of their own sturdy democracy and to avoid becoming tainted with the 
totalitarian methods which the Communists would like to introduce.” He did, however, suggest 
that the Legation staff should devise a more systematic programme to orally expose the lies the 
Russian were distributing for justifying their policies. This programme was also to include 
positive propaganda about the true situation in the British Empire, which, according to Mr 
Shepherd, the Russians persistently misrepresented.425 The Russia Committee approved this 
proposal and agreed to furnish the Legation with all possible support, providing that extreme 
discretion was followed in all forms of action.426 
As the British Legation's measures for countering the growing Soviet propaganda campaign 
in Finland remained limited even after this slight change of policy, the British Council and the 
BBC played significant roles in presenting the British case in the first post-war years. Expanding 
the BBC Finnish Service's audience base remained particularly high on the British agenda. For 
learning more about its listeners and getting feedback for its programmes, the broadcaster set 
up a listener panel, arranged competitions and closely examined the correspondence with its 
followers. It also ordered audience analyses from the privately-owned research companies 
Suomen Gallup and Markkinatutkimus. In 1947, Suomen Gallup estimated that the number of 
occasional listeners to the BBC Finnish Service, which at this stage only included a 30-minute 
broadcast at 1600 GMT, was between 200,000 and 250,000.427  
The first listener competition was organised in March 1948, and the feedback given by the 
participants to the Finnish Service was almost entirely complimentary. The BBC’s impartiality 
and reliability in its news bulletins won particular praise. Indeed, it turned out that the news was 
the main reason for listening to the station, which reflected a growing feeling among Finns that 
the YLE news could not be relied to give them the truth or even being up to date. More than 
anything, what was expected from the BBC broadcasts were objective news, the British 
viewpoint to world affairs and talks on Russia and its Eastern European satellites, the Baltic 
States in particular.428 In political reporting, the Finnish audience ranked the commentaries 
given by Max Jakobson particularly highly due to their accuracy and point of interest. Jakobson 
was undoubtedly influenced by the staff working for the BBC’s international section, many of 
whom had taken part in the propaganda battle during the war and were now about to start their 
attack on communism. According to him, the BBC's post-war engagement in the distribution of 
propaganda was a reality that the broadcaster's selective use of facts rather than blatant lies 
made less obvious.429 
Although the Finns' demand for wider news reports and political talk programmes increased 
steadily, the largest number of requests made by the Finnish audience to the BBC called for 
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programmes on everyday life in Britain.430 Programmes for special audiences, such as workers, 
farmers and young people, were also in demand as were comments on Finnish affairs from a 
British viewpoint. Due to its wide variety of programmes ranging from developments taking 
place in the British Commonwealth to reports on British culture including music, literature, 
theatre and sports, the Finns started to gradually regard the BBC not only as a provider of 
trustworthy news, but also as a ‘window to the world’.  
In making the Finns more acquainted with Britain, the work done through the British 
Council was, even if not always as appreciated, as important as the BBC broadcasts. 
Observations made both by the British Legation and Finnish contacts supported the Helsinki 
office's view that it had managed to gain considerable success even with limited resources.431 In 
addition to the usual BC objectives, i.e. the promotion of a better knowledge of British 
scientific and cultural achievements and the encouragement of exchange in these fields, in 
Finland specific attention was given to extending the knowledge of the English language and to 
support and expand the network of anglophile societies. The decision made shortly after the 
war by a large number of Finnish schools to replace German with English as the first taught 
foreign language gave an enormous boost to the promotion of the language, as well as British 
culture in general. The rapidly growing numbers of students of English at the University of 
Helsinki only enhanced this trend.432  
The partial replacement of German language by English in the Finnish educational sphere 
was, unsurprisingly, not a completely straightforward matter. The shortage of qualified teachers 
and the lack of textbooks were the two most crucial obstacles preventing an even faster 
embracement of the language in the country. According to the BC Helsinki office, the lack of 
teachers was an issue that would take several years to rectify. To do at least something about 
this, from 1946 onwards the Council started to hold special summer schools for Finnish 
teachers.433 As for language publications, the plan was to distribute a sufficient number of 
books and periodicals to schoolteachers, universities and anglophile societies with even more 
immediate effect. In this task, however, British officials were at first left bitterly disappointed 
with the Bank of Finland’s sterling allocations for the two leading Finnish bookshops, 
Akateeminen Kirjakauppa and Suomalainen Kirjakauppa, which permitted very little increase in 
the volume of book imports.434 As the demand for books in English was so great in post-war 
Finland that virtually all titles were sold at once, the situation greatly frustrated the British 
Legation, also closely involved in this particular field. 
Towards the late 1940s, the situation in academic publications gradually improved and the 
British managed to send a more reasonable amount of required teaching material and 
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periodicals to Finland. Textbooks and handbooks on the English language were sent to schools 
and universities. The numbers of English books, both scientific and fictional, sent to the 
University of Helsinki Library also grew considerably before the end of the decade. In order to 
accelerate the general shift towards the English language in the world of academia, the BC 
began to offer Finnish universities a list of alternatives for prevailing German textbooks used in 
all subjects. The British also started sponsoring the use of lecturers at the University of Helsinki 
and Åbo Akademi, which both held a chair in English philology. A readership in the subject of 
British Institutes at the former was also funded in order to shift the emphasis away from the 
purely philological study of English.435  
The recruitment of more British-born teacher-secretaries to provincial anglophile societies 
enhanced the supply of teaching to working and middle class Finns. Since a large share of their 
members had joined in order to learn the language, English courses were the societies’ main 
area of activity. In this respect they differed from the Finnish-American societies, which initially 
had a more social than educational approach.436 The popularity of the anglophile societies 
continuously surprised the British. In 1945, the Finnish-British Society in Helsinki already had 
1,300 members, and the number of societies around the country had passed the thirty mark.437 
What turned out to be even more surprising was the provincial societies' persistence. The 
British Council had expected that many of them would lose members especially after the 1952 
Helsinki Olympics when the greatest desire to learn at least some English was over. This 
proved not to be the case, as the number of language groups run by the societies only grew in 
the early 1950s.438  
The relationship between the BC and the anglophile societies was particularly close in the 
first post-war years when the British wished to kick off their activities by providing study grants 
and distributing printed material, short films, photographs and other such products. One 
important activity in which the Finnish-British Society in Helsinki was of particular value was 
the promotion of prominent British individuals visiting Finland. Both the BC and the British 
Legation were more than keen to arrange British visitors, among them the novelist and 
playwright J.B. Priestley, to give lectures for anglophile societies whenever possible.439 British 
officials in Finland also gave their personal contribution to the cause by occasionally giving their 
own lectures to society members.440 In 1946, the British were also able to find a much broader 
listener audience for such commentaries when YLE agreed to air a series of talks given by the 
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likes of J.B.C. Grundy and Denis Frean. These broadcasts, given fortnightly with the title 
‘Britain Today’, dealt with topics like the British educational system, the London scene and life 
in the English countryside.441 D.R. Roper from the British Legation complemented the 
broadcasts by presenting similar issues in Finnish in his ‘From the British Point of View' series. 
The British Council’s most visible activity took shape in the various exhibitions it organised 
in Finland. As in the post-war years every event with any connection to the West generated 
considerable interest among the Finns, the BC's exhibitions and theme weeks, which for 
instance in 1946 included a book exhibition, an exhibition for children’s art and a British music 
week, were well attended and produced plenty of visible and favourable publicity in Finnish 
newspapers.442 The regular visits many Finnish political leaders paid to these exhibitions443 
reflected how interesting and highly valued foreign, especially Western, cultures were regarded 
in Finland at that time. The success of these exhibitions, together with the spread of the English 
language and the expansion of the anglophile societies, impressed Oswald Scott, British 
Minister to Finland, to such an extent that in January 1948 he declared that “of all foreign 
cultural activities in Finland the British remained by far the most extensively and effectively 
conducted”.444 Although this praise was followed by a FO observation emphasising the 
importance of cultural diplomacy in Finland445, one is left with the feeling that even more could 
have been done in the country. The decision to spend less on activities aiming to have a longer 
term effect on its target groups meant that the British Council was not able to execute even its 
most central tasks as efficiently as it would have wished.  
 
First Signs of USIS Expansion 
 
As concerned as British actors in Helsinki remained of the resources at their disposal, the scale 
of their operations were at least growing impressively. The same cannot be said about the US 
campaign, which remained fairly modest for quite some time. The British Legation felt in late 
1946 that the Americans, although slowly extending their activities, were above all constrained 
by their inability to call on “the highly organised home producer services as we and the British 
Council”.446 This and the fact that even the BC's resources at first clearly outweighed those of 
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the American cultural attaché447 meant that the scope of the American operations would be a 
good deal smaller, the British concluded.  
It is true that in the first years after the war, US policy towards Finland predominantly 
focused on providing financial assistance, which was, of course, as such considered the best 
kind of propaganda. Although a USIS country programme for Finland was launched in 1946, 
soon after the arrival of the first post-war public affairs officer, American information activities 
did not really pick up speed until the passing of the Smith-Mundt Act in January 1948, which 
guaranteed proper funds for propaganda operations also in Finland. This did not mean that the 
Americans were indifferent of informational and cultural affairs in Finland. On the contrary: as 
early as in 1945 the US Legation started to follow closely, and with some concern, the 
expanding Soviet propaganda activities in the country. The Legation wrote several reports on 
the issue and after the visit of the Red Army Choir seemed particularly impressed with the use 
of military music in propaganda, which according to the Americans was highly efficient since it 
appealed equally to the broad public and the cultural circles.448 The increasingly visible presence 
of Soviet newspapers and publications in the streets of Helsinki was another worry for US 
officials. The suspicion that American cultural products could be overshadowed by Soviet ones 
is well reflected in a report by Mr Hamilton claiming that Soviet books, mainly on communism, 
available at Akateeminen Kirjakauppa were more prominently placed than books in English 
after a Russian officer had visited the store.449  
The Americans felt more confused than alarmed of these kinds of developments, as they 
knew perfectly well that the sentiment in Finland was in general pro-Western and anti-Russian. 
As Soviet propaganda in Finland grew, and the policy of containing communism started to gain 
ground in Washington, the US Legation in Helsinki was, however, more than willing to 
introduce a reasonable expansion to informational and cultural operations in 1947. The 
activities were now clearly divided into the printed word, films and the radio, exhibitions and 
the exchange of people. This division would be characteristic for the USIS programme in 
Finland for years to come. 
Not surprisingly, the expanded programme gave closest attention to film. In 1947, the 
USIS/Helsinki already held almost 700 screenings to a total audience of over 93,000. For 
screening purposes, the Americans quickly found efficient partners from a number of Finnish 
organisations such as elementary and secondary schools, the Finnish trade union movement and 
various cultural organisations. As a result, the seven film projectors the USIS owned were in 
constant use throughout the country.450 At this point, the content provided by the US Motion 
Picture Department focused more on presenting American history, particularly the country’s role 
in the Second World War, and US achievements in the fields of health and technology rather than 
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contemporary political events.451 Because of this, the Americans faced few problems in the films' 
importation and distribution. For example in 1947, the Finnish Censorship Board approved all of 
the 153 educational films the Americans imported to the country.452 This was in stark contrast 
with the commercial American films shipped to Finland during the same year of which as many 
as 7.7 per cent were banned by the Finnish authorities.453 
The distribution of American-produced news and articles was also finally growing in 1947. 
The State Department Wireless Bulletin was now delivered on a daily basis to over a hundred 
‘clients’, including Finnish Government officials, newspaper editors and leaders in Finnish 
industrial and cultural life. A fifteen-page Finnish-language bulletin was produced twice a week 
and circulated to over fifty Finnish daily newspapers. In addition to the two bulletins, selected 
Finnish newspapers and magazines were served on request with special stories and photographs 
from the leading American publications. While the expansion of distributed material led to the 
growing use of American content in Finnish newspapers, evidence also suggests that the reports 
included in the Wireless Bulletin, which had the general objective of keeping leading Finnish 
politicians informed about international developments from the US perspective, were closely 
read and used by Finnish leaders. This was evident, for example in January 1947 when President 
Paasikivi prepared a separate memorandum based on bulletin content on the way Soviet Union 
had increased its control of the economies of, for instance, Hungary and Romania by taking 
over companies that used to be in German ownership and founding new ones with mixed 
ownership.454 As one of Paasikivi’s top priorities was to prevent the Soviets from increasing 
their presence in the economic life of Finland, feeding him with news articles over similar 
developments in other countries was undoubtedly a smart move from the US Legation. This 
incident also shows that behind the scenes the Americans, despite often pessimistic about 
Finland’s future, wished to make sure that the country’s fate would not be determined by its 
leaders' lack of topical information.  
The opening of the USIS library in Kalevankatu, Helsinki, in May 1946455 was something 
that made US officials particularly proud. During its first year of operation, over 38,000 Finns 
visited the library and the number of borrowed books, periodicals and recordings reached a 
new level. Among its other activities, the library took an active part in organising American 
exhibits in Finland, now prepared on average twice a month, both for use as window-displays 
and as travelling shows.456 The library and the exhibits on show around Finland, together with 
the larger exhibitions imported from the US, gave the Americans such an influential presence in 
Helsinki in particular that even the British, convinced of the supremacy of their own 
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programme, were impressed with them.457 The gradually growing activities gave a reason also 
for the US Legation to be reasonably happy with the USIS/Helsinki’s overall performance. At 
the same time, however, the Americans felt that any further expansion of the informational and 
cultural programme would not be possible due their lack of staff. As the main objective of the 
US activities remained the same as in earlier years, i.e. to encourage Finns to understand 
American ideas and polices rather than questioning communism, the State Department was still 
not convinced that larger resources were needed in Helsinki.  
If it took some while for the US Government to have its worldwide propaganda machinery 
running after the Second World War, the growing focus on cultural and educational diplomacy 
was turned into practice at a faster pace. Investment in various exchange programmes grew 
rapidly after American leaders began to recognise their importance as a part of the country’s 
foreign policy and an important weapon in the Cold War. The 1950s were a particular golden 
age for the Fulbright Programme, as back then the US Government saw no contradiction in 
making sizeable investments in overseas education for the young, while refraining from 
interfering with them too much.458 The exchange of persons was a field in which the Americans 
were willing to invest early on also in Finland. Indeed, in the very first post-war years, the US 
gave specific emphasis on the establishment of cultural contacts and the promotion of 
educational exchange through privately-sponsored programmes. All these efforts were, 
naturally, made in order to make Finland more integrated to the West.  
Already before the war, private foundations had sponsored the education of a number of 
promising Finnish students in the US. When the conflict came to an end, it did not take long 
for, for example, representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation to visit Finland and make 
agreements concerning future exchange schemes and projects in which the foundation was 
willing to invest.459 The Finns themselves were obviously eager to establish new contacts with 
American universities and other educational institutions. From 1945 to 1947, three rivalling 
organisations were involved in offering a still modest number of scholarships available for 
Finnish students willing to study in the US. The Finnish-American Society was the first actor to 
enter the field in December 1945 when it offered its first four scholarships.460 In spring 1947, 
the specially established Finnish-American Cultural Commission was also able to offer four 
grants that were provided by private American foundations and institutions. The National 
Union of University Students in Finland (Suomen Ylioppilaskuntien Liitto, SYL) joined the 
market during the same year after establishing contacts with such organisations as the Institute 
of International Education and the American Scandinavian Foundation.461  
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In order to make the offering of scholarships more efficient and end the rivalry between the 
three organisations, representatives of American universities and foundations, together with the 
US Legation in Helsinki, suggested that a single organ should be established for the promotion of 
scholarly exchange. In October 1947, the proposal materialised when the Finnish-American 
Committee on Study and Training in the United States (FCSTUS) was established by the Finnish-
American Society, the Finnish Cultural Fund and several Finnish academies.462 The committee 
dedicated its first years of operation mainly to the establishment of new contacts. Representatives 
of a number of American foundations visited Finland in 1947-1948, while Eino Saari and Bengt 
Broms, Chairman and General Secretary of the new committee, toured the US with the quest of 
becoming acquainted with the various American organisations offering scholarships.463 As new 
contacts were made and new foundations were willing to offer scholarships to Finland, the 
number of Finns making the trip across the Atlantic for study purposes started to grow 
formidably. The introduction of the Fulbright Programme in Finland, and subsequently more 
comprehensible academic exchange, was, however, still some years away. 
The US Government's growing, albeit rather slow-paced, investment in cultural diplomacy 
and informational activities in Finland in the first post-war years shows that the Americans did 
show some interest in the northern country after all. As political, not to mention military, 
support to the Finns remained unwise, US officials, like the British, realised that it could 
influence Finland’s development only through cultural and economic methods, which often 
complemented each other. Helping the Finns to modernise their industrial sector and making 
the country’s economy more dependent on Western trade464 was an objective for which the 
activity involving the exchange of persons, most importantly businessmen and academics, 
would play a particularly integral part. The general American sentiment regarding Finland’s 
future was well epitomised in one of the CIA’s early situation reports from June 1947. Although 
the report categorised Finland as "a model Stalin protectorate", it noted that the country was 
still free and its exports to the West were growing.465 The US started to become at least slightly 
more confident that Finland could maintain its position as an independent country after all.  
 
Finland and Propaganda: Tight Control and Intensifying Political Agitation  
 
As already suggested, it did not take long for the Western powers to discover that post-war 
Finland would be a tough environment for informational and cultural activities. Soviet 
propaganda in Finland was strong and the country had a substantial influence on Finnish media 
content. The situation was particularly difficult in 1944-1947 when official censorship prevailed 
and the Finnish Government instituted a consistent control of the press to protect the nation’s 
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new course in foreign policy. Soviet sensitivity over anything that could be regarded as 
unfavourable was well reflected in the Control Commission's order to Finnish libraries and 
bookshops to dispose of books that did not meet its approval. As a result, over 1,700 titles were 
removed, including books that criticised the Soviet system or handled the Fenno-Ugric nations 
sharing ties of kinship with the Finnish people. Several school text books on history, geography 
and the Finnish and German languages were also rejected and their content was altered in order 
to prevent the teaching of fascist or anti-communist elements to pupils.466 
The Finnish state censorship machinery that continued to carry out its war-time duties was at 
its most active in 1945 when it gave as many as 130 instructions to Finnish newspapers and 
magazines regarding topical issues and requested the removal of 153 articles in total.467 The most 
typical requests concerned reports on developments in the Soviet Union or Finnish-Soviet 
affairs.468 In addition to articles written by Finns, the censorship organ monitored outgoing and 
incoming foreign news reports, telegrams and telephone messages, occasionally making requests 
to remove whole articles meant to be published by Finnish newspapers, mostly the larger ones 
based in Helsinki, or STT.469 This obviously made the promotion of British and American policies 
in post-war Finland an even harder task. The strictest censorship period did not, however, last for 
very long, and already in 1946 after the War-Responsibility Trial, during which the Finnish press 
was particularly closely monitored, newspaper editors found a somewhat sharper tone and 
became increasingly reluctant to let their papers’ text in the hands of censors.470 
Even though formal censorship was finally lifted in 1947, the position of the Finnish press 
changed only to a certain extent. J.K. Paasikivi had already as Prime Minister in 1946 famously 
warned editors about the possible consequences of their writings and urged them to “help to 
shape the way towards a new kind of relationship with the eastern neighbour by writing about it 
correctly and in a better and more versatile way”.471 As President, he continued for some while 
to influence the press through telephone calls, letters and personal meetings as well as speeches 
on the newspapers and their contents.472 The regular comments and personal instructions 
Paasikivi and his Prime Ministers Mauno Pekkala and Urho Kekkonen gave newspaper editors 
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over the writings of the press played an important part in persuading the Helsinki papers to 
adopt an extremely sensitive course in their writings about the Soviet Union.  
The special amendment made to Finnish law in 1948 only increased this caution as it made it 
possible to give a prison sentence to a journalist for articles slandering foreign nations. 
Although the law was never applied, together with the leading politicians’ efforts to guide the 
press it laid the foundation for Finnish newspapers’ dealings with Soviet matters during the 
Cold War. The Finnish press, even the more outspoken right-wing and social democratic 
papers, remained in general reluctant to write about the eastern neighbour. Sensitive matters, 
such as conflicts or various disasters, as well as developments in international politics involving 
the Soviet Union, were often only reported about through quoting international news 
agencies.473 According to Salminen, the exaggerated caution with which the Soviets were treated 
resulted in a whole practice of silence, indirect expressions and readings between the lines.474 
The rules and measures of Finnish self-censorship were already being defined in the first post-
war years and closely guarded by the state censorship organs' and the Finnish Foreign Ministry' 
continuous monitoring of the media. 
All this did not mean that Finnish newspapers did not practise any criticism towards events 
involving the Soviet Union. As the final boundaries for the Cold War were drawn in the late 
1940s, the Finnish press was also divided into two camps that would relentlessly criticise each 
other. By attacking domestic communists, right-wing, liberal and social democratic publications 
were able to indirectly undermine Soviet actions as well. Although the country’s leading 
newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, officially independent but with well-known liberal and social 
democratic sympathies, the conservative Uusi Suomi, and particularly the social democratic 
Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, did start to provide stronger comments about international 
developments, such as the communist takeover in Hungary in 1948 or Marshall Aid, when it 
came to examining superpower relations, they continued to follow a predominantly cautious 
policy for some time.475 
The battle of words between the non-communist papers and publications from the far left, 
mainly Vapaa Sana and Työkansan Sanomat, quickly turned fierce. Although focusing mostly on 
domestic issues, the leading communist papers formed a significant part of the Soviet Union’s 
propaganda machinery in Finland by regularly quoting Soviet newspapers on topical issues. In 
this task, they were supported by Moscow’s Finnish language radio broadcasts, by far the most 
hard-hitting organ of Soviet propaganda. The broadcasts, listened to only by the most loyal 
communists476, picked up where they had left off after the war by providing daily comments on 
developments in Finland and criticising the Finnish Government and its policies, the Finns’, or 
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more precisely ‘the reactionary forces'', ties with ‘Western capitalists’ and, above all, the social 
democrats and their leading newspapers.477  
Even though the Soviet Legation conducted a propaganda programme of its own in 
Helsinki, and its officials, together with the Russian members of the Control Commission, 
relentlessly complained to Finnish politicians about anything that might be interpreted as 
negative towards the Soviet Union or the country's poor visibility in the media, a lion’s share of 
Soviet propaganda in Finland was executed through the leading communist party, the Finnish 
People’s Democratic League (Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto, SKDL), the SKP and, 
above all, SNS. The society, which was joined by a number of leading Finnish politicians against 
their real political convictions as a gesture of friendship towards the vast eastern neighbour, 
provided an important organ for the implementation of closer cultural ties between the two 
countries. In close cooperation with the Soviet VOKS, the Society for Cultural Relations with 
Foreign Countries, SNS managed to import an impressive number of Soviet artists to Finland 
after the war as well as promote Russian films, exhibitions, plays and literature. After the rush 
of activity in 1945, when the number of members was as large as 170,000, the visits and 
exhibitions became more scarce and the society’s popularity started to decline slowly.478 In spite 
of this, SNS remained an influential actor in Finnish society during the early Cold War. It 
continued to implement broad-scale propaganda activities and acted as something of a 
watchdog of Western activities in Finland, reporting actively about ‘anti-communist’ 
propaganda practised in the country.  
In following anti-communist propaganda the Finnish communists received plenty of 
assistance from the services of the communist-dominated Finnish Security Police (Valtiollinen 
poliisi, Valpo). Apart from keeping an eye on foreign activity in the country, the police shaped 
the information and cultural battleground in Finland by monitoring both domestic and foreign 
cultural products, such as films, books and pamphlets, which were distributed throughout the 
country. Valpo agents, often complete amateurs in their conduct, reported actively about 
anything that might be interpreted as anti-communist or anti-Soviet and urged the Finnish 
police to penalise for such activities. While carrying out this close follow-up, Valpo also started 
to make somewhat exaggerated interpretations about developments in Finnish society. By 1947 
Valpo officials had reached the conclusion that anti-Soviet propaganda in Finland had adopted 
a particularly arrogant tone and that the encouragement of a hostile sentiment against the 
communist neighbour had become common throughout the country.479 This sentiment, 
according to Valpo reports, was evident in newspaper articles, politicians’ comments, the 
distribution of anti-communist propaganda leaflets and the activities of some suspicious 
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organisations, such as various youth clubs.480 In order to prevent the anti-Soviet feeling from 
becoming even stronger, the security police kept a close watch on all British and American 
activities in the country. Valpo’s agents reported regularly about, for instance, the Finnish-
British Society and the Finnish-American Society481 and collected samples of British and 
American news bulletins482 distributed in Finland so that the suitability of their content could be 
estimated. The secret police also gathered information about the daily movements of British 
and American information officers in Finland, often following their travels even outside the 
capital area.483 
When monitoring the distribution of films and books in Finland, at times Valpo officials 
even provided an analysis of their own over the product’s suitability for the local environment. 
One such comment concerned George Orwell’s novel Animal Farm, one of the IRD’s and the 
USIA’s most used Cold War propaganda products throughout the world, both in print and as 
an animated film.484 According to the Valpo agent reviewing the book in 1947, the work was 
“undoubtedly propaganda directed against the Soviet Union in which the tendency’s 
obviousness has been skilfully hidden by the use of satire”.485 The fact that the book was sent to 
the Ministry of Justice for further review and not published in Finnish until 1969 tells a lot 
about the degree of caution that prevailed in Cold War Finland. Orwell’s other famous work, 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, also promoted eagerly by the IRD, fared somewhat better as it was 
published in Finnish by WSOY in 1950, but only after the publisher excluded a part from it 
judging the Soviet Union’s systematic persecution of all dissidents.486 An uncensored translation 
of the book was not published until 1999, fifty years after it was first put on sale in London.  
Although both the British and the Americans in general regarded the increasing propaganda 
battle in the Finnish press mainly as a domestic issue, the slandering tone the leading 
communist papers often adopted against their respective countries and governments was 
something both of them were ready to counter. The British Legation proved more active also in 
this respect. Already in June 1945 the Legation made its first complaint to the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry about articles appearing in the press that it found objectionable. According to Francis 
                                                 
480 The distribution of anti-communist propaganda leaflets was something that Valpo agents reported regularly about, 
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481 For example,' Ilmoitus koskien Kotkan Suomalais-Englantilaisen Seuran tilaisuutta, 4.3.1947'; 'Ilmoitus koskien 
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Shepherd, a press campaign against Britain in particular was taking place in a number of papers 
from the extreme left, including the SNS journal SNS Lehti, which for example criticised 
Britain’s attitude with regard to Yugoslavia, Poland and Greece, and Vapaa Sana, which claimed 
that Western Powers were protecting fascists and repressing democratic risings by force. 
Shepherd, well aware that the attacks found their inspiration in Moscow, asked instructions 
from London whether an official complaint should be made and whether it would be wise to 
respond to these attacks by inspiring an article in a English newspaper, such as The Times.487 The 
FO felt that neither of these measures was necessary since they would only give too much 
importance to the attacks and start a controversy.488 At the end, Mr Shepherd discussed the 
matter with Reinhold Svento, Second Minister for Foreign Affairs and a new member of the 
SKDL, who promised to take action against a repetition of similar articles through the Ministry 
of Education.489 
In early 1946, the tension between British officials and Finnish communists only grew after 
Vapaa Sana and Työkansan Sanomat published more violently anti-British articles. The papers, for 
instance, labelled Britain's occupation of Indonesia as "British imperialism" and criticised the 
dealings of the Anglo-American alliance concerning the Soviet withdrawal from Persia. Acting 
in accordance with FO orders, Mr Shepherd again discussed the subject with Mr Svento and in 
particular complained about the claims appearing in the article on Indonesia that Britain 
subdued by force of arms liberty movements wherever she encountered them. As Article 21 of 
the Armistice Agreement obliged the Finnish Government to prevent propaganda against the 
UN, also criticised in the story, the issue was brought to the Allied Control Commission’s 
notice with the consequence of General Grigori Savonenkov promising to take action. The 
British felt that a firm response would be desirable and that the Finns needed to be recalled 
about Britain’s position as the other Power Signatory to the Armistice.490  
When more anti-British articles, culled from the Moscow press, kept appearing in spring 
1946, Britain decided to send an official note regarding the affair.491 In the note, Francis 
Shepherd brought to Carl Enckell’s, Minister for Foreign Affairs, attention a report on the 
Persian question that was published by both Työkansan Sanomat and Vapaa Sana492, and an 
article, which labelled the Second World War as having been an imperialistic conflict until the 
Soviet Union had entered the struggle.493 According to Mr Shepherd, the articles not only 
displayed a hostile feeling towards Western democracies including Britain, but also appeared to 
be designed to direct attention to and encourage differences between the Soviet Union and the 
British Empire.494 Mr Enckell, regretting the ignorance of the newspapers, brought the note to 
the attention of the papers’ chief editors and suggested to them to avoid publishing articles with 
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“tendentious and inaccurate statements”.495 The British were pleased with this response and 
generally happy to see that the protest made against anti-British articles was given considerable 
publicity by the Finnish press.496  
The note did not stop the communist papers from publishing further provocative material. By 
autumn 1946, however, the domestic situation in Finland had developed to such degree that the 
social democratic newspapers, following a party directive, started to campaign for tactfulness 
towards Britain and the US. After this, the British felt that the Finnish press was becoming strong 
enough to react against the propaganda from the extreme left and that a further protest over anti-
British articles would no longer be necessary.497 Although reducing the number of official 
complaints, this position did not stop the British Legation from making the occasional unofficial 
inquiry over certain articles published in the Finnish press. For instance in November 1946, Ray 
Muston, Third Secretary at the British Legation, brought to the Finnish Foreign Ministry's 
attention an article published in the small communist paper Kansan Ääni, which suggested that 
"British reactionary forces" were involved in the so-called Weapons Cache Case.498  
The US Legation also kept a close eye on articles appearing in the Finnish press and the 
development of the country’s propaganda environment. As early as in 1945, the Americans 
made a direct complaint about a report they felt was insulting towards President Truman. As a 
result of this complaint, the Finnish Censorship Board notified Työkansan Sanomat about its 
publishing policy.499 In February 1947, the Legation reported about a series of anti-American 
editorials appearing in Työkansan Sanomat500, the publication of which followed a conscious 
decision made by the Finnish communists to strengthen their rhetoric attack against "the 
world's leading reactionary power the US".501 In general, however, American officials did not 
seem quite as concerned as their British counterparts about growing communist propaganda. 
For instance in April 1947 Maxwell Hamilton reported that SNS was having great difficulty in 
adjusting propaganda received from the Soviet Union for use in Finland.502 Although strongly 
anti-Western editorials and reports appearing in the communist press would become more the 
norm rather than the exception in the upcoming years, over time the British also relaxed their 
attitude towards them, mainly because the total circulation of the corresponding publications 
remained rather small. 
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Contacting Key Media Outlets  
 
In the first post-war years, both British and American officials more than anything stressed the 
importance of creating close personal ties with influential Finns, such as politicians, civil 
servants, academics and journalists. The British Legation was highly active also in this field, 
particularly after its campaign to verbally undermine Russian fabrications had been introduced. 
After the Control Commission finished its work in Finland and interaction with Finns became 
more relaxed, the Legation started to invite even more prominent Finns from various walks of 
life to weekly social gatherings at its premises. The objective of these meetings was not only to 
collect information about Finland, but also to reassure Finns that the Western powers knew 
about the latest developments in their country.503 There was nothing strange about this, as the 
link between gathering intelligence and distributing information was very close in post-war 
Finland. The appointment of Rex Bosley, whose main task in Finland was to reopen and take 
full charge of the MI6 station in Helsinki, as Assistant Information Officer in 1947 only 
emphasised this connection.504 Mr Bosley was to cultivate hundreds of contacts in Finland, both 
for intelligence and propaganda purposes. 
Although both the British and the Americans wished to make close contacts with all leading 
political parties in Finland, considerable effort was made to building a warm relationship with 
the SDP, as it was seen to hold the very key position in countering communism in Finland. 
Finnish social democrats, together with the conservatives, were also regarded as useful 
providers of intelligence regarding political development in Finland and the undertakings of the 
Soviets. The fact that Britain was governed by a Labour Government naturally made 
cooperation with the SPD significantly easier. 
The Finnish social democrats, especially staunch anti-communists such as Väinö Leskinen 
and Unto Varjonen, certainly did not object to having closer ties with their ideological allies all 
over Western Europe. In addition to being in close contact with the British and American 
legations in Helsinki from 1945 onwards505, both men made numerous trips to Sweden and 
Britain in order to win support and receive advice for their struggle against communism from 
their Western comrades. Varjonen was particularly active in pleading authoritative members of 
the Labour Party to show some solidarity for Finland during the most uncertain post-war times. 
He, for example, requested Morgan Phillips, General Secretary of the Labour Party, to contact 
the Labour press and arrange that British journalists would be present at the War-Responsibility 
Trial.506 Varjonen was also successful in inviting Western social democrats, including Labour 
MP John Freeman, to the SDP’s Party Congress in 1946.507 The closer ties with other European 
socialists also increased the exchange of information on international affairs and labour matters 
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through such channels as the 'SILO Bulletin', circulated by the Labour Party’s Socialist 
Information and Liaison Office.508  
Both British and American officials were impressed by the way the SDP was able to build a 
highly effective propaganda and intelligence collection organisation so quickly after the war. 
Because the communists had the edge in most Finnish labour organisations in the very first 
post-war years, the SDP made some significant reorganising to its party machinery by 
establishing a new party propaganda department and a trade union section.509 Both of these new 
divisions were to play a significant role in combating communism within the labour movement; 
in political parties, the trade unions and in workplaces.510 The SDP’s trade union section, in 
particular, held a key position in implementing the tougher propaganda line adopted against the 
communists after the Party Congress in 1946.511 Having a highly modern organisation that, 
according to Seppo Hentilä, resembled the structure of military intelligence work512, the section 
listed a great number of detailed propaganda activities513 for opposing the communists and 
stressed the importance of using opinion polls for political purposes.514 For the latter objective, 
the SDP even founded a company of its own, Psyko-Työ, which would conduct a large number 
of surveys on such issues as the general attitudes of factory workers and the performance of 
political parties.515 The effectiveness of the SDP’s new propaganda activities, based on the new 
concept of 'fighting social democracy' was eventually measured, above all, in the SAK elections 
of spring 1947 in which the social democrats managed to win a clear majority of representatives 
thanks to a campaign of unprecedented scale that saw leading SDP propagandists like Unto 
Varjonen, Väinö Leskinen and Yrjö “Jahvetti” Kilpeläinen use all their creativity to undermine 
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the communists under the 'Enough is Enough' (Jo riittää) slogan.516 A similar campaign was also 
successfully carried out for the parliamentary elections of July 1948 when the SDP managed to 
gain more seats mainly at the expense of the SKDL. 
Although pleased with the modern propaganda organisation the SDP had created to contain 
communism in political parties517, the British and Americans remained worried that the social 
democrats, and Finns in general, might be getting too enthusiastic and open in this activity. As a 
result, for example Denis Healey, Secretary of the International Department of the Labour 
Party, on several occasions reminded them against becoming overexcited and too provocative, 
as the number one priority for the SDP should, after all, be the preservation of Finland’s 
independence and democracy, which could be guaranteed only with the goodwill of the Soviet 
Union.518 Healey feared that if the Finns could not resist themselves, there was the possibility 
that the Soviet Union would not ratify the Peace Treaty with Finland. Väinö Leskinen did not 
agree with Mr Healey’s rather pessimistic view of Finland’s future and tried to convince him 
that Finns in general did not feel that the country was going to follow Hungary's recent fate.519  
The strong anti-Soviet sentiment developing among certain social democrats also worried 
John Freeman, who after his visit to Helsinki noted to Unto Varjonen that at times the general 
discussion in Finland was irresponsible considering the circumstances.520 Francis Shepherd 
partly agreed with this view in a report to Minister Bevin in which he stressed that particularly 
Mr Varjonen’s criticism of the Soviet Union could turn out to be dangerous for the whole 
country.521 The US State Department adopted a similar position in regard to anti-communist 
activities in post-war Finland; in general the containment of communism was to be supported, 
but at the same time caution was to be emphasised. This policy was well evident for example in 
December 1947 when the US Legation decided not to lend another film projector to a member 
of the Finnish-American Society of Hämeenlinna, who planned to travel around the 
countryside showing USIS filmstrips in an effort to arouse anti-communist activity.522  
Due to their close contacts with the SDP, the British and US Legations were able to 
distribute plenty of propaganda of their own through the party network and the social democrat 
newspapers. The fact that perhaps the largest amount of official British and American 
propaganda content distributed in Finland, both anti-communist and neutral, can be found at 
the party’s archives illustrates this well. The material from the first post-war years, consisting of 
British and American news bulletins, supports the view that the two Western powers adopted a 
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somewhat neutral policy in regard to their informational content after the war. The bulletins 
issued by both countries consisted mostly of reports on topical international issues without 
making any criticism of the Soviet Union or communism. During the first post-war years, the 
American bulletin, at times even thirteen pages long and published in English, gave a highly 
detailed account of US foreign policy523, while the Finnish-language British bulletin, much 
shorter in length, focused more on presenting the economic and social achievements of the 
Labour Government.524 
As important as the close relationship with the social democrats and their newspapers, most 
crucially Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, was to the British and Americans, the most significant contact 
in the Finnish media for both Western legations was Eljas Erkko, owner and editor of the 
country’s leading newspaper Helsingin Sanomat and the leading tabloid Ilta-Sanomat. Closely 
connected to both countries, Erkko often acted as something of an intermediary between the 
Finnish political leadership and the Western powers.525 In his publishing policies, Mr Erkko 
pretty much kept his own head during the post-war years and refused to introduce too strict 
censorship measures in his newspapers, despite being regularly pressurised by J.K. Paasikivi and 
later Urho Kekkonen. This did not mean that his papers were openly critical of, for example the 
Soviet Union; they merely published much more material on British and American issues than 
articles concerning Finland’s mighty neighbour.526 If conditions in the Soviet Union were 
criticised in Helsingin Sanomat, it was mainly done through articles written by foreign writers. 
For keeping Finns on track with international news topics, the agreements with UP and The 
Times were of particular importance for Helsingin Sanomat. The deal with The Times gave 
Erkko’s publication the exclusive right in Finland to include any material from the famous 
British paper. This agreement was so binding that even COI had to pay compensation through 
the British Legation to Helsingin Sanomat when picking articles from The Times for the 
Finnish editions of various periodicals it spread for propaganda purposes.527 Erkko also built 
close contacts with, for example, the editors of Time and Life, which provided the Sanoma 
papers with plenty of content for years to come. Helsingin Sanomat’s position as the leading 
newspaper in Finland also meant that both the British and US legations aimed to provide the 
paper with as much material as they could. The USIS, for example, started to offer various 
photographs from the US for the publication's use, free of charge.528 Helsingin Sanomat's 
employment of correspondents abroad, a very rare treat for a Finnish newspaper in the 1940s, 
also contributed to giving the readers a more profound picture of international issues. For their 
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reports from London, for example, the correspondents naturally used a wide range of British 
newspapers as sources. This was not always that simple, as the Finns always had to contemplate 
whether their content was suitable for readers back home. For example, Eero Petäjäniemi, 
Helsingin Sanomat’s London correspondent, regretted in 1947 that the broad articles The Times 
published on Eastern European countries could perhaps not be used in Finland, even if the 
British newspaper’s publishing policy was, in general, neutral.529 In addition to its own 
correspondents, the use of a number of prominent foreign commentators, such as Walter 
Lippman, gave Helsingin Sanomat more international flair.530  
Eljas Erkko's desire to include mainly American cartoons in his newspapers also brought the 
Western way of life closer to the Finnish public. Already before the war, Helsingin Sanomat had 
published a great variety of famous comics from the 'Lone Ranger' to 'Mickey Mouse'. In 1947, 
Sanoma Oy extended the agreement with Bull’s Presstjänst, the Scandinavian representative of 
the cartoon sales organisation Kings Features Syndicate531, whose inclusion of Cold War 
messages to its comics began at full force in the 1950s. Erkko’s enthusiasm with the possibilities 
cartoons offered culminated in the decision to start publishing the 'Donald Duck' comic book 
under Sanoma Oy in 1951. The huge popularity the comic reached quickly after its launch gives 
another indication of the Finnish people’s great interest in US-related publications and 
American culture in general. Mr Erkko realised fully well the wider importance of cartoons. In a 
later letter to Walt Disney he praised Disney comics for "drawing the young generation’s 
attention to normal and peaceful things and helping them to avoid the cruel day happenings in 
the rest of the world". 532 
One of Erkko’s many achievements that pleased the Americans was the launch of Valitut 
Palat, the Finnish edition of Reader’s Digest, which was during the Cold War generally regarded as 
Finland’s ‘window to the West’. The publication of a Finnish version of the world-famous 
magazine was not, mainly due to Finland’s position, a straightforward affair. When Valitut Palat 
was finally founded in April 1945, the agreement made between Reader’s Digest and Eljas Erkko 
was in many ways exceptional. Whereas in other countries editions of Reader’s Digest were 
published by its affiliated companies, the deal gave Mr Erkko the right to act as the temporary 
publisher of the Reader’s Digest’s Finnish version, being responsible for the translating, 
publishing, promoting, distributing and selling of the magazine. Mr Erkko was also given the 
full right to choose the articles published in the Finnish edition and edit them whenever he felt 
                                                 
529 E. Petäjäniemi to E. Erkko, October 11, 1946, Sanoma Oy:n toimintaan liittyvät asiakirjat, Sanoma 
Osakeyhtiöön liittyvä arkisto, Bb3, EEA, PLA. 
530 Helsingin Sanomat started to publish Walter Lippman’s comments on international affairs as early as 1943, a 
move that was so exceptional at the time that it led to Wipert von Blücher, the German Ambassador in Finland, 
making a protest over the matter to the Finnish Foreign Ministry. Klemola, Pertti, Helsingin Sanomat - 
sananvapauden monopoli (Helsinki 1981), p. 35. Soon after the war, several of Lippman's articles included in-depth 
analyses on the increasingly tense relationship between the Soviet Union and Britain and the US. For example, 
Helsingin Sanomat May 31, 1945. 
531 Manninen & Salokangas 2009 pp. 150-157, 552-553. 
532 E. Erkko to W. Disney, November 7, 1956, SOLAK, Aa 1, EEA, PLA. 
 
 
113 
 
necessary. The exceptional arrangement was justified by “the urgent desire of the Finnish public 
to have good reading matter from abroad now”.533 
Eljas Erkko and Reader’s Digest's management in the US soon found out that this was 
exactly the case. The first two editions of Valitut Palat, with total circulations of 50,000 and 
75,000, were sold out in a matter of couple of days.534 By 1947, the circulation had already easily 
surpassed the 100,000 mark, inspiring Barcley Acheson, Head of Reader’s Digest, to claim that 
Finland was the magazine’s brightest spot, particularly considering its political position.535 Mr 
Erkko was also more than happy with the new magazine, later describing that the launch of 
Valitut Palat in 1945 was exactly what the country had needed in that moment “when we had 
just escaped a war, which had taken us to the wrong side, perhaps".536  
As Valitut Palat soon gained a reputation of being a mouthpiece for American culture, it is 
no surprise that Finnish authorities kept a close watch on its content. For making the magazine 
more suitable for the Finnish market, Eljas Erkko and his assistants, mainly Sirkka 
Ruotsalainen, the first actual editor of Valitut Palat, gave great consideration when picking and 
editing the articles originally published in magazines like Time and Life. This work bore fruit, and 
the magazine actually turned out be more acceptable to the censorship authorities than the 
other versions of Reader's Digest on sale in Finland, mainly the Swedish Det Bästa, the selling of 
which was at times banned in Finland.537 When reading the first editions of Valitut Palat, one 
instantly realises why this was the case: their focus was very much on presenting American 
scientific inventions and various wonders of the world. The magazine also gave notable 
attention to the promotion of such traditional, and rather puritan, American values as modesty, 
courage, religion, democracy and, above all, the possibility of making a fortune out of nothing 
through hard work.538 The few articles that can be regarded as political mainly dealt with either 
the war or topical issues in the US domestic politics.539  
As for other contacts with Finnish newspapers, the likes of Uusi Suomi and Hufvudstadsbladet 
were the obvious targets for the British and Americans. Both papers were regarded as Western-
orientated and willing to publish material explaining Britain or the United States’ point of view. 
The fact that Uusi Suomi, together with Helsingin Sanomat, was the only publication to employ a 
correspondent in London obviously made the relationship easier to build on. The paper’s 
agreements over the use of material with, for example, AP540 and the Daily Mail541 also 
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contributed to this. In terms of publishing more foreign content, however, Uusi Suomi faced 
similar problems as other Finnish newspapers in the post-war years. The lack of paper often 
prevented the inclusion of articles offered by foreign newspapers, such as The Evening Standard 
and The New York Herald Tribune.542 Moreover, President J.K. Paasikivi's close relationship with 
Lauri Aho, Editor of Uusi Suomi, made it awkward for the newspaper to publish any material 
that could be interpreted as critical of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the President clearly wished to 
use the publication for persuading the supporters of the Coalition Party to adopt the principles 
of his new foreign policy.543 The lectures Paasikivi gave to Mr Aho not only on material he 
regarded unsuitable for Finland’s foreign policy, but also on his newspapers' coverage of certain 
domestic political issues544, reflect the newspaper’s difficult position in the late 1940s; it was 
simply too close to the President to adopt anything else but a cautious publishing policy. 
In this respect life was easier for newspapers published outside the capital region. Since their 
content was not as closely followed by the political leadership or the censorship authorities, 
papers like Ilkka were able to publish slightly sharper content.545 On the other hand, the share 
of international news in these papers was small and dependent on STT’s articles. This gave the 
British and the Americans an excellent opportunity to push more of their material through in 
provincial papers, as they were quick to discover. 
If contacts with influential members of the press were easy to make, the relationship with 
YLE proved a somewhat more difficult affair. Both the FO and the State Department first 
suspected that the appointment of Hella Wuolijoki, the left-wing politician and playwright, as 
Chairman of YLE’s Governing Board could lead to the domination of communist content on 
the Finnish radio546, but soon learnt otherwise. Although YLE, under regular monitoring by 
Finnish communists547, did increase the use of broadcasts about the Soviet Union548 and 
introduced new programmes it found more appealing to the working classes, such as the 
famous ‘Työmiehen perhe’, Mrs Wuolijoki never launched a large scale communist propaganda 
                                                                                                                                                   
541 Uusi Suomi first planned to sign an agreement with the Daily Express. This deal quickly collapsed due to 
difficulties with the Bank of Finland over the granting of sterling. An agreement with the Daily Mail was eventually 
made in August 1949. This cooperation did not, however, turn out as fruitful as Uusi Suomi would have wished, as 
already in December 1949 Max Jakobson, now the paper’s London correspondent, reported about his 
disappointment with the Mail’s foreign news service. The cooperation between the two papers was finally 
terminated in December 1954 when Uusi Suomi signed an agreement with the Daily Telegraph. L. Aho to G. 
Young, August 5, 1946,; M. Jakobson to L. Aho, December 29, 1949, US, box 43; L. Aho to C. Sutton, December 
5, 1954, US, box 45, all KA. 
542 Like all other Finnish newspapers after the war, Uusi Suomi suffered from the lack of paper. This limited the 
amount of available space for news coverage and meant that the papers had to refuse a large number of material of 
foreign origins that they would have otherwise been willing to publish. On the other hand, the lack of paper , 
together with the lack of dollars and sterling, was undoubtedly sometimes used as an excuse when turning down 
articles that were regarded as potentially sensitive in Finland. For example, L. Aho to Evening Standard, December 
14, 1946; L. Aho to New York Herald Tribune, December 14, 1946, US, box 41, KA. 
543 Salminen 1979, pp. 30-31. 
544 For example, in October 1947 Paasikivi criticised Uusi Suomi’s position on the question of making reforms to 
Finland’s provincial structure. L. Aho to J.K. Paasiviki, October 18, 1947, Lauri Aho's collection, box 3, KA. 
545 Salminen 1979, p. 35. 
546 For example, F.M. Shepherd to A. Eden, May 22, 1945, FO 371/47420, NA. 
547 Mrs Wuolijoki received numerous letters from provincial communist organisations which demanded the 
increase of programmes directed to the working class and broadcasts regarding the Soviet Union. For example, 
SKP:n Rovaniemen osasto to H. Wuolijoki, February 3, 1948, Hella Wuolijoki's collection (HW), box 35, KA. 
548 Kinnunen 1998, p. 295. 
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campaign on the airwaves.549 This conclusion can be made, for example, by examining the 
statistics on the newspapers quoted in YLE broadcasts. For instance, in autumn 1948, the 
principle according to which the use of newspapers in YLE broadcasts was defined according 
to the number of seats each party held in the parliament was closely followed.550  
Hella Wuolijoki's keenness to introduce a great number of British and American plays to the 
Finnish public also proves that she did not base her broadcasting policies strictly on increasing 
content regarding the Soviet Union. As a playwright, Mrs Wuolijoki wanted to decide herself 
whether various British or American scripts were suitable for the Finnish radio. Her interest in 
this content was so large that, for example, when visiting London in April 1946, she left with 
her bags full of drama scripts she planned to review.551 Although she rejected a great number of 
offered scripts, Finnish adaptations of plays such as William Shakespeare’s Henry IV were 
produced and aired to a large audience.552 In the first post-war years, the use of British plays, 
short dramas and talks was, in fact, seconded only by broadcasts of Swedish origin.553 Due to 
the music exchange scheme, British concerts were particularly often aired.554 Educational 
broadcasts for, for example, upper secondary school students was another growing programme 
group, with the ‘English by radio’ series becoming especially popular also among YLE 
listeners.555 Although cooperation between American radio networks and YLE was more 
limited than the one with the BBC, the US Legation reported in 1947 that 21 programmes of 
American origin were aired by YLE that year.556  
In addition to Mrs Wuolijoki’s visit to London, and Programme Director Jussi Koskiluoma’s 
one-month trip to the same city557, the relationship between YLE and the BBC was further 
enhanced through the visits of Sir Ian Jacob, Liisa Pesonen from the BBC's Finnish Section and 
Denis Winther, Head of the Scandinavian Section.558 Hillar Kallas also visited Finland more 
than once, for example in July 1947 when he assisted the British Council’s summer school in 
Aulanko and in June 1948 when he gave daily reports on the Finnish general elections from one 
of YLE’s studios to all BBC services.559 The assistance YLE provided to the BBC in recruiting 
                                                 
549 For example Erkki Tuomioja, grandson and biographer of Hella Wuolijoki, insists that Mrs Wuolijoki had no 
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staff to its Finnish Section also increased the cooperation between the two broadcasting 
companies.560  
Even if the British and the Americans felt that they were more successful in getting 
broadcasts through on YLE’s frequency than they had initially expected, doing business with 
the corporation was always a delicate affair. This became evident already when the British 
Council lecture programmes were launched. Although pleased with the broadcasts, Hella 
Wuolijoki was not at all happy with their introduction part, which informed the audience that 
the programmes belonged to the British Council talk series. An YLE employee informed the 
British Council representative J.B.C. Grundy that the reason for this was that mentioning that 
the broadcasts were exclusively produced by the British Council could be associated with 
propaganda.561 Despite Mr Grundy’s protest, the British Council had to accept that the 
programmes it offered were to be given the introduction "arranged in cooperation with the 
British Council."562 
The agreement between the BBC and YLE, according to which the latter would receive and 
broadcast every fortnight the news summary ‘London Calling’ prepared by the BBC Finnish 
Section’s commentator in London, would also turn out to be a highly sensitive affair. When Mrs 
Wuolijoki learnt about the arrangement, she was particularly horrified when finding out that the 
BBC’s Max Jakobson, also an assistant of YLE, was getting paid only by the British company.563 
Jakobson’s relationship with a foreign broadcaster was obviously a touchy subject to her. Since 
YLE received similar summaries by a reporter of the Moscow Radio in the late 1940s564, even 
Wuolijoki, however, had to admit that the airing of BBC material was acceptable also from a 
foreign policy perspective. Although the two broadcasters reached an agreement concerning the 
use of Mr Jakobson’s services, YLE’s airing of the BBC Finnish Service’s summaries, together 
with the commentator’s terms of employment, was a topic that would be discussed several times 
in the upcoming years. Any activity that could even remotely be associated with the transmission 
of the views of another government was always going to be sensitive.  
 
A Restricted yet Far-Reaching Beginning  
 
The incident discussed above is a good example of the situations Britain and the US faced when 
relaunching their operations in the very first post-war years. The two governments were able to 
implement reasonably active campaigns and form close contacts with a number of influential 
Finns, but at the same time the Finnish environment placed various restrictions to the activities 
and often made them a delicate balancing act. This kind of a position did not seem to trouble 
Western officials too much, as they wished to follow a cautious policy towards the country in 
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any case and to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the Soviets. As a consequence, the FO's 
first post-war instructions for overseas propaganda, which stressed the promotion of British 
institutions and the new welfare state, fitted in with the Finnish environment well. Even though 
the Americans were willing to show some support to the Finns, their somewhat rapidly 
launched activities remained fairly modest for quite some time since the US Government also 
believed that it was both in its and Finland's interest not to risk the country's friendly relations 
with Moscow. This position also reflected Washington's attitude to post-war informational 
operations in a broader sense.  
In the middle of all the caution, Western officials were quick to learn that Finland offered 
fruitful soil for their cultural programmes in particular. The Finns' great demand for all forms of 
Western culture in particular bolstered the British Council's position in the country and made its 
work easier even with limited resources. When the relationship between the Western powers 
and the Soviet Union started to deteriorate, both British and American officials began to pay 
more attention also to their informational operations in Helsinki and to defending their 
respective countries against the increasing verbal attacks published in communist newspapers. 
Although political propaganda remained limited and the northern country's independence 
seemed uncertain, the two Western governments' officials gradually became to realise that 
informational and cultural operations were likely to hold an exceptional position when 
attempting to influence Finland's future. In this respect, British and American activities in 
Finland in the first post-war years were important as they, despite their restricted nature, 
successfully laid down the foundation for broader and more direct operations launched in 
upcoming years. 
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4. COLD WAR BATTLE IN FINLAND BEGINS, 1948-1949  
 
Introduction of IRD Print Material and Anti-Communist Radio Propaganda 
 
The year 1948 can be seen as something of a watershed not only in Finnish history, but also in the 
Western powers’ policy towards the country. The exclusion of the communists from the Finnish 
Government, the abolishment of the police organisation Valpo and the realisation that the 
Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), signed between Finland 
and the Soviet Union, was a less threatening pact than the West originally had feared strengthened 
the US and British governments' belief in Finland’s survival as an independent country.565  
In early 1948 this belief had been especially thin after Josif Stalin’s request for military 
consultation was received by the Finnish Government. Finland was now widely expected to 
‘follow Czechoslovakia’s path’. The assurances given by the US Government that it would back 
Finland in anything short of war were the country to turn down Stalin’s request was small 
consolation to the Finns and left them to face the Soviets virtually on their own. The British 
Chiefs of Staff was, once again, particularly negative about the situation, stating that Finland 
was sooner or later doomed to be dominated by the Soviet Union.566 CIA reports from March 
1948 were slightly more confident about the Finnish situation, noting that due to intense 
nationalism in Finland and the communists’ limited influence in the Government, Moscow 
would probably seek to avoid a major Finnish crisis and settle for terms which would “prepare 
the way for ultimate and complete domination at some future date”.567 As spring went on, the 
Americans became even more optimistic about the developments and saw that Finland would 
not be easily willing to give way to all Soviet propositions and that the communists would 
perhaps not have enough support to gain political power after all.568  
The FCMA Treaty’s final form, although initially treated with suspicion, came as something 
of a relief to the West as it gave Finland some space to move on.569 The treaty, and the fact that 
the numerous rumours of a communist coup in Finland were quashed after the incidents of 
spring 1948570, gave new hope that Finland would not necessarily follow the same pattern as 
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other Eastern European countries had done after the war. Instead of discussing what kind of 
action should be chosen in the situation of complete Soviet domination, the Western powers 
started to prepare themselves for a more long-term strategy. Essential to this strategy was the 
belief that a free-market economy would be the strongest obstacle to the spread of 
communism.571 Therefore, the West should, with caution, strengthen its economic ties with 
Finland and support its reconstruction process. For fulfilling these objectives, the Finnish forest 
industry offered to be the perfect sector for investment, forming the strongest and most 
permanent link between Finland and the West.572  
Naturally, the Western governments’ more optimistic interpretation of Finland's future did 
not mean that the country’s position would not continue to be under constant re-examination. 
In particular, Finland's closer trade relationship with its giant neighbour and Urho Kekkonen’s 
warm relationship with Moscow were followed with some alarm. The five-year trade agreement 
between Finland and the Soviet Union signed in 1950 was seen as an attempt to influence 
Finland’s domestic politics and tie, the then Prime Minister, Kekkonen to closer dependency on 
Finnish communists.573 This view became more of a norm than the exception in the 1950s.  
As the founding of the IRD coincided with a particularly sensitive period in Finnish history, 
the launch of the department’s material in the country was always going to have a slow start. 
The FCMA Treaty negotiations and its eventual ratification made the British realise that the 
moment was not quite right for a firmer line against Soviet propaganda in Finland. The FO’s 
first instructions concerning Britain’s more active anti-communist propaganda campaign from 
January 1948 had already confirmed that Whitehall’s estimation of Finland’s position remained 
unchanged also in terms of informational activities. With the actual telegram, a secret message 
was sent to British legations regarded as unable to carry out active anti-communist propaganda 
locally.574 The Helsinki Legation's inclusion in this group, in addition to the ones in Warsaw, 
Prague, Budapest, Sofia and Belgrade, illustrates that Finland was firmly regarded as having 
more in common with Eastern European countries than those belonging to the West. 
According to the FO, legations such as Helsinki should concentrate on implementing the 
positive side of the news policy, i.e. to publicise the virtues of Western civilisation and let the 
BBC, if possible, to carry out the anti-communist campaign. 
In his reply to these instructions, Oswald Scott, the new Minister to Finland, agreed that it 
would be unwise to “press Finland to throw in her lot with the Western Democracies”.575 
According to him, the British campaign in Finland would focus on presenting the virtues and 
material advantages of the British approach to democracy by disseminating information 
through personal contacts with Finns in influential positions in politics, the trade unions, 
industry and journalism. As for written anti-communist propaganda, Scott was more positive 
than his colleagues at the FO, estimating that the Legation’s output would achieve at least some 
publicity. In general, however, Scott labelled Britain’s policy in Finland as one of “maximum 
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influence and minimum display”, a definition that illustrated the nature of the British campaign 
well in the late 1940s.  
Subsequent correspondence on IRD work in Finland kept emphasising the country’s special 
position both geographically and politically and stressed that embarrassing the Finnish 
Government was not in line with British policy. This was also taken into account in day-to-day 
informational activities. The British Legation remained virtually silent during the events of 
spring 1948, while the BBC Finnish Service, following the FO’s instructions, focused on 
reporting about the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland in a neutral manner, 
merely speculating about the motives behind the Soviets’ action rather than encouraging the 
Finns to resist their neighbour’s demands. The adopted policy came as a disappointment to 
several prominent Finns, for example to Hjalmar Procopé, former Minister to the US and 
active, albeit entirely unofficial, spokesman concerning Finland’s position after the war, who 
had suggested that the British radio and press should encourage the Finns to reject the Soviet 
Union’s demands for a defensive pact.576 
Saying that Britain practised a policy of minimum display in Finland in spring 1948 does not 
mean that the FO did not show any support to the Finns during one of the most crucial periods 
in their history. In early April, the FO’s Northern Department decided to provide appropriate 
Finnish politicians and officials with a memorandum that set out in detail the procedure 
followed by the communists when they seized power in Czechoslovakia.577 The FO felt that the 
memorandum, originally prepared by Pierson Dixon, Britain’s Minister to Prague, and 
requested for translation into Finnish by Oswald Scott, could be of use for Finnish anti-
communists in preventing a similar coup d'état in their country. The writing, for example, 
stressed the importance of using the forces of order at the first sign of danger.578 As President 
Paasikivi, who also received the text from the British Legation579, quashed all coup d'état 
rumours in Helsinki in late April 1948 by taking rapid and decisive action, for example by 
approving the movement of police arms, scholars like Hannu Soikkanen and Jukka Nevakivi 
have interpreted that he, and in Soikkanen’s view some leading social democrats as well, actually 
followed the memorandum’s propositions.580 Although this might be too direct a conclusion, 
for instance because the points brought up in the memorandum were not exactly novel, it is 
obvious that a public demonstration of force helped the Finnish political leadership to reach its 
objective of showing that what happened in Czechoslovakia would not be possible in Finland.  
British officials in Helsinki certainly felt that the memorandum had landed in fruitful ground, 
and with the FO’s permission continued to distribute another version of it to several Finnish 
MPs before the parliamentary elections of July 1948. Mr Scott wished that this version would 
be used by the politicians to bring home to the electorate the essentials and functions of 
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communism and what a communist government would mean in terms of loss of personal 
liberties. In his view, the issue between communism and social democracy in Finland could no 
longer be regarded as a matter of purely internal politics.581 This position can be regarded as 
somewhat controversial considering that only in late April the FO had, once again, stressed to 
the Minister to Finland that Britain should not leave the Finns under any illusion that they could 
hope for more than moral and political support from the country.582 Mr Scott’s statement 
suggested that some British officials were ready to introduce at least slightly stronger measurers 
for supporting anti-communist Finns in their activities against the communists. 
British propaganda activity in Finland was finally expanded in 1949. Although the majority of 
the Information Office’s work still concerned overt activities, such as the distribution of ‘normal’ 
printed content, the introduction of IRD material increased the attention given to more covert 
means. Also with this in mind, the British Legation made the distribution of its printed material to 
Finnish newspapers and political parties considerably more efficient. The network of ‘influential 
contacts’, which included politicians, newspaper editors, academics and teachers, played a large 
part in this. The publication of newspaper reports, in particular feature articles, was constantly 
discussed with various Finnish editors and journalists. At first, the ‘straight’ material provided by 
the COI totally dominated the material sent to the Finnish press through the daily press bulletin, 
but as time passed and Finland’s independence grew more robust, the more aggressive IRD-
produced anti-communist articles were included in the bulletin to a growing extent. Already in 
April 1948, Oswald Scott noted that such papers as Helsingin Sanomat, Uusi Suomi and 
Hufvudstadsbladet would hold a key position in advocating the anti-communist message under the 
special circumstances prevailing in Finland, as they had been “consistently resourceful and 
courageous in their anti-communist line”.583 In order to present the British viewpoint to Finnish 
as effectively as possible, the FO started to arrange several visits of top-flight Finnish editors to 
Britain. The first of these trips took place in spring 1950, and included well-known names like 
Yrjö Niiniluoto of Helsingin Sanomat and Lauri Aho of Uusi Suomi.584 
Despite the gradual increase in distributed anti-communist material, it would be an 
exaggeration to say that Britain practiced broad scale anti-communist propaganda in Finland in 
the late 1940s. Indeed, in many respects the content of British printed propaganda in Finland 
during this particular period remained similar to that distributed in Eastern satellites countries. 
Publicity was confined to the virtues of the Western way of life. The Finns’ objection to 
propaganda, as well as the fact that they needed no reminding of the Soviet Union being an 
imperialist power, was generally recognised in London, and it was assessed that blatant anti-
Russian propaganda might have an opposite effect to that intended.  
This view was not always applied to the BBC Finnish Service broadcasts, which the British 
Legation in Helsinki regarded as the main channel for anti-communist commentary in the late 
1940s. As the FO wished to 'brighten up' the Finnish transmissions after the new propaganda 
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policy was introduced at Whitehall, the Finnish audience would soon have more of what it 
wanted in terms of political content. The closer cooperation between the FO and the BBC also 
concerned Finnish broadcasts, which meant that the British Legation started to follow the 
service more closely and to provide comments and suggestions on how the programmes should 
be developed. The introduction of two-way correspondence between the Legation and Denis 
Winther, Head of Scandinavian and Finnish Sections at the BBC, soon turned into a regular 
feature for broadcast planning. In particular, the criticism on individual scripts by Hamish 
McGhie, the Information Officer posted in Helsinki in the late 1940s and early 1950s, were 
highly detailed and included a great number of improvement proposals. The FO also requested 
that the Legation start sending what were known as Aside telegrams to London in order to 
provide the BBC with ammunition of a more political nature. The Aside telegrams, usually 
transmitted only from Soviet satellite countries, included information on the propaganda line 
adopted by the communist press and they were sent from Helsinki in particular when any attack 
was made on Britain or any misrepresentation of British policy appeared so that the FO could 
suggest the BBC on how to address them.585  
In Finnish working class areas that were strongly affected by communist agitation and 
propaganda in the late 1940s and 1950s, the British Legation regarded the BBC as virtually the 
only channel that could make an effective contribution to the counter-attack.586 While the 
inclusion of more political and, in particular, anti-communist content was urged by the FO, it 
was also acknowledged that material on the misdeeds of communism deemed as too heavy 
“might overexcite the Finns, most of whom are anyhow as hostile to the Russians and the 
communists as they could possibly be, with unwelcome results”. At least in early 1948 there was 
no fear of this as the broadcasts mainly included news, music and discussion programmes with 
titles like ‘An interview with an Anglo-Finnish Family’.587 
The British Legation certainly provided plenty of comments on the BBC to both the FO 
and the broadcaster itself from 1948 onwards. In February 1948, Minister Scott gave a highly 
detailed account on how the output of the Finnish Service should be allotted in terms of 
programme content. Not surprisingly, the Legation called for more political commentaries that 
“should be presented in a confident, almost aggressive tone, calculated to stimulate the listener’s 
confidence in what he is hearing”. The British officials in Helsinki also recommended the 
inclusion of favourable comments on Finnish events. This proposal was justified by noting that 
Finns continued to feel both geographically and culturally isolated from the West and that 
“anything that the British can say to create a feeling that they are nevertheless in some respect 
marching along a road approved by us would have value”. Despite this local angle, the Legation 
agreed that the bulk of material should concern Britain and that, for instance, the music played 
on air should be British.588 FO officials agreed with these views and suggested that a greater 
number of the Finnish Section's political broadcasts should focus on enlightening the Finns 
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about such heavier issues as economic and political difficulties inside the Soviet sphere of 
interest while at the same time stressing the economic and military power of the West.589  
Although the BBC insisted that it would remain cautious in its broadcasts to Finland, the 
greater amount of news material the Finnish Service started to share with other regional services 
made its content more in line with the hardening anti-communist policy emerging in Britain. 
This tendency was also noted by Eero A. Wuori, Finland’s Minister to Britain, who in 
September 1948 asked the FO whether the sharper tone adopted by the BBC would mean a 
change in British policy towards Finland. Mr Wuori felt that “the Finnish opinion should not be 
too actively stirred up.” Although the FO gave Mr Wuori the diplomatic answer that the British 
Government's policy had not changed and that it was not part of their policy to carry the Cold 
War to Finland, the British felt that it would be a mistake to refrain from stating their case 
merely because it involved reporting facts that were unpleasant to the Soviets.590 The reply 
seemed to convince Mr Wuori, who while understanding that Britain’s more direct policy for 
countering Soviet propaganda would only increase tension in Europe, estimated that it was not 
in its interest to cause a conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union, simply because it would 
have no effective methods to intervene in such a dispute.591  
This was not the first time when a Finnish official such as Minister Wuori expressed his 
concerns over the consequences of a stronger anti-communist, not to mention anti-Soviet, 
campaign that the British or the Americans might introduce in Finland. As Wuori felt that his 
primary task in London was to maintain confidence among British circles about Finland’s 
prospects592 and assure the FO that there was no need to bring the Cold War to the country, his 
activity in this matter was hardly surprising. The claim according to which irritating the Soviets 
was in no way in the Finnish Government’s interest was often shared with Western officials in 
Finland who in general respected this view. The line between being too aggressive and too 
defeatist was, however, never easy to draw, even by the Finns themselves. During the delicate 
situation Finland faced in spring 1948, Mr Wuori expressed his concerns to the FO over the 
tone of British and American newspapers comments, which he found too negative in terms of 
Finland’s future.593 Oswald Scott felt that Wuori’s allegation had some justification and saw to it 
that the few British correspondents in Finland were reminded about the desirability of objective 
reporting.594 Although the British Legation felt that the Finnish Government’s actions in 
matters related to informational activities were often exaggerated, the British did realise that 
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590 R.M.A. Hankey to H.A.P. Hohler, ’Criticism by Monsieur Wuori on tone adopted by the BBC Finnish 
broadcasts in relation to Russia’, September 30, 1948, FO 953/233, NA. 
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finding something of a middle ground in both newspaper reports and radio commentary was 
important for Finland’s relationship with the Soviet Union. 
 
Promoting the Positive of America  
 
In the late 1940s the US Government adopted an informational policy in Finland in many 
respects similar to the British one. American officials continued to expand their contacts with 
Finnish politicians and members of the media, but refrained from introducing the same kind of 
a broad-scale anti-communist propaganda campaign they had started to implement both home 
and abroad. There is no evidence of the US Legation distributing similar material to the FO 
memorandum during spring 1948, but it is evident that officials both in Helsinki and 
Washington followed the developments closely and backed any action taken to defeat possible 
coups in the country. The Americans’ close contacts with leading Finnish politicians, in 
particular with the social democrats, kept them well informed about the general developments 
in the country, including the activities of the communists, and helped them to form a suitable 
policy for informational and cultural operations. As the outcome of the FCMA Treaty 
negotiations turned out to be more lenient than the State Department had initially feared, the 
US Legation in Helsinki started to feel more confident about planning its activities further to 
the future.  
Although the Smith-Mundt Act guaranteed greater funds for informational and cultural 
operations also in Helsinki, the shift to large-scale American activities did not take place at once. 
In 1948, the fact that the personnel of the US Legation’s information and cultural section 
included only two Americans and five local employees595 limited the execution of press, film 
and library services in particular. Some improvement was achieved in the summer of 1948 when 
the USIS restarted issuing its daily Finnish-language Wireless Bulletin, which had been axed as a 
result of budget cuts in the previous year.596 Improving the distribution of American news 
reports through the USIS bulletins and American newspapers was something the US Legation 
put particular effort to in the late 1940s. In addition to the relaunch of the Finnish-language 
bulletin, the distribution of the original English Wireless Bulletin was, with the help of the 
Finnish Foreign Ministry, increased to a greater number of leading politicians.597 By early 1948 
the English bulletin was, in addition to the President and leading ministers, sent to, for example, 
members of the Finnish Diet Foreign Affairs Committee. Henry F. Arnold, the first American 
Cultural and Press Attaché in Finland, also made sure that leading Finnish decision-makers, 
including President Paasikivi, received American publications such as The New York Times, 
Newsweek and Life Magazine on a regular basis.598  
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A close relationship with the Finnish press was of great importance for the US Legation and 
its quest of increasing coverage of American news in the local newspapers. After the official 
inception of the USIS programme in Finland, the Americans were quick to realise that Finnish 
newspapers were more than willing to publish their material. In September 1948, the press 
service had already expanded to the point at which the USIS distributed both its English and 
Finnish news bulletin to over 200 recipients, 112 of which were Finnish newspapers. At this 
stage, the largest Finnish papers, using mostly commercial news services and their own 
correspondents, published only one to four USIS-distributed items per month. The situation 
with afternoon papers such as Ilta-Sanomat and Kauppalehti was an altogether different affair, as 
they included one or more items every day.599 These two publications, together with some 
provincial newspapers, particularly the Tampere-based Aamulehti and social democratic party 
affiliations were to become the best outlets for USIE and later USIA material in Finland. In 
order to create closer relationships with Finnish journalists and increase their use of USIS 
content even further, the Americans, not unlike the British, also invited them to their country. 
One of the first organised visits of leading Finnish reporters to the American continent took 
place in September 1949, when Helsingin Sanomat, Uusi Suomi, Hufvudstadsbladet and Suomen 
Sosialidemokraatti sent one senior journalist each on the two-week ‘air discovery tour’ of the US 
organised by the State Department for editors from fourteen European countries.600  
As it became increasingly evident that Finnish editors were not ready to publish material that 
could be interpreted as anti-Soviet, the Americans focused on supplying them with more 
positive items about their country. There was no problem in having this kind of material 
published, and the Americans learnt that news on new inventions and medical discoveries were 
especially easy to place, as were stories on economic developments in the US. USIS officials 
were aware that their news service could not match the commercial news agencies in terms of 
reporting speed. Mainly for this reason, the bulletins' primary objective was to provide material 
that would supplement the already reported news and give editors some valuable background 
material for further articles. In addition to news articles, for example translations of the most 
important speeches of leading American politicians were constantly sent to editors. In order to 
push their message through as efficiently as possible, the Americans gradually developed a 
practice that saw them closely monitoring the leading Finnish newspapers and then providing 
them with material on news that had been insufficiently covered or left out altogether. For this 
reason, and because anti-communist material was rarely used by the press, the Finnish news 
bulletin became highly tailored for local needs. The items were selected for “their importance as 
timely statements in American foreign policy, as picturing events, conditions, or life in the 
United States, or because of their direct or indirect interest to Finns”.601 
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In November 1949, the USIS reported that the Finnish-language bulletin sent to 
newspapers, known as ‘Uutisia Usasta’, consisted of material of which 60 per cent was 
translated from the daily Wireless Bulletin and 40 per cent from the USIE’s Air Bulletins, Press 
Features and Magazine Reprints. USIE’s ‘Negro Notes’, which had the objective of presenting 
the increasing opportunities black people had in the US, were also widely included in the 
bulletin. Finnish newspapers were also willing to publish “the positive negro news”; in fact, 
other news material concerning Afro-American people in the US was rare in Finnish 
newspapers.602  
In addition to improving the execution of informational operations in Helsinki, the 
Americans gradually started to pay attention to making contacts throughout the country. One 
example of this kind of activity was the public affairs officer's field trip in May 1948 to 
provincial Finnish towns with the goal of acquainting civic leaders and newspaper editors with 
the facilities available through the USIS for acquiring information about the US, showing USIS 
films to Finnish-American societies and creating “a general awareness in the visiting 
communities of the continuing interest of the United States in the Finnish people”.603 In terms 
of publicity, these activities certainly paid off. Provincial newspapers were more than happy to 
report about such visits as well as about American culture in general. By covering American 
activities in their region, the publications were, of course, no different from the newspapers 
published in Helsinki. The volume of foreign activity in Finland in the late 1940s was still so 
small, as was the number of foreigners, that the Finnish press followed them with great interest. 
Both American and British informational and cultural operations were at the time broadly 
covered in Finnish newspapers with officers such as Henry Arnold and Hamish McGhie 
becoming relatively well-known figures among the Finnish public.604 
As the available resources increased, the USIS office in Finland continued its steady 
expansion in the late 1940s. Finnish people’s eagerness to watch and read almost anything 
coming from the US was well reflected by the impressive pace at which the audience size for 
USIE films grew. In October 1949, a total of 45,837 persons viewed the films at 384 non-
commercial performances. A year later, as many as 148,000 persons, 117,975 of whom at non-
commercial showings, watched USIE motion pictures.605 A growth rate of this magnitude 
meant that the four people looking after the USIS Motion Picture Section had their hands full 
in running its everyday business. As one of the main objectives of the USIE film programme 
was to give people living in sparsely-settled rural areas the possibility to see the productions, the 
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office staff was as overwhelmed with loaning out films and projectors to organisations and 
individuals throughout the country and arranging Finnish and Swedish translations for the films 
as they were with presentations in the Helsinki area, mostly in schools and other educational 
institutes. The Finnish State's decision to place a lower tax rate for short films of educational 
nature meant that USIE films, together with American newsreels provided by private 
companies606, were also to a growing extent shown in commercial movie theatres before the 
main film.607 By 1950, the Americans were able to note that the USIS/Helsinki had become by 
far the chief supplier of educational films in Finland.608 This was, of course, hardly surprising 
considering that the total number of American films, both commercial and non-commercial, 
made up for an incredible 69 per cent of all film premieres given to the Finnish audience during 
that year.609 
Despite the early success of USIS operations in Finland, the US Legation was always aware 
of the limitations imposed by the local circumstances. In November 1949, the Americans 
summarised the main challenge for USIS activities by reporting that foreign government 
propaganda, particularly American, required almost the same level of caution with which 
Finland handled its relationship with its powerful neighbour “for the delicacy of the Finnish 
position rules out any flamboyant approach such as might be possible in other countries”.610 
For this reason, USIS activity in post-war Finland continued to proceed relatively quietly, 
stressing positive, factual information about the US. The USIS/Helsinki realised that its 
operations must be so correct that they precluded any Soviet reaction against the Finns for 
allowing such activities.611  
The objective of not endangering Finland's position also involved calming the Finns by 
avoiding to give them any assurances about assistance. According to J. Raymond Ylitalo, a CIA 
official working at the US Legation in Helsinki in the 1940s and 1950s, American officials were 
in the first post-war years constantly contacted by even fanatical underground leaders seeking 
promises of support in their future conflict with the Russians.612 Although the most direct 
expressions of resentment to the Soviet Union cooled down by the 1950s, or were more likely 
swept under the carpet, the Americans were fully aware about the anti-Soviet sentiment among 
the majority of Finns, which was to prevail for decades to come.  
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The sense of caution reflected a broader concern regarding Finland’s position. Both CIA 
and State Department reports from 1949 reveal that although somewhat more confident about 
the future of Finland, the Americans could not entirely write off either Soviet military 
aggression in Finland or the erection of a communist state in Finland by other means. The CIA 
interpreted the rumours about the increase of Soviet troops along the Finnish border in spring 
1949 as being mere ‘war of nerves' to prevent Scandinavian participation in the Atlantic Pact, 
and believed that the Kremlin would avoid a military occupation of Finland because that might 
only frighten Sweden into the arms of the West.613 Nevertheless, it also pointed out that Finland 
was among the few remaining regions in Europe where a Soviet military operation could be 
carried out without inevitably precipitating a war with the West.614 The US Legation in Helsinki, 
while agreeing that a military move from the Kremlin seemed unlikely, concluded that the 
Russians were willing to invest more in propaganda in Finland in the belief that its activities, 
together with an often predicted economic depression in the capitalist world, would weaken the 
anti-communist forces in Finland and pave way for a legitimately appointed communist-
influenced government.615 This concern would sharpen the American activities in Finland 
considerably in the early 1950s.  
 
Spreading the Word to Social Democrats 
 
Even though both the US and British administrations continuously stressed that they should 
operate discreetly in Finland, the Western powers were unwilling to watch the growing tension 
between Finnish communists and non-communists entirely from the sidelines. The ever-heating 
battle between the two in both party politics and within the trade union movement made the 
British and Americans expand their connections and support for SDP officials, increasingly 
regarded as key players for Finland’s future development. Political propaganda offered the most 
natural platform for the cooperation between the SDP and the two Western countries. The 
British in particular understood that the social democratic propaganda machinery, which 
increasingly stressed the importance of countering communism in the field by exposing the true 
nature of its ideology616, would offer an important channel for the further distribution of their 
informational material. The fact that party memoranda urged social democratic publications to 
acquire a greater number of international news reports and expressed the importance of 
countering communist propaganda by spreading reliable information about the situation in 
Eastern Europe617, which was hard to come by in Finland, also suited the British objectives 
perfectly. As a result, the British Legation started to feed the SDP Information Department 
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with more anti-communist content, put together both in London and in Helsinki, in addition to 
the more ‘neutral’ news included in their bulletin.618  
The first examples of material of this nature sent to the party in the late 1940s included a 
summary of a lecture Denis Healey gave on the BBC concerning communist tactics during the 
Czechoslovakian coup619, his written comment on the tight control the Soviet Union practised 
over its Eastern European satellites620 and an extract of Christopher Mayhew’s speech dealing 
with forced labour in the Soviet Union he gave as Britain’s delegate at the UN’s Economic and 
Social Council.621 As both Healey and Mayhew were closely associated with the IRD622, the 
distribution of this content to foreign shores was obviously planned by the department itself. 
Since these comments countered the Soviet Union and communist practices in a direct manner, 
they clearly offered another perspective to world developments than the British bulletin. The 
same can be said about the summaries of the foreign press623 and the reviews of events behind 
the Iron Curtain624, which, judging by their content, style of writing and quality of paper, the 
British Legation also delivered to the SDP. 625 The social democrats certainly made full use of all 
of the content mentioned above by producing and spreading copies of them to different parts 
of the country through the party’s information department.  
British influence on the SDP’s informational operations was not restricted to the distribution 
of propaganda material. Finnish social democrats also received plenty of useful advice on field-
level propaganda strategies from the Labour Party in London, in addition to the FO officials in 
Helsinki. In 1950, Armas D. Siimes, with the title ‘SDP’s propaganda secretary’, and Aito Anto, 
one of Väinö Leskinen’s closest collaborators, visited Britain in order to learn about Labour’s 
propaganda activities.626 Although it is not possible to estimate the actual outcome of these 
visits, one can assume that the superior resources invested in political propaganda in Britain 
impressed the visitors and gave them new ideas for making their own propaganda machinery 
even more efficient. Even if this was true, the collaboration between the Labour Party and the 
SDP remained at the ‘foot soldier’ level, as Mikko Majander has noted.627 This of course suited 
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Britain’s general policy towards Finland, which accepted gestures of moral support, but stressed 
the need of caution when it came to broader cooperation.  
Although the cautious approach also applied to Britain’s relations with Finnish trade unions, 
it did not prevent the FO from wanting to increase its influence in Finnish labour circles. For 
this purpose, the FO appointed a labour attaché to the British Legation in Helsinki. From 1946 
to 1950 this post was held by Charles L. Thomas, who can be considered as to have been 
Britain's most important link to Finnish labour market circles during that time.628 Thomas’ 
regular reports from Helsinki give the reader a good impression of the scale of his activities in 
Finland. He not only monitored the battle taking place within the Finnish trade union 
movement, but also undertook several travels throughout the country, for both presentation 
and information collection purposes, and managed to establish a vast number of contacts with 
ministers, civil servants, the press and the University of Helsinki at which he also gave some 
lectures.629 In addition to his own presentation tours, which focused on giving talks on topics 
like socialised industry in Britain and the British National Health Service630, Mr Thomas also 
collaborated closely with both the British Council and the Finnish-British Society in addressing 
aspects of life in Britain to various groups of Finns.631 
As for printed propaganda, from August 1947 onwards Mr Thomas started distributing a 
special labour bulletin, ‘Työalan uutisia Britanniasta' (Labour News from Britain), to a selected 
group of Finns, mainly social democratic trade unions. There was clearly some demand for 
information related to labour matters among Finns since the circulation of the monthly bulletin 
grew rapidly from 70 to 150. Several of its articles were also included as such in Finnish 
newspapers or used indirectly for other published reports.632 The British Legation soon 
understood the significance of distributing such content, ranking the labour bulletin among the 
most important tools of propaganda in Finland together with its other bulletins and the BBC 
Finnish Service.633 Although the articles included in the first bulletins, as well as other reports 
sent by Mr Thomas, largely followed the same guidelines as the other British material spread to 
the Finns, emphasising such positive labour-related developments in Britain as the creation of 
the welfare state,634 the share of anti-communist material in the publication was soon increased. 
In the last years of the 1940s, the bulletin started to include more articles dealing with the 
TUC’s position on the dispute taking place at the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) 
and on communism in a more general sense.635 The Finnish trade unionists made the most of 
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this material, as for instance a special Finnish version of the TUC pamphlet regarding its 
relationship with the WFTU was circulated to all members of the SAK.636 
In addition to the labour attaché’s activities, the FO and the TUC also expressed their 
solidarity to Finnish social democratic trade unions by sending prominent visitors to Finland 
and jointly organising visits of several Finnish trade unionists to Britain. The first important 
figure to take part in this scheme was long-time trade unionist Sir George Chester, who visited 
the SAK Congress in June 1947. Although Chester’s stay was regarded as a success by both 
sides, the visit that really caught attention was made by Victor Feather, Assistant Secretary of 
the TUC, who in autumn 1949 addressed large audiences in Helsinki, Tampere and Turku. The 
impact of Feather’s small tour, which was well covered by the Finnish press637, was such that 
the organisation of similar events by the FO and the TUC became even increasingly important 
in British eyes.638 From the propaganda operation perspective, the significance of Feather’s visit 
to Finland was that he was the TUC’s main connection to the IRD, who not only coordinated 
the distribution of propaganda material within the trade unions, but also contributed to the anti-
communist cause by writing several articles and pamphlets that were spread around the world 
and by giving lectures both home and abroad.639  
The British trade union leaders’ visits to Finland had a great propagandistic value for the hosts, 
as they symbolised Western support for social democratic trade unionists during difficult times. 
The visits made by leading Finnish trade union officials to Britain, part of the FO’s larger anti-
communist scheme to invite foreign labour leaders, or future leaders, to the country640, were also 
warmly welcomed by the Finns. Although some Finnish trade union officials had visited Britain 
already in February 1945641, the tour given to eight labour leaders, including Aku Sumu, General 
Secretary of the SAK, in summer 1949 marked the first effort to influence Finnish visitors in an 
organised way. According to C.L. Thomas, the tour, which took the participating Finns all over 
the country from London to Leeds and from the Ministry of Labour to football matches, was 
undoubtedly of great value. “The Social Democrats, already good friends of ours, have had their 
faith stabilised and have returned with plenty of material ready to hand with which to promote the 
cause of Western Democracy and Britain in general”, he concluded.642  
Even though the US Legation had formed a close relationship with Finnish social democrats 
already in the first post-war years, for quite some time the Americans remained cautious about 
promising anything but verbal support. When the State Department became more convinced of 
Finland’s future and the SDP’s and the SAK’s key positions in containing communism in the 
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country, US officials both in Helsinki and Washington gradually started to find more concrete 
ways to back the social democrats. It soon became evident that the main channel for this would 
be the CIA-backed AFL-organ the FTUC. The organisation’s two leading Cold War warriors, 
Jay Lovestone, a former communist who was the de facto head of FTUC operations, and Irving 
Brown, the AFL representative in Europe also working directly for the CIA, both felt that the 
Finns should be provided with more than just verbal encouragement and quickly formed 
contacts with several prominent members of both the SDP and the SAK. Of course, this task 
was not that difficult as prominent figures like Väinö Leskinen and Olavi Lindblom, General 
Secretary at the SAK, were in regular contact with both men, trying to convince them of how 
crucial any financial support to the social democrats would be in the battle against 
communism.643 Soon after Brown’s first visit to Helsinki in October 1949, during which he met 
a number of leading Finnish politicians and trade unionists644, the FTUC decided that the SAK 
was definitely worth supporting financially. Lovestone now had two objectives in Finland; to 
get enough CIA funding to support the field-level fight against the communists and to wean the 
SAK away from the WFTU.645  
The actual money started to flow to the SAK the following year after the CIA finally opened 
its cash pipeline. When the first sums arrived to the "Finnish lumber merchants", as Lovestone 
labelled the receiving group646, they helped the social democrats to outnumber the communists 
in the SAK Congress and gave the Finnish trade union movement confidence to seed from the 
WFTU.647 In his biography of Lovestone, Ted Morgan has claimed that from 1951 on, the CIA 
continued to fund the SAK by approximately $160,000 per year.648 Although Mikko Majander 
has later dismissed this figure as too large, he has recognised that the exact sum is more or less 
impossible to estimate due to the great number of sources pumping money to the Finnish social 
democrats.649 Whatever the precise sum was, Finland’s share of FTUC support was, 
undoubtedly, among the most considerable during the early Cold War. This did not prevent the 
Finns from actively asking for more funds to cover additional expenses throughout the 1950s.  
In his quest to contain communism in Europe, Jay Lovestone understood the value of 
personal contacts in addition to mere financial support. For the Finnish case, he managed to form 
a relationship with such prominent Finns as Arvo “Poika” Tuominen. In the late 1940s, 
Tuominen, a former member of the Cominterm Executive Committee, worked as a 
correspondent for the Finnish social democratic press in Stockholm and acted as something of a 
middleman for the SDP, channelling material support to the party from mostly Finns living in the 
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US.650 Lovestone realised fully well the propaganda value such individuals as Tuominen had to 
offer to the Cold War battle and started to exchange articles with him that were mostly of an anti-
communist nature.651 Tuominen was pleased with this correspondence and, for example, 
contributed an article about the ideological battle taking place in the Finnish trade unions to the 
FTUC publication International Free Trade Union News.652 For translating the article, Tuominen 
received help from Hjalmar Procopé, who also was in correspondence with Lovestone and even 
met him in Washington.653 Procopé acted as something of a promoter of closer ties between 
Finland and the US, cooperating also with social democrats such as Tuominen and Oskari Tokoi, 
former head of the SDP living in exile in Massachusetts.654 All three men, as different as their 
backgrounds were, shared the same goal of countering communism in Finland. Tokoi, in addition 
to raising funds to help the Finns in their post-war struggle, wrote regular articles about the 
Finnish situation and developments in the US not only for Raivaaja, the leading publication for 
Finnish-Americans, but also for Suomen Sosialidemokraatti.655  
While providing the social democrats with financial support, the Americans also made sure 
that they would receive plenty of propaganda material about labour issues both at home and 
abroad. The most important channel for labour-related news was the special labour bulletin, 
first named as ‘Työuutisia Yhdysvalloista’, which the USIS/Helsinki started to deliver bi-weekly 
in 1951. The bulletin was edited by the labour reporting officer of the Legation primarily on the 
material published by the Department of Labour, and distributed to leaders of labour 
organisations and the SDP.656 Early issues suggest that its articles emphasised the high standard 
of labour conditions in the US and promoted such broader American propaganda themes as 
the improvement of race equality in the workplace without paying that much attention to 
attacking the communist system.657 The tendency remained more or less the same even when 
                                                 
650 Tuominen's latter role was particularly important for the SDP, which in the first post-war years received 
significant amount of funds by organising the export of certain American products, such as fruit, coffee and 
cigarettes, to Finland where they were sold at much higher price, as post-war rationing served to inflate prices. 
Majander 2007, p. 295. 
651 In addition to articles on the trade union movement, the material Lovestone sent to Tuominen included such 
publications as 'Slave Labor in Russia', which Tuominen found highly useful for his work. The correspondence 
between the two is held both at the George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, MD, US (Hereafter GMMA), 
and the Finnish National Archives. For example, J. Lovestone to A. Tuominen, March 20, 1950; A. Tuominen to J. 
Lovestone, May 30, 1950, both RG 18, Jay Lovestone Files (JL), box 34, GMMA, Arvo Tuominen's collection 
(AT), box 9, KA. 
652 J. Lovestone to A. Tuominen, August 9, 1950, RG 18, JL, box 34, GMMA, AT, box 9, KA; Majander 2007, p. 163. 
653 J. Lovestone to A. Tuominen, June 22, 1950; H. Procopé to J. Lovestone, August 3, 1950, both RG 18, JL, box 34, 
GMMA; J. Lovestone to H. Procopé, August 5, 1950, Hjalmar Procopé's collection (HP), KAY 6593, KA. 
654 The long-lasting correspondence between Messrs Procopé, Tuominen and Tokoi can be found in Arvo 
Tuominen's collection, boxes 10 and 13, and Hjalmar Procopé's collection, both KA. 
655 Tokoi’s numerous articles about American society, in particular labour issues, gave the US plenty of 'free' 
propaganda in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti. In particular, the series ‘Kirjeitä rapakon takaa’ gave the Finns highly 
detailed, mostly positive information about developments in the US For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, 
October 5, 1952. A number of Tokoi’s published articles can be found as clippings in Oskari Tokoi's collection, 
box HB 1, TA. 
656 US Legation to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending November 30, 1950’, December 29, 
1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/12-2950, NARA. 
657 For example, ’Työuutisia Yhdysvalloista’, January 2, 1951, SDP KV, box F295, TA 
 
 
134 
 
the Cold War started to heat up also in Finland.658 When this happened, Finnish social 
democrats were also able to use more hard-hitting material from, for instance, the CIA-backed 
The New Leader, whose content was widely published in Finland. When receiving the first copies 
of the magazine in 1950, Väinö Leskinen informed The New Leader’s Editor Sol Levitas, also a 
founding member and activist of the CCF659, that articles from his publication would be used 
throughout the social democratic press, from Suomen Sosialidemokraatti to small provincial papers 
and the periodical Sosialistinen Aikakausilehti.660  
In addition to the labour-related news delivered by the USIS and US-based newspapers, the 
SAK received much-needed propaganda content also directly from the American trade unions 
AFL and the Congress of Industrialized Organisations (CIO). For this they mostly had Olavi 
Lindblom to thank, who during his travels to the US collected as much interesting "educational 
and topical propaganda material" as he could and ordered for some more when returning 
home.661 Although the social democrats in Finland were pleased to receive any material that 
they could use in their battle against the communists, even they soon discovered that not all 
American labour movement material was suitable for the Finnish environment. When 
evaluating, for example, the possibility of receiving a special Finnish version of AFL’s Soviet 
'slave labour camp map', Lindblom informed Jay Lovestone that it would not be wise to 
produce or use such content.662 The US Legation in Helsinki understood this position better 
than the trade unionists back home, since they agreed with the view that the distribution of 
such a map might do more harm than good.663 
 
Soviet and Communist Countermeasures Reach Burning Point 
 
The timing for providing Finnish socials democrats with more moral and material support was, 
of course, no coincidence. The last years of the 1940s was not only a period when the Cold War 
quickly intensified throughout the world, but also a time when the Finnish propaganda 
environment heated up into a more open conflict. Although the main political battle was fought 
between Finnish social democrats and communists, both Britain and the US were to a growing 
extent dragged into the conflict, particularly after the communists started to use the two 
countries and their activities in Finland as a propaganda tool.  
It did not take long for Finnish communists to react to the gradually growing Western 
propaganda and cultural operations in Finland. Already in January 1948 a Valpo official wrote 
about growing British propaganda operations, which, according to the report, were led by Rex 
Bosley and had the objective to “win as much Finnish friends in the event of a conflict between 
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the Soviet Union and the US”664 A Valpo report warning about the United States' more hostile 
policy towards the Soviet Union also backed the communists' view that the Finns were under 
"growing American agitation".665 After Valpo was replaced by the non-communist 
Suojelupoliisi, and the security police gradually shifted its attention to the activities of Finnish 
communists, these kinds of reports became a rarity. This does not mean that Supo did not 
monitor British and American informational and cultural operations and treat them with some 
suspicion. The new organisation continued to keep an eye on foreign activities in case they 
adopted too provocative an approach or posed some kind of a security risk.666  
Officials of the SKP and SNS also followed foreign activities in Finland and regularly 
reported about the “strong, foreign-led anti-Soviet propaganda” taking place throughout the 
country.667 According to SNS, Valitut Palat, and in particular Det Bästa, represented the most 
outrageous anti-Soviet propaganda in Finland as it not only published lies about Soviet society 
but also had only positive things to say about everything American.668 Since SNS feared that this 
publication, “scientifically developed to please the masses with its layout, choice of topic and 
low price”, together with other means of promoting Anglo-American culture, would increase 
anti-Soviet sentiment in Finland, it urged its members to take every possible measure to counter 
the growing Western propaganda, which, according to communist papers, at times dealt with 
affairs of the Soviet Union with a technique similar to Nazi propaganda.669 The greater focus 
SNS gave on its film operations in Lapland670, a region to which the Americans had also paid 
increasing attention, is a good example of how the Finnish communists wished to produce a 
direct response to Western activity in the country.  
Rather than an impulsive reaction to the growing propaganda operations of both Finnish non-
communists and the two Western powers, the Finnish communists’ activities were a part of a 
larger Soviet propaganda offensive in Finland, which started in 1948 and reached its strongest 
form in spring 1949 and again in the autumn of the same year. The offensive saw the Soviets 
increase their presence in Finland by expanding their radio, print and film propaganda, the 
promotion of Soviet artists and athletes and the import of industrial and architectural exhibitions. 
Although the broad reports written by the US Legation about growing Soviet propaganda, part of 
the State Department’s scheme to collect information about the activity in certain European 
countries671, indicate that the Americans were at least slightly concerned about the situation, 
figures like Henry F. Arnold did not give much hope for the Soviet programme in terms of 
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effectiveness due to the simple fact that the vast majority of Finnish people were anti-Russian and 
discounted foreign propaganda.672 
A greater concern to both the Americans and the British the Americans was the way with 
which the Soviets, aided by the Finnish communist press, constantly attacked against the social 
democrat Prime Minister K.A. Fagerholm and his minority government and tried to find a 
connection between their policies and the two Western governments. According to Soviet 
propaganda, the Finnish Government had the objective of binding Finland into the Western 
camp and therefore served the interests of the imperialist powers.673 While criticising the 
government and its policies, the Soviets also made heavy attacks against the content published 
in non-communist Finnish newspapers, which it regarded as excessively based on Western 
news. In the late 1940s, Soviet officials and correspondents in Finland, including representatives 
of the news agencies TASS and Sovietform, made a number of complaints to the Finnish 
Foreign Ministry about ‘unfriendly’ articles published in Finnish newspapers and claimed that 
not enough Soviet content was included.674 The article series written by Walter Bedell-Smith, 
former US Ambassador to Moscow and future head of the CIA, which were published in 
Helsingin Sanomat, caused the biggest uproar. In Soviet eyes, Bedell-Smith was “the Soviet 
Union’s greatest enemy and a professional liar” and, therefore, the worst possible person to 
have his opinions published in Finland.675 According to the interpretation by the Soviet Union’s 
Foreign Ministry, the FCMA Treaty actually prohibited the publication of memoirs of this 
nature.676 Since Bedell-Smith’s articles can be regarded as rather neutral accounts on 
developments in the Soviet Union677, mainly because Helsingin Sanomat had excluded long parts 
of them678, the scale of the Soviet protest just shows the extent of their mistrust towards both 
the Finnish Government and of the non-communist press. 
The increasingly atrocious claims made by communist newspapers about Britain and the US 
and their relationship with the Finnish Government left the Western powers with no other 
option than to protest about their publication again. This time it was the Americans who 
reacted more strongly to the matter. During a meeting between John M. Cabot, Minister to 
Finland, and Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen held in March 1950, Cabot, while emphasising 
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that the US did not request the Finnish Government to take any direct action over anti-
American newspaper articles, expressed his wish that the Finnish authorities would not create 
an environment where only one side of the story could be told to the Finnish public.679 Mr 
Kekkonen’s answer, i.e. that Finland had a free press that could only be given moral guidance, 
was precisely the kind of reaction the US Minister had, undoubtedly, expected. Even if the US 
Minister from time to time wished to remind Finnish leaders about anti-American propaganda 
taking place in their country, American reactions to the Soviet pressure in Finland remained 
somewhat moderate in the late 1940s. US Legation officials had no desire to launch such broad 
and open anti-communist cultural offensives as were suggested to them for instance by Jaakko 
Kahma, Director of the Finnish Trade Association.680 
The continuous official protests made by representatives from both sides of the Iron Curtain 
over press articles obviously placed the Finnish politicians and Finnish Foreign Ministry 
officials in an awkward position. As their main priority was to keep the Cold War out of 
Finland, they wished that all actors, both domestic and foreign, would follow caution in their 
informational activities. However, despite their extremely careful approach towards propaganda 
activities, the Finns gradually started to realise the importance of cooperating more closely with 
foreign countries in informational and cultural operations. The country’s slightly more stable 
position also gave the political leadership the confidence to expand the promotion of Finnish 
policies and culture abroad.  
In order to launch broader cultural and informational activities of their own and increase 
cooperation in this area, the Finnish Parliament set up a committee to analyse Finland’s cultural 
ties with foreign nations and explore possibilities to enhance them. According to the 
committee’s final report, presented in May 1949, Finland’s international exchange in the fields 
of art and science did not meet the required standards and should therefore be expanded as 
quickly as possible. With this objective in mind, the committee proposed greater funds for, for 
example, scientific exchange, the organisation of cultural exhibitions and, perhaps most 
significantly, the introduction of the Foreign Ministry’s cultural attachés.681   
The desire to introduce broader cultural and informational activities in Western Europe and 
the US was also evident in the way leading Finnish politicians and officials directly asked for 
Western advice for their actual implementation. For example, during an interview in 1949 Prime 
Minister Fagerholm asked for Information Officer Hamish McGhie’s opinion on the possible 
introduction of a Finnish press attaché in London.682 The timing of Fagerholm’s enquiry was no 
coincidence since the Finnish Foreign Ministry had become increasingly annoyed with how 
little the British public actually knew about Finland.683 When learning about Finland’s plans, the 
FO felt that it was sensible to assure the Finns that, in particular, their quest to explain the 
Western public that Finland did not belong to the other side of the Iron Curtain was a 
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welcomed move.684 In Whitehall’s eyes, a successful publicity campaign would not only improve 
Finland’s chances to make its political position properly understood around the world, but also 
help the country increase its commercial ties with the West. 
As much as this, undoubtedly, encouraged the Finns, the promotion of Finnish culture and 
policies abroad remained a somewhat limited activity for years to come. Although the first press 
attachés were appointed to the Finnish legations in London, Washington and Paris in 1950, the 
meagre available funds together with the lack of a centralised coordination body685 prevented 
the launch of broader and more consistent international publicity campaigns.686 The 
professional field for public relations in Finland was still young and remained rather 
unappreciated despite the foundation of the Finnish Association of Public Relations and its 
active position in convincing Finnish leaders of the sensibility of establishing a separate Finnish 
institute that would see to the promotion of the country to foreigners.687 Another factor 
restricting Finnish informational activities was the number of complaints the Russians made 
over the Finnish Foreign Ministry's country promotion campaigns, which focused mostly on 
the ways Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union was presented.688 In the international 
presentation of arts and crafts as well as visual arts, the Finns' performance was more efficient 
than in informational country promotion, mainly thanks to the work of several independent 
actors rather than operations run by a single central organisation.689 
 
Balancing between Political Propaganda and Misleading Promises  
 
In conclusion, the late 1940s was a time when the Cold War propaganda war started to reach 
Finnish shores. Both Western powers, above all Britain, implemented anti-communist 
propaganda operations in the country, but local circumstances continued to place restrictions 
on both propaganda activities and content. As a consequence, the increasingly aggressive East-
West battle for people’s hearts and minds entered Finland at a slower pace and appeared in 
somewhat weaker form. The accelerating domestic confrontation between the communists and 
non-communists did, however, result in the Western countries increasing their cooperation with 
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social democratic labour circles in addition to the positive promotion of their countries, which 
continued to make up the largest share of their informational and cultural operations.  
Evidence suggests that the British and US governments were to a large degree successful in 
expressing moral support to the Finns through informational and cultural channels, and in the 
American case through funding, while abstaining from giving direct promises for other kind of 
assistance. Even though the FCMA Treaty's final form gave Western officials in Helsinki 
greater confidence to plan their operations on a more long-term basis, the majority of their 
activities remained covert. The Finnish communists' 'revelations' and Soviet officials 
complaints' about Western propaganda in the country did indicate of expanding British and 
American informational programmes, but at the same time reflected more the tightening world 
situation than an actual broad-scale Western anti-communist propaganda offensive. While the 
Western position in several political matters was to a growing extent reaching through to the 
Finnish audience, the overtly distributed message remained largely unaggressive. In the very end 
of the 1940s, the intensifying Cold War became, however, increasingly apparent also in Finland 
and led to an altogether new era as far as more direct political propaganda in the country was 
concerned. 
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5. WESTERN PROPAGANDA REACHES FULL GEAR, 1950-1953 
 
Expansion of US Activities 
 
If the British and American governments had at the end of the 1940s felt at least slightly more 
confident about Finland’s chances of surviving as an independent country, the early 1950s saw 
the two Western powers again adopt a more pessimistic approach in regard to the country's 
future. As the Cold War was reaching burning point mainly because of the Korean War, fears 
over a communist offensive in Europe grew both on London and Washington. A number of 
State Department, NSC and CIA reports from this period reveal that US officials regarded the 
war spreading to Finland if not likely, but a fairly realistic possibility, nonetheless.690 The British 
Chiefs of Staff shared this view with their American colleagues and noted that the Soviets were 
more than capable of advancing rapidly to the West in the following few years due to, for 
example, their air force superiority.691 Although both London and Washington estimated that 
the Finns would oppose any military attack made against their country, the West regarded the 
Finnish Army as not only too small, but also ill-equipped to pose any credible threat to its 
gigantic eastern rival.692 Partly because of this, but more importantly because of Finland’s 
unchanged relationship with the Soviet Union, the Americans and the British were left with no 
other realistic option but to follow the same general policy as in the late 1940s: Finnish 
independence was to be supported mainly by moral and economic backing693, but no military 
assistance could be provided to the country even in the case of war. 
The Western powers were already in the early 1950s more concerned about developments 
that could lead to a gradual satellisation of Finland than they were of a possible military 
invention. The country’s expanding trade arrangements with the Soviet Union, particularly after 
the final reparation payments in 1952, increased fears that Finland was becoming too closely 
tied to the East.694 The growing acceptance of ‘neutrality’ and what became known as the 
Paasikivi Line as Finland’s adopted foreign policy raised even more eyebrows, particularly in 
Washington. The Americans regarded neutrality as more or less the goal of Soviet policy, or at 
least as a weakness to resist communism, and the Finns’ ability to oppose Soviet pressure was at 
times, especially during international crises, seriously undermined.695 This concern was also 
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shared by the British, who, like the Americans, saw it important that communists were excluded 
from the Finnish government also in the future.696  
Although both American and British officials kept following the same general principle in 
their propaganda and cultural operations in Finland as before, which meant avoiding anything 
that would embarrass the Finnish Government, increasing suspicions over the Finns’ ability to 
stay firm in containing communism, together with growing international tension, led to the two 
expand their activities also in the northern country. The Western governments came to realise 
that they had a role to play in the intensifying propaganda battle between Finnish communists 
and non-communists after all, if not directly but at least by providing support from the 
sidelines. Although the Finnish Government officially opposed ‘bringing the Cold War to the 
country’, the Finns’ desire to invest more in informational and cultural cooperation made the 
Finnish environment more fertile for Western activities as did the gradually increasing 
collaboration on, for example, intelligence and military issues between certain Finnish and US 
officials. The more robust approach many Finns adopted against the spread of communism, for 
example by founding new anti-communist organisations, offered both Britain and the US new 
possibilities for the distribution of their anti-communist propaganda in particular. 
As Western informational and cultural operations expanded in Finland in the 1950s, it soon 
became clear that the US campaign would overtake the British one thanks to the rapidly 
growing resources granted by Washington. The Campaign of Truth and the State Department’s 
new determination to launch a ‘psychological offensive’ to counter Soviet propaganda against 
the 'Free World' gave American activities a completely different magnitude also in Finland, 
which was ranked among the 21 countries that could either become the next targets of 
communist aggression or be in a position “where the danger of the disaffection of large groups 
is present or most probable”.697 As the State Department regarded a psychological offensive as 
necessary in each of these countries, the size of the information and cultural section was quickly 
expanded also at the US Legation in Helsinki. By autumn 1951, the department employed eight 
American officials and well over a dozen local employees.698 New premises in central Helsinki 
also enabled the USIS to make its Information Centre more appealing to the general public.  
Even if available resources for USIS operations in Finland started to grow steadily, new 
American recruits in Helsinki quickly noted that their activities would have a different character 
from what they were like in many other countries. In addition to the obvious reason, i.e. 
Finland’s proximity to the Soviet Union and the self-censorship practiced by the media, which 
according to USIS officials was continuously reflected in the Finns' unequal treatment of anti-
communist propaganda and anti-American messages699, the country’s vast physical size and 
sparsely-settled population made the Americans realise that approaching the broad masses 
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would be more difficult than in most parts of the world. At the same time, they concluded that 
an aggressive anti-communist propaganda offensive in the country was not entirely necessary 
given the Finnish nation's antipathy of the Soviet Union. In April 1950, the USIS estimated that 
its objective of “encouraging the Finnish people to maintain their political, economic and 
cultural independence and presenting the foreign and domestic policies of the United States as 
persuasively as possible from day to day” could be achieved by creating a receptive climate of 
opinion primarily through the presentation of a “dignified, full, factual picture of the US".700 
Harder-hitting propaganda was to be practised almost entirely through indirect channels. 
The increasing criticism Finnish newspapers on the extreme left directed against the US 
made American officials in Helsinki soon revise this strategy. Although they still recognised that 
a direct anti-Soviet crusade could damage their own image and cause trouble to the Finns, the 
stronger presentation of the anti-communist message won growing support. As early as May 
1950, Minister John Cabot noted that the US must in particular “seek to reach those who are 
sympathetic to communism but not wholly impervious to reason, and those who consciously 
reject communist propaganda yet innocently accept authentic some of its falsehoods regarding 
the United States”. One of the main objectives was to convince the Finns that communist 
attacks on the US were damaging to Finland and that it was in their own interests to actively 
combat them.701 In the early 1950s, the staff, finances and facilities of the USIS in Finland were 
finally regarded as adequate enough to make the task of encouraging Finns to resist communist 
pressures and strengthening Finland’s traditional attachment to the West more realistic. The 
objective was made even more plausible by the attitude of the Finnish people, which American 
officials more than once described as predominantly open to American and Western influence, 
and the highly organised structure of Finnish social, economic and cultural life, which provided 
various channels for reaching almost any conceivable audience.702 
In order to ‘provide psychological encouragement to the Finns’, the USIS staff in Helsinki 
defined labour groups and organisations, teachers and intellectuals and the broad masses as 
their primary target groups, in this order. Young university students along with professional and 
technical groups were defined as secondary target groups.703 The American view that reaching 
anti-communist labour leaders would be absolutely vital as blue-collar workers constituted a 
critically significant segment of the population would be characteristic for their campaign for 
years to come. This strategy was by no means unusual since the same approach was closely 
followed in many other European countries, including neighbouring Sweden.704 At the same 
time one must note that the chosen approach was not automatic either, but based on a 
thorough analysis of local conditions. The example of Austria, another neutral country where 
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the educated middle class was the USIS's number one target instead of labour leaders705, 
indicates that in different circumstances the American campaign in Finland could have also 
followed another kind of path.  
Placing teachers and intellectuals high on the list of importance was justified by a view held 
by the Americans that education in Finland followed a stereotyped pattern that generally 
excluded American history, culture and policies. US officials felt that the broad masses had a 
friendly attitude to their country, but they also saw that the picture of America was somewhat 
distorted. Because of this, the general public should also be given a deeper understanding of the 
US and its way of life, they concluded. As for the secondary target groups, the USIS felt that 
students, in particular, needed to be shown that quiet cooperation with the West would not 
mean surrendering their country’s independence.706 
The USIS/Helsinki constantly sought for new and more developed channels of 
communication to reach its target groups. As the need to counter communism grew also in 
Finland, the officials wished to introduce channels that would give them greater freedom in 
responding to Russian allegations in a more direct manner than it would ever be possible with 
the Legation’s standard methods. The Americans' ability to make several breakthroughs in the 
fields of propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland in the early 1950s leaves, for example, 
Jussi Hanhimäki’s claim that the State Department refused to establish new cultural 
programmes in Finland during that period due to the precarious Finnish-Soviet relationship 
rather inaccurate.707 Indeed, available source material reveals that Washington had no intention 
of leaving the Finns alone in resenting Soviet pressure when it came to informational and 
cultural methods. 
 
US Press Operations – From the Projection of America to Counterattacking 
Communist Propaganda 
 
Presenting a positive picture of the United States to the Finns and using ‘subtle’ propaganda 
through mainly factual material turned out to be one of the most successful American 
operations in Finland. By 1950, all major non-communist newspapers published large numbers 
of USIS-based articles and photographs. According to USIS officials, the use of their material in 
Finnish papers was even close to reaching saturation point.708 The Americans were particularly 
pleased to report that Helsingin Sanomat started publishing the monthly series ‘Letter from 
America’. Ilta-Sanomat also kept increasing its coverage of USIS material and now included 
regularly the complete ‘Week in the United States’, while Suomen Sosialidemokraatti published 
several excerpts of President Truman’s most important speeches.709 The series ‘What Americans 
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Are Really Thinking’ also turned out to be hugely popular both in the Helsinki region 
publications and provincial newspapers. The US Legation was also satisfied with the way in 
which the Finnish press reported about major world events, such as the progress of the 
Marshall Plan.710 The Korean War was also, according to the Legation, covered in a very pro-
Western manner by leading Finnish papers, even if a couple of published articles questioning 
“the American tendency to oversimplify not only things in the Far East but also on a universal 
scale” did raise some concern of the Finns’ general attitude towards US foreign policy.711 
Among the main themes on which the USIS focused and which were widely covered was 
the positive economic development taking place in the US. Speeches and official figures from 
the employment and business world were used to show the truth about the ‘depression’ in 
which the communist press had claimed the country to be. Like in many other countries, US 
officials gave special emphasis on explaining American capitalism in order to overcome 
European misconceptions.712 In this campaign also, the USIS wished to focus on the positives 
of the American system by, for instance, presenting how the average American benefitted from 
it rather than by directly attacking socialism or the Soviet Union.713 Items with a factual basis 
focusing on, for example, the comparative prices of food in Washington and Moscow were 
more than once successfully placed in Finland, especially in social democratic papers.  
The importance of projecting American culture and way of life was not neglected, either. 
Although jazz music was not yet part of the official cultural programme, the USIS/Helsinki, like 
many other USIE posts, also showed some interest in promoting jazz music as it felt that “we 
must not let the Finns continue to think that we are only a nation of gadgets”.714 For this 
purpose Louis Armstrong's visit to Helsinki in October 1949 gave a natural boost, as did the 
concert given by Benny Goodman a couple of years later.715 The significance of sports as a 
propaganda tool was also gradually recognised in Washington, and as a consequence, Finnish 
papers were fed with news of American sporting heroes. The visit of an American athletic team 
to Finland in June 1950 was regarded as a particular publicity success.716 
The projection of America through positive news articles and photographs was not regarded 
as a success only by USIS staff. Several high-ranking Finns expressed their appreciation of the 
news service, while a number of newspapers claimed that they would not get hold of similar 
kind of material any other way. According to the Americans, the USIS service was used more 
often than any non-commercial service in Finland. USIS officials did appreciate the content of 
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the British Information Service, but noted that the British campaign focused more on 
influencing certain individuals than expanding the use of their material.717 
In spite of factual news stories finding their way to the pages of Finnish publications, in the 
early 1950s the Americans started to become increasingly frustrated with the policies of the 
Finnish press. It was not only self-censorship and the legislation forbidding the slandering of a 
foreign nation that set limitations for making the American message properly heard: indeed, the 
Finnish newspapers habit of often excluding international topics, especially if they did not 
pertain directly to Finland, made things even more difficult. The way the press almost totally 
ignored, for example, Foreign Secretary Dean Acheson’s renowned California speeches, in 
which he called the West to practice ‘total diplomacy’ for countering hostile propaganda and 
defined terms for settlement should talks with the Soviet Union ever become possible718, 
disappointed the US Legation a great deal, especially when much effort had been put into 
translating the speeches and distributing them in advance.  
According to the USIS, the limited and delayed editorial comment given to the speeches was 
typical of the Finnish press. Furthermore, the newspapers’ general attitude to international 
events, seen as "realistic and seasoned with scepticism", made the Americans doubt whether the 
USIS could produce any spectacular results in such an environment, after all.719 The reserved 
treatment given by Finnish papers to the Baltic plane incident in 1950 only increased these 
suspicions as, according to the Americans, most papers avoided commenting on the matter and 
the few that did seemed to favour the Russian version of the affair.720 
At the same time, the Americans recognised that Finnish newspapers did not usually resist 
publishing quotes from speeches and quoting foreign newspapers even if they included anti-
communist statements. Larger resources enabled the USIS/Helsinki to translate a greater 
number of speeches and produce such special papers as ‘The UN and the Korean Crisis’, which 
was distributed to a total of 6,243 recipients.721 Newspaper editors were also supplied with State 
Department pamphlets, such as ‘Background Information on the Soviet Union in International 
Relations’ and ‘Our Foreign Policy’, which for instance Helsingin Sanomat used as background 
material in an editorial.722 The Americans also learnt that although direct criticism of the Soviet 
Union was restricted in Finland, anti-communist propaganda could be distributed by delivering 
material exposing the flaws of communism in satellite countries. As a result, the USIS bulletin 
'Uutisia Usasta' also started to include more direct quotations from American newspapers over 
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such news issues as riots in East Berlin.723 The fact that the news agency STT forwarded USIS 
articles like ‘Hungarian Army Russianized’ and ’30,000 Political Prisoners in Czech 
Concentration Camp’, which were then published by leading papers such as Aamulehti and Uusi 
Suomi, not only encouraged the Americans in their anti-communist efforts, but also led to ever-
hardening attacks against non-communist newspapers by the far left.724  
The need to distribute such material started to become more evident in the first years of the 
1950s, as Soviet-based material was increasingly being published by the Finnish press, partly due 
to the direct pressure on newspaper editors and partly because Soviet propaganda was turning 
less crude and obvious than it had been in the late 1940s. Furthermore, the far-left repeatedly 
accused leading Finnish newspapers and the SDP in particular of being mere tools of the 
USIS’s “warmonger propaganda”725 who “obeyed the orders of Wall Street”.726 A major 
problem for meeting Minister Cabot's quest of responding to communist propaganda in a more 
offensive manner was that a large share of material supplied to the USIS as part of the 
'psychological offensive' could not be used in Finland. The USIS noted that copies of such 
items as the Herblock cartoon book, which included a communist character with a handlebar 
moustache, should be sent to them only by request as they would have no chance of being 
published by Finnish newspapers.727 Indeed, a constant challenge for the press section was to 
come as close as possible to the line that seemed acceptable and judicious without going too far 
and, thereby, endangering major American objectives in Finland. The delicacy of this task was 
emphasised in a number of messages sent from Helsinki to Washington, for instance in the US 
Legation’s reply to an inquiry over the use of the USIE’s new ‘Background and Actions Kits’, 
which contained of propaganda material dealing with topical issues such as the Soviet peace 
offensive.728 Although officials in Helsinki reported that the kits were of high value in Finland, 
particularly for the factual background material certain articles and pamphlets provided, they 
stressed that very little of the outspokenly anti-Soviet material could be put into effective use.729 
The limited possibility of distributing anti-communist material made the Americans constantly 
contemplate the use of other channels and ways of communication. In 1951, the USIS/Helsinki 
sharpened its output by launching its own pamphlets for distribution to newspapers and 
individuals mainly through the labour organisations and the SDP. For example, the edited 
translation of Erwin D. Canham’s, Editor of the Christian Science Monitor, pamphlet The Authentic 
Revolution, ‘Todellinen Vallankumous’ in Finnish, which discussed the basic conflicts between the 
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communist and the American social systems730, was published as an edition of 10,000 copies.731 
Other pamphlets and leaflets distributed included the ‘Americana Free World Pamphlets’732 and 
adaptation of texts on more precise topics such as ‘Rauhanehdotus’ (Proposal for Peace) and 
‘Kaksi aseistariisumissuunnitelmaa' (Two Plans for Disarmament).733 
 In 1953, US propaganda became even more extensive, as a special pamphlet series was 
launched under the general title of ‘Ajattelemisen Aihetta’ (Something to Think About) for 
distribution to the main USIS target groups. The more aggressive approach was also reflected in 
separate smaller leaflets spread around Finland, which for example in Eisenhower’s and 
Acheson’s name attacked directly the Soviet Union’s intentions over world peace.734 In 1953 the 
USIS also delivered the first edition of the History of the American Labor Movement to Finnish labour 
circles and members of the media. This booklet, originally edited by the US Ministry of Labor, 
gave the Finns a detailed account of the American trade union movement’s development from its 
humble origins in the late 18th century to its post-war position as a powerful and fully accepted 
force in American society, emphasising the trade unions’ long tradition of proceeding with their 
objectives gradually rather than engaging in a direct class struggle.735  
In light of a more direct American propaganda policy in Finland, the introduction of the 
journal Problems of Communism took place at a good moment. The journal, first published in early 
1952, was distributed to Finnish journalists, academics, civil servants and politicians. As Problems 
of Communism was, due to its highly academic approach, meant mainly as background material, it 
is doubtful that much of its content was as such used by the Finnish press or politicians. The 
publication’s value as a documentation of the flaws of the communist system should not, 
however, be dismissed. Particularly in its first couple of years the journal offered strong articles 
on, for example, the peasant’s everyday life under Marxism, Eastern European trials and the 
true performance of the Soviet economy736, which undoubtedly complemented the Finnish 
readers’ knowledge of international communism. 
In addition to increasing the number of pamphlets, leaflets and other publications 
distributed to the Finnish press, placing articles in newspapers was also made more effective 
with the help of a special Finnish-language background service and through growing 
cooperation with Finnish editors. For instance, a writer of a Finnish magazine assisted the USIS 
by writing ‘a factual explanation’ of the so-called Rosenberg Case, after which the article was 
distributed by the National Coalition Party press organisation.737 As the overseas presentation of 
                                                 
730 Canham, Erwin D., Todellinen Vallankumous (USIS/Helsinki 1951). 
731 D.G. Wilson to SD, ’Report on USIE Publication Produced Locally’, July 17, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, 
box 2426, 511.60E21/7-1751, NARA. 
732 J.V. Lund to SD, ‘Usability of Proposed Pamphlets’, January 11, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2426, 
511.60E21/1-1152, NARA. 
733 J.V. Lund to SD, ‘Report on USIE Publications Produced Locally’, January 10, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF Finland 
1950─1954, box 2426, 511.60E21/1-1052, NARA. 
734 Leaflet: 'Eisenhower kysyy: Haluaako Neuvostoliitto rauhaa?' (USIS/Helsinki 1953), Amp, X G 1953, SUPO, 
KA; 'Kansainvälisen kommunismin uusi linja. Otteita ulkoministeri Dean G. Achesonin ammattijärjestöväelle 
äskettäin pitämästä puheesta' (USIS/Helsinki 1952). 
735 Amerikan työväenliikkeen historiaa (USIS/Helsinki 1953). 
736 Problems of Communism, Vol. 2, No. 3; Vol. 2, No. 2; Vol. 2, No. 4. 
737 D.G. Wilson to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending May 31, 1953’, July 15, 1953, RG 59, 
SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2426, 511.60E/7-1553, NARA. 
 
 
148 
 
the case was among the topics on which the State Department had given highly detailed 
instructions to American missions around the world738, the USIS/Helsinki staff was 
undoubtedly pleased with this arrangement.  
In its quest of ‘giving the Finns a less distorted picture of America’, the US Legation also 
started giving growing emphasis on the Finnish-American Society’s publication Suomi-Finland 
USA, which regularly included USIS pamphlets in its editions. Moreover, three leading 
American-Finnish newspapers, Raivaaja, New Yorkin Uutiset and Minnesotan Uutiset, were also 
made available in Finland through libraries and the Finnish-American societies. According to 
John Cabot, the distribution of these publications was important since by reading about Finns 
in the US, the readers “can scarcely fail to absorb facts and impressions which will nail commie 
lies”.739 This estimation can be regarded as highly accurate as the Finnish-American papers 
published at the time, the labour-orientated Raivaaja in particular, regularly included political 
articles revealing, for instance, the true nature of the Eastern European communist countries' 
juridical system and the actual scale of the population transfers taking place in the Baltic States 
as well as editorials condemning Soviet peace propaganda and defending US foreign, defence 
and economic policies.740 The fact that the papers’ material had not been written with 
propaganda intentions only enhanced their position as the most effective sort of propaganda, 
Cabot praised.  
This assessment was certainly taken seriously within the State Department, and in particular 
the IIA's Private Enterprise Cooperation Department, which launched a special project to 
encourage Finnish-Americans to send newspapers and magazines both in Finnish and English 
to friends in Finland in order to meet the lack of American publications in the country.741 For 
this goal, State Department officials were in close contact with Finnish newspapers, radio 
stations and nationality organisations based in the US.742 After early difficulties concerning the 
shipment process, the American officials were pleased with the ‘Magazines for Finland Drive’ 
project, a part of the State Department’s larger ‘Magazines for Friendship’ campaign, noting 
that the increase of American printed material was met with some enthusiasm.743 For this they 
had partly the Finnish-American Society to thank, as the association gave valuable assistance to 
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the USIS/Helsinki in distributing the publications throughout the country.744 A greater number 
of more professional industrial and technological periodicals also became available at 
Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, even if at first at least the American publisher Cleworth Publishing 
refused to send their products to Finland due to their understanding that the country was in 
communist hands.745  
 
Aikamme Catches Workers' Attention 
 
Despite the introduction of new media, the Americans were not convinced that the working 
class, the number one target group, was efficiently reached in Finland. The Legation came up 
with a number of novel methods to remedy this problem. In addition to the distribution of the 
Labor Bulletin and other USIS-produced pamphlets, the Americans started to put more effort 
into creating new personal contacts with labour leaders around the country. For example, the 
US Legation started to organise so-called labour information trips to various parts of the 
country during which members of the Legation met local trade unionists and discussed both 
Finnish and American labour and social issues with them. According to Mr Cabot, who himself 
visited the Ostrobothnia region in June 1952, these trips were warmly welcomed by the 
attending Finns, as they appreciated the down-to-earth nature of the discussions, which they 
said were in stark contrast with the Soviet delegations' strongly propagandistic behaviour during 
their corresponding events.746 As successful as these activities were, the most important reform, 
however, was the launch of a local magazine that was mainly meant for working class readers. 
The US Legation came up with the idea of printing a field magazine of its own in 1951. The 
objective was to supplement the other USIS media by devoting each issue of the magazine to 
one or two related subjects that would be based on IPS pamphlets and feature stories sent to 
Helsinki. By this stage, the Legation was particularly concerned that growing communist 
propaganda had led into a situation in which there was a serious lack of information about the 
US and its aims in Finland, especially among the working class population. It was felt that the 
introduction of a regular publication in magazine format would enable a more complete 
treatment of certain subjects and make such information more readily available and more 
acceptable than mere pamphlets.747  
It took quite some time before the first issue of the field magazine was published, as the 
Legation ran into several legal and technical problems. The main obstacle was that Finnish law 
prohibited an entirely foreign publisher from printing and distributing its material in Finland. As 
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the Americans wished to proceed openly in the magazine’s production, John Lund, Second 
Press Attaché at the US Legation, approached the Finnish Foreign Ministry to receive advice on 
the matter, stressing that the publication would be based on purely informative content and 
would avoid making any political comments or provocations against the Soviet Union.748 A 
solution for this problem was found in spring 1952 when a dummy corporation known as the 
Publishing Company Katsaus was founded. Each of the company’s three directors was a 
Finnish citizen and owned one share of its stock.  
The managing director of the company, Mr Pentti Lehti, was to become the editor of the 
magazine.749 Lehti had studied at Stanford University and was familiar with American society 
and US objectives in Finland.750 For the field magazine, he prepared an extensive guide for 
editorial content and distribution details. According to him, the most important group of 
citizens to reach through the publication would be the labour force organised under the SAK, 
followed by educators who conveyed ideas to young people at upper secondary schools and 
universities. The editor stressed that the magazine should have a down-to-earth approach 
stressing US economic welfare and purchasing power. As American culture and education were 
generally considered weak as compared to Europe, special emphasis should also be placed on 
these areas. In general, according to Lehti, the magazine should avoid the use of oversimplified 
propaganda as it could only offer suitable ground for further anti-American information.751 
These were, undoubtedly, sensible remarks made during a time when anti-American feeling was 
actually on the rise among Europeans, mainly due to their reactions towards racism and 
McCarthyism, but also because the American campaign was at times regarded as patronising.752 
The first issue of the magazine Aikamme ('Our Time'), originally published bi-monthly but 
from 1954 onwards every month, was at last published in May 1952 and sold approximately 
7,500 copies at newsstands. The sales figures for the following issues exceeded this level, which 
according to the Americans indicated that the Finns were ready to pay for a propaganda 
publication if it was intelligently edited and attractively presented.753 In July 1953, the US 
Legation reported that Aikamme had around 3,000 subscribers with a heavy concentration 
among labour groups and that newsstand sales were still growing. The magazine had, according 
to Public Affairs Officer David Wilson, evolved an editorial formula that had developed high 
reader interest while successfully pushing its propaganda message through.754  
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Other evidence of Aikamme’s successful start included Mr Lehti’s report about an incident at 
a Finnish plant located in Tikkakoski, which was owned by the Soviet Union. After discovering 
that Aikamme was sold in the company-owned kiosk, the Soviet management immediately 
banned the magazine. This only increased the number of Aikamme subscribers in the region. 
Lehti also started receiving several positive reports about the magazine being a big hit among 
non-communist workers whose information sources were relatively limited as compared with 
the well-briefed communist section.755  
Although the Americans were satisfied with the field magazine's early success, the 
publication did not turn out to be as triumphant a medium as was intended. The State 
Department was not entirely happy with Aikamme’s content, calling it somewhat 'fluffy'. 
Officials in Washington did acknowledge that the magazine should be light enough for broad 
appeal and that overt propaganda was undesirable in Finland, but reminded the USIS/Helsinki 
that the purpose of Aikamme was to further the aims of US foreign policy. Therefore, it was 
urged that each issue of the magazine should to include at least two “thought-provoking articles 
which are expressive of the American view and will tend to influence Finnish thought toward 
that end”.756  
The more severe problem had to do with finance. The growing expenses for the publishing 
of Aikamme, together with the increasingly successful USIS article placements in Finnish 
magazines, finally led to the abolishment of the publication in 1957. Even the publication's 
ability to increase its total circulation to approximately 30,000 was not enough to prevent this.757 
American officials in Helsinki expressed no regret about the decision, as by the time it was 
made they were already using new methods to reach the much desired labour groups. 
 
Adjusting British Propaganda to Local Practices 
 
As the US Government expanded its propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations in Finland 
in the early 1950s, the British felt that they must also come up with new ideas in order to 
increase their presence in the country. Although London and Washington had by now taken 
their first steps towards cooperation in propaganda operations, the FO had no intention to let 
the Americans entirely steal the show on the psychological anti-communist front in Finland. 
While the British Government’s general approach towards Finland in the early 1950s remained 
cautious, the now commonly accepted notion that Finland had a future as an independent 
country after all, together with Whitehall’s more robust policy on anti-communist propaganda, 
gave an altogether new impetus for the activities in the country.  
A broader British propaganda campaign was also justified by Whitehall’s increasing worry 
that the so-called Soviet Peace Campaign might in the long run end up in some weaker 
countries falling into neutrality and eventually joining the communist bandwagon; according to 
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some FO officials, these countries included Finland.758 In this instance it is important to note 
that the British did express some understanding of what was meant by Finnish neutrality, 
acknowledging that the country's political behaviour largely resulted from its geographical 
position. When British and US officials saw it fitting to criticise Finland’s policies, it was 
because they suspected Finnish neutrality being too much inclined towards the Soviet Union, 
not because they wanted to condemn the country’s neutral position as such.  
As for information activity, the belief that Finland would remain outside the communist bloc 
was reflected well by a request made by the British Legation in Helsinki in April 1950 that it no 
longer wished to receive reports, telegrams, political papers and so-called 'E despatches' that 
were distributed to British posts in communist countries. The Legation justified this by pointing 
out that Finland was by no means a Soviet satellite and that its problems were consequently 
quite unlike those in the orbit states.759 The FO’s Northern Department agreed with this view, 
especially as it was in line with the economy drive taking place in Whitehall.760 From then on, 
only reports from satellite countries that were of relevance to Finland were sent to Helsinki. 
Being finally categorised as a non-communist country did not mean that Finland was treated 
as an outright Western European country in information operations. A report from the Cabinet 
Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas Information Services from May 1952 placed the 
country in the group of Western European ’frontier countries’ together with Germany, Austria, 
Yugoslavia and Greece. This categorisation did not mean that conditions for information work 
in these countries were poor. On the contrary, the committee reported that in the frontier 
countries circumstances had created an exceptional interest in all things British or had placed 
Britain in a particularly favourable position to put across its point of view.761 Although the 
largest sums were still invested in operations taking place in Italy, an expenditure estimation for 
overseas information services in 1952 and 1953 confirms that informational activity in these 
countries was regarded more important than in the rest of Europe. The money allocated for 
operations taking place in Finland, which included both the Legation's Information Service and 
the British Council, was in the early 1950s almost two times larger than the budget for activities 
implemented in neighbouring Sweden and Norway.762 This made the regular complaints of 
British officials in Helsinki over the slim resources available for informational and cultural 
activities not always entirely justified. 
Even if the British Legation and the British Council in Helsinki did have some money to 
work on, by the early 1950s it had become increasingly obvious that their resources paled in 
comparison to those of the US. Determined not be discouraged by this, the British constantly 
                                                 
758 ‘Anti-Communist Propaganda Operations’, July 27, 1951, CAB 127/296, NA. 
759 British Legation, Helsinki to British Legation, Bucharest, April 3, 1950, FO 371/86492, NA. 
760 Northern Department to British Legation, June 20, 1950, FO 371/86492, NA. 
761 Cabinet Committee of Enquiry into Overseas Information Services. Memorandum by the Foreign Office, July 
30, 1952, CAB 130/75, NA. 
762 The total expenditure for Finland in 1952-1953 was assessed to be £38,510. The figure for operations in Sweden 
and Norway were £21,700 and £22,000 respectively. All in all, the sums invested in operations taking place in 
Western Europe followed closely the categarisation of countries into 'frontier countries' and others. In relation to 
size of population, Finland's share of money was among the largest, only behind those of Austria and Greece. 
‘Table I, Overseas Information 1952-1953, Expenditure per annum by areas in sterling’, Committee of Enquiry into 
Overseas Information Services, May 16, 1952, CAB 130/75, NA. 
 
 
153 
 
tried to come up with operational methods that would not require that much money. Building a 
network of contacts with influential Finns was an area into which British officials in Helsinki 
put more care than their American counterparts. The fact that the British Legation had come to 
regard the position of the Finnish press considerably stronger than in the first post-war years 
increased the efforts to form close ties with Finnish journalists in particular. Indeed, the British 
seemed even more confident than the Americans that the newspapers had adopted a stiffening 
attitude towards communism, predominantly as a result of the Korean War. In August 1950, 
Oswald Scott was pleased to report to Foreign Secretary Bevin that in addition to the social 
democratic press, the right-wing papers had also begun to give supporting fire. According to 
Scott’s interpretation, the discussion on communism had now been raised onto an ideological 
plane, “and the danger of communism as a world-wide evil, as opposed to communism in 
Finland as a purely local evil”.763 The Minister to Finland justified his view by listing a number 
of comments made on communism in conservative and liberal papers. Of these, Scott was 
particularly impressed by Aamulehti, which in its editorial reminded its readers about how 
dangerous it was to tolerate such an absolute conception of life as communism.764 Ilta-Sanomat 
and Helsinki Sanomat also received the Minister’s approval for the way they commented on the 
Cominforn meeting taking place in Berlin and the United States' role in safeguarding peace.765  
Although the more robust policy adopted by Finnish newspapers gave the British 
encouragement about the potentially broader possibilities for printed propaganda, Finland’s 
delicate position was taken into account in the distributed content as it had been done in the 
late 1940s. The British knew that the Finns would not, despite the recent encouraging trend, 
publish excessively aggressive anti-communist articles, not to mention anti-Soviet comments, 
and sought to supply them with more positive material. The FO continued to stress that the 
Cold War should not be brought closer to Finland than it already was.766 In April 1951, the 
British Information Service’s efforts were reported to be “directed against undue pessimism, 
pointing to the growing strength of the West, and the solid basis of the Anglo-American 
alliance, and trying to explain, by reference to the threat to peace represented by the 
preponderance of the Soviet and satellite armies, the case for the enlistment of Germany’s 
potential strength”.767  
The adopted strategy also meant that the British did not wish to pressure Finnish editors to 
publish anything that would be against Finnish law or that would place them in a difficult 
position. One example of this policy was Oswald Scott’s decision not to make special 
arrangements for the exposure of Russian forced labour, a successful IRD theme in several 
other countries, in view of local conditions.768 The cautious approach was also reflected in a 
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remark made by Scott in July 1950 on the inadvisability of opening new Information 
Department premises in Helsinki: “While we have ample evidence that the quiet expansion of 
‘non-public’ information work which has been going on is widely appreciated, I feel that to 
open public premises would be a gesture of a kind which would be more likely to embarrass 
than to gratify the Finns”.769 
In spite of continuing to implement a non-aggressive informational strategy in Finland in the 
early 1950s, the British Government was by no means willing to end its support for the SDP, 
which was left with the tricky position of fighting against the communists without provoking 
the Soviets. Indeed, the British Legation was now in even closer contact with the Finnish social 
democrats and more than once expressed its desire to assist them in their struggle, as long as 
their measures would not take an excessively aggressive form. If in the late 1940s Labour 
Attaché C.L. Thomas had been the central figure in providing Finnish social democrats with 
suitable anti-communist propaganda material, it was now left for Hamish McGhie, the highly 
active British Information Officer, to carry the main responsibility in this field. In McGhie’s 
view, it was in British interests to back such SDP field activities as the education of party 
officials of the real meaning of Stalinism and the circulation of anti-communist propaganda 
throughout the party. For this purpose, he managed to convince the IRD to supply the SDP 
central library with background papers and books that were not obtainable in Finland. The first 
book list from August 1950 included publications like A Communist Party in Action by Angelo 
Rossi, Tito’s Plot against Europe by Derek Kartun and The Police State by Craig Thompson.770  
Only a few months later, the British Legation started to send such titles, as well as a growing 
floury of IRD background papers, also to social democratic trade unions, which the British 
continued to regard as almost as important in confronting communism in Finland as political 
parties or the public press. In early 1951, the British Legation once again expressed its concern 
over increasingly strong communist agitation in working class areas, factories and forests and 
added, alarmed, that the social democratic workers' inability to make any counter-effort made 
the situation even worse. 771 The objective of influencing the wavering Finnish voter that could 
be in danger of slipping towards communism was now very much regarded as one of the main 
British informational tasks in Finland. In July 1952, the FO estimated that it had managed to 
achieve this goal by securing a considerable audience among the Finnish trade unions in 
addition to the various political parties.772 
A number of practical reasons prevented the collaboration between the British Legation and 
the Finnish social democrats from expanding even more. The most important reason obviously 
had to with the nature of available propaganda material. As the social democrats, as well as 
other Finnish anti-communists, wished to avoid explicitly abusing the Soviet Union or its 
leaders in their propaganda, the broader use of many of the titles produced by the British 
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propaganda machinery was still simply out of the question. Completely aware of this, British 
officials in Helsinki tried to adapt to local conditions as well as they could by providing their 
Finnish contacts with more positive material from the IRD publication Digest, or material 
concerning, for instance, only Eastern European matters. Items showing how the worker fared 
economically under a communist regime continued to be of particular interest to the Finns and 
were, therefore, almost regularly included in the material distributed to them. 
Even though in general the British propaganda machinery was more flexible than its 
American counterpart, the IRD was not always able to meet demands for the production of 
material more suitable for the local circumstances in question due to the extra work required.773 
In the case of Finnish social democrats, this problem was partly solved by keeping them 
informed about the latest IRD publications and supplying them with material whenever it was 
seen as appropriate to local needs. Providing details about communist strategies and tactics in 
France and Israel was one example of suitable propaganda material for Finnish social 
democrats.774 Officials at the FO regarded this kind of information as useful for the SDP, as in 
their view the Finns’ knowledge of communist activity abroad continued to be limited.  
The close cooperation between the British Legation and the SDP was in the early 1950s 
above all reflected by the eagerness of the social democratic newspapers to publish British news 
reports and feature articles. Indeed, the social democratic press, in particular the leading party 
paper Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, was the most active instrument for promoting the Western 
message in printed form. In 1952, the British Legation, for instance, reported that the political 
commentator of Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, Yrjö “Jahvetti” Kilpeläinen, a well-known 
propagandist and a close associate of Leskinen and Varjonen, based around 25 per cent of his 
articles on the IRD material sent to him by the British.775  
Mr Kilpeläinen’s use of Western anti-communist material hardly comes as surprise 
considering his background. Nicknamed “Jahvetti” after the war-time radio programme he 
hosted as part of the Finnish propaganda effort, he quickly became one of the Finnish 
communists’ pet hates in the first post-war years. The devilish style with which Kilpeläinen 
criticised Finnish communists in his numerous columns and political speeches not only made 
him a constant target for Valpo surveillance776, but also inspired his adversaries to give him 
another, more dubious nickname: “Little Goebbels”.777 Both a politician and a journalist, 
Kilpeläinen developed an expertise in anti-communist rhetoric that was sharp and witty, while 
being understandable to the common man. Although usually adopting a humorous style in his 
columns, he did not make his comments regarding communism off the top of his head. On the 
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contrary, Kilpeläinen continuously expanded his knowledge of his number one topic by 
collecting a wide range of relevant newspaper articles from both home and abroad.778 
Going through Kilpeläinen’s political comments published in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti reveals 
that the claim of him using IRD material in 25 per cent of his columns was something of an 
exaggeration. Although occasionally commenting explicitly on the true nature of, for example, 
‘people’s democracy in Czechoslovakia’,779 Kilpeläinen’s columns, in the early 1950s published 
almost daily, predominantly took a stab at Finnish communists and their publications rather 
than provided information about developments abroad. At times, however, Jahvetti made direct 
references to comments published in The Daily Herald, some of which might well have been 
based on IRD material, and discussed topical world events through them.780 What makes an 
estimation of the true impact British propaganda had on Mr Kilpeläinen’s comments almost 
impossible is that in many of his columns he combined domestic and international topics while 
making ambiguous references to developments in countries like Yugoslavia and Hungary.781 
When Kilpeläinen did choose to make use of IRD-based material in his columns, British 
propaganda themes were guaranteed to receive plenty of attention, such was the popularity of 
his witty comments.782 
In addition to the social democrats, the British Legation wished to increase its cooperation 
with parties on the political right and centre. Although the National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) 
had been in political wilderness after the war ended, its sharpened propaganda policy against 
domestic communists that was already evident in the parliamentary elections of 1948783 made the 
British more curious about using the party as another channel for its informational objectives. 
This did not, however, change the way London and Washington perceived Kokoomus and its 
position in Finnish politics. Indeed, when discussing the cooperation between the two leading 
Western powers and Kokoomus in the early 1950s, one has to keep in mind that the party was 
not in general of particular interest to either the British or the Americans, since it was expected to 
be predominantly sympathetic to the West in any case. The party was simply not considered as 
the main organ in containing communism in Finland, and therefore not a likely target of financial 
investment either, as Vesa Vares has noted.784  
British officials' intention to collaborate with the Coalition Party on informational activities 
progressed decisively in early 1951 when Mr McGhie managed to establish good relations with 
the Kokoomus press syndicate and started consulting party officials about articles and features 
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that could be placed in their service.785 In addition to press articles, the British Legation also 
started providing the party library with pamphlets and books on communism. For example, in 
August 1952 Mr McGhie sent Niilo Honkala, Party Secretary of Kokoomus, a long list of 
British publications from which to choose.786 The fact that at least on this occasion almost all of 
the publications Honkala picked were written by authors associated with the IRD, such as 
George Orwell, Dennis Healy and R.N. Carew-Hunt, as well as Bertrand Russell, Leonard 
Schapiro, C.D. Darlington, Francis Watson, W.N. Ewer and Victor Feather, who all 
contributed to the essay collection Why Communism Must Fail787, shows that the British had now 
found a new, even if indirect, channel for their anti-communist propaganda campaign. Up until 
this development, Kokoomus’ collection of printed Western political material had been modest 
and mostly included publications sent to them by the British Conservative Party. The exchange 
of political pamphlets between the two parties had not begun until the summer of 1950 when 
the Tories had requested for Kokoomus’ recent campaign literature.788 
The relatively modest extent of international cooperation applied even more to the Agrarian 
Party (Maalaisliitto), which the British also wished to use as a distributor of their printed 
content. As the party’s international contacts mainly consisted of politicians from similar parties 
in Scandinavia and West Germany789, this would always be a difficult proposition. The fact that 
leading party figures such as Urho Kekkonen in the early 1950s considered cooperation with 
the West secondary to building a working relationship with the Soviet Union790 made the 
challenge even bigger. All this did not, however, stop Hamish McGhie from offering British 
articles to the Agrarian Party press syndicate. In order to create closer ties with party officials, 
McGhie also requested them to send him examples of the kind of propaganda the party had 
implemented in the parliamentary elections of 1951 that would be useful for a “London-based 
association conducting research in political propaganda”791, undoubtedly the IRD. Although 
Maalaisliitto agreed to this wish, and party officials continued to remain on McGhie’s contact 
list, cooperation between British Legation and the party remained slim. The British were not 
particularly surprised by all of this since they were fully aware that the Agrarian Party’s 
reluctance to adopt a closer relationship with Western countries, especially if they were 
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members of NATO792, was largely down to its position as one of the leading governmental 
parties, often the case in the 1950s. 
In spite of the local conditions, the harder-hitting IRD material, which was both sent as 
background papers to, for instance, political and newspaper contacts and included in the press 
bulletin, in general had a satisfactory landing in Finland. For the distribution of the material, the 
Legation developed a routine under which a great deal of the received content was translated 
and then duplicated to the contacts made mostly by Mr McGhie. The number of Digest items 
included in the press bulletin that were printed by the Finnish press even surprised the British at 
first. They also soon recognised that provincial papers in particular could be more easily 
encouraged to publish anti-communist material as their resources for own production were so 
limited. In October 1950, such anti-communist items as ‘Forced Labour in Czech Uranium 
Mines’ and ‘The Communists and the Attack on the Churches’ were published by Finnish 
newspapers, which were now considered even more willing to publish more controversial 
material, naturally providing it did not infringe the FCMA Treaty.793 Especially semi-humorous 
content and items on Eastern European countries were actively picked up from the Legation 
press bulletin, published on a weekly basis from 1950 onwards.  
Naturally, the anti-communist propaganda distributed in Finland made up only a certain share 
of the printed material delivered by the British Information Service. Although no official figures 
exist, it is not difficult to conclude that in a country like Finland the more neutral material 
produced by the COI, which above all focused on British matters, made up the majority of the 
publicity. Particularly short items compiled together in the press bulletin and translated into 
Finnish were actively published by newspapers throughout the country. The main themes 
distributed to the Finnish press in the early 1950s dealt with such major international issues as 
Britain’s position to the Korean War and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Conflict. The welfare state and 
other social, industrial, economic and scientific developments also remained among the larger 
topics most typically included in both the press and labour bulletins.794  
 
Britain Enters Harder Propaganda War 
 
The fairly successful start in the placement of IRD material did not stop British officials from 
noting that a number of reasons kept holding back its use. For instance, in addition to making 
observations about the practice of self-censorship in Finland, they recognised that Finnish 
newspapers were restricted in size, there was a complete absence of periodicals of The Economist 
or New Statesman class and that important international news without direct repercussions on 
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Finland, if even published, had strikingly little impact on the newspaper reading public.795 
Indeed, British officials often regarded the average Finn living outside Helsinki as insulated 
from any real sense of world affairs.  
The question on the attribution of the material was also seen as tricky in Finland. As IRD 
content was always circulated confidentially and recipients were asked not to reveal the articles’ 
source, journalists in some Western European countries used the material as if they had thought 
of it themselves. In Finland, however, this was possible only in exceptional cases as the 
newspapers saw that they should reveal the story’s source. For this reason, Oswald Scott 
requested that on some occasions, in order to secure publicity, it would be useful to be able to 
attribute the material to, for example, ‘a Foreign Office spokesman’.796 According to his 
estimation, many Finnish papers would print more of IRD material if they were able to publish 
it as an official view of the British Government. This was not to happen as John Peck, who was 
to become Head of the IRD, replied to Scott that no permission to attribute the material to an 
official source of any kind could be given.797  
Such a denial did not prevent the circulation of the IRD's semi-secret background material to 
‘trustworthy recipients’ from becoming general knowledge in Finnish press and political circles. In 
1951, both Vapaa Sana and Työkansan Sanomat saw as their duty to ‘expose’ the activity on two 
occasions after they had got their hands on confidentially circulated material to chief newspaper 
editors and Mr McGhie’s accompanying letter. On the first occasion, which took place in January 
1951, the document in question was the IRD’s long background paper on the Soviet Peace 
Campaign, which analysed with great detail the Soviet Government’s policy and tactics regarding 
the campaign and discussed the role of the communist-controlled international organisations.798 
The two Finnish papers published parts of the document and the entire covering letter with the 
title ‘The anti-Soviet propaganda of the social democratic press is directed from a legation of a 
foreign power’.799 The papers did not, however, attack the British for their activities as much as 
they did Yrjö Kilpeläinen, who was shown to have used a quotation from the document. All this 
fitted in well with one of the main communist propaganda themes, that the SDP received its 
orders and directives from the Western powers. The FO did not see this ‘exposure’ as particularly 
serious, but decided to duplicate 175 more copies of the document in question “to give it much 
wider circulation that it received before pointing out that the document in question is in no way 
secret, and that it was intended for the background guidance of publicists and others free to form 
an unbiased opinion of world events”.800 
The second incident, taking place in April 1951, was taken more seriously. This time, the 
communist papers published a letter addressed to Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen by Toivo 
Karvonen, Secretary General of SNS. In his letter, Karvonen announced that a circular letter 
issued by the SDP to its information officials in the field had come into his hands.801 The circular, 
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according to Mr Karvonen, was based on a pamphlet issued by the British Information Office in 
Helsinki. The ‘exposed’ document was the same background paper on the Soviet Peace Campaign 
that had already been revealed in January. According to Väinö Leskinen, now Secretary General 
of the SDP, the intention of these communist ‘revelations’ was once again to discredit the party in 
connection with the trade union elections and to assemble a volume of ‘proof’ of foreign support 
of the Finnish social democrats as a foundation for eventual Russian pressure.802  
Arthur Kellas, First Secretary at the British Legation, saw that it was unwise of the SDP to 
circulate a document that had already been shown to have originated in the British Legation and 
another for which the British origin had not been concealed and felt that it could not do the 
Finns any good to be accused of spreading British propaganda.803 The IRD’s Mr Peck felt that 
the Legation in Helsinki had been stretching things somewhat in passing this kind of material to 
social democratic organisations and agreed with Kellas that such activity should be suspended 
for the time being.804 IRD officials did, however, understand that it was impossible in the long 
run to entirely conceal the origin of its material. In Finland’s case the question merely was more 
delicate than in most other countries where this did not matter so much.  
What is ironic about these ‘revelations’ is that while the Finnish communists reported about 
their discoveries, the Finnish Foreign Ministry already owned two versions of the paper, one in 
Finnish sent by Hamish McGhie as another example of British background material,805 and one 
shipped from London by Eero A. Wuori, who “had got his hands on this kind of a 
memorandum”.806 It is likely that the IRD paper was also circulated to some foreign ministry 
officials. This conclusion can be drawn from a memorandum prepared for Urho Kekkonen in 
which the various versions of the document, including the one used by the SDP’s Editorial 
Department, were compared to each other.807 The memo also tells something about the 
methods the social democrats used for tailoring the British documents into a form that would 
be more suitable for the Finnish environment. In addition to making the papers shorter, SDP 
officials also, for example, replaced the word ‘Soviet’ with the word ‘communist’. This 
procedure was very typical of the Finns, who always tried to avoid directly offending their giant 
neighbour, whatever the topic in question was.  
These incidents did not come out of nowhere. The propaganda battle in Finland, both 
domestic and international, was becoming fiercer and, according to the British, the Soviets had 
for a couple of years increased their direct pressure on Finnish newspapers to publish more of 
their material and give more space to Russian topics in general. In the early 1950s, the British 
Legation in Helsinki reported about several new incidents in which editors of leading 
newspapers, for instance Helsingin Sanomat, were ruthlessly directed to print more Soviet-based 
material or leave certain contents unpublished. The Soviets particularly focused on the 
cooperative press as they regarded it as the ‘workers’ press’. For instance Martti Larni, editor of 
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the weekly magazine Elanto, was under scrutiny as the Soviet Legation felt that he had not used 
enough Soviet content and gave too much space to articles and picture materials originating 
from the West. After paying a visit to the Soviet Legation, together with Väinö Tanner, once 
again an authoritative SDP parliamentarian, he agreed to use Soviet material if it was objective 
when “dealing with culture, scenery and other non-controversial subjects”.808  
The intensifying activity of the Soviets and the Finnish communists, together with 
international developments and the more aggressive material produced by the IRD, led to the 
British adopting a somewhat harder line in their propaganda activities in Finland in 1951 and 
1952 in particular. According to the British Legation, the establishment of NATO and the 
disappearance of fears related to the Korean War made Finnish newspapers more prepared to 
publish controversial material. The British noticed that the Finns continued to have a lively 
distrust of and healthy resistance to communist propaganda, but also reminded that there were 
no grounds for complacency as “in the absence of encouragement from the West the Finns 
might conceivably succumb to despair”.809  
It was now that the tendency of President Paasikivi’s neutralism to harden from an 
expedient policy into a national doctrine really started to worry the British Legation. The FO 
instructed British officials in Helsinki to gain more influence in the opinion of Finnish 
politicians as well as the general public on such world affairs that might have an actual effect on 
Finland rather than merely projecting Britain for its own sake.810 This change of heart had also 
to do with the increasing threat of expense cuts to which the FO information services around 
the world were subject. More results of British political influence on world public opinion were 
now called for by Whitehall. As a consequence, the British Legation in Helsinki made its 
propaganda machinery more effective to face the communist propaganda offensive. 
In this new situation, the British Legation particularly focused on strengthening its work 
through local channels and finding even more contacts. Cooperation with parties fighting 
against communism was again expanded and material sent by the British was, according to a 
report by Andrew Noble, Minister to Finland, increasingly used in spring 1952 for articles, 
speeches, lectures, talking points and information bulletins that different parties circulated 
privatively.811 The British, still rather cautious, felt that they would rather work like this than 
attempt to enter a more open war with a local political party. This was also a question of 
expenditure, as the wider distribution of books and pamphlets would require sums out of the 
British Legation’s reach. Moreover, the British were still willing to avoid an excessively 
aggressive anti-communist propaganda campaign, as it might have encouraged adventurous 
elements in Finland to expect more help from the West than could have been given. As the 
circulation of anti-Soviet material violated Finnish law and therefore involved a great risk of 
embarrassing exposure, the British, and the Americans, decided that any content circulated on 
the larger scale should notify the publication’s originator. 
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Regardless of the risk of exposure, the use of indigenous organisations as channels for the 
distribution of anti-communist material was seen as the only way to reach Finns who were 
personally anti-communist but still exposed to the SKDL at every election. Both the British and 
the Americans realised that the degree to which the distribution of material through local 
organisations was effective depended almost entirely on how ‘Finnish’ they could make their 
adaptation of the original publication.812  
Despite all the obvious limits and risks, British officials in Helsinki were in 1952 able to note 
with some satisfaction that they had become rather successful in promoting their harder-hitting 
propaganda. A greater number of articles on serious economic and political subjects now found 
their way into newspapers, and the resistance certain editors had previously shown against this 
type of material was beginning to weaken. The British Legation felt that it had been particularly 
successful in placing articles on the country's economic position, the Egyptian question, 
Britain’s relations with the US and the Commonwealth countries and on NATO.813  
Among the more specific British propaganda themes that were advocated in Finland to 
some success was the objective of discrediting charges made by Soviet and Finnish communists 
according to which the Americans had undertaken bacteriological warfare in North Korea.814 
After feeding the Finnish press with IRD background material on the issue815, the Legation was 
pleased to report that a number of Finnish newspapers had published articles condemning the 
communists’ claims. Not surprisingly, the germ warfare campaign was conspicuously tackled by 
Yrjö Kilpeläinen, who on several occasions used the theme as a propaganda tool in his satirical 
comments on both Finnish and international communism.816 Although Finnish commentators 
must have been fully aware of this dimension of Soviet propaganda for quite some time, they 
undoubtedly found great use of the IRD report published in June 1952, which examined the 
germ warfare from a strategic perspective and labeled the affair as the climax of the broader 
Soviet Peace Campaign.817 W.N. Ewer, correspondent of The Daily Herald and the IRD’s most 
dependable contributor818, also increased the Finns’ awareness of the topic through an article, 
published at least in Ilta-Sanomat, in which he suspected that the whole myth was created due to 
the outbreak of either malaria or bubonic plague in Manchuria and North Korea.819 
In June 1952 things were running so smoothly for the British activities in Finland that Mr 
Noble saw it fitting to claim that British material was receiving more publicity in the country 
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than the material supplied by any other foreign mission. At the same time, however, he 
reminded how difficult it was to assess the Information Service’s value to Britain “because of 
the restraint with which international affairs are necessarily handled in Finland”. According to 
Noble, the Finnish press remained very responsive to guidance on its desirable line in 
commenting on foreign affairs and, therefore, the extent of the impact of anti-communist 
propaganda could not be adequately measured by the number of printed columns in the 
newspapers or the tone of leading articles.820 This remark was made all the more understandable 
by the British Legation's growing launch of more overt IRD-produced background material, 
consisting of, for example, quotations of editorial opinion on communist and Soviet topics, that 
was promoted as topics of ‘idea debates’ for the Finnish press as well as opinion-makers and 
intellectuals. This material also included translated summaries of articles that had appeared in 
the British press and pamphlets such as What is Communism? and Titoism. The content with 
which the Finns were being fed was becoming so much more complex that it made assessing 
the actual source behind newspaper reports even more troublesome.  
 
More Open Pro-Western and Anti-Communist Sentiment Arises 
 
In order to understand the factors behind the boost in British and American activities in 
Finland in the early 1950s, one must study the broader developments taking place in the 
Finnish political and journalistic fields during that time. Even though the tightening 
international situation largely explained the Western governments' more resolute conduct also 
in Finland, the domestic scene played a much greater role than in many other countries in 
determining their operations' scope and degree of success. An examination of the local political 
parties' and newspapers' main policies also makes it possible to comprehend how the two 
campaigns and the printed content distributed under them suited their purposes. 
As suggested, the early 1950s was a period when the domestic political propaganda battle in 
the northern country was particularly aggressive. The attacks made by communists newspapers 
against the US and Britain was part of a larger offensive that saw the communists, backed by 
Moscow, taking every possible measure to undermine both their Finnish rivals and the 
representatives of the Western world. For this purpose, particularly officials of the SKP 
developed the communists’ propaganda strategy into a more systematic one by examining 
especially American activities closely and defining specific ‘battles’ and ‘workplace agitations’ in 
which Finnish communists should take part. In 1953, the SKP’s ‘agitation department’s’ general 
objective of “promoting peaceful co-existence and fighting against chauvinistic and right-wing 
social democratic influence” was met by arranging closely determined 'battles' for example in 
the areas of 'peace defending' and the promotion of friendly ties between Finland and the 
Soviet Union.821 The fight against American influence in the Finnish media was also a common 
target for the communists, with the “war propaganda and American agitation” of STT and 
Yleisradio becoming specific targets. For instance, for opposing ‘war propaganda’ on YLE 
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broadcasts, the SKP instructed its members to write letters and make phone calls to the 
company protesting over its content.822  
The activities of SNS reached their peak in the early 1950s.823 The growth of the society’s film 
operations was particularly impressive largely due to the cars and film projectors donated to the 
society by the Russian film distributor Sovexportfilm.824 For example, in 1953 SNS gave a total of 
5,221 film presentations reaching almost 400,000 spectators.825 The society also introduced a 
broad ‘lie-blocking campaign’ that aimed to expose anti-Soviet propaganda, which, according to 
SNS, was evident throughout Finnish society: in the media, in theatres, in schools, the army and 
in the rumours deliberately spread to ordinary Finns.826 SNS activists were fully aware of the 
activities of the British and American legations, including the content of their bulletins, and 
named the distribution of publications like Valitut Palat, Aikamme, Time and Life as the most 
outrageous anti-Soviet propaganda in Finland.827 In order to give its claims more credibility SNS 
started the systematic collection of anti-Soviet articles published by Finnish newspapers828 with 
special emphasis on news printed in Helsingin Sanomat, Ilta-Sanomat and Aamulehti.829  
The society also made sure that the Finnish public and leading politicians were informed 
about its findings. In a letter presented to President Paasikivi in February 1951, SNS wished that 
the President would do something about the hostile propaganda against the Soviet Union that, 
according to Chairman Sylvi-Kyllikki Kilpi and Secretary General Toivo Karvonen, was 
particularly evident in a number of Finnish newspapers and several American films presented in 
Finland.830 Paasikivi was apparently not that impressed with this presentation, writing down in 
his diary that the criticism directed towards the Soviet Union was not worrying, keeping in mind 
the tone with which Russian newspapers dealt with Finland.831  
Soviet officials posted in Helsinki kept backing the propaganda campaigns conducted by the 
SKP, the SKDL and SNS, and contributed to the exposure of rivalling activities. In the early 
1950s, the Soviet Union delivered two notable démarches to the Finnish Foreign Ministry 
concerning matters related to culture and the media. The first had to do with the censorship of 
the Russian film ‘Peace Wins War’ and the poor audibility of Russian radio broadcasts832, and 
the second complained about the hostile attitude adopted by Finnish newspapers and YLE 
towards the Soviet Union.833 The constant unofficial remarks the Soviets made about the 
Finnish press, the screening of American films and the publishing of controversial books, in 
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particular Väinö Tanner’s memoirs of his time as Foreign Ministry during the Winter War834, 
again shows how closely the cultural and informational fields in Finland were monitored. 
As the communists enhanced their activities, non-communist Finns also began to behave 
with more intent. The growing faith over Finland’s independent future gave a number of 
prominent Finns the confidence to expand the cooperation between Finnish and Western 
organisations, often behind the scenes. In recent years, studies have, for example, revealed that 
cooperation between Finland and the US on military affairs was closer in the Cold War period 
than it had previously been realised.835 This collaboration began already in the early 1950s when 
members of the Finnish Armed Forces started visiting the US more frequently, some of them 
in training purposes. Since the US Army saw that the value of the information received from 
Finland, due to its close proximity to the periphery of the Soviet Bloc, would outweigh any 
security risk that might have been involved, the exchange of intelligence information was also 
launched in 1952.836 The Americans were particularly interested in receiving information about, 
for example, Soviet-produced engineering equipment, Soviet cold-weather construction 
equipment and the port of Petsamo.837 For learning more about winter warfare, the US Army 
specifically enlisted fifteen ex-Finnish officers famously led by Colonel Alpo Marttinen as 
instructors in this field. 
According to the US Army Attaché in Helsinki, a great deal of valuable military intelligence 
was, indeed, received from the Finns.838 In turn, the Finnish General Staff was provided with 
publications describing, for example, North Korean methods on mines, field fortifications and 
bridging, while Finns visiting US military instalments were informed about guns, tanks, physical 
training and military psychology.839 The supply of appropriate military background material to 
the Finns was another way for the US to show support to the Finns. The cooperation would 
only expand in the upcoming decades, reaching its height in the 1960s and 1970s, when a large 
number of influential Finnish military leaders collaborated with their American counterparts 
partly behind the political leadership’s backs.840 
The exchange of security intelligence largely followed the pattern. For instance in the early 
1950s, apart from providing the British with details about defectors from the Soviet Union, 
some of whom turned out to be commissioned agents841, the Finnish Suojelupoliisi remained 
                                                 
834 Väinö Tanner remained as one of Moscow’s pet hates in Finland. His memoir ‘Olin ulkoministerinä talvisodan 
aikana’, published in 1950, was a regular target of Soviet criticism, for instance, in Russian newspapers. For 
example, ‘'Suomalaisen sotarikollisen muistelmat’ by V. Bereskov. Translation of a book review published in 
Novoje Vremja, n:o 46/November 15, 1950', 12 L Venäjä, UMA. 
835 See, for example, Rislakki 2010; Tarkka, Jukka, Karhun kainalossa (Helsinki 2012). 
836 ‘Memorandum for Chairman, State Defense-Military Information Control Committee: Exchange of Intelligence 
with Finland’, June 25, 1952, RG 319, Army-Intelligence Project Decimal File 1951─1952 (Hereafter AIF), box 4, 
NARA. 
837 H.R. Cole to Sec of Mil Info Branch, ‘Exchange of Information with Finnish Military Agencies’, June 1952, RG 
319, AIF, box 4, NARA. 
838 B.B. McMahon to Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, May 29, 1952, RG 319, AIF, box 4, NARA. 
839 A.R. Bolling, G-2, to US Army Attaché, Helsinki, ‘Release of Engineer Publications to Finland’, July 8, 1952; 
N.T. Norris to Captain Saukkonen, January 15, 1954, ‘Report of Visit of Foreign National Dr. Gosta Silen’, March 
3, 1952, both RG 319, AIF, box 4, NARA. 
840 For example, Rislakki 2010, pp. 251, 277;The documentary film: 'Mennyttä etsimässä. Salainen sotilastie länteen.' 
Edited by Ainola, Olli & Lehikoinen Ari (2004).  
841 Rentola 2009, pp. 21-22. 
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somewhat cautious in terms of collaborating with the CIA and MI6. This policy changed in the 
mid-1950s when cooperation between the intelligence agencies became closer.842  
The more open pro-Western and, in particular, anti-communist position adopted by a number 
of Finns can also be recognised in the behaviour of the leading political parties. Among the most 
notable developments was the more robust stance implemented by Finnish parties from the 
political right. Such party officials inside Kokoomus as Niilo Honkala concluded that the SDP's 
position in the fight against communism should be challenged.843 The vitality of expanding anti-
communist propaganda was strongly emphasised in several party memoranda before and after the 
parliamentary elections of 1951.844 Reports on the situation in Eastern Europe and the flaws of 
Marxism845, together with various broad analyses of the Finnish communists’ strategies846, were 
increasingly distributed inside circles representing the political right. The conservatives' more 
systematic use of political propaganda was also becoming more evident in the activities of the 
Confederation of Finnish Employers (Suomen Työnantajain Keskusliitto, STK). In order to 
strengthen its position in Finnish society, and undermine above all the idea of socialisation, the 
confederation founded a news agency of its own, first known as Taloustieto and from 1949 
onwards as Taloudellinen Tiedotustoimisto.847 This development was closely related to the larger 
financial support various Finnish industries started to provide to non-communist parties.848 
Although fairly successful in their informational operations in the early 1950s, the employers did 
not pay too much attention to influencing public opinion until the general strike of 1956, when 
they introduced more extensive and efficient propaganda methods.849 
Compared to the Coalition Party, the Agrarian Party and the Swedish People's Party of 
Finland (RKP) were not closely connected to the Western campaigns for two very different 
reasons. The Agrarian Party had no intention of becoming involved in the broader Cold War 
propaganda battle and although approached by the Western powers, party members were, 
according to the British view, “not easily accessible for linguistic, social and cultural reasons”.850 
Although this was to a large extent the case, one has to remember that Maalaisliitto played an 
important part in the ideological battle against communism in rural areas and therefore 
indirectly helped the Western cause. Towards the mid-1950s, the party gradually extended its 
                                                 
842 Rentola 2009, pp. 24-25. 
843 Party circular: ’Taustatietoja päivänpolitiikkaan', May 6, 1953, Niilo Honkala's collection (NH), box 8, KA. 
844 Party memoranda: ’Propagandakysymykset’, January 15, 1951 and ‘Kv. taistelu, 1952', both Db6, KK, PTA. 
845 The development in Eastern Europe was particularly closely covered by the news summary circular 
‘Rautaesiripun takaa’ (From Behind the Iron Curtain). As the circulars do not reveal the source of the news reports, 
their origin remains uncertain. The covered topics and the style of writing do, however, refer to the IRD. For 
example, ‘Rautaesiripun takaa’, March 21, 1953, Db6; ‘Rautaesiripun takaa’, 1952, Hga 1, both KK, PTA. 
846 For example, ’Varottaja. SKP nykytilanteessa’, 1953, Db6, KK, PTA. 
847 Mansner Markku, Suomalaista yhteiskuntaa rakentamassa. Suomen työnantajain keskusliitto 1940-1956 (Helsinki 
1984), pp. 244-248, 466. 
848 For instance, the forest industry started to finance the election funds of even the SDP and the Agrarian Party in 
the 1950s since they were regarded to hold an influential position in the containment of communism, which it 
regarded as absolutely vital. For example, Jensen-Eriksen, Niklas, Metsäteollisuuden maa 4. Läpimurto: 
Metsäteollisuus kasvun, integraation ja kylmän sodan Euroopassa 1950-1973 (Helsinki 2007), pp. 87-89.  
849 Mansner, Markku, Suomalaista yhteiskuntaa rakentamassa. Suomen työnantajain keskusliitto1956-1982 (Helsinki 
1990), pp. 232-234. 
850 A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA. 
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attack against the SKDL in particular851 and adopted a more systematic approach to its 
informational activities by expanding the use of printed word, establishing its own survey 
company Maaseudun Gallup852 and introducing the use of films.853 As for the RKP, the 
Swedish-speaking minority was, according to Andrew Noble, simply unnecessary to approach 
as their leaders were able to read English newspapers and frequently visited Britain.854 The 
party’s orientation to the West was well reflected in the content published by the RKP’s leading 
paper, Hufvudstadsbladet. Compared to the leading Finnish language newspapers, the publication 
gave considerably more space to articles with an Anglo-American origin while ignoring Soviet-
related topics almost entirely.855 
The more active position adopted by the conservatives did not challenge the social 
democrats' leading position in anti-communist activities or Western cooperation. Visits by SDP 
and SAK delegations to both the US and Britain had by now become somewhat regular. Olavi 
Lindblom remained particularly active in arranging meetings with not only Jay Lovestone and 
Irving Brown, but also CIO’s European Representative Victor Reuther856, who had visited 
Finland, for example, in autumn 1949 and again in September 1951 for the America Days held 
in Lahti857, with the purpose of requesting a larger slice from the FTUC funds. Even though not 
all requests were automatically funded by the FTUC, the early 1950s was a period when the 
most important foreign funding for the social democrats’ struggle against communism took 
place.858 The crucial ideological battle within the Finnish trade union movement also turned the 
SAK's international department into something of an information distribution centre with 
propaganda content, including leaflets, pamphlets and books, being flown in not only from 
Britain and the US, but also from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICTFU) headquarters. In turn, SAK officials collected different language versions of the 
material it received from the WTFU and Soviet trade unions and forwarded them to their 
brothers in Brussels.859 After the SAK finally applied for official ICTFU membership in 1957, 
this activity naturally became more limited.  
The Finns' more determined approach can also be sensed by reading party-associated 
newspapers. Newspaper editors had, to some extent paradoxically considering the general 
Soviet pressure, more confidence to publish more openly political and critical content than they 
                                                 
851 For example, Party circular, February 1, 1954, Puoluetoimisto, Da Lähetettyjä kirjeitä 1953-1955, KMA 
852 ’Maalaisliiton tiedoitustoiminnan tehostaminen ja uudelleenorganisoiminen', Annex to 'Maalaisliiton 
keskushallituksen kokous', October 9, 1951; Circular: 'Gallup-asiamiesten toimintaohjeet', October 24, 1952, both 
Puoluetoimisto, Da Lähetettyjä kirjeitä 1950-1952, KMA. 
853 'Elokuvatoimilautakunnan mietintö', March 29, 1951, Puoluetoimisto, Da Lähetettyjä kirjeitä 1950-1952, KMA. 
854 A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA. 
855 For example on July 19, 1950, Hufvudstadsbladet’s international section included eleven news reports credited to 
Reuters (and STT) and two to AP. None of them were related to the Soviet Union. Hufvudstadsbladet, July 19, 1950. 
856 O. Lindblom to V. Reuther, January 10, 1952, RG 18, Irving Brown Files 1943-1989 (IB), box 15, GMMA 
857 Bergholm 2005, pp. 252-253; V. Reuther to A. Sumu, September 28, 1951, SAK KV 1951 (Yhdysvallat), TA. 
858 One of the most significant projects for which the Finnish trade unions needed funding was a new printing 
machine for their newspaper Palkkatyöläinen. V. Puskala and O. Wikström to J. Lovestone, November 22, 1953, 
RG 18, JL, Series 1, box 34, GMMA. See, also, Majander 2007, pp. 172-173, 181, 192, 210. 
859 A. Adamczyk to O. Lindblom, July 15, 1953; O. Lindblom to A. Adamczyk, September 11, 1953, both SAK KV 
1953 (VAKL), TA. 
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had had in the late 1940s. This also made the content offered to them by the British and 
Americans more publishable.  
Since SDP-affiliated newspapers only expanded their relentless crusade against Finnish 
communists, they continued to offer the best outlets for Western anti-communist propaganda. 
The content published by Suomen Sosialidemokraatti in the early 1950s shows that the social 
democrats were indirectly willing to undermine the Soviet Union by giving increasing attention 
to developments in Eastern Europe. The coverage included both broad article series, such as 
‘What Life Is Like in a People’s Republic”, which labelled communist republics as systems 
based on dictatorship and forced labour860, and regular less extensive reports about, for 
instance, the agricultural crisis and political purges taking place in East Germany, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary.861 For covering these issues, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, as other 
Finnish papers, used a wide number of predominantly foreign sources. In addition to 
publishing news about the harsh realities of life behind the Iron Curtain, the paper supported 
the Anglo-American cause by frequently including articles written by prominent Western trade 
unionists, such as Morgan Phillips862, and reports presenting the US as the leader of popular 
innovations and consumer products such as Coca-Cola.863 
Although rather cautious in its publishing practices, and rarely if never openly critical of the 
Soviet Union, the leading Coalition Party paper Uusi Suomi also started to offer greater 
possibilities for the Western actors to get their message through. The publication contributed to 
the party's new policy by including reports on international developments, such as the Korean 
War and Eastern European issues, that it received through the Daily Mail864 and The Daily 
Telegraph. Due to the lack of foreign correspondents of their own, the other major conservative 
dailies, Aamulehti and Kaleva, also covered these topics almost exclusively through, often very 
short, reports provided by Reuters or UP.865 Smaller Finnish papers' similar practises continued 
to see their international sections dominated by Western content. These papers included Karjala, 
which published a great number of, often anti-communist, articles provided by Reuters through 
STT.866 The Agrarian Party-affiliated publications made up a notable exception in the Finnish 
                                                 
860 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, May 17, 1951, May 18, 1951, May 22, 1951 & May 25, 1951. 
861 For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti July, 11, 1951, July 31, 1951, September 18, 1951, October 25, 1951, 
July 5, 1953 & July 6, 1953. 
862 In his articles Phillips explained the trade union movement's objection of Marxism in every form. For example, 
Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, July 7, 1950. Phillips's contribution was highly topical, since he, as General Secretary of the 
Labour Party, visited Helsinki only a couple of months later as a guest of the SDP. Majander 2004a, pp. 356-357. 
863 For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, September 23, 1951.A list of American and British subjects published 
by the paper can be found by browsing its card index filed in boxes B1-B5, Suomen Sosialidemokraatin arkisto, TA. 
864 Uusi Suomi was especially willing to use Daily Mail-produced news on the Korean War. In subjects related to 
Eastern Europe it resorted more to Reuters. For example, Uusi Suomi, September 8, 1950 & October 29, 1950. 
865 For example, Aamulehti, July 31, 1950: Kaleva, July 2, 1950. 
866 It was not uncommon for middle-sized Finnish newspapers, such as Karjala, to credit all of their international 
news to ‘STT-Reuters’ or ‘STT-AP’. As the published news often included content originating from the British and 
American propaganda machinery, these papers offered a highly valuable channel for both Britain and the US For 
example in 1950, Karjala included such topics covered by Reuters as Dean Acheson’s comments on countering the 
Soviet Union’s expansionist objectives and the rise of anti-communist movements in Asia. As no written records 
exist on the degree with which these stories were influenced by either the IRD or the USIA, an exact estimation of 
the amount of British and American official propaganda content published in these papers is impossible to give. 
We can, however, assume that a fair share of the news content was influenced by them. For example, Karjala, 
March 17, 1950 & May 16, 1950. 
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press. Since leading papers such as Maakansa mostly consisted of local issues and challenged 
their opponents usually through very practical, often agrarian topics,867 their use of international 
content stayed small. Maakansa also published Soviet-related articles as well as news material 
provided by the Soviet Information Bureau (SIB) more frequently than its social democratic or 
conservative rivals.868  
Even if many newspapers associated with the non-communist Finnish political parties started 
to feel more confident about publishing news articles criticising developments in Eastern Europe, 
the independent Helsingin Sanomat and the Sanoma-owned tabloid Ilta-Sanomat continued to 
dominate the field of international news coverage. The growing gap between Sanoma’s resources 
and those available for other Finnish newspapers became more evident as the decade went on869 
and gave the publishing company the ability to invest more in international coverage by 
employing more foreign correspondents and maintaining a variety of extensive partnerships with 
foreign publishers and news agencies. Partly because of this, the content of both Helsingin Sanomat 
and Ilta-Sanomat gradually became even more orientated to the West and, at times, even openly 
anti-communist. The latter tendency was greatly enhanced by the policy of giving more coverage 
to political comments written by foreign politicians and journalists.  
In covering Eastern European matters, Sanoma benefitted particularly from the output of 
Immanuel Birnbaum, a Polish-German political reporter specialising in both the Soviet Union 
and the Nordic Countries, who first offered his services to Eljas Erkko in May 1946 when still 
living in Warsaw.870 Birnbaum’s long articles on various political, economic and cultural 
developments became almost a regular feature both in Helsingin Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat, and 
not even his forced leave from Poland871 changed this. Birnbaum’s reports dealing with Eastern 
European issues soon became a permanent feature in the paper and ensured that Finnish 
readers were not kept in the dark when it came to such matters as the inability of socialism to 
produce actual growth in Polish living standards or the Jewish question in Eastern Europe.872  
Readers of Sanoma-owned newspapers also learnt about international developments 
through reports distributed by international news agencies. As this output included material 
from such contributors as Walter Kolarz, an IRD-associated writer whose UP-distributed 
reports dealt with as diverse topics as the tactics of the Cominform and religion in the Soviet 
                                                 
867 For example, ‘Pienviljelijät ja vasemmisto’, September 25, 1951, Maalaisliiton sanomakeskus 1951, KMA. 
868 For example, during spring 1950 the paper published several articles, some of which were produced by SIB, on 
such topics as teachers’ position in the Soviet Union, the mechanisation of Russian agriculture and the growing 
industrial production in the world’s leading communist country. Maakansa, May 23, 1950, May 27, 1950 & June 9, 
1950. 
869 Not surprisingly, Helsingin Sanomat’s superior resources increased the newspaper’s share of the total circulation 
of Finnish newspapers. When in 1946 Helsingin Sanomat’s circulation made up 10.6 per cent of the total 
circulation, in 1965 the figure already reached 13.1 per cent. For example, Löyttyniemi, Veikko, Sanomalehdistö 
1940-luvulta 1980-luvulle in Salminen, Esko (ed.), Sanomalehdistö Suomessa (Helsinki 1981), p. 22. 
870 I. Birnbaum to E. Erkko, May 5, 1946, SOLAK, Aa 4, EEA, PLA. 
871 Birnbaum was deported from Warsaw without any official reason in November 1949. For more about 
Birnbaum's career and his connection to Finland, see Teräväinen, Erkki, 'Immanuel Birnbaum ja Urho Kekkonen - 
Kun kuva Kekkosen ulkopolitiikasta saksalaisille komistui' in Multamäki, Kustaa, Peltonen Markku & Saarinen, Hannes 
(eds.), "Se rakkain kotipolku": Erkki Kouri ja Yleinen historia (Helsinki 2000), pp. 437-453. 
872 Ilta-Sanomat, July 31, 1952; Helsingin Sanomat, March 18, 1950. A detailed list of the topics Birnbaum covered 
for Helsingin Sanomat can be found at Ulkomaiset kirjoituspalkkiot, Dd, for example, box 38, Sanoma Oy:n 
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Union873, they obviously offered both the British and the Americans a valuable channel for their 
propaganda. Although a large amount of propaganda articles were published simply under the 
name of the news agency, in the mid-1950s it became increasingly common for Helsingin 
Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat to both publish independent articles from political commentators and 
give the name of the story’s actual writer. As a consequence, it is possible to track down some 
of the reports published during that particular period from writers associated with the IRD. 
However, when reading newspaper content from the first years of the 1950s, one can only 
speculate with the connection between the writer and the state-run propaganda organisation.  
In the American case this is not as problematic, since the propaganda agency operated 
mostly in overt fashion and only rarely credited articles to a specific individual. Indeed, when 
reading Sanoma-owned newspapers from the early 1950s, it is relatively easy to identify some of 
the main themes the USIS-produced reports wished to promote during the period. In addition 
to distributing news about political developments in the US, the USIS articles focused on such 
broad issues like the expanding political rights of African-Americans874 and freedom of speech 
in the American media875. The USIS's desire to assure the reader about the US being a country 
where traditional art forms were appreciated as much as popular culture876 shows that at least 
the promotional material distributed to Finnish newspapers followed to a great extent the 
broader themes mapped out in Washington.  
When discussing Sanoma Oy’s role in providing Finns with reliable international news, Eljas 
Erkko’s personal contribution to the cause cannot be overestimated. His insistence of 
publishing material from well-known Western political writers, who were at times directly 
critical of the Soviet Union, was somewhat courageous considering the constant pressure he 
was subjected to by the political leadership. Erkko’s ability to include even strongly anti-
communist content, for instance, in the pages of Valitut Palat877 continuously amazed his 
American colleagues. When asked about how he was able to publish such material, Erkko noted 
that when the material touched propaganda he wished only to touch the danger line, not go 
over it, and that in many cases his publishing practice was “a matter of instinct more than of 
brains”.878 This policy did not stop Erkko from often crossing the danger line, at least in the 
eyes of the political leadership. In particular, President Paasikivi made sure that the newspaper 
tycoon received his share of verbal feedback and guidance to Finland’s political position.879 The 
relationship Eljas Erkko developed with Urho Kekkonen, Paasikivi’s successor, was more 
complex, based on suspicion and respect at the same time.880 
                                                 
873 For example, Ilta-Sanomat, May 31, 1949 & July 9, 1949. 
874 Ilta-Sanomat, December 1, 1950. 
875 Ilta-Sanomat, December 28, 1950 
876 For example, Ilta-Sanomat, December 3, 1951. 
877 By the early 1950s, Valitut Palat had clearly adopted a harder-hitting approach by covering such topics as RFE's 
battle against communism and defectors' accounts on life behind the Iron Curtain. For example, Valitut Palat, April 
1954; Valitut Palat, August 1954; Valitut Palat, September 1954. 
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Although the more active approach to combating communism adopted by Finnish political 
parties and the leading newspapers pleased the Americans and the British, even more important 
for their work in the northern country was the general sentiment among Finnish people, which 
had gradually become more open and active, at least if compared to the relative apathy that 
dominated Finnish society in the first post-war years. In the world of academia, the more 
confident mood adopted particularly by those on the political right was reflected as a stronger 
stance against communism and a growing emphasis on patriotism, Western democracy and 
individual freedom.881 The new mood was well materialised in the activities of Vapauden 
Akateeminen Liitto (VAL), a semi-covert academic association founded in November 1950. 
The organisation, which declared to “promote a Finnish way of thought, a higher sense of 
morality and the spirit of social justice among its members”882, played a significant role in 
promoting anti-communist sentiment not only among students but also in marginal areas where 
it, for instance, organised discussion events and distributed printed propaganda.883  
Among the most important organisations for the distribution of Western propaganda was 
SYT, which was founded in spring 1952. The organisation, financially backed by large 
employers and supported by several influential Finnish politicians, academics and journalists, 
focused on collecting information about communism and Finnish communists and producing 
objective research material out of it, offering support for non-communist parties, among other 
things, in their election strategies, as well as for producing anti-communist propaganda and 
organising lectures and related events throughout the country. However, SYT did not wish to 
interfere too closely with daily political issues884, presumably in order to avoid provoking the 
Soviet Union. 
Although SYT would remain a rather vague foundation, mainly due to the obvious 
circumstantial limitations on its activities, both the British and Americans welcomed the 
establishment of a local anti-communist actor with some pleasure. The legations of both 
countries followed the developments that led to the organisation’s founding closely885 and 
stayed in contact with a number of its members for years to come. Even the SDP's decision to 
remain out of SYT, due to its members' misgivings about being openly associated with the 
political right and employer representatives886, did not stop particularly the British feeling that 
something significant had been achieved on the anti-communist front.887 As SYT was founded 
during a time when the FO seemed highly worried about the strong support of communism 
particularly in Northern Finland, and somewhat envious of the progress the Americans had 
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achieved in the country, for example, through the publishing of Aikamme, the IRD’s John Peck 
even considered the possibility of offering some financial support if not to the foundation itself, 
then “any other useful local channel for the transmission of anti-communist material”.888 Since 
the idea was against the broader British policy of not supplying direct financial support to an 
individual group or organisation, and because there is no evidence to prove otherwise, it is 
highly unlikely that SYT received money from London. The suggestion that the CIA funded the 
anti-communist organisation, a claim that has been expressed more than once, is also unlikely to 
be accurate mainly because there is no trace of such activity, as Vesikansa has pointed out.889 
What available evidence strongly suggests, nonetheless, is that the relationship between SYT 
and the two Western powers was far from being just a passive one. Both American and British 
officials were particularly interested in SYT’s research activities concerning the reasons for the 
popularity of communism in Finland. According to Vesikansa, at least the US Legation got its 
hands on SYT’s first main research report890, which examined the people's various reasons to 
vote for the SKDL.891 It is very hard to imagine that the British would not have received SYT’s 
research material; after all, from its offset the foundation’s propaganda section was under the 
leadership of Aito Anto, the former SDP official who had received propaganda training in 
England and remained in close contact with British diplomats in Finland.  
SYT's collaboration with British and US officials in the production of propaganda material 
also indicates that the foundation’s relationship with them was a two-way street. More or less 
immediately after SYT's founding, both Helsinki-based legations started supplying the 
organisation with their propaganda material. Whereas in the British case this meant the delivery 
of copies of The Interpreter and other IRD material, the Americans focused on distributing USIS-
produced pamphlets on typical propaganda themes, such as the reasons behind the Korean War 
and the history of the American labour movement.892 Since SYT used a wide range of both 
domestic and international sources for its printed propaganda, the Anglo-American content 
came to good use. The foundation's decision to hire two editor-translators to produce material 
suggests that Western content was widely reproduced and distributed to politicians and 
journalists around the country.893  
As SYT’s policy for producing printed content was based on the idea of avoiding too 
aggressive forms of propaganda, particularly the IRD’s more sophisticated analyses of political, 
economic and cultural developments in Eastern Europe proved valuable for anti-communist 
Finns. For example, when examining the propaganda leaflets distributed for the non-
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890 Ibid., p. 116. 
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communist parties’ 1954 parliamentary election campaign894, it is relatively easy to notice a close 
connection between IRD and SYT propaganda. All the leaflets in question followed the very 
same themes that were tackled by a number of IRD publications, namely working conditions, 
living standards and the position of the church in communist countries.895 A closer analysis of 
SYT leaflets shows that while they were not direct copies of the IRD texts, a considerable share 
of the content has been used particularly when dealing with agriculture and workers’ rights.896 
As these were topics that were covered also in various USIA pamphlets897, SYT by no means 
fell short of Western material it could adjust to local circumstances.  
Since members of SYT, like most other Finns, did not wish to attack their giant neighbour 
directly, the use of IRD texts required a fair amount of editing and rewriting. However, as the 
SYT propaganda material was distributed to a wide range of actors throughout the political 
spectrum, including the influential social democrats898, the foundation offered the British yet 
another channel for at least indirectly reaching an even greater number of Finns who could help 
their cause of undermining communism. Both British and American officials had emphasised 
the importance of working through indigenous organisations and now a growing number of 
them were willing to expand their collaboration. 
 
USIS Finds New Film Audiences 
 
As mentioned above, a characteristic of, in particular, the US campaign in Finland in the early 
1950s was the constant search for new methods and channels of communications through 
which a more direct anti-communist message could be presented. Screening films fitted into 
this quest perfectly and quickly became one of the key methods for the Americans to reach the 
Finns throughout the country. Although the majority of USIE films was at first shown at short 
subject-newsreel cinemas and at the USIS Audience Room in Helsinki, which gave almost daily 
presentations to a variety of groups ranging from business organisations to sports clubs and 
youth organisations, the proportional share of films loaned out to numerous organisations 
operating also in provincial areas kept growing at rapid pace. Among organisations regularly 
using the films for their touring lectures and local events were the two large cooperative 
societies Suomen Osuuskauppojen Keskuskunta (SOK) and Kulutusosuuskuntien Keskusliitto 
                                                 
894 For the elections, SYT supplied several political parties, organisations and newspapers with printed material “to 
support their battle against communism”. The content consisted of special material, including research reports on 
SDKL supporters and leaflets on life behind the Iron Curtain, and press articles. 'Kommunisminvastainen 
tiedotustoiminta ennen eduskuntavaaleja 7.-8.3. 1954', Annex to 'SYT:n hallituksen kokous, 29.5.1954', SYT, box 2, 
KA. 
895 The leaflets ‘Työolot kansandemokratioissa’, Elintaso kansandemokratioissa’, ‘Maatalouden kollektivisointi 
kansandemokratioissa’ and ‘Kirkon asema kansandemokratioissa’ can be found in a number of political archives, 
including those of the SDP, Kokoomus and Maalaisliitto. The ’original’ leaflets can be found at, SYT, box 87, KA. 
896 For example, ‘The Collectivisation of Agriculture in the Soviet Union’, April 1949, FO 975/24; ‘Land Reform 
and Collectivisation in Eastern and south-Eastern Europe, 1952, FO 975/59; ‘Control of Workers in Countries 
under Communist Domination’, 1948, FO 975/16, all NA. 
897 For example, The USIA pamphlet: ’Collectivization in Europe and the Far East’, Undated , RG 306, MFCPL, 
box 4, NARA. 
898 In addition to the party headquarters, SYT material, including the 1954 leaflets, was distributed to influential SDP 
politicians engaged in the struggle against communism. One of them was Penna Tervo, Minister for Trade and 
Industry in 1951-1953 and former editor of Suomen Sosialidemokraatti. See Penna Tervo's collection, box 3, KA. 
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(KK), the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Employment Safety Association, adult education 
centres in Helsinki, numerous workers’ institutes, women’s clubs, teacher training institutes and 
religious groups.899 As a large share of the movies, which in 1953 reached the total figure of 
351900, dealt with scientific and agricultural developments, there was also great demand for them 
from professional and technical groups as well as agricultural organisations. One example of the 
latter was the 4H Club in Finland , which in February 1950 had two lecturers on tour showing 
USIE films exclusively.901  
In order to reach audiences in the most sparsely-settled areas in Finland, the USIS 
introduced a special mobile unit, a jeep equipped with facilities enabling screenings even in 
places without electricity, in October 1949. The first film tour with the mobile unit was made to 
Eastern Finland the following month. During the course of two weeks, film operator Väinö 
Lindman gave 57 different performances, mainly in schools, Finnish-American societies and 
reserve officers’ clubs.902 As the tour proved to be a success, similar operations were conducted 
in the following couple of months to the south-west of Finland and the small towns and 
villages in the Ostrobothnia region. The most ambitious mobile unit trip was made by Mr 
Lindman to Lapland in March 1950. During the one-month tour, 45 shows were presented to 
almost 4,000 local residents in the most sparsely inhabited areas of the country. Lumber camps 
and schools in remote regions, where the USIS mobile generator was the only available power 
supply, constituted the chief audience. According to the US Legation’s report, the screenings 
were sympathetically received and fully appreciated in localities where film shows had been 
virtually non-existent. Mr Lindman himself did, however, face a degree of unfriendliness at a 
few of his lumber camp visits, mainly due to the relatively large number of communists 
employed as lumbermen in Lapland.903  
The USIS/Helsinki was definitely satisfied with the way its film operations were developing 
in the early 1950s. The programme reached people of all ages in every corner of the country 
and its popularity only kept growing. As a result, the US Legation felt it was necessary to hire a 
full-time film officer as well as another mobile film operator who could focus on presenting the 
movies in the capital region.904 The number of complementing letters and newspaper articles 
regarding the USIS film presentations indicated that the audience was also satisfied.  
The USIS regarded the content of the movies as suitable for the Finnish environment, 
although it did demand for more productions for more specifically defined groups such as 
labourers and young people. At this stage, the great majority of USIE films either dealt with 
                                                 
899 H.G. Arnold to SD, ’Report on Information and Cultural Activities for November, 1949’, January 13, 1950, RG 
59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/1-1350, NARA. 
900 Elämää Amerikassa – Valistuselokuvaluettelo (USIS/Helsinki 1953). 
901 US Legation to SD, ‘Report on Informational and Cultural Activities for February, 1950’, March 14, 1950, RG 
59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/5-1450, NARA. 
902 H.G. Arnold to SD, ’Report on Information and Cultural Activities for November, 1949’, January 13, 1950, RG 
59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/1-1350, NARA. 
903 H.F. Arnold to SD, ’Report on Informational and Cultural Activities for March 1950’, April 20, RG 59, SDDFF 
1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/4-2050, NARA. Apparently Lindman was not too upset about these encounters 
since he remained loyal to his job and continued to give extensive tours of Finland for years to come. 
904 US Legation to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending November 30, 1950’, December 29, 
1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/12-2950, NARA. 
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news events or a specific scientific or technical subject or projected American culture in a more 
general sense.905 Among the most popular productions in 1950 were such films as High Over the 
Border and A Step Saving Kitchen.906 The overall efficiency of presenting these films was seen as so 
high that according to an US Legation report from November 1950, no other mass medium 
was as successful in reaching certain USIS targets.907 
Although the bulk of USIE films were non-political productions focusing on the projection of 
America, the USIS/Helsinki had to remain careful in terms of what kind of material it could 
present to the Finnish audience. Finnish film distributors were on many occasions wary of 
handling certain films for the fear of communist reactions. For instance, in December 1950, the 
US Legation reported that Finnish commercial film distributors had refused to run the USIE 
picture on President Truman’s 'San Francisco Speech' in spite of it having been passed by the 
Finnish Film Censorship Board. The representative of Columbia Pictures, with which the USIS 
cooperated closely on film distribution, decided to show the film in his own theatre for one week, 
but withdrew the movie after the film critic of the newspaper Hufvudstadsbladet labelled it as 
propaganda and stated that propaganda was unwelcome in Finland, regardless of its source.908  
In September 1950, the US Legation had reported about another incident concerning 
Finland’s overcautious policy to anything resembling propaganda. In this case, the Finnish 
Censorship Board had informed the local USIS clerk responsible for motion pictures that a 
section of the film President Truman Reports on Korea had to be cut before prints could be 
exhibited. The censored version of the film, which was sent to USIS officials did not include 
the phrase: “We are united in detesting communist slavery”.909 After making inquiries, the USIS 
information officer found out that someone in the Censorship Board’s office “had interpreted 
regulations too strictly and industriously”.910 Although the cut sections of the film were 
eventually returned to the USIS/Helsinki for reinsertion, this incident could be added to the 
growing list of peculiarities effecting American informational activities in Finland.  
In the field of film, these peculiarities were rather common, particularly in the years before 
Stalin’s death. Although relatively few Western films, among them such obvious propaganda 
productions as MGM’s The Red Danube911, were completely banned by the Finnish Censorship 
Board, a considerable number of American documentaries and newsreels or certain parts of 
them were censored either by the board or already during the preventive censorship procedure 
conducted by the Finnish Foreign Ministry, as Jari Sedergren has explained in his 
                                                 
905 The USIS/Helsinki catalogue from 1953 shows that typical subjects for the projection of America included the 
presentation of US cities, the educational system, healthcare as well as introductions to typical modern American 
professions. Elämää Amerikassa – Valistuselokuvaluettelo (USIS/Helsinki 1953).  
906 US Legation to SD, ‘Report on Informational and Cultural Activities for February, 1950’, March 14, 1950, RG 
59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/5-1450, NARA. 
907 H.F. Arnold to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report’, November 21, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 
2425, 511.60E/11-2150, NARA. 
908 US Legation to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending November 30, 1950’, December 29, 
1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/12-2950, NARA. 
909 Valtion elokuvatarkastamon päätös, Nro 32290, August 24, 1950, Fbb37, VETA, KA. 
910 H.F. Arnold to SD, ’Attempt to Censor the USIE Motion Picture Film: “President Truman Reports on Korea”’, 
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comprehensive study.912 A glance at the Censorship Board’s documents gives a good indication 
on just how conscientiously newsreels were studied during the Korean War in particular. The 
board made sure that not only controversial comments given by Harry S. Truman or Dean 
Acheson on the dictatorial nature of communism913 were cut out from the newsreels, but also 
insisted that pictures of Stalin should be censored from several of them.914 
The Americans understood that in certain cases they too needed to take preventive action 
regarding their films. For instance in May 1950, the Legation's senior officers agreed that the 
film The Story of Two Cities was unsuitable for showing in Finland because its direct attacks on 
Soviet policy would only cause embarrassment to Finnish authorities.915 Finland’s political 
situation required that the material sent from Washington always had to be checked and its 
suitability evaluated. In addition to the verdict of its own staff, the USIS/Helsinki explored the 
opinion of some prominent Finns over the film’s feasibility for the country’s political climate by 
carrying out extensive field testing for almost all titles before Finnish language versions were 
ordered. The Finns did not, however, have the last say about the suitability of the films. For 
example, the screening of A Watch for Joe, an AFL film on retail clerks, was found unjustified by 
the USIS due to its "completely unrealistic approach to actual living conditions of workers in 
the US”, even though Olavi Lindblom, active also on this front, had expressed keen interest in 
the production.916 
Caution in the promotion of films in Finland did not prevent the US Government from 
supporting the screening of American films and the Finnish motion picture industry in a more 
general sense. The administration in Washington kept providing important backing for film 
companies such as Suomi-Filmi, which continued to suffer from the lack of unexposed motion 
picture film in the early 1950s.917 This support was by no means automatic, but after the State 
Department acknowledged in spring 1951 that there was a real possibility that Suomi-Filmi 
would have to resort to supplies from the Soviet-controlled import and export firm Seximo Oy, 
and in return be forced to show Soviet propaganda films in its studios, Washington made fast 
arrangements over raw stock film supplies worth $40,000 to Finland.918 
The USIS's general satisfaction with their extensive motion picture activities did not stop its 
staff from worrying that their number one target group in Finland, labour groups and 
organisations, was not being reached. The same more or less applied to young university 
students.919 Furthermore, the Legation felt that the commercial movies provided by private 
                                                 
912 Sedergren 2006, pp. 66─72. 
913 For example, Valtion elokuvatarkastamon päätökset: Nro 32698, November 7, 1950, Nro 33063, January 11, 
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916 US Legation to SD, ‘Motion Pictures – Labor Films’, March 12, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA. 
917 W. Barnes to SD, ‘Finland’s Requirements for Unexposed 35-mm Motion Picture Film’, April 6, 1951, RG 59, 
SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2120, 460E.119/4-651, NARA. 
918 W. Barnes to SD, ‘Finland’s Requirements for Unexposed 35-mm Motion Picture Film’, May 24, 1951; D. 
Acheson to US Legation, June 26, 1951, both RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2120, 460E.119/5-2451, NARA. 
919 US Legation to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending November 30, 1950’, December 29, 
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177 
 
corporations such as Columbia were, despite their popularity, not of the highest quality and, in 
fact, one key reason for the “extremely diverse impressions various Finns seem to have of the 
US – a paradise on the one hand, a crime-ridden, unstable, uncultured and superficial existence 
on the other”.920  
In order to give people a more realistic picture of America, the USIS gave great care to 
becoming something else than a mere source of free entertainment. The staff saw that their film 
operations could be made even more effective by moving away from the general audience to a 
more specifically targeted group consisting mainly of members of labour organisations. According 
to the Legation’s view, the hiring of an American official to monitor the films and present them 
on certain occasions was of upmost importance as the official would be more conscious than a 
Finn in hitting the targets and give a certain objectivity to the programme.921 With the help of 
greater resources, which included the appointment of an American film officer, the very first years 
of the 1950s saw the USIS staff constantly planning special campaigns and eagerly requesting 
Washington to send them films like The Mechanic and Johnny Jones which could be more of interest 
to labour groups. Even though these films presented the lives of typical American working 
families, the latter from the perspective of a young boy922, they were still rather neutral in tone, 
focusing on the individual rather than a larger group of workers.  
The USIS/Helsinki started receiving more of the films it craved for in late 1951 directly 
from Washington or by borrowing them from other posts. Features explaining the nature and 
functions of American labour unions such as Union Local, which told the story of workers’ 
struggles from their own viewpoint, and, according to Washington, should help to discredit the 
communist theory of class conflict923, were warmly welcomed by USIS officials. The film that 
they ranked particularly highly was The Carpenter, which depicted American technical and 
industrial advances from a labour viewpoint. Enthusiasm for this particular film was so great 
that the Legation believed that it had found a new angle for approaching the primary target 
audience more effectively. In order to convince themselves of the accuracy of this evaluation, 
the Americans first screened the film to a group of top labour leaders. Their reactions were, if 
possible, even more excited as, according to their view, the film addressed effectively the 
communist propaganda line that only in the Soviet Union had great strides been made in 
industrial development.924 
After receiving a greater number of labour-related films, the USIS started strongly pressing 
for their presentation throughout the labour field. Some, like The Carpenter, were distributed to 
local organisations without attribution to the USIS. In April 1950, the Americans still reported 
that workers’ organisations were not using the films to the degree that was believed potentially 
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possible.925 In the following couple of years, the situation showed some considerable 
improvement after the USIS made special efforts to make nationwide organisations show their 
films. The Americans sought to accomplish this goal by special mobile unit tours, cooperative 
campaigns in conjunction with organisation-sponsored lecture tours and through selective 
bookings utilising ‘packaged’ programmes more efficiently.926  
The first significant step in nationwide mobile film tours organised in cooperation with a 
large Finnish organisation was taken in the summer of 1951 when the USIS/Helsinki and the 
Finnish Sports Federation (Suomen Valtakunnan Urheiluliitto, SVUL) carried out a seven-week 
campaign during which films were presented at many of the organisation’s key locations. The 
US Legation reported that this project was probably the first extended tour to reach more 
adults than school children and that it included more of the primary target group than any other 
campaign, as many audiences were composed entirely of workers. All in all, the Americans saw 
that “since the interest in sports was high in Finland, the subject of this tour was a valuable 
device for creating interest and establishing desirable attitudes”.927 
An even more extensive sports-related campaign took place in the same autumn, when a 
ten-week film campaign was organised in cooperation with both leading national sports 
federations, the more right wing SVUL and the Finnish Workers’ Sports Federation (Suomen 
Työväen Urheiluliitto, TUL). Having the two highly competitive organisations to sponsor the 
same project was almost unheard of. Although the campaign was planned in cooperation with 
the national headquarters of both organisations, only one of the sports federations carried the 
responsibility for the project in each community. According to American reports, interest in the 
project was so wide that several members of the federations attended screenings arranged by 
the rival organisation. The comprehensive and spontaneous press coverage of the campaign 
also suggested that the tour had been a great success.928 
The most strategic and direct campaign of the entire USIS film programme implemented in 
cooperation with several leaders of the primary target group, the blue-collar workforce, was 
planned for quite some time. After the worker-related films finally started flowing in, especially 
after the introduction of the so-called ‘Phase Two’ in the distribution of USIE movies929, the 
possibility to increase labour organisations’ use of USIE material improved to a considerable 
extent. The quest of convincing all social democrat leaders inside the SAK about the 
importance of propaganda collaboration was not, however, that simple as many of them still 
feared that such an activity would be more damaging than helpful. After some persuasion, a 
gradual breakthrough was made during 1951 and 1952 when the SAK started presenting labour 
meetings all over the country with films about American labour and American industry, which 
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“give the lie to communist propaganda about ‘Wall Street control’ and ‘enslavement of the 
workers’”, as Ambassador Cabot put it.930 The operations were organised in such a way that the 
SAK presented the films during its promotional tours, while the role of the USIS in providing 
and adapting them into the Finnish environment was kept as invisible as possible. Although the 
SDP had some film production of its own, in the shape of Kansan Filmi, which had 
collaborated with both the Americans and the British on, among other matters, the import of 
film projectors931, the fact that SAK officials felt that there was a huge shortage of both 
domestic and foreign productions, especially at an affordable price, undoubtedly helped the 
Americans in having their input screened.932  
The key that unlocked the final door for USIS cooperation with the SAK was the 
International Ladies Garments Union film With These Hands of which a Finnish-language 
adaptation was made in Finland rather than New York. Both the USIS and the SAK invested 
heavily in the local version of the film by giving it a rewritten Finnish script and soundtrack. By 
September 1952, ten 16 mm prints of the film were ready for the SAK’s ‘Trade Union Week’ 
during which the movie was shown to union members in more than 150 cities, towns and 
villages throughout Finland.933 The film tour, widely advertised in the trade union publication 
Palkkatyöläinen934, was regarded as a huge success by USIS officials, leading to regular use of 
their films on the SAK’s own circuits and, in more general, to “cracking the labour-target 
problem in Finland” as now “the social democrats have learnt that they can trust the USIS and 
that the USIS can help them in their struggle to keep control of Finnish labour in non-
communist hands”.935  
What both the USIS staff and the Finns appreciated most about With These Hands was that it 
made a point that the SAK’s social democrats wished to stress in their war against the 
communists – that the right road to the improvement of workers’ wellbeing was to act through 
union organisation under a democratic government, not political strikes or a communist regime. 
The film, directed by Jack Arnold and produced by Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 
presents a dramatic story of the history of the union from the perspective of a retiring 
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member.936 Although it starts off by showing the poor working conditions in the early 20th 
century and the bitter strikes that followed, the real emphasis is on proving that the model of 
collective bargaining and the new union laws introduced by F.D. Roosevelt in the late 1930s 
had been the main reasons for workers’ improved healthcare standards and pensions. The split 
of the union in the 1920s is, on the other hand, explained by the "unrealistic demands made by 
workers illusioned by Lenin". Although the main message is by today’s standards presented in 
too obvious a fashion, one can understand why the film was regarded as so powerful in the 
1950s; the quality of production is high and the storyline with its rather stereotypic characters is 
made understandable to audiences across the world. 
The growing success of the USIS/Helsinki's film operations did not stop the Americans 
from continuously developing new techniques for reaching labour groups. For example, 
workplace screenings of USIS films in a group of factories were planned in great detail. Factory 
safety was a topic of particular focus. According to the USIS, films presenting American 
factories and working conditions in the context of safety education would reach the primary 
target audience in a highly efficient manner by not only showing that the US was extremely 
interested in the safety and well-being of workers, but also demonstrating the technical 
advances of American industry.937 In this particular project, the Americans cooperated with the 
Finnish insurance companies Teollisuus Tapaturma and Vakuutusosakeyhtiö Pohjola, which 
conducted extensive safety insurance programmes promoted by travelling lecturers who also 
used USIS films to illustrate their point.938 
As for other US activities using visual material to affect people’s perceptions, the photo 
exhibits in the display window rented by the USIS in the Lasipalatsi building in central Helsinki 
were the most visible. In addition to more general displays projecting America, the exhibited 
photographs illustrated the American living standard graphically, especially the purchasing 
power of the American worker.939 In this area, mainly due to financial matters, the USIS worked 
closely with the British Information Service. In 1953, the Americans rented one window in 
Turku and the British one in Lahti after which the American and British displays were shown 
alternately. In the same year, Public Affairs Officer David Wilson reported that in order to 
produce a stronger propaganda impact and reduce expenses, elaborate displays in the Lasipalatsi 
window had been replaced by four panels of news and feature photos one of which was 
changed each week.940 In addition to exhibits in rented windows, American photographs were 
regularly sent to various newspaper offices in Finland for their show windows, and other 
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collections were provided to associations and businesses in various fields.941 As for picture 
posters, the USIS faced difficulties in their successful placement as the most obvious outlet, 
schools, showed hardly any interest in them at all due to their propagandistic nature, as the 
Americans estimated. Film strips were used slightly more efficiently by teachers who realised 
the value of them as a teaching aid.942 
 
VOA Finland – Propaganda Effort Falling Short 
 
The way the Americans, like the British, saw that radio would be an essential medium for a 
successful propaganda campaign in Finland gives even more proof that the US Government 
was willing to adopt a much more active role in this exceptional environment. If the 
distribution of Aikamme and other locally-printed US-based material, together with the 
screening of USIE films, had the intention of addressing communist propaganda in Finland 
within a highly specified target group, the Voice of America broadcasts in Finnish focused on 
providing a more direct response to even broader masses. The fact that the radio channel’s 
story turned out to be a rather short one not only reflected the broader policy changes taking 
place in Washington, but also indicates that the use of this particular medium did not quite meet 
this expectation. 
The slow pace at which VOA broadcasts to Finland were reintroduced gives a good example 
of the general post-war American sentiment to the use of public funds for media operations 
abroad. International shortwave broadcasting was regarded more of a war-time activity than a 
useful tool for longer-term public diplomacy. As a consequence, VOA’s global output suffered 
some drastic cuts in the first post-war years. As the tide turned in the late 1940s, the idea of 
resuming broadcasts to Finland gradually started to win more support in State Department 
circles. As Soviet pressure in Finland grew, also through Moscow’s daily broadcasts in Finnish, 
this idea materialised into a formal recommendation made by the department in January 
1949.943 As this did not lead to the inauguration of broadcasts to Finland, the US Legation in 
Helsinki decided to start its own campaign to promote its importance. In his strong letter sent 
to Washington in May 1950, Minister Cabot expressed his fear that remaining silent about 
communist propaganda claiming the US to be a "money-mad nation of imperialists and war-
mongers" would make some Finns believe that there was some truth in these charges. 
According to him, VOA offered the best possibilities for an immediate reply to attacks made on 
behalf of the far-left press. Radio broadcasts would have greater freedom of action as they 
could “show up the falsity of the Russian allegations without mincing words and maintain a 
direct, positive counteract in a manner the Legation could never do”, Cabot added. He saw that 
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the establishment of a Finnish service, should events ever come to a point where the Russians 
dominated Finland, would be wise from a psychological as well as a practical point of view.944  
A Finnish VOA service could also be justified by the Americans' inability to secure USIE 
recordings air time through YLE. Only a couple of educational programmes and music 
transcriptions prepared by the USIE were broadcast per month.945 The great caution given by 
YLE to foreign programmes was evident, for instance, in its decision to refuse the Finnish-
American Society from presenting an American Independence Day programme in 1950. YLE 
explained this decision by noting that a general ban had been placed on commemorative 
programmes for foreign national days.946 Although the USIS/Helsinki came up with some ideas 
for stepping up the use of their broadcast material through the Finnish national radio, for 
instance by arranging special interviews with Finns visiting the US that might interest YLE947, 
the limited possibilities for the use of radio in Finland meant that the need for VOA broadcasts 
became increasingly obvious. 
Before the eventual inauguration of Finnish VOA broadcasts, the programme content was 
discussed in great detail. The Americans were well aware of the popularity of the BBC Finnish 
Service and the Finns’ appreciation of the objectivity of its news. Partly for this reason, VOA’s 
goal should not be to compete in this area but to focus more closely on topics in which the 
Finns had particular interest, the Legation pointed out. The leading assumption was that a large 
number of Finns living in the US would give a firm basis to build on as there would surely be 
strong interest in the everyday life of American Finns.948 In general, the US Legation saw that 
the programmes should not go too far in their propaganda as Finns would resent any attacks on 
domestic party activity from the outside – even if directed against the communists. In addition 
to using Finnish-Americans in interviews and factually portraying America, the programmes 
should focus on well-presented dramatisations of actual Soviet and satellite tactics and 
explanations on current events, it was recommended.949  
These views were all taken into account in the actual build-up of the VOA Finnish Service. 
In December 1950, Henry F. Arnold was specifically sent on a temporary basis from Helsinki 
to New York to launch the Finnish operation and to ensure that the programme policy was 
actually understood and followed.950 In recruiting staff, he was helped, among others, by 
Raymond Ylitalo, who was still stationed in Helsinki. After a rather testing recruitment period, 
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the regular staff of VOA Finland made up of eight employees, five of whom were born in 
Finland. Undoubtedly, the Finnish Desk’s most pre-eminent writer was Esa Arra, an 
experienced journalist who joined the radio station from the editorship of the Brooklyn-based 
New Yorkin Uutiset. At first VOA Finland operated without an officially appointed senior 
official. In August 1952 the man who finally took charge of the operations was John I. 
Kolehmainen, a professor well-known for his studies on immigrant life in the US. After 
Kolehmainen decided to return to the world of academia after only ten months with the radio 
station, senior reporters Alan Nelson, former Press Officer at the USIS/Helsinki, and Piltti 
Heiskanen served as acting chiefs.951  
VOA's first Finnish broadcast was finally heard on January 1st, 1951. The 15-minute daily 
programme was increased to two 15-minute programmes by the same autumn. The service did 
not enjoy the most perfect of starts as its broadcasting reception was at first poor. Despite a fair 
amount of publicity given to the broadcasts, the audience size remained far below its potential 
for quite some time, and the early listener reaction was for the most part apathetic. In order to 
make the Finnish Service more attractive, Minister Cabot felt that the broadcasts should have a 
lighter touch and include more topics that would bring them closer to Finnish listeners’ 
immediate interest. To give a more local flair to the service, the Americans started seeking 
Finnish journalists who would be able to deal with communist propaganda humorously and 
provide more topical material.952 Mr Cabot’s views on the content of the early programmes was 
shared by a Finnish listener panel, which recommended a more down-to-earth approach to 
some news broadcasts as it felt that the over-excited use of the Finnish language by certain 
VOA presenters made American politicians’ remarks sound boastful and threatening and as a 
whole too much of ‘propaganda’.953 
One of VOA Finland's first special tasks was to support non-communists in the SAK’s 
elections in spring 1951. The service transmitted a regular labour programme consisting of 
features and commentaries on American labour unions and such subjects as slave labour and 
workers’ lowering living standards in communist countries.954 To make sure the approach 
would be appropriate to Finnish trade unions, Minister Cabot discussed the programme 
content with Olavi Lindblom, who gave his approval while stressing the importance on building 
talks around known facts, keeping polemics and ‘propaganda’ to a minimum.955  
This kind of an approach would become characteristic of Finnish VOA broadcasts. 
Although radio broadcasts enabled the Americans to address Soviet propaganda more directly 
than the case had been with the printed word, Finland’s position did place restrictions on the 
use of this medium as well. Indeed, by far the greatest majority of VOA Finland’s programmes 
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dealt with American and Finnish-American culture, history and religion.956 In addition to 
American history, John I. Kolehmainen was particularly active in promoting wide themes like 
the history of Finnish-American immigrants and Finnish and Nordic mythology.957 The 
adopted policy also meant that in some respects the Americans, particularly during the station’s 
early months, refrained from using broadcasting methods that were seen appropriate in many 
other parts of the world. One example of this was that Finland was left out of an extensive 
VOA programme comparing living standards between East and West. According to the US 
Legation, including Finland in the Western category would only have given extra ammunition to 
the communist propaganda campaign claiming that the country was dominated by the West.958  
Although the projection of America and American culture was VOA’s main objective in 
Finland, and the Finnish situation restricted the use of hard-hitting propaganda, political 
content was certainly not neglected. Indeed, the US Legation’s humble estimation was that the 
programme content was usually ‘sharper’ than that of the BBC Finnish Service.959 The talks 
given by Oskari Tokoi, aired on Sunday nights, aroused particular interest in Finland and 
became the station’s most popular programme. Besides covering the everyday lives of Finnish-
Americans, Tokoi gave a number of political talks on labour issues and the standard of living in 
the US.960 The popularity of the talks was strongly boosted by the US Legation in Helsinki, 
which offered Tokoi's comments in written form to those who were interested. Scripts of the 
talks, together with other suitable VOA material, were also incorporated into the 
USIS/Helsinki’s information releases, most notably its bulletins, and picked up extensively by 
Finnish newspapers.961 All this obviously pleased USIS officials as they were now offered a 
whole new dimension to their work in printed propaganda.  
The success of Oskari Tokoi’s broadcasts gave the Americans the confidence to expand 
VOA Finland’s political output. The service started to give more air time to interviews with 
substantial anti-communist figures, such as Irving Brown, who commented on international 
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labour issues on the channel in March 1953.962 By far the most controversial and hard-hitting 
anti-communist propaganda series transmitted through VOA Finland, however, had started 
already when the Americans finally found a Finn who would give anti-communist broadcasts 
under a pseudonym. For this role Arvo “Poika” Tuominen fitted perfectly, as he was able to 
give first-hand insights on events taking place in the Soviet Union. When trying to persuade 
Tuominen to the job, Esa Arra963 determined Tuominen’s task as to write 6-minute long scripts 
that would “put the doings of the Soviet Union and the communists in its service into the right 
perspective and in particular pluck the feathers off the Finnish communists’ tails”.964 After 
Tuominen, still living in Stockholm, accepted the job offer, it was agreed that the talks would be 
presented under the pseudonym 'Niilo Virta', a man who had, before escaping back to Finland, 
held responsible posts in the Cominterm and knew the Soviet system inside out.965 
When Tuominen got started, he certainly fulfilled VOA Finland’s wishes. The Niilo Virta 
broadcasts, aired on Friday nights from May 1952, gave a thorough account on the way the 
Soviet system worked and the political leadership, in particular Stalin behaved.966 After Stalin’s 
death, the broadcasts gave broad accounts on the power struggles in the Kremlin and 
speculated over their outcome. From the very first talk on, Virta also dealt with the 
concentration camps in the Soviet Union, claiming that the number of people living in them 
had reached 20 million.967 Details about the state terror practiced by Stalin were also brought 
into the public attention more than once.968  
As one would imagine, the Niilo Virta talks quickly stirred interest among the Finnish public. 
Although not unaware of the injustices taking place in their neighbouring country, the Finns 
had before this hardly received as uncensored, detailed and hard-hitting information about 
Soviet controversies as this. This was also reflected in listener feedback, which predominately 
thanked the broadcasts, in addition to "providing moral support during dark times", for 
revealing the enslaving nature of communism.969 The use of Tuominen’s printed scripts for 
unofficial political campaigning also shows how effective the Virta broadcasts were considered 
in Finland. If the number of subscribers for scripts of Tokoi’s broadcasts could be counted in 
their hundreds, Veikko Puskala, a leading SDP strategist, made sure that as many as 20,000 
copies of Virta’s second series were distributed throughout the country in printed form.970 This 
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kind of popularity ensured that Niilo Virta kept analysing the Soviet Union and its flaws until 
the eventual termination of the VOA Finnish Service. 
Besides the revelations given by Niilo Virta, the Finnish political and media circles 
speculated furiously over the actual identity of the former communist on air. VOA gave great 
care that Tuominen’s role would not be revealed and was rather successful in doing so. The 
communist newspaper Työkansan Sanomat did eventually try to prove that Tuominen was 
actually the real Virta, by comparing the content of the broadcasts and Tuominen’s writings 
published in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti and the Tampere-based Kansan Lehti.971 Tuominen himself 
replied to these allegations by noting that “this kind of a claim was extremely stupid even by 
communist standards”.972 Niilo Virta's real identity was kept secret until the early 1980s when 
Raimo Seppälä finally confirmed it in his biography of Tuominen.973  
Not surprisingly, the Niilo Virta talks also played their part in the quest of winning more 
listeners to VOA Finland’s broadcasts. Nonetheless, the growing number of articles published 
in the far-left press claiming the station to be “an indication of the crisis prevailing in US 
propaganda"974 indicates that the service's popularity had, actually, risen even before the 
introduction of Virta. According to the 1952 VOA/BBC Poll, the American station had in a 
single year managed to increase the size of its audience by as much as 40 points to 
approximately 212,000 weekly listeners.975 The service was now particularly popular in rural 
areas976 thanks to the considerable volume of special broadcasts directed to certain communities 
from which large numbers of Finns had emigrated to the US. Finns living in the countryside 
were not, however, that eager to listen to news and politics from an American perspective.977 
The appreciation of VOA’s political dimension, including the Niilo Virta talks, was therefore a 
more urban phenomenon.  
Despite the growing number of listeners, it was always evident that VOA would never be 
able to replace the BBC’s position as the most popular and trusted foreign radio service in 
Finland. This and the continuous Soviet jamming of VOA broadcasts were among the main 
reasons behind the decision to discontinue the service to Finland. Officially the resolution was 
justified by the grant reductions influenced by the McCarthy hearings, which forced the 
broadcaster to abolish six other foreign services.978 The termination of broadcasts was hard to 
understand not only for the VOA Finland staff but also the USIA, whose director defended the 
service in a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee meeting in spring 1953 by noting that it 
played a vital role in “counterattacking Russian influence in Finland and keeping the Finnish 
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people constantly alert and informed about the threat of Russian communism”.979 This appeal 
did not manage to prevent the discontinuation VOA Finland, which gave its final broadcast on 
September 12, 1953. 
Although the discontinuation of VOA's Finnish desk came as a disappointment to a great 
number of Finns, comments undermining the service’s importance hint that in the early 1950s 
the Finnish environment was not that fertile for more hard-hitting political comment after all. 
For example, the tabloid Ilta-Sanomat noted that the service's termination indicated an American 
realisation that the broadcasts had managed to do nothing essential to the picture of the US in 
“a country where there prevails freedom to publish all manner of news, news stories and other 
information materials of American origin, too”.980 This explanation was not very accurate, as the 
Americans, together with representatives of a number of nationalities, remained far from 
convinced about the freedom of the Finnish press.  
Officials at the US Legation certainly did not regard the VOA Finnish broadcasts as a failure. 
After the last broadcast, the idea of resuming the service came up occasionally in their reports. 
The concern expressed by a number of Finns over the outcome of the ongoing propaganda war 
between the social democrats and the communists led to a number of campaigns backing the 
relaunch of American broadcasts. The most potential of these was led by Reijo Korhonen, 
former employee of VOA Finland, who claimed to have ready facilities for new broadcasts 
from the US to Finland that would be conducted on a privately-sponsored basis.981 Despite 
winning support for his project from the USIA and gaining valuable moral backing from people 
like Oskari Tokoi and Hjalmar Procopé, Korhonen’s plans never saw daylight due to a lack of 
adequate funds. Any hopes for the quick reintroduction of broadcasts to Finland started to fade 
in 1954. Even though Jack McFall, Minister to Finland, noted that the rather limited 
possibilities to reach the VOA audience by other media had to some extent thwarted the US 
information programme in Finland982 , the Legation was no longer willing to support an early 
resumption of VOA broadcasts as it felt that available funds could be much more effectively 
used for other kinds of projects.983  
 
BBC Joins Arms 
 
The performance of the BBC Finnish Service in the early 1950s gives another indication that 
also the British saw it necessary to address the Finns more directly. The service's position as the 
most popular Anglo-American broadcaster in Finland even during VOA's most successful days, 
together with its traditional image of being a more objective news producer offered the channel 
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the opportunity to attack Britain's enemies in a way that would reach a wide audience and be 
generally perceived as credible at the same time. 
The pressure the Finnish Service was under by the FO to reform its broadcasting content 
grew quickly in 1950. According to the British Legation in Helsinki, the tense world situation 
would attract a growing number of listeners who expected to hear the British opinion about the 
turn of international events and especially about the British attitude towards communism. 
Therefore, talks like ‘Nature Talk’ and the ‘Porcelain Industry in Britain’, were seen as not 
producing the intended listener reaction.984 FO officials both in Helsinki and London also felt 
that Finnish communists should now be countered more urgently. Since one of the most 
important purposes of British informational activity in Finland was to stress the strength and 
solidarity of Anglo-American cooperation, particularly accusations appearing in the far-left 
press over the discord between the British and Americans were regarded as necessary to be shot 
down as effectively as possible.985 Both Minister Scott and the FO also recognised that the more 
open anti-communist sentiment developing in Finland would justify some modifications to the 
Finnish Service's output and the broader interpretation of the 'not bring the Cold War into 
Finland' policy in the BBC's case. 
The FO’s wish to give more political punch to the Finnish broadcasts was enthusiastically 
backed by the Finns to whom the matter was mentioned. The social democrats felt that the 
BBC’s output had been far too modest, objective and colourless and that workers listening to 
the Tallinn, Leningrad and Moscow broadcasts were not impressed by the "self-criticism which 
the BBC indulges on behalf of Britain”.986 Antero Vartia, Finland’s Press Attaché in London, 
noted that if the BBC Finnish Service were to enter the political field by answering communist 
lies directly, it would soon have a million listeners.987 
The attempt to ‘hot-up’ the BBC Finnish Service can be seen as a rather typical arm 
wrestling contest between Whitehall officials and the broadcasting corporation. In this case, it 
was the job of Sir Christopher Warner to try and convince Sir Ian Jacob that political 
commentaries should contain some anti-communist material, while bearing in mind Finland’s 
delicate position. As at so many instances when the FO aimed to influence the BBC’s 
broadcasts, Warner’s attempts did not lead to any immediate changes. An IRD official’s 
comment noting that Denis Winther was never particularly responsive to the attempts to 
strengthen the Finnish programmes illustrates the same stance.988 The BBC was clearly no more 
ready to change its cautious approach to a sensitive country like Finland than it was to alter the 
objectivity of its news service.  
After growing pressure the corporation did, however, give some concessions also to the 
Finnish broadcasts. The share of centrally-produced political programmes, originally broadcast 
in English, started to grow in Finnish transmissions at the expense of cultural content in the 
early 1950s. The decision to broadcast anti-communist propaganda on all overseas services of 
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the BBC from October 1950 onwards, therefore, concerned Finland as well. Broadcasts entitled 
‘Estonian Workers under Soviet Rule’ and talks on Russian concentration camps quickly 
became more frequent also in the Finnish language. The British Legation in Helsinki welcomed 
this development warmly. According to Mr McGhie, the Finns were familiar to these kinds of 
topics, but seemed to like confirmation from time to time.989 
The number of political talks increased decisively when series such as ‘In Eastern Europe’, 
‘International Communism’ and ‘The Land of Detained Counter-revolutionaries’ were included 
in the Finnish Service. The first two were written by Walter Kolarz, a Czech refugee, who in 
addition to radio programmes based on material provided by the IRD, wrote at least six books 
on communism and the Soviet Union and lent his name to several anti-communist books, 
pamphlets and news-feature articles that the IRD was able to place widely.990 The available 
scripts of Kolarz’s radio talks reveal the extensive nature of his expertise in both the theoretical 
and practical side of communism. Apart from discussing the true nature of, for example, the 
Soviet Union’s leadership structure and public expenditure991, he gave a number of in-depth 
insights into race relations in both the US and the Soviet sphere, arguing that African-
Americans had no need to resort to a communist party in their fight against discrimination.992 
Walter Kolarz’s political analyses seemed to hit the target in Finland. In particular ‘In 
Eastern Europe’, first launched in January 1950993, received almost entirely positive feedback 
from the audience and became one of the service’s most popular programmes. Again, the 
sentiment among the Finnish audience was that the BBC provided the only way for a Finn to 
properly follow the discussed issues.994 The series was regarded as particularly useful in 
counteracting Moscow Radio’s misrepresentations and elucidating the predominantly one-sided 
impressions gained during Finnish workers’ tours to the Soviet Union.995  
While Kolarz’s output exposed communist tactics in a number of countries, ‘The Land of 
Detained Counter-revolutionaries’ was strictly based on Dr. Julius Margolin’s 5-year experience 
in Soviet forced labour camps. Both this series and the programme ‘East-West Settlement’, 
which exposed the oppressive nature of the Moscow dictatorship, were also popular among 
Finnish listeners as “these matters never fail to interest people living in the East-West 
borderline”, as one listener noted.996 The reception of these broadcasts was, however, more 
controversial since some listeners saw their content as overly propagandistic, reminding them 
too much of the Soviet technique.997 The number of comments requesting the service to 
concentrate on promoting the Western way of life in a positive way suggests that the BBC 
might have crossed the line for the 'propaganda-sensitive Finns'. 
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Other political talks broadcast in 1951, including ‘Lenin and Stalin Versus the Peasantry’ and 
‘Labour Camps in Satellite Countries’ and a serialised reading of Orwell’s Animal Farm managed 
to win a better rating from the Finnish listener panel.998 The titles of these broadcasts indicate 
that the more hard-hitting material had been reasonably widely included in the Finnish Service 
in a matter of only twelve months. When saying this, it has to be remembered that the more 
neutral programmes projecting Britain that were prepared by the Finnish staff continued to 
dominate the service’s total output. 
The popularity of political series and such commentary programmes as Max Jakobson’s ’The 
English Scene’, together with the much-praised new Sunday jazz broadcast, won the station 
new listeners. According to a BBC/VOA poll conducted in 1952, the Finnish Service had 
approximately 38,000 listeners every day, and 325,000 at least once a week. The number of the 
occasional audience was estimated to be as high as 750,000.999 An independent Finnish poll 
confirmed the BBC’s popularity by claiming that the channel was the second most favoured 
foreign broadcast with an audience more or less the same size as the Soviet radio had 
(minimum 14 per cent of the adult population). The most popular foreign station was the 
Swedish Radio, mainly due to its music broadcasts.1000 
As for the audience, what distinguished the BBC Finnish Service, which in the early 1950s 
had three transmission times for its 15-minute and half-hour broadcasts, from other stations 
was that the majority of its listeners were young men from Southern Finland. Moreover, the 
audience was more urban and educated than that of, for example, VOA or YLE.1001 After VOA 
ended its Finnish Service, the importance of the BBC grew also in rural areas. The 
discontinuation of French broadcasts in the Finnish language did not, however, have much 
effect as the size of its audience had been modest. The same applied to the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation’s (CBC) broadcasts to Finland, which started off as a once-a-week 
service in both Finnish and Swedish in December 1950.1002 The service only managed to attract 
approximately 25,000 listeners, but continued to run persistently until April 1955 when it was 
axed due to the reductions made to Canadian foreign broadcasts to Western Europe.1003 As for 
the BBC General Overseas Service, it never matched the Finnish Service’s popularity, either, as 
only an estimated 4 per cent of the adult population listened to radio broadcasts in English. 
Even though the FO was pleased to see the inclusion of centrally-produced anti-communist 
programmes in the Finnish Service, it continued to give detailed criticism on the broadcasts and 
felt that more could be done. The British Legation kept stressing that the Finnish communists 
and their misrepresentations about the Anglo-American distortion or British colonial policy 
should be answered directly through the radio. With this purpose in mind, and because the staff 
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of the Finnish Service apparently did not include anyone of "the sufficient political or 
journalistic calibre", the Legation planned to hire a prominent Finnish politician or journalist 
who could write a more direct and personal counterblast to communist propaganda.1004  
Finding the right commentator was left to Hamish McGhie, who started an active search for 
suitable candidates and sending trial scripts to London.1005 The social democrats assured the 
British that they would find someone appropriate for the job in question, but McGhie rejected 
this suggestion by stressing that the BBC could never become the vehicle of the propaganda of 
one internal party in Finland.1006 It is highly unlikely that someone was ever hired for the task. 
Neither FO nor BBC correspondence give any indication of such a recruitment, and going 
through the Finnish Service’s broadcasting content does not give any reason to believe 
otherwise.1007 The fact that the recruitment process seemed to take months or even years also 
suggests that the BBC decided against appointing a local commentator at least on a permanent 
basis and relied on interviewing various Finnish anti-communist politicians, such as the rising 
Coalition Party MPs Tuure Junnila and Päiviö Hetemäki, who, as former Minister of Defence, 
gave comments on both defence issues and Finnish domestic politics on the BBC Home 
Service programme ‘At Home and Abroad’ in July 1955.1008 Interviewing figures like Junnila and 
Hetemäki suited the broader British objectives well as although neither of them criticised the 
general Finnish foreign policy as such, they did, particularly later on, question the true nature of 
Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union.1009  
In spite of not materialising, the desire to hire a political commentator reveals that the Niilo 
Virta talks launched by VOA Finland were something over which the British, usually stressing 
the BBC’s superiority over VOA, were actually envious. The way the FO was willing to dictate 
the Finnish Service's recruitment policy also reveals that Finland made no exception when it 
came to the relationship between Whitehall and the broadcasting corporation. Indeed, the 
Finnish case enhances the view according to which in the late 1940s and early 1950s the BBC 
was to a growing extent harnessed to support Britain’s broader Cold War objectives. It also 
shows that the Finnish Service did not determine its broadcasting content independently but 
was subject to the broader policy of the BBC’s External Services. This conclusion is in some 
contrast to a later interview given by Essi Kiviranta, who joined the service as a reporter in the 
early 1950s, in which she assured that apart from the news bulletins, which were written at the 
BBC News Department and directly translated to numerous languages, the service’s content 
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was rarely interfered with by the External Services, let alone the FO.1010 The truth, undoubtedly, 
lies somewhere in the middle. While it is true that the Finnish Service was usually able to 
determine its broadcasts on its own, the rapid inclusion of anti-communist propaganda, 
something the Finns themselves were not particularly willing to do, suggests that at least in 
political output the broadcasting content was, at least to some extent, dictated by the BBC and 
ultimately the FO.  
It is no surprise that the inclusion of political talks analysing the internal affairs of Eastern 
European countries and even the Soviet Union stirred some reactions from Finnish 
communists. As they realised that their opportunities to prevent the activities of a foreign 
broadcaster were limited to say the least, the communists did find a way to protest over the new 
broadcasting content by, for example, filing a strong complaint against STT after the news 
agency had distributed a story advertising Walter Kolarz’s talk on Otto-Wille Kuusinen, the 
Finnish-born Soviet politician and former leader of Finnish communists.1011 As the communists 
felt that the broadcast included an outrageous attack against not only Mr Kuusinen but Stalin as 
well, they demanded an explanation from the Finnish Government. The Finnish Foreign Office 
did look into the matter by requesting a comment by Eero A. Berg, still Editor in Chief at STT. 
In his reply, Berg noted that STT had no way of knowing the content of Kolarz’s broadcast and 
stressed that the news agency followed a cautious and sophisticated policy when it came to 
matters related to the Soviet Union.1012  
The Soviets also seemed to have had enough of Western broadcasts to Finland and began to 
jam them. The first deliberate interference of the BBC’s broadcasts to Finland took place on 
January 8, 1952. This was something quite new in international radio communication as it was 
the first time in peacetime when anyone had jammed radio transmissions between two other 
free and independent states. The Finnish Service was soon followed by broadcasts to some 
other non-communist countries sharing a border with the Soviet Union.1013 The jamming of the 
Finnish Service broadcasts came as a surprise to the British, as they thought that Finland as a 
country with free press and access to international news would be spared from such actions. 
The BBC’s popularity was regarded as one possible reason why the Russians started jamming 
the service before any other foreign broadcasts in Finnish.1014 The most acceptable theory, 
however, was that the intention of the jamming was to protect radio listeners in Eastern Karelia 
and Estonia against the influence of the BBC. This view was backed by observations noting 
that jamming seemed more severe in South East Finland, the area closest to the Soviet frontier. 
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The jamming of the Finnish Service was big news in Britain also because this was the first 
time BBC broadcasts had been jammed from a source outside the country. For instance, The 
Times reported about the matter and the upcoming countermeasures that the BBC was quick to 
introduce. These measures, first used as early as January 14, 1952, were based on the idea of 
forming a ‘barrage’ by broadcasting on as many frequencies with a larger number of 
transmitters. Similar operations had already been used to overcome the jamming of the BBC’s 
Russian and Polish programmes.1015 The only problem with the activities was that they required 
more money in a time when the first major expense cuts were already taking hold of the BBC’s 
overseas services. The matter of funding the jamming countermeasures was raised in 
Parliament. A special grant for the operations was rejected by the Chancellor, which meant that 
the BBC had to make further cuts if it wished to combat jamming effectively.1016  
The BBC succeeded relatively well at least in countering the jamming of Finnish Services. 
According to the numerous questionnaires sent to the BBC audience, 60 per cent of listeners in 
spring 1952 had difficulties, but more with fading than jamming. The British also learnt, thanks 
to their regular monitoring arrangements, that the effect of Soviet interference varied greatly by 
area and time. The jamming was also highly selective, as for instance the Sunday dance music 
programmes were hardly ever disturbed.1017 These observations were shared by listeners of 
VOA, which also suffered from even heavy interference. The fact that the jamming of the 
American broadcasts were at their heaviest during the Niilo Virta talks1018 also shows that Soviet 
jamming followed a pattern, which was predefined by the programmes’ nature and content. 
All in all, the effect of Soviet jamming was limited. The audience for Finnish Service 
remained more or less the same size in the 1950s, although it would appear that some people 
stopped listening to the broadcasts after the interference had started while others, on the other 
hand, started to follow them as a result.1019 Finnish listeners did not seem too disturbed by the 
Soviet operations, although some comments, mainly from Lapland, where the reception was 
also at times particularly bad, claimed that “now that only Moscow, Warsaw and Hungary can 
be heard free from interference, it seems as if the West is defeated in the Cold War”.1020 After 
the early surprise, the BBC was not too alarmed about the situation, either. After all, in one way 
the jamming of foreign broadcasts could be interpreted as a sign of success, as the British often 
acknowledged. In June 1952, the Legation again confirmed that the BBC Finnish Service held a 
leading position among foreign broadcasts to Finland. According to Minister Noble, the 
audience would grow even more sharply at a time of international crisis.1021 
The Finnish audience certainly supported the British impression of a successful operation as 
it remained highly complementary to the broadcast content. As time passed, however, some 
change in the listeners’ priorities did occur. Even though the BBC was still followed by and 
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large because of its news broadcasts, the audience’s interest in the news and political broadcasts 
declined to some extent towards the mid-1950s. The political programmes were more often 
criticised for being too heavy and dry, and several listeners reminded the BBC not to neglect 
humour in its political broadcasts as it “was one of the best weapons on the political front 
too”.1022 This change in listener attitude was already at the time explained by being a result of an 
easier political situation and by the assumption that the audience was now taking the news 
service for granted. 
The numerous surveys also suggested that the projection of Britain, the BBC’s most 
important objective, had been a success in post-war Finland. Finns had learnt a great deal more 
about British culture and the way of life, as well as about specially promoted topics such as 
workers’ social conditions in Britain.1023 Without doubt, the service offered Finns an 
opportunity to hear about international topics or follow modern culture more closely than they 
ever could by listening to their domestic channels. In addition to culture and the news, science 
turned into a popular programme theme, with the Finnish adaptation of the astronomer Fred 
Hoyle’s BBC Home Service production ‘The Nature of the Universe’ winning particular praise 
from the audience.1024 The opportunity to listen to a large variety of different programs would 
not, however, last forever. Even though the cuts made to the BBC Overseas Services did not 
directly concern Finland, as it belonged to the countries where services should be continued for 
‘special reasons’, the reduction and reorganisation of European Services meant that the Finnish 
Service was forced to abolish, for instance, its weekly half-hour jazz programme.  
As for the BBC’s other activities regarding Finland, the corporation managed to build an 
increasingly warm relationship with YLE, whose new Director Einar Sundström was almost a 
regular visitor in England. The two companies cooperated, for instance, on broadcasting the 
Olympics held both in London 1948 and Helsinki 1952. The BBC also gave valuable 
broadcasting training for Finns representing a large variety of organisations. Although pleased 
with the expanding cooperation between the two broadcasters, the British were not entirely 
happy with YLE’s policy of using foreign broadcasts. While the number of programmes of 
British origin aired by YLE remained among the largest for a foreign country1025, and 
cooperation in music programme exchange and language training in particular flourished1026, the 
Finnish broadcaster’s caution in transmitting any political content that could be associated with 
the West was treated with continuous frustration in British circles. 
As with many newspapers, the national radio was under persistence scrutiny from Finnish 
communists, who relentlessly filed complaints over the broadcaster’s coverage of, for example, 
the Korean War, which, according to the critics, followed a bias to the US and glorified warfare 
in general.1027 YLE had undoubtedly anticipated that the outbreak of war in East Asia would 
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lead to an even closer examination of its broadcasts. This can be concluded, for instance, from 
a letter sent by Programme Director Jussi Koskiluoma to Max Jakobson, who continued to 
produce news summaries for both YLE and the BBC Finnish Service, in which the London-
based reporter was told to avoid handling foreign policy altogether due to the delicate political 
climate.1028 YLE’s position regarding its association with foreign broadcasters was well 
epitomised by its decision not to rebroadcast CBC's opening transmission in Finland.1029 
The examples mentioned above only illustrate a point that became apparent also through 
BBC’s listener feedback: in the early 1950s there was still a clear demand among radio-listening 
Finns for a service that provided international news reports from an angle that was at times even 
highly different from the national broadcaster’s coverage. The BBC Finnish Service, undoubtedly, 
fulfilled this need perfectly. The channel offered its listeners a Western perspective to a large 
variety of international events, and by doing so also provided Finland with some much needed 
moral support in its edgy relationship with its Eastern neighbour. At the same time, many Finns 
remained cautious about being associated with the service for years to come. A good example of 
this kind of stance was Uusi Suomi's decision to prevent Max Jakobson from continuing to work 
for the BBC after he had joined the newspaper in January 1952. Editor Lauri Aho explained the 
situation by revealing that according to a number of Finns, Mr Jakobson could not act as an 
independent journalist while being an important voice of the BBC Finnish Service, which they 
saw as a semi-official propaganda organ of the British Government.1030  
 
An Increasingly Direct but Slightly Predictable Approach  
 
The matters discussed above indicate that the early 1950s was a time when Cold War 
propaganda in Finland took its most direct form, mostly as a consequence of the Korean War. 
Growing American and British investment in informing the Finnish audience about communist 
injustices shows that the two Western governments were more willing to shape public opinion 
also in the northern country, and in this way support its independence to a greater extent than 
has been earlier recognised. In particular, the US Government made considerable expansions to 
its anti-communist activities and introduced several new methods of influence. Due to Soviet 
pressure in Finland, the most direct Western political propaganda was channelled to closely 
specified audiences through new forms of print content, short films and, above all, the radio. 
That a growing number of British and American anti-communist comments were also finding 
their way through to Finnish newspapers shows that self-censoring practices did not entirely 
dominate the Finnish press's behaviour even when the Cold War was at its hottest. Indeed, the 
Western governments were surprisingly efficient in reaching their target audiences, considering 
the circumstances. For this they largely had various Finnish actors’ stronger involvement in the 
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anti-communist campaign to thank for. In addition to offering British and American officials 
with new possibilities for spreading their message, the expanding anti-communist operations of, 
above all, SYT and non-communist political parties dragged them closer to the fierce domestic 
propaganda war taking place in Finland, which was not always compatible with their general 
policy of not becoming openly involved in local struggles. Offering their support to the Finns 
covertly was much more to the Western governments' liking, and this remained the usual form 
of cooperation. 
Even if the Americans and British were somewhat innovative in finding new ways to 
influence the Finnish public opinion, the content of distributed propaganda suggests that in the 
1950s they did not entirely realise what kind of a message would be the most effective in the 
country. The way Western propaganda spread and published in Finland constantly sought to 
directly criticise the communist system was rather unsophisticated and lacked the lighter touch 
that would have possibly appealed to the Finns even more. Indeed, one could say that in the 
early 1950s the East-West propaganda war in Finland took a rather predictable form: the 
Finnish communists, backed by the Soviets, attacked the West on imperialism and the true 
nature of capitalism, while the content of Western origin focused on criticising the 
backwardness of the communist system by, above all, comparing living standards between 
capitalist and communist countries. As these messages were repeated on a near regular basis, 
one is left with a somewhat unimaginative impression of both camps' propaganda techniques. 
When saying this, one must point out that at least the Western content distributed in Finland 
followed closely the propaganda policies determined in London and Washington, which at the 
time focused on hitting the enemy in an overwhelmingly direct manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
197 
 
6. THE MANY FORMS OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY, 1950-1953 
 
Anglo-American Cooperation in Finland Begins 
 
The expansion of political propaganda in Finland also had an effect on Anglo-American 
collaboration in the country. As the methods for direct influence in Finland were far and few 
between, representatives of the two Western powers gradually began to explore opportunities 
to work together in the informational and cultural sectors. The way in which US and British 
officials cooperated in Finland in these fields followed to a great extent the general pattern 
discussed in chapter two. At first, both administrations were highly suspicious of closer 
cooperation. However, from the early 1950s onwards, the other party was at least kept 
informed about day-to-day activities and major developments. As with Anglo-American 
cooperation in general, both British and American propaganda and cultural operations in 
Finland were almost without exception independently executed. 
British and American documents related to propaganda activities in Finland in the first post-
war years draw a picture of two competing powers rather than cooperating allies. Officials from 
both countries closely monitored the propaganda and cultural operations of the other. As 
already mentioned, particularly the British followed the launch of American activities with some 
concern, but were at the same time confident that the scope of USIS operations in the country 
would remain a good deal less than theirs, largely because they did not have a similar 
organisation to the British Council on which to rely.  
The first big question concerning cooperation in Finland closely concerned British Council 
activities. The desire of some Finnish anglophile societies to actually become Anglo-American 
societies, and to be titled in that way as well, might today seem as a perfectly innocent idea, but 
back in 1946 it almost caused uproar among the British. At the time, the British Council’s 
general policy was to discourage Anglo-American ventures where this could be done without 
offending the Americans. According to the Council, an Anglo-American institution was likely 
to be an awkward and doubtful vehicle for forwarding its purposes. In countries like Finland, 
the British were particularly apprehensive of the double title being deliberately used by the local 
nationals to imply a Western bloc against the Soviet Union.1031 Both the FO and the BC also 
felt that the day-to-day running of an Anglo-American Society would be “tremendously 
difficult” and that the Americans had such disproportionate resources in money and equipment 
that in any possible common society the British would be at a disadvantage.1032 Although the 
number of anglophile societies was clearly larger than that of Finnish-American societies, the 
British were already perceptibly anxious about protecting their leading position in this field. 
Great admirers of the British Council's work, the Americans seemed somewhat more willing to 
cooperate in cultural ventures. The subject was, however, never among the primary US goals in 
Finland. Common Anglo-American societies never materialised in Finland, but the strong 
British opposition to the scheme confirms that in the late 1940s the BC was not very 
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enthusiastic about expanding its cooperation with the Americans any further than to the 
organisation of common lecturers, especially in provincial societies.1033  
The situation concerning propaganda activities in Finland was rather similar to that in the 
cultural field. Both parties were happy to share information with the other, but there was hardly 
any shared coordination of activities, not to mention common operations in the field. The 
British objective was not dissimilar to that in Italy, where the posted officials had no intention 
to undertake joint activities, but wished to let the Americans know what they were up to in 
order to avoid the two governments' efforts from overlapping with each other.1034  
Anglo-American cooperation became significantly closer in the early 1950s after both 
Washington and London gave all posts instructions concerning liaison on informational 
activities. In Finland, the timing of the new policy could not have been better as both the 
British and Americans had been observing the expanding Soviet propaganda activities with 
growing concern. Officials of both countries felt that closer liaison could help them to match 
the Russians and, in particular, enable the more sensible use of resources, which in the British 
case were now starting to lag behind those of its larger ally.  
The possibility of British-American cooperation in Finland in the informational field was 
first discussed in a joint meeting held at the British Legation in August 1950. During the 
meeting, the major policy objective of both governments was defined as “to assist the Finns to 
maintain and strengthen their independence, to encourage them in their beliefs in the 
democratic way of life and to do everything possible to reinforce their attachment to the 
Western world”.1035 Although hampering the influence of communists in Finland was seen as a 
definite objective, officials from both countries stressed the importance of sustaining from 
doing anything likely to endanger Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union. The best way of 
directly addressing communist propaganda, especially as for the workers’ groups, was through 
BBC and VOA broadcasts, both parties noted. As various operational fields were explored 
during the meeting, the parties also decided to a certain degree to embark on mutual 
cooperation in film distribution, the coordination of visits to Finnish-American and Finnish-
British societies, and arranging alternating displays of American and British window exhibitions 
in provincial towns. The Americans and the British also agreed to increase joint consultations 
between the information officers of both legations in order to exchange information about 
newspapers, their editors and their reactions to the various materials they received, and to 
discuss day-to-day editing and distribution techniques. These kinds of discussions were 
eventually held on a monthly basis, while broader consultative meetings took place every four 
months.1036  
Even after the positive steps taken towards more extensive liaison, both the US and British 
legations were more than often willing to emphasise that they must carry out the majority of 
their activities independently. Indeed, the cooperation between officials was rather based on 
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discussing broader issues and strategies than practical action. The Finnish press’s practice of 
self-censorship and the need to stimulate Finnish editorial columns with topics that were of 
essential concern to Finland and its future were among the topics most typically discussed 
between American and British officials. On these kinds of issues, as with regard to 
informational policy in general, they were usually of the same mind. For instance, in October 
1952, the Americans and the British unanimously decided that the bulk of the output provided 
by both administrations should continue to “accentuate the positive”. Nevertheless, the 
circulation of overt ‘idea debate’ material and the distribution of overt but private and more 
complex material, as well as covert and indirect distribution of hard-hitting anti-communist 
materials through reliable indigenous agencies, should be increased simultaneously by both 
parties.1037 These operations were to a great extent put into practise independently, but the use 
of new materials or new distribution channels, which involved joint interests, always required 
inter-legation consultation. 
Anglo-American collaboration in the actual field continued to grow, albeit gradually, in the 
early 1950s. Propaganda operations executed through the Finnish press, perhaps the most 
independent of the Western powers’ activities, usually included strategic cooperation only in 
exceptional cases, such as in spring 1952 when the British found evidence of the wide 
propaganda net the communists were spreading about the bacteriological warfare myth.1038 
Otherwise, liaison in press operations included the several joint visits made by the British 
information officer and the American press attaché to provincial newspapers and the 
discussions held with their editors.1039  
Radio transmissions were another area in which cooperation was fairly rare in Finland largely 
due British officials' low regard of VOA's output. Anglo-American collaboration was largely 
restricted to exchanging information about anti-jamming techniques. The Americans sought to 
increase the liaison by suggesting greater cooperation in the way ‘Learn English’ broadcasts 
were presented and promoted.1040 The British, quite typically, remained somewhat passive also 
on this front as they clearly wished to maintain their superiority in the field of language 
education. As time went by, English teaching would become the field in which Britain and the 
US would cooperate the most. The two governments gradually came to realise that they could 
achieve considerable advantage by increasing the joint coordination of their broader cultural 
schemes as well. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1037 ’Memorandum of Discussion of British and American Information Policy in Finland’, October 16, 1952, FO 
1110/481, NA. 
1038 A.N. Noble to A.C.E. Malcolm, April 8, 1952, FO 953/1325, NA. That the countries collaborated in the germ 
warfare issue in Finland was nothing exceptional as the global response to the allegations was coordinated in 
cooperation by officials in London and Washington. For example, T.S Tull to B.A.B. Burrows, July 8, 1952, FO 
1110/494, NA.  
1039 For example, A.N. Noble to A.C.E. Malcolm, October 6, 1951, FO 953/1119, NA. 
1040 J.K. McFall to SD, ‘Evaluation of the Program Effectiveness of the United States International Broadcasting’, 
June 10, 1954, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2429, 511.60E4/12-1751, NARA. 
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Breakthrough in Exchange of People – ASLA and Fulbright 
 
Educational diplomacy was an area in which the two Western governments operated almost 
exclusively alone in the early 1950s. The Americans' breakthrough in this field was the most 
important development during the period, leaving every USIS/Helsinki propaganda effort 
clearly behind. The progress made in the exchange of persons programme brought a 
considerable expansion to the US Legation’s activities in Finland and decisively increased 
American influence throughout Finnish society. 
Even though American officials in Helsinki had been pleased with the progress in extending 
the number of Finns studying in the US through privately-sponsored programmes in the late 
1940s, the introduction of a much broader exchange programme between the two countries had 
for some years been one of their main objectives. This task, like so many in post-war Finland, 
turned out to be anything but simple. After the Finnish Government, following its cautious 
foreign policy, rejected the first unofficial invitation to join the Fulbright Programme in 
December 1947, the Americans started to plan the structure and funding of an educational 
programme that would be suitable for the Finns. The idea of using a portion of the funds made 
available by the settlement of credits extended to Finland by the US for the purchase of surplus 
war material for educational exchange had been presented already in June 1947, but the matter 
was not introduced to Finnish officials for some time due to the State Department's view that an 
agreement of this nature could have an adverse effect on Soviet-Finnish relations and produce a 
strong reaction from the communist press.1041 In the following year, linking Finland’s payment of 
its First World War debt1042 to the US with educational exchange was discussed in Washington 
with even greater detail. The handling of a new programme proposal based on this funding 
structure was, however, also delayed as the State Department decided to wait for the outcome of 
the Finnish election in July 1948 and for the “clarification of the situation in the country”.1043 
An educational programme for Finland was finally determined by Public Law 265, endorsed 
by Senator Howard Alexander Smith, which was passed in August 1949. The Grants from the 
American Loan to Finland Program – Amerikan Suomen Lainan Apurahat (ASLA) – was 
established by a joint resolution of the two houses of the US Congress in recognition of 
Finland’s impeccable record of honouring its international credit commitments.1044 According 
to the resolution, all subsequent repayments of Finland’s loan from the US should be used to 
support academic and professional exchanges between the two countries. A share of the funds 
was to be used for providing Finns with appropriate scientific books and laboratory equipment.  
                                                 
1041 State Department officials also decided to wait for the Soviet ratification of the Finnish Peace Treaty before 
broaching the matter with Finnish officials. M. Hamilton to Secretary of State, June 16, 1947, RG 59, SD Decimal 
Files on Finland 1945─1949, box 4807, 811.42760D/6-1647, NARA. 
1042 Finland was one of the countries to receive short-term loans from the US to purchase grain in the aftermath of the 
First World War. Finland’s determination in repaying its loan exactly on schedule even during the Great Depression 
earned the country immense goodwill among the American people. For example, Copeland 1993, pp. 79─81. 
1043 Mr Rice to Mrs. Williams, ’Finnish Scholarship Aid Resolution’, June 8, 1948, RG 59, SDDFF 1945─1949, box 
4807, 811.42760D/5-1848, NARA. 
1044 Copeland 1993, p. 79. 
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The US Legation in Helsinki was well aware of the necessity for discretion in presenting P.L. 
265 to the Finns. The first concrete measures to implement the Finnish-American educational 
programme were taken in January 1950, when a temporary committee of seven prominent 
Finns, chaired by Eljas Erkko, was appointed by Minister Avra Warren. The committee 
completed its job at the end of January and its report on the nomination of specialist candidates 
and the classification of graduate student groups was submitted to the Legation. The Americans 
felt that the policy of appointing a committee to offer guidance in these matters would convince 
the Finns that this exchange programme was not to be one-sidedly administered, but was one in 
which the Finns themselves were to be granted a substantial voice.1045  
American officials in Helsinki also stressed that the administration of P.L. 265 should as far 
as possible be divorced from the general aspects of the Legation’s information and cultural 
programme, "which foreigners identify as propaganda”.1046 In order to avoid the harshest 
communist criticism over the programme being merely American cultural imperialism, the State 
Department decided that the use of P.L. 265 funds as an expansion of general USIS activities in 
Finland, such as translations, exhibits and subsidies to the Finnish-American Society, should be 
avoided. Finland’s political situation was taken into account also in the way the Legation wished 
to avoid the public use of the word ‘leader’ for describing the status of other than academic 
professionals taking part in the exchange programme and use ‘specialist’ instead, since the 
former could have produced some adverse propaganda.1047  
A press statement concerning the exchange programme was finally issued with the approval 
of the Finnish Government in February 1950. The timing was decided also with Finnish politics 
in mind, as both the Finnish Foreign Office and Prime Minister K.A. Fagerholm now held the 
opinion that the release could no longer encumber the re-election of President Paasikivi, should 
it evoke a reaction from Moscow. 1048 The press statement confirmed that the Finnish 
Committee on Study and Training in the United States, headed by Professor Eino Saari, was 
given the responsibility of the preliminary screening of Finnish applicants for student grants, 
while various professional Finnish organisations would be requested to assist in the nomination 
of specialist candidates. The USIS/Helsinki would, however, take care of the majority of the 
administration and the final nominations. In the US, the Institute of International Education 
(IIE) started to administrate the Finnish programme for the State Department. The ASLA 
Programme got onto a swift start as the first 35 Finnish graduate students and 10 specialists 
were awarded their stipends, and the first allocation of scientific books and equipment was 
made in spring 1950. 
The figure of Finns travelling to the US under the ASLA Programme grew steadily in the 
upcoming years. In 1953, the number of ASLA graduates and teachers studying in the US 
                                                 
1045 H.F. Arnold to SD, ‘Report on Information and Cultural Activities for January 1950’, February 24, 1950, RG 
59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/2-750, NARA. 
1046 US Legation to SD, ‘Plan of Operation Under Finnish War Debt Act’, January 6, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 
1950─1954, box 2426, 511.60E3/1-650, NARA. 
1047 US Legation to Secretary of State, January 23, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950-1954, box 2426, 511.60E3/1-2350, 
NARA. 
1048 US Legation to Secretary of State, January 31, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2426, 511.60E/2-1750, 
NARA. 
 
 
202 
 
already reached 49.1049 In addition to ASLA, the duties of the FCSTUS were also expanded by 
the growing number of the other student exchange schemes it administrated. These included, 
for instance, the American Field Service’s high school student grants, which were introduced in 
1948, and the Jonas Foundation’s Camp Rising Sun summer camp grants, the first of which had 
been awarded to a Finnish schoolboy back in 1946.1050 In 1953, the foundation also started to 
manage the grants awarded to four to five young Finns taking part in the 'Salzburg Seminar', 
which for example in 1954 held sessions focusing on American society and legal thought 
through a great variety of lectures given by such famous names as Professor Hans J. 
Morgenthau.1051 The later revelation that the seminar enjoyed funding from the CIA1052 only 
shows how important any activity influencing young foreigners was considered in Washington.  
Despite the progress made through P.L. 265 and other exchange schemes, the US kept 
persistently encouraging Finland to join the Fulbright Programme. The Americans clearly felt that 
the introduction of the programme in a country like Finland was such a vital task that they were 
even ready to make special amendments to their agreement proposals if necessary. Although 
anticipating that it could take some time before the country would join the scheme, US officials 
were caught with some surprise about how many efforts it took to persuade the Finns to give the 
final go-ahead. The Finnish Fulbright agreement had been discussed particularly thoroughly at the 
Finnish Foreign Ministry during 1948, only to be rejected due to the officials' concerns over how 
the Soviets would react on such a move and their dissatisfaction over how according to the US 
proposal the Americans should have a majority in the programme's administrative foundation.1053 
Even after a new proposal presented to the Finns by Mrs Margaret Williams, Acting Chief of the 
Northern European Branch of USIE, during her visit in Helsinki in spring 1949 had included the 
idea of an equal number of Finnish and American foundation members1054, Finnish Foreign 
Minister Carl Enckell and his successor Åke Gartz both kept blocking Finland from entering such 
an agreement in fear of Moscow's response.1055  
The Americans' patience was finally rewarded in July 1952, when Finland signed the 
Fulbright Agreement, which complemented the ASLA programme.1056 The agreement 
recognised Finland’s role in the administration of the programme by defining the number of 
board directors at the new United States Educational Foundation in Finland (USEF) to four 
American citizens and four Finnish citizens.1057 Finland now had two parallel exchange 
                                                 
1049 'Suomalais-amerikkalaisen stipenditoimikunnan toimintakertomus ajalta 1.1. – 31.12.1953', FCSTUS, box 1, KA. 
1050 Mämmelä, Terttu, Kotona maailmassa. Youth for Understanding Suomessa 1958-2008 (Helsinki 2011), pp. 21-23. 
1051 'Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, XXXIII Session, July 18 to August 14, 1954', Finnish-US Educational 
Exchange Commission (Hereafter FUSEEC), box 36, KA. 
1052 For example, Wilford 2008, p. 126. 
1053 The ministry opposed Finland from joining the programme even if the Finance Ministry, the Ministry for 
Education and the Bank of Finland all recommended the Government to accept the invitation. Foreign Ministry 
Memorandum on the Proposed Fulbright Agreement, May 24, 1948, 46 N Yhdysvallat, UMA. 
1054 'Memorandum Regarding Recent Visit of M. Williams to Helsinki', June 10, 1949, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 14, 
NARA. 
1055 In particular, Gartz openly informed Minister Cabot that the Soviet Union was the actual reason why Finland 
was having doubts about accepting the agreement. J.M. Cabot to SD, ’Discussion on Proposed Fulbright 
Agreement’, April 21, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2426, 511.60E3/4-2150, NARA. 
1056 J.M. Cabot to Secretary of State, June 30, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2428, 511.60E3/6-3052, NARA. 
1057 Agreement between the USA and Finland, signed at Helsinki July 2, 1952, FUSEEC, box 9, KA. 
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programmes with the US, which would later simply become known as the ASLA-Fulbright 
programme. In addition to extending the number of Finns visiting the US, the new agreement 
enabled American students to win a scholarship for studying in Finland. 
Quite soon after the implementation of the ASLA Programme, the US Legation realised that 
the educational exchange programme would occupy a special position in Finland. The USIS 
office now handled an even larger number of visitors requiring information about the 
programme. The allotment of books to thirteen Finnish libraries associated with higher 
educational institutions also kept the personnel busy. As the scientific books sent to Finland 
were mostly brand new and the quantitative significance of them for Finnish academic libraries 
was vast, this activity played a part in improving the standards of Finnish universities and 
enhancing their library network.1058 Indeed, when discussing the ASLA-Fulbright programme 
one should keep in mind that in its first couple of years approximately one-third of the funds 
programmed each year were spent in books and equipment.1059 
Great care was also given to the way P.L. 265 was presented to the Finns, as the Americans 
expected the far-left press to take every opportunity to attack the bill and label it as mere 
propaganda. Indeed, the USIS consciously attempted to counteract any communist criticism, 
which turned out to be surprisingly rare, in conversations about the programme, pointing out 
that the American taxpayer was, in reality, paying the bill.1060 
 
Printed Praise, Leader Visits and Academic Reform 
 
It did not take long for the Americans to acknowledge the impact of the exchange of people 
programme, either. As early as in November 1950, the Legation pointed out that no other 
medium could offer such fruitful knowledge of the US as a personal visit. The enthusiasm 
shown by returning Finns for the American people and American institutions, as well as the 
knowledge they had gained in their specific fields, were regarded as a vital means for achieving 
long-term friendship and understanding between the US and Finland.1061 The more concrete 
evidence of the programme’s effectiveness were the returning grantees’ positive comments 
about the US made public in newspaper articles, books and lectures. The USIS gave special 
attention to assisting the returnees in their literal delivery and even sent the most prominent of 
them on lecture tours throughout Finland for which they were later equipped with publications 
and films.1062 The Americans felt that the propaganda value of returning grantees and their 
newspaper articles was highly significant and that the publication of positive experiences was, in 
                                                 
1058 See, Mäkinen, Ilkka, 'Finland Pays Its Debts and Gets Books in Return: ASLA Grants to the Finnish Academic 
Libraries, 1950-1967', Libraries and Culture, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 225-230. 
1059 Department of State report: "An Investment in Understanding", Educational Exchange Program between the 
United States and Finland, 1950-1954, June 1956, CU, FP, box 106, UAL. 
1060 US Legation to SD, ‘Report on Informational and Cultural Activities for February, 1950’, March 14, 1950, RG 
59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/5-1450, NARA. 
1061 US Legation to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report’, November 21, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 
2425, 511.60E/11-2150, NARA. 
1062 US Legation to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending November 30, 1950’, December 29, 
1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/12-2950, NARA. 
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fact, a most effective supplement to USIS activities in the field of press.1063 The founding of an 
ASLA Alumni Association in the early 1950s made it easier for the USIS to remain in contact 
with returned Finnish grantees and make sure that their intercourse with representatives of the 
US would not end.1064  
Articles from returning politicians visiting the US with specialist and leader grants were 
regarded as particularly influential. The Americans were pleased to see that articles from leading 
figures like Yrjö Kallinen, former Minister of Defence, Tyyne Leivo-Larsson, former Minister 
of Social Affairs, and Eila Jokela, journalist of leading magazine Suomen Kuvalehti, were based on 
a combination of praise and criticism that carried conviction. According to the American view, 
the mass circulation magazines publishing this material would never think of accepting State 
Department articles of the same tenor.1065 This claim is credible particularly for Eila Jokela’s 
lengthy reports in which she praised the US for its forward-looking and liberal spirit and gave 
positive estimations of both the Native Americans’ and African Americans' future prospects in 
the country.1066 The by and large twenty lectures given by pacifist politician Mr Kallinen, a 
board member of the Finnish-American Society with close personal contacts to both American 
and British officials in Finland1067, in a dozen Finnish towns on his visit to the US were also 
highly appreciated by the Americans and made the USIS even to explore the possibility of 
organising a special speakers’ bureau for returning specialist grantees.1068 Even though a more 
organised lecture campaign such as this was not materialised, the significance of specialist and 
leader grants for visits lasting between two or three weeks and a couple of months was 
constantly emphasised by American officials in Helsinki, and their proportional share of the 
exchange programme remained considerable throughout the 1950s.  
Indeed, when discussing both the ASLA and Fulbright programmes, it is important to note 
that the exchange of persons by no means concerned only students, teachers and academics. 
The number of Finns who studied in the US between 1950 and 1962, mostly subjects related to 
technology and the natural or social sciences, was 665 (806 if lecturers and researchers are 
included). Leaders and specialists did not come that far behind as its total number for the 
similar period reached 430.1069 The category not only included politicians and other highly-
                                                 
1063 J.V. Lund to SD, ’Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending November, 1951’, December 19, 1951, 
SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2426, 511.60E/12-1951, NARA; Annual Report of USEF for Program Year 1955 
Covering Exchanges for the Academic Year July 1, 1955 – June 30, 1957, FUSEEEC, box 17, KA. 
1064For example, Annual Report of the USEF, Program Year 1955, Covering exchanges for the academic year July 
1, 1955 – June 30, 1956, FUSEEC, box 17, KA.  
1065 D.G. Wilson to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending October 31’, November 8, 1951, RG 
59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2426, 511.60E/11-2061; US Legation to SD, ‘Magazine Articles by Specialist 
Grantees’, April 18, 1952, RG 59, Bureau of Public Affairs (Herafter BPA), Division of International Exchange of 
Persons, Records Relating to Exchange of Persons Programs, 1947-51, box 1, both NARA. 
1066 Suomen Kuvalehti, 1/1952, 2/1952, 3/1952 & 4/1952. 
1067 Kallinen, one-time minister and well-known pacifist and theosophist, was in regular contact with several 
Western officials in Finland in the 1940s and 1950s. A good example of Kallinen’s social character was that after his 
visit to the US in 1951 he held a social gathering for members of the US Legation in Finland. See, Nieminen, Saul, 
Yrjö Kallinen – Mies äänen takana (Helsinki 1978), pp. 106-109.  
1068 J.V. Lund to SD, ‘Speakers’ Bureau for Grantees’, December 8, 1952, RG 84, USEH, box 29, NARA. 
1069 'Finnish ASLA-Fulbright Grantees', FUSEEC, box 168, KA. 
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ranking officials, but also technological experts who were invited to the US to learn more about 
the rationalisation of industrial and agricultural processes.1070 
As with its other operations in Finland, the USIS was constantly concerned about making 
the exchange of persons programme more influential in labour circles. The visits made by 
almost every top labour leader who knew some English to the US on governmental and non-
governmental grants were not enough for the Americans, as they wished to make the trips more 
available to such labour leaders who were likely to assume top leadership in the future.1071 
American officials realised that using more P.L. 265 funds for this purpose would be out of line 
and that the only way to expand labour grants was through P.L. 402 funds, commonly known 
as the Smith-Mundt Act, and private financing through such institutions as CIO, AFL and the 
Ford Foundation. 
Visiting Finnish trade unionists and social democrats were not only given a view of 
American political, economic and cultural life, but were also acquainted with the principal 
labour union central organisations.1072 Special group trips for labour leaders were organised 
from autumn 1952 onwards with the idea that “the reports they bring back from the US will 
help undermine communist tactics by promoting between labour and management a greater 
sense of mutual interest”.1073 Quite often the most important purpose for these trips was, 
however, the collection of funding for the SDP and the SAK. During their visits, like the one 
made with an ASLA grant in autumn 1951 by Olavi Lindblom, both party and trade union 
officials received large sums of money through, for instance, FTUC contacts.1074 Indeed, 
according to Lindblom, his three-month exploration of the US was more or less a “begging 
mission” during which he gave several speeches to American trade unionists emphasising 
Finland’s difficult economic position and the constant political struggle against the 
communists.1075  
The propaganda value of returning labour leaders was also highly ranked by the 
USIS/Helsinki. Mr Lindblom’s series of articles on labour and social conditions in the US, 
published by Suomen Sosialidemokraatti and the SAK publication Palkkatyöläinen, was precisely the 
kind of positive propaganda the Americans were after, particularly as he stressed the country’s 
superior living standards and the high quality of its healthcare system.1076 The USIS staff was also 
pleased to read about the vast coverage the latter publication gave to the Finnish trade union 
delegation touring the US in late 1950. What makes this piece of publicity interesting is that, partly 
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at the same time, Palkkatyöläinen also published articles covering another delegation’s visit to the 
Soviet Union. A browse through the articles reveals that the American visit won more and highly 
visible coverage than the tour of Russia, consisting of a number of favourable reports on the trade 
unions' influential role in US society.1077 The Americans, naturally, had nothing against this kind of 
a battle taking place in Finnish labour publications and started to provide visiting leaders and 
specialists with comprehensive ideological orientation to their country. 
This was rather small-scale activity as compared to the orientation programmes Finnish 
students and particularly teachers were made to attend so that they would "broaden their 
acquaintance with American society and civilisation", as one of the exchange programme’s 
official goals stated. Even though exchange students from all over the world were strongly 
exposed to American culture through Hollywood movies and popular music, US officials saw it 
fitting to organise various orientation programmes for the visitors to ensure that they would 
receive a ‘proper’ picture of the society they were visiting. During the orientation period, the 
Americans gave visiting students, who were often living with a number of American families, 
various lectures on American politics and culture as well as English classes and organised field 
trips to special places of interest, such as industrial plants.1078  
Although the larger orientation programmes, often taking place in Washington, were 
voluntary, the inclusion of special introductions into life in the US by most universities meant 
that the majority of Finnish students were presented with a thoroughly planned image of their 
host country and its general ideology. The USIS office in Helsinki also played a part in this by 
organising one to two meetings to leaving Finnish grantees during which they were lectured, 
shown films and provided with material on, for instance, American democracy.1079 Although 
Finns in general had nothing against these kinds of activities, especially the orientation 
programme for teachers, which was compulsory and took up to three weeks, was more than 
once criticised for not giving the participants the freedom to make their own decisions while 
focusing on mere trivialities.1080 By the late 1950s, the orientation for teachers also started to 
include political lecturers on, for example, the flaws of communist ideology.1081 This kind of 
guidance only shows that although American officials more than once noted that Finnish 
teachers taking part in the Fulbright Programme were usually of such high calibre that they 
should actually be placed under the lecturer category1082, they were still treated as a group that 
could be influenced with traditional, often highly obvious and predictable methods.  
                                                 
1077 The articles on the USSR presented Russian culture in favourable light, but were otherwise not that valuable for 
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As for American educational activities in Finland, the promotion of American Studies 
especially at the University of Helsinki was a primary task.1083 At first, the Americans had some 
difficulties in bringing many professors or competent lecturers to the country, but their number 
and quality increased in the 1950s. When this happened, visiting Fulbright grantees were also 
able to give highly popular courses on American History as well as American Civilisation and 
Literature also at the University of Turku and Åbo Akademi.1084 The first American students 
arriving in Finland through the exchange programme also offered a new and effective channel 
for the general projection of the US. American scholarship students became in some cases 
recognisable figures in Finland as newspapers, the radio and even television showed an interest 
in them. The USIS was not slow to realise the potential these ‘unofficial ambassadors’ offered 
and provided them with American newspapers and books as well as USIE films and film 
projectors.1085 The exhibitions and concerts given by American artist grantees, often held at 
USIS premises, also contributed in a tangible way to building an understanding between Finns 
and Americans, as an USEF annual report concluded.1086  
When evaluating the significance of the exchange of persons between Finland and the US, 
one has to take its remarkable size into account. According to Copeland, only five bi-national 
commissions recorded a larger exchange programme during the 1952 - 1989 period when taking 
into consideration the grantee-population ratio.1087 In addition to the vastness, the Americans' 
willingness to meet Finland’s specific needs in the creation of the ASLA-Fulbright Programme 
shows that the US Government realised the importance the exchange of persons had for 
Finnish-American relations in a broader sense. The high number of politicians and labour 
leaders invited to the US reflected the Americans’ desire to influence Finnish society as a whole 
also through this channel. 
 This objective gave the exchange of persons programme a highly flexible nature. When seen 
necessary, the Americans were willing to assign certain individuals grants even on short notice 
as so-called bona fide study grants. One example of such an arrangement was the State 
Department’s decision to provide financial help to assure Finland’s representation at the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) Conference held in Washington in 1953. In this case, leaders of the 
five Finnish non-communist parties were informally invited to suggest members who would 
meet the exchange programme criteria and at the same time be suitable for representation at the 
conference.1088  
It is all but impossible to estimate the full impact the exchange of persons had for the future 
of Finland. The US Legation certainly had no doubts over the activities’ success. Already in 
1951, it noted that the exchange of persons programme was by far the most effective USIS 
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operation in Finland. Although the Americans acknowledged that the results of educational and 
professional exchange could be measured only after the passage of some years, and even then 
imperfectly, the operations’ immediate impact was rather soon regarded as plain and far-
reaching.1089 According to Minister Cabot, the testimony of Finns about what they had seen and 
learnt in the US would always make a deeper impression on their fellow Finns than anything the 
Americans might say about themselves.1090  
As for the long-term impact, it is evident that the exchange programmes enhanced Finland’s 
closer association with the West and Western culture. The ASLA-Fulbright programme 
provided the US with a concrete tool for supporting Finland’s independence during the Cold 
War years. The symbolic value of offering Finnish students and various kinds of professionals 
the opportunity to cross the Atlantic was, naturally, immense. In the world of academia, the 
ASLA-Fulbright Programme served as an important catalyst for most other kinds of 
educational and professional exchanges. Furthermore, the growing number of Finnish scholars, 
researchers and graduate students working and studying in American universities and research 
institutes inevitably redirected the focus of Finnish academic tradition from a Europe-
orientated one towards the US.1091 This not only led to changes in academic structures in 
Finland, mainly to the erosion of old hierarchical constructions, but also increased American 
influence in Finnish research activity. This was particularly strong in the social sciences: for 
instance, every single researcher or lecturer from the University of Helsinki's Department of 
Sociology had by the mid-1950s spent at least some time in the US.1092 The greater role the 
Americans began to play in the world of science also became evident by the superior amount of 
citations made of American sources in Finnish doctoral dissertations and other academic 
publications in the upcoming decades.1093  
The psychological impact of the experience of living in the US on young Finns was 
examined with perhaps even greater interest and satisfaction by the Americans than the 
developments on the macro level of Finnish society. The evaluation reports written by Finnish 
students taking part in the ASLA programme in the early 1950s certainly give an overall 
indication of young people who had changed their way of thinking about the US as a result of 
their stay. Many of the reporting Finnish students give close details about how their attitude 
towards American society had changed for the better from the perception they had held of the 
country prior to their arrival.1094 One typical report described how false an image Hollywood 
films gave of Americans, who, according to the writer, had a much higher moral standing than 
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was universally realised.1095 Not all reports by Finnish students were, however, full of praise of 
their hosts. The differences between the two countries’ educational systems were criticised by 
several Finns, some of which felt that they had had difficulties in adjusting to the more school-
like American way of studying.1096  
The Americans valued these reports, which had to be written twice a year to the IIE, highly 
as, according to them, they provided as exact evidence of the programme’s success as it would 
be possible to get. Both the accounts given by Finnish students and the reports written about 
Finns visiting with the leader grant were also studied by the CIA, which indicates the great 
interest the US placed on the psychological effects the experience of spending time abroad had 
on the individual level.1097 Although it is impossible to give an exact analysis on the influence of 
the continuously growing number of personal exchange with the US had on the Finnish psyche, 
the various reports concerning Finnish people’s stay in the county support the generally 
recognised claim that the ASLA and Fulbright programmes played a significant role in shaping 
also the Finnish mental environment in the early Cold War.1098 
 
Popularity of American Culture Dwarfs Soviet Efforts 
 
Amidst the decisive expansion accomplished through the exchange programmes, the 
USIS/Helsinki continued the management of its wide range of other culture-relates tasks. With 
its large collections, the USIS library in central Helsinki, from the early 1950s onwards known 
also as the Information Centre, formed the very basis for these activities. The quickly-growing 
popularity of the library services enabled the Americans to reach all segments of the Finnish 
population. Already in October 1949, the library was reported to have over 3,000 monthly 
visitors, who had borrowed almost 1,000 books and over 2,000 periodicals. All of these figures 
would more or less double only in a matter of a couple of years.1099 The demand for American 
publications was so great that the library soon started loaning out its material to Finnish 
provincial libraries.1100  
All this was made possible by the rapid growth of the library’s collection. In addition to 
having the largest collection of American books in Finland, the USIS library offered material 
that was otherwise very hard to come by in the country, such as children’s books. Even though 
the library reading and music rooms became highly popular, the Americans regarded it equally 
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as important to reach the general public outside the capital region. For this purpose, the USIS 
also organised regular book exhibitions in leading cities such as Turku and Tampere, which 
gave the visitors an opportunity to become acquainted with the American publishers' latest 
output in the field of non-fiction.1101  
The Finnish public’s growing demand for the American novel was taken into account both 
in the library collection and the commercial promotion of American books, which the USIS 
also assisted. American officials noted, with some disappointment, that the more scholarly type 
of American book was hardly ever translated into Finnish1102, while “the sensational interest-
catching novel, frequently of low order is most likely to find itself in print in the Finnish 
language”.1103 On the other hand, the frequent translations and great popularity of works by 
Ernest Hemingway and John Steinbeck gave the Americans plenty to cheer about.  
Growing visitor and out-loaning numbers were not the only proof of the Information 
Centre’s popularity. The library’s information services were highly sought after by a number of 
public organisations, such as Finnish ministries, English teachers and Finnish authors who 
often called on the centre to check on the reliability of selected American materials.1104 The 
USIS's goal of promoting American culture to the larger population was also met to a great 
extent. The staff, for example, distributed free copies of such fact-based publications as An 
Outline of American History and An Outline of American Education through bookshops and 
schools.1105 As it supported the greater quest of placing education at the very core of the US 
campaign in Finland, particular care was given to the production of the latter pamphlet. What 
was common for the various Finnish language editions of the booklet produced in later years, 
particularly after the launch of Sputnik, was that they all defended the American schooling 
system by underlining not only the quality of educational methods but also the benefits of 
providing a higher education to a considerably larger share of younger people than was the case 
in Europe.1106  
The Americans' almost obsessive goal of reaching labour groups more effectively also 
concerned library services. The USIS felt that it was successful in catching the services' chief 
targets: teachers, intellectuals, students, school pupils, professionals and technical groups, but 
reported about its problems in introducing the information service to rural areas. The 
importance of making more personal visits to towns and villages was stressed already in 
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December 1950, but due to limited resources this kind of activity remained rare. More effort 
was made in contacting organised labour and factory workers in the city through personal 
contacts, and by placing small loan collections in factories as well as workers’ colleges and 
clubs.1107 Furthermore, from 1951 the USIS provided five leading labour group libraries in 
various parts of the country with magazines especially ordered for distribution purposes. 
Newspapers published in the Finnish language in the US and the Finnish translation of Facts 
About the United States, the USIA’s hundred-page reference booklet containing basic information 
about life in America, were also sent to groups that could not be reached through English-
language material.1108  
The Finnish-American Society provided important support in the promotion of American 
culture to the average Finn. The society, which in January 1950 was reported to have 21 
chapters throughout Finland1109, turned out to be an effective distributor of periodicals, 
magazines, books and pamphlets, a valuable organiser of exhibitions and lecture programmes as 
well as a presenter of motion pictures. The Americans saw that using the Finnish-American 
Society and other organisations as sponsors of, for example, USIE art exhibitions or musical 
events had the effect of making the local societies more active than usual and attracting non-
members who might not ordinarily attend functions sponsored by a foreign agency.1110  
They were certainly correct in this assessment as far as the popularity of the ‘American 
Home 1953’ exhibition went. The exhibition held at Taidehalli, Helsinki, attracted over 20,000 
visitors, by far the largest figure for any exhibition that year1111, and won several praises in the 
Finnish press over the presentation of kitchen equipment, such as the fully automated oven, in 
particular.1112 The Americans had the Finnish-American Society to thank for about the original 
idea of organising an exhibition that would celebrate the society’s tenth anniversary by 
combining two different displays into one exhibition: the society’s own ‘Home Economics 
Display’ and the Museum of Modern Art’s (MoMA) ‘American Design for Home and 
Decorative Use’.1113 The way the society comprised two independently organised sub-sections 
to the exhibition was an entirely new one since the usual practice for the exhibitions of mainly 
USIA-sponsored organisations, most notably MoMA, was that they were initiated and planned 
in the US. The advantage of the Finnish-American Society’s involvement in staging the 
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combined exhibition, as well as sharing its expenses with the USIS1114, was that it was more 
aware of how to present aspects of the American domestic model to the local audience. The 
‘Home Economics Display,’ therefore, offered a less style conscious and a more practical image 
of contemporary American domestic life than that promoted by the equipment supplier 
Westinghouse.1115 The society’s general intention was not only to promote the very latest 
American household appliances to the public and local industries, but also to make sure that the 
displayed equipment would be used for teaching home economics in Finnish institutions.1116 
This was not an impossible task to accomplish, given the Finnish people's huge desire to 
compensate the consumption opportunities they had lost in the previous decade with the very 
latest household appliances.1117  
The promotion of American visitors to Finland was another area in which the Finnish-
American Society proved to be a particularly valuable partner for US officials. Partly thanks to 
the society’s contacts around the country, high profile American visitors, often invited to 
Finland in cooperation with the USIS/Helsinki, and in some cases the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry1118, both met distinguished Finns during their stay and won a great deal of publicity for 
their country. As bringing various visitors to Finland often served the purpose of promoting 
broader American propaganda objectives, US officials felt that naming the Finnish-American 
Society as their official host, rather than the USIS, would dampen the most violent protests on 
behalf of local communists. A good example of using visitors for propaganda purposes was the 
way a number of distinguished African-Americans were invited to Finland under the society’s 
auspices partly with the objective of proving that it was possible also for members of this 
minority to gain a good education and have an internationally recognised career. As racial 
discrimination was one of the most effective weapons for anti-American propaganda also in 
Finland, the USIS valued the visits of Ralph Bunche, the first black winner of the Nobel Peace 
Prize, Dean Dixon, world-famous orchestra leader, and Edit S. Sampson, the first black 
member of the US UN Council, exceptionally highly. Particularly the importance of Miss 
Sampson’s visit to Finland in January 1952 was praised by the USIS/Helsinki staff.1119 During 
her stay, Miss Sampson, who had already become something of a specialist in answering to the 
Soviet Union’s criticism over racial segregation in the US, gave lectures on the topic ‘Negro in 
America’ to large audiences in Helsinki, Tampere and Turku.1120 The fact that Miss Sampson’s 
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comments were covered with great detail in the Finnish press, and on YLE radio, only 
confirmed USIS officials’ earlier view that visits of similar kind were more useful than a 
thousand press releases.1121  
The popularity of the various events made US officials in Finland acknowledge that giving a 
more active role to the Finnish-American Society and increasing the use of its facilities for 
locally-sponsored projects would play an important part in reaching people in all parts of 
Finland. The Americans clearly felt that in this way the propaganda stigma of foreign-
government sponsorship could be avoided. On the other hand, the US Legation stressed that it 
would be unwise to create an impression that the society was another arm of the USIS.1122 Even 
though the Finnish organisation proved to be an effective outlet for the US campaign, mainly 
its budget limitations restricted the use of high-calibre lecturers in the country as well as 
prevented organising as many exhibitions on, for instance, American paintings and sculpture as 
would have been desirable. The society members' occasional dissatisfaction with the more 
simple photographic exhibits they were asked to display, that they felt were planned for Third 
World audiences rather than people living in countries like Finland1123, also shows that USIS 
officials were not always sure of what would be the most effective way to take advantage of the 
society and its resources.  
The Finnish-American Society’s desire to bring famous artists to Finland was at times also 
restricted by some US officials' mistrust of American citizens with suspected leftist worldviews. 
This kind of suspicion was evident, for example, in early 1953 after the society had invited the 
playwright Tennessee Williams to be a quest of honour at its tenth anniversary celebrations and 
the University of Helsinki had requested Mr Williams to deliver lectures on modern drama 
during his visit. For this intention, the university even applied for a Fulbright grant.1124 This 
funding was never granted to Mr Williams as the Dramatic Workshop and Technical Institute, 
at which he was a member of the Board of Trustees, was cited as a communist-front 
organisation by the California Committee of Un-American Activities. As Mr Williams was also 
otherwise cited by the HUAC, the State Department recommended the possible visit to be kept 
on a private basis.1125  
In the field of promoting the English language, the USIS continued to admit that it lagged 
far behind the British Council, which had been much more determined in implementing its 
activities. In particular, the way in which the BC had organised the educational operations of the 
Finnish-British societies clearly impressed the Americans.1126 Some progress in the American 
teaching of English was achieved in the early 1950s as well, mainly through the supply of 
teaching material to schools, the organisation of occasional lectures to Finnish-American 
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societies and the arrangement of small conversation groups for Helsinki-based students and 
businessmen. The USIS also managed to establish close contacts with Finnish institutes of 
higher learning and increase the teaching of American culture as well as the use of American 
material in their preferred English-language textbooks.1127 American influence on Finnish 
educational institutes was also enhanced through private foundations’ financial gifts. For 
example, in 1953 the Rockefeller Foundation made two considerable donations to the 
University of Helsinki for scientific and medical research.1128  
The promotion of American theatre and music was also an integral part of the US cultural 
programme abroad. In Finland, the production of American plays was for a long time modest, 
mainly due to their highly-priced production rights. In 1952, the Finnish Theatre Association 
pointed out that although American plays and musicals were included in the Finnish theatre 
repertory, the US ranked only fourth in the number of performances by country of origin.1129 In 
the field of music, on the other hand, the situation was better. Visits of American artists were 
frequent and received large attention when of high merit.1130 The popularity of American music 
was further boosted by making American records available at the USIS library and its music 
room for the use of professional musicians, music students and persons preparing special radio 
programmes.1131  
When discussing the promotion of American culture in Finland, one cannot ignore the so-
called American Days, sponsored by the Finnish-American Society and held annually in one of 
Finland’s major cities. The celebration helped the Americans to emphasise their literature, 
music, films, living standards and social-economic progress through special performances and 
exhibitions. The festival was not strictly an affair of high culture since the organisers wished to 
include events attracting a wider audience as well, such as the first game of American-style 
baseball ever played in Finland, which took place during the celebration held at Lahti in August 
1951.1132 The opportunity to do this was one of the reasons why the US Legation considered 
the American Days as a valuable addition to its cultural programme.  
Despite the problems related to the nearby presence of the Soviet Union or, indeed, because 
of it, the environment for the promotion of American culture was generally speaking fertile. After 
the overcautious first post-war years, the Finns started to show an interest in all things American 
more openly. The popularity of American culture, especially films, literature and music, grew at a 
staggering pace in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1953, over 60 per cent of films imported to 
Finland were produced in the US, while the share of 'movie days' of all running films in the 
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country was as large as 70 per cent, among the highest in Western Europe.1133 In this kind of a 
situation, the US Legation was not too concerned about the cultural activities of the Soviet Union, 
which they nonetheless followed closely. Even though the Americans recognised that they could 
never match the sheer size of Moscow's campaign in Finland, especially in terms of bringing 
artists, lecturers or athletes to the country, they felt that the Russians were failing to win the 
Finnish people onto their side. Not even the cultural offensive launched by the Soviet Union in 
the early 1950s, during which Soviet propaganda and the terms the Russians used to present a 
polarised image of world politics were perhaps at their most aggressive1134, seemed to create panic 
among the American ranks. According to the Legation, SNS, the most active of Finnish pro-
Soviet agencies, engaged in types of activities hardly palatable to most Finns and could not be 
considered effective.1135 As with all USIS activities, the main concern was not that the broader 
public would suddenly turn pro-Soviet in their cultural preferences, but that certain labour groups 
could be overly exposed to Soviet influence. 
 
Making British Ends Meet 
 
Although the early 1950s was a period when, due to the fever point reached in East-West 
relations, the British Government placed growing focus on political propaganda in areas such as 
Finland, the more subtle projection of the country through cultural diplomacy was not 
forgotten, either. The expenditure estimation for the British overseas information services for 
1952-1953 shows that also British Council operations in Finland received more financial 
backing than the ones in, for example, Sweden and Norway.1136 This did not, however, prevent 
officials from both the British Council and the British Legation in Helsinki from constantly 
pointing out that their resources were inadequate for promoting any significant new initiatives. 
Although it is not entirely unheard of that a representative of a public organisation groans about 
the lack of resources, available documents show that these complaints were not entirely 
ungrounded. In spite of playing a vital part in the promotion of Britain, and English language in 
particular, the financial restrictions, together with Finland’s political position, meant that the 
BC’s main policy in Finland was determined as “to help the Finns to help themselves”. Of 
course, the shortage of money was not an entirely bad thing as it made sure that the BC 
operations were more or less forced to follow the broader objective of avoiding any kind of 
‘cultural aggression’ in Finland.1137 
Supporting the activities of native Finns was mostly channeled through the anglophile 
societies, which kept growing rapidly both in size and number. By 1953, the number of societies 
had already passed the sixty mark, and as many as 28 teacher-secretaries had been hired to teach 
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their members English. As a result, knowledge of the English language, considered as the number 
priority for both the British Council in Finland and the anglophile societies, kept spreading. The 
way the number of Finns taking part in the Cambridge Examinations in English almost 
quadrupled in only a one-year period from 56 candidates in 1952 to 215 in 1953 illustrates the 
pace of development perfectly. Another area closely involving the Finns themselves was the 
promotion of English language through drama. For instance, in March 1954, the Finnish-British 
Society in Helsinki gave three successful performances of George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion at the 
Swedish Theatre in Helsinki under the guidance of Kingsley Hart, the British Council-subsidised 
lecturer at the University of Helsinki.1138 Drama fared well also as comes to visits from Britain. 
From the early 1950s onwards British theatre groups became regular visitors in Finland and 
especially the performances of the Old Vic Company, the first one held in February 1952, were 
rated as memorable both by British and Finnish observers.1139  
The strong focus given by the BC on theatre in Finland throughout the 1950s indicates how 
much the British relied on their traditionally recognised art forms in their cultural projection 
rather than presenting a more modern image of their country that would appeal more to 
younger people and the public in a more general sense. The rather safe operational formula 
adopted by the Council in Helsinki was also evident in the annual lecture tours it organised to 
anglophile societies.1140 The lectures, sometimes given by the BC representative himself, focused 
usually on the traditional virtues of British culture, namely drama, literature, films, science, the 
humanities and journalism. Although perhaps not that appealing to the broader masses, some 
of the presentations given by prominent Brits turned into major events. An excellent example 
of this were the two lectures that the historian Arnold J. Toynbee gave in Helsinki on ‘The 
Creative Minority’ and ‘Christianity and Western Civilisations’, which attracted over a thousand 
listeners1141 These kinds of visits were, however, rare exceptions. Towards the mid-1950s also 
the less spectacular lecture tours and artistic performances diminished in number due to the 
lack of adequate funding. This led to constant worries that the most remote societies would lose 
contact and strength as a result.  
In other British Council activities in Finland the office also largely followed a pre-determined 
operational model designed for all parts of the world. In the early 1950s, its tasks included 
delivering BC publications such as Britain Today, English Language Teaching and British Agricultural 
Bulletin to subscribers and bookstores and organising various British exhibitions both in 
Helsinki and the provincial towns. As a result of the popularity of English language and culture, 
particularly the British Council Library in Helsinki grew rapidly. If in 1947, the library had 
contained around 2,500 books, the figure had almost tripled by the early 1950s.1142 
                                                 
1138 ’The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1953─1954’, FO 924/1053, NA. 
1139 ’The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1951─1952’, BW 30/6, NA; Helsingin Sanomat, 
February 15, 1952. 
1140 BC officials regarded these tours as vital activity due to the 'exotic' attraction the presence of a representative of 
the British nation aroused especially in the more remote societies. ’The British Council, Finland: Representative’s 
Annual Report 1958─1959’, BW 30/6, NA. 
1141 ’The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1953─1954’, FO 924/1053, NA. 
1142 ’The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1951─1952’, BW 30/6, NA. 
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The one area in which the British Council can be regarded to have failed in Finland was the 
exchange of persons, one of the most essential tasks also for British cultural diplomacy. In the 
very first post-war years things had still looked promising as BC scholarships and bursaries for 
studying in Britain were introduced as soon as the Council operations got under way. The first 
scholarships were awarded to Finnish students after T.H. Searls, the BC’s Deputy Controller of 
Educations, had visited Finland in 1946. In the following year, for example Oxford University 
entered the student exchange market independently by introducing a cooperative programme 
with the University of Helsinki. These developments were, naturally, greeted warmly in the 
Finnish student circles, which by the late 1940s had developed a growing interest in 
international cooperation and the, often purely theoretical, opportunity to study or travel 
abroad.1143 In spite of these first encouraging steps, however, the exchange of students between 
Britain and Finland remained modest in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. The number 
of annual British Council scholarships varied between four and eight1144, a level that was 
explained by both financial reasons and the impossibility of placing larger numbers of overseas 
students in British universities in post-war conditions.1145 Teachers, scientists and other 
professionals were more successful in this respect, as their visits to Britain grew steadily in the 
1950s. The exchange of university lecturers expanded substantially in 1952 after Finland was 
included in the British University Interchange Scheme.1146  
British Council officials regarded Helsinki as a demanding yet interesting environment, not 
least because by the early 1950s other governments had also increased their cultural work in 
Finland. The country’s location between East and West made it a particularly appealing area for 
cultural activities, even though at the same time this meant that cultural competition was taken 
more seriously also by the locals than in many other countries. Although the British Legation 
had immediately after the war feared that the popularity of SNS would grow at an alarming 
pace, already in 1947 it had observed that the Russophile endeavours were in decline at the 
same time as the Finnish-British societies were experiencing a strong revival.1147 In June 1952, 
Andrew Noble confirmed this trend by noting the following: “Our resources are too small to 
enable us to match the Russians pound for pound (in winning over the Finns), but we do not 
need to, because we have the goodwill of the Finns on our side."1148 
The question of insignificant resources is also a central issue when comparing the British 
cultural activities to those of the US. According to the BC, the resources the USIS deployed in 
Finland in the 1950s were on a scale comparable with the Soviet activities. In particular, the size 
of the Fulbright Programme impressed the British, who knew that they could never provide 
                                                 
1143 Kolbe 1993, pp. 151-156. 
1144 Between 1948 and 1953, only 18 Finnish students were awarded with a Council scholarship. This was not an 
exceptionally low figure since the number of scholarships granted to the Swedes during the period was 19. 
‘University Interchange between the U.K. and Other European Countries’, Issued by the British Council, 46Z 
Englanti, UMA. 
1145 A.C. Hayter to J.B.C. Grundy, October 21, 1947, BW 30/1, NA. 
1146 R. Washbourn to Finnish Ministry of Education, February 1, 1952; T.H. Searls to I. Tapiola, June 17, 1952; 
R.H. Oittinen to Finnish Foreign Ministry, December 23, 1952, all 46Z Englanti, UMA. 
1147 F.M. Shepherd to W.A. Montagu-Pollack, March 11, 1947, BW 30/3, NA. 
1148 A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 5, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA. 
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anything of the same scale.1149 The same did not apply to the efforts of other countries in 
Finland, although in the early 1950s the British were somewhat concerned about the re-
emergence of Germany as a factor in cultural relations.1150 Even though, for instance, France, 
Switzerland, Italy, Canada and India, as well as most East European countries, most notably 
Poland and Hungary, all expanded their cultural activity in Finland in the 1950s, mainly by 
arranging exhibitions and establishing friendship societies, their influence in Finland remained 
much smaller than that of Britain. The one campaign the British were willing to give some 
credit for was that of the French, who in their view were "not afraid of being high-brow”. The 
numerous French exhibitions and drama performances in Finland were highly regarded by the 
BC as were the social and cultural activities of the two small Finnish-French Societies.1151 
In spite of the growing competition in the cultural field, British Council officers in Helsinki 
felt that they were successful in their adopted role, which was based on offering liaison rather 
than direct instructions to the Finns. On the other hand, they also recognised that it was not 
always simple to assess the effect of their activities especially because of the cautious attitude 
many Finns had developed towards being openly associated with foreign activities.1152 Even 
though this was true, it is afterwards easy to conclude that the Council played an essential role 
in complementing the more direct propaganda activities of the British Legation and the BBC. 
As the cultural activities’ focus was on influencing people and their way of thinking in the 
longer-term, their importance was particularly high in a country like Finland. 
When examining the British cultural campaign, it is also necessary to note that a growing 
number of operations were placed under the responsibility of the British Legation, another 
indication that the British Council's potential was not fully appreciated. The most important 
development was moving most film activities from the BC to the Legation's care in 1950, 
undoubtedly in order to boost the promotion and lending of British films. This move proved to 
be effective, as for instance in 1952 the Legation reported that around 700 short films were 
distributed to schools, clubs, institutes and societies. The most active user of these productions 
was the Finnish-British Society, which usually screened one to two British films to its members 
every week.1153  
In the field of commercial films, the annual British Film Festivals were regarded as particular 
successes as they attracted large audiences and produced good publicity. The festivals were 
high-profile events as, for example, the opening ceremony of the 1950 festival was attended by 
President Paasikivi and several members of the Finnish Government.1154 In the daily movie 
screenings around the country, British films were actively distributed by Suomi-Filmi, which 
often screened the weekly British-sponsored newsreel Pathé Gazette News. Various newsreels 
continued to be an efficient media to promote the British message even in the 1950s, and the 
                                                 
1149 ’The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1951─1952’, BW 30/6, NA. 
1150 R. Washbourn to Director of North and Eastern Europe Department, ’Periodical Confidential Report’, 
December 31, 1952, BW 30/5, NA. 
1151 ’The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1951─1952’, BW 30/6, NA. 
1152 Ibid. 
1153 A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA; Finnish-British Society circular No. 4/1950/51, FBS.  
1154 O.A. Scott to C.F.A. Warner, ’Report on Information work during the first quarter of 1950’, March 23, 1950, 
FO 953/876, NA. 
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FO on more than one occasion tried to increase their anti-communist bias without too much 
success.1155  
As successful as the British Legation regarded its film activities, the vast expansion of the 
American motion picture programme in the early 1950s left the British in a secondary position 
in the distribution of short films, not to mention the commercial blockbusters. By December 
1951 the USIS/Helsinki already had 750 films to offer, half of which were subtitled into 
Finnish, while the British Legation had to settle for 260 prints.1156 This did not mean that the 
Information Department’s role in promoting the British way of life was insignificant. On the 
contrary, the COI-produced films distributed in Finland covered a wide range of important 
topics ranging from technological innovations in the aviation industry to the British schooling 
system.1157 The British monarchy was also an obvious film topic with the Coronation of Queen 
Elizabeth II becoming the most-borrowed short film in Finland. Although the majority of the 
films shared information about a certain aspect of British society, some of them promoted the 
same Western propaganda themes as the American ones. One good example of this was a film 
titled Factory Inspector, which in a humorous way informed the audience about the various ways 
in which employees’ working conditions were monitored in Britain.1158 The main intention of 
the film was to convince the audience that employers worked hard to improve work safety in 
Britain (and the Western world). As this movie had a proper script and included professional 
actors, it was in many ways a more credible way to promote the ideas than often was the case 
with American short films, which usually merely lectured about a certain positive aspect of 
American society through facts and documentary picture.  
At times, British Council and British Legation lecture activities also overlapped. British 
information officers arranged promotional tours of their own during which they promoted 
British culture besides discussing the supply of information with newspaper editors. The 
administration of Finnish journalists' visits to Britain and British journalists' trips to Finland, the 
number of which kept growing, was also in the Information Department’s range of duty. Even 
if at times confusing, making the British presence felt by two operators was in general 
considered as a functional arrangement. The cooperation between the two was enhanced by the 
growing attention both actors started to pay to the promotion of Britain's commercial interests. 
In the 1950s, a larger share of, in particular, COI material comprised news about British 
products, including consumer goods that were of interest to the Finns. Apart from ensuring 
publicity for such events as the British Industries Fair, British information officers made sure 
that economic bulletins and background material were sent to public opinion leaders, 
economists and trade unionists.1159  
                                                 
1155 At least in the late 1940s, of the companies producing British newsreels only Paramount accepted some political 
guidance from the FO, while the likes of Pathé remained hesitant. Britain's desire to sponsor the screening of the 
Pathé newsreel in Finland suggests that their content was, however, in line with the official policy. P.F. Tennant to 
R. Murray, 'Newsreels and Anti-Communism', April 16, 1948; C.F. MacLaren to IRD, October 2, 1948, both FO 
1110/50, NA.  
1156 A.N. Noble to FO, January 8, 1952. FO 953/1325, NA.  
1157 An incomplete list of COI films screened in Finland can be found at KAVI’s Elonet service, www.elonet.fi. 
1158 The film ‘Factory Inspector’, 1955, Kansallinen audiovisuaalinen instituutti (Hereafter KAVI), Helsinki, 
Finland. 
1159 A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952. FO 953/1324, NA. 
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Helsinki Olympics: Using a Sporting Event as a Tool for Propaganda 
 
The one event giving a decisive boost for Western informational and cultural efforts in Finland 
was, naturally, the Olympic Games held in Helsinki in 1952. In particular, US officials started to 
invest rather heavily in increasing the American presence during the games after realising the 
opportunities the world of sports had to offer for the Cold War mind battle. If the Summer 
Olympics held in London in 1948 had still been contested relatively free of political 
propaganda, the Soviet Union’s decision to join the Olympic movement and for the first time 
send athletes to the 1952 Summer Olympics forced officials in Washington to start viewing 
international sports events from a different angle. The increasing number of reports and 
analyses of the importance of sports to the Soviet Union and its communist propaganda 
campaign, as prepared by the State Department in the early 1950s1160, shows how seriously this 
question was all of sudden taken in Washington. In order to beat the Soviets also on the 
sporting front, American officials started to make systematic plans for how to make use of 
sporting events as much as possible. 
The US Government began planning its propaganda operations for the Helsinki Olympics 
well in advance. In addition to studying different sports-related propaganda techniques, 
including the famous ones used by the Nazis during the Berlin Games in 1936, State 
Department officials gathered information about the reactions American teams performing 
abroad generated in different parts of the world.1161 Although the presentation of American and 
athletes and American culture in general were regarded as the most important task during the 
games, the way athletes from behind the Iron Curtain were to be approached was also 
thoroughly planned in State Department circles. This not only concerned the way the media 
should cover the performance and behaviour of communist athletes; American athletes were 
also given detailed instructions about how to behave in case they were to be in contact with 
their communist competitors and how to present the US message of friendship and 
international goodwill. In order to make sure that the Americans knew as much as possible 
about their rivals, the CIA was asked to collect as much information about the most 
outstanding Soviet athletes, their records and training programmes and even about possible 
defectors among them.1162 
As the State Department expected, in hindsight rather falsely, that the number of spectators 
from satellite countries to Helsinki would be significant and that the games would offer an 
excellent opportunity for communist propaganda, the Americans wanted to make sure that 
information about the US would be easily available during the games for both local and visiting 
spectators as well as the athletes. For this purpose a special information office was opened at 
the USIS premises in downtown Helsinki a few days before the opening ceremony.1163 This 
                                                 
1160 Soviet Affairs Notes No. 137: 'Sports in the Communist World’, April 23, 1952; J.M. McSweeney to SD, ‘Soviet 
Attitude Toward Olympic Games’, January 9, 1952’, both RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 23, NARA. 
1161 The State Department followed in great detail what kind of a reaction, for example, the visit of an American 
ice-hockey team to Sweden in March 1952 generated. W.W. Butterworth to SD, ‘Public Reaction to American 
Olympic Hockey Team in Sweden’, March 12, 1952, RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 23, NARA. 
1162 Undated memorandum: ‘ 1952 Olympic Games’, RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 23, NARA. 
1163 For example, Helsingin Sanomat, July 17, 1952. 
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office not only helped American visitors and their quests for information about Finland, but 
also provided other nationalities with leaflets and pamphlets, both with or without attribution, 
about life in the US. J. Raymond Ylitalo, back in Finland, was given the special task to head this 
operation with the title ‘Olympic Attaché’.  
Even if the opening of a special information office was a shrewd move from the US 
Legation, the Americans were able to gain the most visible coverage for their political opinions 
during the games through Helsingin Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat, which both agreed to publish a 
special two-page English language news summary to serve visitors from foreign shores. The 
English news review, based mainly on UP reports dealing mostly with international issues, 
avoided publishing any critical comments on, for example, life in Eastern Europe, but did 
include several news articles about developments of the Korean War that clearly exaggerated 
American progress in the conflict.1164 Even if the service was mainly meant for American 
visitors, the agreement made with Sanoma gave a great opportunity for the US Government to 
promote its viewpoint to the Finnish public as well. In addition to reports on international 
news, this was done, for example, through an article written by John Cabot in which he praised 
Finland’s post-war efforts and corrected some mistaken ideas circulated in the US concerning 
Finland’s political status.1165 By this, Mr Cabot referred to a map published by Life Magazine 
showing Finland as a communist satellite. As at least Eljas Erkko had previously felt that it was 
his duty to remind the magazine about this mistake1166, the Minister to Finland was not the only 
one who wanted to correct this particular blunder. News telegrams were published in English 
and French also in other Finnish newspapers, most notably in Uusi Suomi, but the size of 
column inches they provided for reporting in foreign languages paled in comparison to the two 
Sanoma-owned papers.1167  
The USIS office also screened a number of USIE short films to Olympic visitors as a 
nonstop service on a daily basis.1168 In order to operate this task, the State Department had 
requested a number of American posts around the world to send suitable films in several 
languages to Helsinki that would help in offering an image of America and its way of life to as 
many athletes from behind the Iron Curtain as possible. The selection and presentation of these 
films were in line with the broader American policy, as the State Department officials stressed 
that the screened films should be strictly "non-political, non-war and non-controversial" in 
order to avoid causing any embarrassment to the organisers.1169 A list of films sent from Paris to 
Helsinki indicates that this request was conscientiously followed. Such films as Hudson Valley 
and Nevada and its Resources were hardly political in nature and, therefore, suitable for both 
                                                 
1164 For example, Helsingin Sanomat July 17, 1952; Ilta-Sanomat, July 29, 1952. 
1165 Helsingin Sanomat, July 26, 1952. 
1166 E. Erkko to J.A. Linen, January 5, 1950, SOLAK, Aa 41, EEA, PLA. 
1167 Uusi Suomi published news telegrams in both English and French. Both sections were, however, small, and the 
news content predominately concerned American or French domestic news or Olympic performances. For 
example, Uusi Suomi, July 23, 1952. 
1168 Ilta-Sanomat, July 23, 1952. 
1169 D. Acheson to Certain American Diplomatic Officers, ‘Motion Pictures: Films for the Olympics’, June 20, 1952 
RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA. 
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Finnish and foreign audiences in Helsinki.1170 One typical feature that was screened was a short 
film titled Appalachian Trail, which presents the joy with which the Americans enjoy their natural 
wonders. Although the way in which the sense of community spirit among all hikers, also 
including African-Americans, is emphasised in the film1171 was a rather typical American 
propaganda theme in the early 1950s, the production lacks any direct political content and was, 
therefore, appropriate for even such exceptional circumstances as the Helsinki Olympic Games.  
American officials in Helsinki had even higher hopes for the utilisation of Hollywood’s 
popularity during the games. As one of the State Department’s tasks was to encourage 
American companies, in particular airlines, to attract as many American Olympic visitors to 
Finland as possible, the obvious ambition was also to bring some recognisable faces to Helsinki. 
The film industry, and its world-famous representatives, was seen as perfect for this activity. 
The fact that many of the most famous stars were members of the Screen Actors’ Guild gave 
them even more propaganda value as they could be presented as perfect examples of the way 
free trade unions took care of people’s rights and encouraged personal success at the same time. 
This angle was first discussed in AFL and State Department circles in January 1952, after the 
SAK’s Olavi Lindblom had visited Hollywood and talked about the possibility to use film 
actors for the campaign against communism in Finland with Jay Lovestone.1172 Both the State 
Department and AFL supported this idea warmly. Encouraged by this, Lindblom wrote a letter 
to William Holden asking him if it would be possible for two guild members to visit Finland on 
SAK’s invitation.1173 As nothing came out of this invitation, the matter was put aside for a while.  
In May 1952, press reports noted that some American actors were planning to attend the 
Helsinki Games. Once again, the SAK got excited by this and hoped that at least one of them, 
preferably Gregory Peck, would make a few appearances in trade union meetings.1174 After State 
Department officials realised that Mr Peck had recently been affiliated with active communist 
front groups, Washington could not support his visit.1175 In the end, only the actor’s Finnish-
born wife flew to Helsinki, while the absence of her husband was explained to the Finnish press 
by “film shootings in Rome and his three attention-seeking small sons”.1176  
This turn of events accelerated the State Department, the Department of Labor and AFL's 
hunt for other famous candidates. The international representative of the actors' union did 
provide them with a list of American films stars, including Danny Kaye, Clark Cable, Errol 
Flynn and Katherine Hepburn, who could be invited to Helsinki1177, but as this information 
arrived after the Olympics had already kicked off, in the end none of the biggest Hollywood 
stars graced Finland with their presence. The idea of inviting American film stars was not, 
                                                 
1170 US Embassy, Paris to US Legation, Helsinki, ‘Motion Pictures: Films for the Olympics’ June 30, 1952, RG 84, 
USEH CGR, box 29, NARA. 
1171 The film ‘Appalachian Trail’, 1951, KAVI. 
1172 O. Lindblom to W. Pidgeon, January 11, 1952, SAK KV 1952 (Yhdysvallat), TA. 
1173 O. Lindblom to W. Holden, January 11, 1952, SAK KV 1949 (Yhdysvallat), TA. 
1174 W.H. Witt to A. Zempel, May 2, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA. 
1175 W.H. Witt to A. Zempel, May 6, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA. 
1176 Uusi Suomi, July 21, 1952. 
1177 R. Brewer to A. Steinbach, July 22, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA. 
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however, a complete failure, as in the next couple of years actors like Gregory Peck and William 
Holden actually visited the country, partly thanks to the Finnish-American Society’s activity.1178  
The opportunity the Olympics offered for American private companies to expand their 
businesses was too attractive for the State Department to ignore. Some months before the 
event, the department’s Private Enterprise Cooperation Staff started collaborating with 
American advertising companies in an attempt to encourage American businesses to increase 
their advertising in Finland during the games. All interested firms were offered highly visible 
advertising space in the biggest newspapers Helsingin Sanomat and Uusi Suomi for a reasonable 
price. Since the Finnish market was small in size, the ideological dimension of an advertising 
campaign “on an extremely sensitive Cold War front” was emphasised.1179 Apparently, US-
based companies did not grab this opportunity as enthusiastically as was expected. Although 
giant car manufacturers Ford and General Motors placed highly visible advertisements in both 
papers1180, smaller American players remained conspicuously absent. The project, even if 
perhaps not as successful as American advertising companies would have hoped for, offers a 
good example of how private companies were to a growing extent included into the Cold War 
mind game and how the economic dimension of the struggle was gaining importance in the US 
propaganda machinery. 
The setback felt in the advertising project, if there was any, did not change the general 
sentiment in Washington according to which particularly print and film operations during the 
games had been a success. As the State Department was also pleased with the number of 
newsreels and photographs of American athletes distributed around the world, even if 
somewhat disappointed with the lack of opportunities offered by the hosts for non-
governmental broadcasters to televise the games for the first time1181, it is no surprise that the 
Americans’ versatile activities during the Helsinki Games caused some uproar among Finnish 
communists. Despite reporting about the “hugely successful” Soviet activities during the games, 
including Russian dance performances to a crowd of 40,0001182, the overall reaction inside SNS 
was that the games were filled with Anglo-American propaganda that was evident in Finnish 
newspapers, films and commercial products, such as Coca-Cola, which was famously 
introduced to the Finnish masses for the first time.1183 The organisation of an ICTFU summer 
                                                 
1178 Peck paid a visit to Helsinki in January 1953 and was warmly greeted both by Minister McFall and David 
Wilson, now Head of USIS/Helsinki. Somewhat bizarrely, his alleged affiliation with communist groups had been 
put aside. For Mr Peck’s visit, see Ilta-Sanomat, January 19, 1953; For Mr Holden, see Viikkosanomat, 31/1954. 
1179 J.M. Begg to B.H. Underhill, ’Newspaper Advertising by American Firms in Helsinki Newspapers During 
Olympic Games’, June 30, 1952; C.P. Jensen to undefined recipients, June 1952, both RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, 
box 23, NARA. 
1180 For example, Helsingin Sanomat, July 19, 1952, July 23, 1952 & July 25, 1952; Uusi Suomi, July 19, 1952, July 
23, 1952 & July 25, 1952. 
1181 The Americans negotiated with the Finnish organisers for quite some time with the hope of winning television 
rights of the Helsinki Olympics for RCA with the possible support of NBC. In the end, no television coverage of the 
games was broadcast. VOA and RFE also wished to cover the games, but were denied of an official broadcaster status 
by the Finns, who felt that according to the ‘Olympic spirit’, only one radio organisation from each participating 
country should be ranked as an ‘official broadcaster’ and guaranteed with broadcasting facilities. Enclosure No. 2 to 
Despatch No. 774 from Helsinki to SD, ‘General Organization of Broadcasting of the Helsinki Olympic Games', 
March 1, 1952; R.B. Walsh to D.G. Wilson, May 19, 1952, both RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 23, NARA. 
1182 ‘Pöytäkirja SN-seuran puhemiehistön kokouksesta 19.8.1952’, SNS, box 40, KA. 
1183 For example, ’Neuvostovastaisen propagandan muodoista Suomessa’, 1952, SNS, box 419, KA. 
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school during the games at the SAK’s Trade Union Institute in Kiljava only offered more fuel 
for communist protests.1184 As for the Soviets, one of their main complaints concerning the 
Olympics was that the newsreel and photographic coverage and the subsequent Finnish film 
based on that material did not include enough Soviet athletes.1185 This reaction, together with 
the communist claims mentioned above, enables one to make a simple conclusion of the 
superpowers’ battle during the Helsinki Olympics: the American not only outplayed their Soviet 
counterparts on the track but also on the propaganda front. 
The propaganda activities in Helsinki were followed with great interest in Washington. 
Particularly the opportunity to have direct influence on athletes from behind the Iron Curtain 
gave the State Department the idea to invite Soviet athletes, for instance the country’s 
basketball team, to tour the US. According to the Americans, they had only to win from this 
kind of an event as it could support their propaganda line saying that the Americans liked the 
Russian people but despised their tyrannical masters in the Kremlin.1186 In the end the 
basketball tour never took place, nor did the visit of the triple-gold-winning Czech runner Emil 
Zatopek, which was backed warmly by President Truman. This project was made impossible by 
the McArran Act, which for instance prevented suspected communists from leaving or entering 
the country, and the apparent difficulty of getting Mr Zatopek out of Czechoslovakia.1187 The 
incident gives another good example of the nature of many American propaganda operations in 
the early 1950s, also in Finland. The organisations running the vast propaganda machinery were 
not short of ideas or commitment. The only problem was that many of the operations were not 
very well planned and because of this often short-lived. 
Britain's campaign during the Olympics was much more modest than that of the US. This 
did not prevent the British Legation from declaring that the games had turned out to be a huge 
propaganda victory for them. The achievements of British athletes were widely appreciated by 
the Finnish public and the country won a considerable amount of favourable publicity in the 
Finnish press.1188 Otherwise, the British presence was very much centred in the arrival of the 
Duke of Edinburgh to Helsinki by yacht, escorted by the cruiser H.M.S. Swiftsure. During his 
nine-day stay the Duke visited famous sights, met a number of prominent Finns and gave 
                                                 
1184 Several newspaper articles and letters to the editor published not only in the far left press but also in more 
moderate trade union publications labelled the ICTFU as an “organisation which has adopted in its programme 
espionage and destructive activity” and described the school in general as “a centre for American anti-Soviet 
propaganda". W.H. Witt to SD, ’International Confederation of Free Trade Unions’ Summer School at Kiljava, July 
21 – August 3´, August 15, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA; Työkansan Sanomat, July 4, 1952; 
Palkkatyöläinen, September 26, 1952. 
1185 Apart from SNS, Soviet officials voiced this claim through the Russian radio broadcasts to Finland. For 
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SUPO, KA.  
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Service had played in developing the understanding between the two nations. Helsingin Sanomat, July 20, 1952 & 
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encouragement to British athletes.1189 This olympic visit was regarded as a great success, as both 
the Duke and the ship attracted huge crowds and the visit “served to remind the people that 
Great Britain is still a large and important country whose friendship may mean a great deal to 
Finland”, as Minister Noble reported.1190  
The Finnish newspapers’ coverage of the Duke’s activities in Helsinki was particularly lavish. 
For instance, Ilta-Sanomat published daily articles about Philip’s movements in the Finnish 
capital with such big headlines as ‘Philip Conquers Helsinki’ and wandered “if even the greatest 
Hollywood stars would have generated such a spontaneous and warm welcome from the 
people of Helsinki”.1191 Andrew Noble was so thrilled by all of the positive publicity generated 
by both a sporting event and a royal visit that he suggested an athletics meeting between Britain 
and Finland and another similar naval visit by the Duke of Edinburgh for the following year.1192 
In terms of sports, Mr Noble was apparently blissfully unaware that a British athletics and 
football team had already visited the country twice before.1193 While cooperation in athletics 
meetings was expanded even further, another royal visit did not materialise for quite some time 
for various practical reasons and for the FO's view that a visit to Helsinki two years running 
might appear to be too demonstrative.1194  
 
Responding to Growing Cultural Demand  
 
An examination of Western cultural diplomacy in early 1950s reveals that this was the time period 
when investment in Finland’s attachment to the West through more long-term operational 
methods began in earnest. The most overwhelming breakthrough was made by the Americans in 
the field of educational exchange in which the ASLA-Fulbright programme would have a 
profound impact on various segments of Finnish society for decades to come. The growing 
number of Finns crossing the Atlantic also provided more ammunition for the more short-term 
propaganda battle in the shape of numerous visitors' written praises of the US. The cultural 
activities launched in Helsinki also increased Western presence in the country impressively. The 
Finns’ abiding interest in almost anything coming from the West, most importantly the English 
language, was decisive in this process and materialised, in particular, in the expansion of activities 
launched through friendship societies. Although the American cultural campaign was growing at 
faster pace, the British still managed to lead the way in this area of activity at least partly due to the 
high regard the Finns gave to traditional British virtues in literature, theatre and the humanities. 
The Americans wished to offer similar features through their operations, for example by 
promoting their country through educational achievements and the import of high-profile 
                                                 
1189 For a detailed account of the activities of the Duke and those taking place on the H.M.S. Swiftsure, see 'Visit to 
Helsinki by the Duke of Edinburgh and the Duke of Kent', August 14, 1952, ADM 1/23953, NA. 
1190 A.N. Noble to A. Eden, ’XV Olympic Games. General report on the success of the games and the international 
relationships involved’, August 7, 1952, FO 371/100495, NA. 
1191 Ilta-Sanomat, July 26, 1952. See also Ilta-Sanomat, July 27, 1952 & July 28, 1952. 
1192 A.N. Noble to Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Browning, August 14, 1952, FO 371/100495, NA. 
1193 A British team consisting of footballers and athletes toured Finland both in 1948 and 1950 on the invitation of 
the United Paper Mills. Report by Labour Attaché C.L. Thomas, July 5, 1950, LAB 13/487, NA. 
1194 For example, P. Mason to A.N. Noble, October 23, 1952, FO 371/100495, NA. 
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visitors, but their campaign did not quite enjoy similar esteem as that of the British Council. On 
the other hand, the success of the American Home 1953 exhibition indicated to officials in 
Helsinki that focusing on the advertisement of the practical side of US prosperity might generate 
even greater interest in their country rather than the promotion of traditional forms of culture. 
For presenting the US through consumer products, the Americans also received valuable 
experience from the publicity campaign launched during the Olympic Games in Helsinki. In 
general, the games offered an exceptional opportunity for the promotion of the two Western 
countries and accelerated the Finns' enthusiasm for their cultures even further. 
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7. BRITISH AND AMERICAN MESSAGE FINDS ITS AUDIENCE, 
1954-1957 
 
‘A Western Breeze’ 
 
The mid-1950s was a period when Western propaganda in Finland expanded at its fastest pace. 
A greater amount of controversial political content found its way to Finnish newspapers and 
rising forms of Western culture offered the operations an altogether new dimension. The first 
development was mostly a result of the country's changed relationship with the Soviet Union, 
which reflected the broader political reformations introduced in Moscow. Although Stalin’s 
death did not bring immediate change to Soviet foreign policy, in 1954 it was already evident 
that the Russians wished to follow a strategy that would endorse more relaxed East-West 
relations. The denunciation of Stalin’s purges and the introduction of less repressive policies, 
famously confirmed by new leader Nikita Khrushchev during the 20th Party Congress in 
February 1956, had a direct impact also on the international presentation of the Soviet Union, 
moving some focus from aggressive political propaganda to the promotion of culture both 
home and abroad. The so-called Soviet cultural offensive created an impression that the Soviet 
Union had abandoned isolationism and chauvinism in favour of East-West contacts as a path 
toward the relaxation of international tensions.1195 As the new strategy also softened the tone 
with which Moscow commented on foreign media content, it had a profound impact on the 
Finnish scene. 
Towards the mid-1950s the Soviet policy towards Finland had started to follow a strategy 
aiming for a long-term impact on the Finns’ future by promoting closer and more peaceful ties 
between the two countries and emphasising Finland’s position as a neutral country. Kimmo 
Rentola has summarised Moscow’s altered policy well by noting that after Stalin’s death the 
Russians began to examine Finland more as a friend and a potential ally rather than an 
ideological enemy like they had done in 1950-1953 when the Cold War was at its hottest. 
According to him, in the late 1940s the Soviets still had considered the possibility of Finland 
becoming a communist country as relatively likely.1196  
The impact of the steps taken towards détente by the superpowers in the mid-1950s on the 
Finnish media scene along with the somewhat more relaxed relationship between Finland and the 
Soviet Union, particularly after the return of the Porkkala Naval Base, has been documented by 
several scholars. The general view has been that Moscow’s new policy gave the Finnish press 
increasing confidence to start publishing material that was more critical of the Soviet Union and 
its policies. This development, often labelled as the time when Western winds blew over Finland, 
also had a broader effect on the nation, which can be noted by the way the intelligentsia and the 
                                                 
1195 This evaluation was given not long after the offensive was launched by Professor Frederick Barghoorn, a well-
known scholar of the Soviet Union, who was later jailed in Moscow for espionage charges. Barghoorn, Frederick 
C., The Soviet Cultural Offensive. The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ 1960), 
pp. 1, 60-64. 
1196 Rentola 1997, pp. 168-169. 
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middle classes in particular exhibited anti-Soviet sentiments.1197 Several popular books critical of 
the Soviet system, such as Unto Parvilahti’s Berijan tarhat, which covered the former SS officer’s 
years in Soviet prison camps, and Arvo Tuominen’s memoirs1198, based partly on his VOA talks, 
were published much to the reading public's pleasure. 
American and British actors in Finland naturally welcomed the more liberal publishing 
policies adopted by the Finnish media, as the development offered them wider possibilities for 
influencing the nation and its future. The more relaxed global atmosphere did not, however, 
bring any major changes to the leading Western governments’ general policy towards the small 
northern country. In January 1954, the National Security Council determined the American 
objective in Finland as to support “the continuance of an independent, economically healthy, 
and democratic Finland, basically orientated to the West (but with no attempt to incorporate 
Finland in a Western coalition)”.1199 Although the NSC acknowledged the importance of 
providing Finland with economic support, for instance by stimulating the import of Finnish 
products, the Americans maintained their policy of avoiding doing anything that would provoke 
Soviet countermeasures. This approach was shared by the British, who were no more willing 
than before to back Finland in any other way than through cultural and informational 
methods.1200 The British Government's general policy toward Finland in the mid-1950s was 
based on the strict protection of its economic interests. When it comes to these interests, one 
could say that the way in which British foreign economic policy towards Finland was 
formulated mirrored Whitehall's predominantly pragmatic approach exceptionally well. As 
Jensen-Eriksen has successfully argued, political considerations of the Cold War had, actually, 
little impact on Britain's economic policy towards Finland due to the country’s own economic 
problems and the Treasury and the Board of Trade’s refusal to use economic methods as tools 
of foreign policy.1201 
The more relaxed period in East-West relations, and those between Finland and the Soviet 
Union, did not bring any considerable change to the Western powers' assessment on Finland's 
general position, either. In fact, the expanding trade and cultural ties between Moscow and 
Helsinki made the British and Americans increasingly suspicious of the true meaning of Finnish 
neutrality. Indeed, the Western powers’ way of thinking led to the following paradox in the 
assessment of Finland’s foreign policy, at least in Finnish eyes: the more active Finland was in 
                                                 
1197 Salminen 1999, p. 18. 
1198 The first two parts of Tuominen’s memoirs, ’Sirpin ja vasaran tie’ and ’Kremlin kellot’, were published by 
Tammi in 1956 and became instant bestsellers. See, for example, Rajala, Panu & Rautkallio, Hannu, Petturin 
testamentti – Arvo Poika Tuomisen todellinen elämä (Helsinki 1994), pp. 374-389. 
1199 NSC 5403: U. S. Policy Toward Finland, January 12, 1954, RG 273, Entry 1, box 27, NARA. 
1200 In this respect Minister Noble's interference in Finland's internal politics during the Finnish parliamentary 
elections of 1954 made a curious exception. In March 1954, minister organised a luncheon party at the British 
Legation during which he presented his own plan over how the new government should be formed to Urho 
Kekkonen, Teuvo Aura, Eero A. Wuori, Ralf Töngren and Väinö Leskinen. Noble’s aim was to prevent Kekkonen 
from making a deal that would save his position as prime minister and bring the communists into the government. 
His candidate for the next prime minister was Sakari Tuomioja. As Kekkonen’s Agrarian Party was successful in the 
election, the plan miscarried. Töngren became Prime Minister and the communists were still excluded from 
government, which meant that Noble was rather pleased with the outcome, after all. See, for example, Nevakivi 
1996, pp. 78─80; Upton, Anthony, ‘Finland, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944─55’ in Aunesluoma (ed.) 2005, 
pp. 70─71. 
1201 Jensen-Eriksen 2005a, pp. 93─109. 
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its promotion of neutrality and the more successful it was in winning concessions off the 
Soviets, the more the West regarded it as a mere tool for Kremlin’s policy. The Soviet decision 
to return the Porkkala Naval Base to Finland in 1955, a warmly welcomed move among Finns, 
was seen a mere propaganda stint from the Western point of view. CIA reports from the 
particular period regularly expressed concerns of not only Finland’s growing economic 
dependency on the Soviet Bloc, but also of Moscow’s strategy to ‘woo’ rather than pressure the 
Finns to their side and of the broader aim of strengthening neutralist sentiments in 
Scandinavia.1202 Particularly the Americans became increasingly concerned about Finland’s 
symbolic value, as it expected the Russians to use its close trade relationship with Finland as an 
example of the benefits that could be enjoyed by any capitalist country trading with a 
communist one.1203 
As concerned as both US and British officials were of developments in Fenno-Soviet 
relations1204, they did not consider the possibility of the Finns yielding to demands that would 
seriously impair their national independence very likely, at least not in the foreseeable future. One 
of the main reasons for this estimation lay in the Finnish psyche, which was predominantly 
determined by a strong sense of patriotism. This sentiment was regularly noted in American and 
British reports on Finland, such as the CIA country estimation report from January 1954, which 
declared that “the Finns have demonstrated a high capacity to resist economic, psychological, or 
internal political pressures brought to bear on the by the USSR. Their dislike and distrust of 
Russia are traditional; their Western sympathies are deep”.1205 Even President Eisenhower shared 
this view, labelling the Finns "a tough crowd" during a NSC meeting held in July 1956.1206  
The Finns’ strong orientation to the West and their more open criticism of the Soviet system 
meant that the British and Americans were not that concerned of the possible impact of the 
Soviet cultural offensive in Finland, at least not in the short term. Indeed, in many respects the 
mid-1950s was a period when Western propaganda and cultural diplomacy enjoyed their most 
fertile operational environment. The Eisenhower Administration’s interest in using propaganda 
as an essential tool in the execution of foreign policy and the consequent establishment of the 
USIA led to a more systematic presentation of American propaganda themes also in such 
border countries as Finland. Although the British did not have the luxury of operating with 
similar kind of resources, their persistent cooperation with the Finns and their ability to adjust 
their activities to local demands made Britain's overall campaign in the country also a success.  
 
                                                 
1202 ’Soviet-Finnish Relations – Post Porkkala’, CIA Staff memorandum No. 76-55, October 19, 1955; Intelligence 
Memorandum: 'Implications of Finnish Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc', April 2, 1956, CIA/RR IM-424, CIA 
Office of Research and Reports, both CREST. 
1203 Hanhimäki 1996, p. 169. 
1204 Besides the Americans, British officials in Helsinki reported regularly about the relationship between Finland 
and the Soviet Union. The statements of leading politicians, such as Urho Kekkonen and Johannes Virolainen of 
the Agrarian Party, were under special examination. For example, M. Creswell to FO, May 25, 1955, FO 
371/116278, NA. 
1205 ’National Intelligence Estimate, Current Situation and Probable Developments in Finland during 1954’, January 
8, 1954, RG 263, box 2, NARA. 
1206 Before saying this, Eisenhower also pointed out that it was "sort of surprising that Finland could hold out to 
Soviet pressure". Memorandum: 'Discussion at the 291st Meeting of the National Security Council', July 20, 1956, 
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, box 18, DDEL. 
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IRD Activity: Effective or Not? 
 
The Finnish press's opportunities to publish more political material originating in the West 
during a time of lower international tension was quickly reflected in Western informational 
activities. Between 1953 and 1955, the distribution and placement of British anti-communist 
printed propaganda in Finland was at its most successful. Material selected from the IRD's 
Digest to the Legation's weekly bulletin, in particular short news articles and jokes on life in the 
Eastern satellites, was picked up by a large variety of Finnish publications, while social 
democratic reporters continued their inclusion of stories on working conditions in the West and 
on the communist conception of trade union functions.1207 In early 1955, the Legation was 
averaging as many as sixty placements a month for such shorter items as ‘Working Norms 
Increased in East Germany’ and ‘Italian Communist Party Loses Ground’ throughout the non-
communist Finnish press.  
The distribution of the IRD’s background publications had also grown considerably by 
1955. The Interpreter and supplements of The Asian Analyst, for instance, were sent to around 
twenty politicians on the Legation’s English-speaking lists, while 'Basic papers’, ‘Basic booklets’ 
and the ‘Facts about' series were distributed to ministers, economists, professors and 
newspapers according to their subject. A number of libraries and the Church Foreign Affairs 
Bureau were also provided with various publications as were the by now permanent recipients, 
which included the SDP, the SAK and SYT.1208 The pamphlet Facts about Communist Front 
Organisations, which provided detailed information about communist activities around the world, 
was given specific attention as it was translated into Finnish and distributed at least through the 
SDP and SYT.1209  
On saying that the British press operations enjoyed an exceptionally efficient period in the 
mid-1950s one must always keep the local circumstances in mind. A large share of the material 
sent by the IRD remained unsuitable for the Finnish market; they were often too long or dealt 
with aspects of life in the Soviet Union that Finnish newspapers refused to print. As the 
placement of longer feature articles remained highly difficult, the British officials' shifted even 
greater emphasis to tailoring the shorter items included in the bulletin to more acceptable form. 
Some progress was, however, achieved in features as well. Considering that only a couple of years 
earlier they were not published at all, the average number of placed longer stories, around one a 
month, represented a step forward. Knowing the limitations of its work, the British Legation gave 
high value for, in particular, decisions taken at both Helsingin Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat to print 
articles like ‘Cold War Politics’ by Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, former director-general of PWE 
and secret agent, and John Cardwell’s ‘First Soviet Satellite’, which labelled Mongolia as the first 
                                                 
1207 British Legation to IRD, ‘Possibility of placing more labour material in Finnish publications’, February 10, 1954, 
FO 1110/690, NA.  
1208 M.J. Creswell to H.A.H. Cortazzi, ‘Distribution and use of IRD material in Helsinki’, April 27, 1955, FO 
1110/808, NA. 
1209 ‘Tosiasioita kommunistien kansainvälisistä apujärjestöistä’, April 1957, SDP:n tiedotusosasto 1957, HAB 19, 
TA; SYT, box 112, KA. 
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victim of Soviet imperialism.1210 The inclusion of the latter article provides an apt example of 
broader IRD tactics, as no such person as ‘John Cardwell’ actually existed. Even though the 
department, in general, favoured distributing articles written by famous figures, the use of 
pseudonyms was often preferred when tackling more specific issues due to the more well-known 
writers' reluctance to receive direct instructions over their textual contributions.1211 
The relatively modest volume of supplied background material and placed longer features 
leads one to wonder whether the British anti-communist press operations were that relevant in 
Finland after all, even during a period of greater success. First of all, a short examination of 
British campaigns in other countries reveals that even in larger countries such as Italy, where 
IRD propaganda was more apparent and the distribution of, for example, the Italian version of 
The Interpreter was measured in hundreds rather than dozens1212, the delivery and publication of 
printed content was not that much wider when keeping the countries' size of population in 
mind. The constant challenge to make the original content more adjustable to local needs was 
not that unique, either. In Italy, the British, in cooperation with the Christian Democratic Party 
and the trade unions, took great care in editing the original material to suit the local press, 
especially newspapers issued mainly in agrarian areas with large communist dwelling.1213 Along 
with Finland, seeking consistent delivery channels was also a familiar issue in other neutral 
countries where the British came across with similar questions regarding the relationship 
between political newspaper content and censorship. Particularly, the Austrian press was 
reluctant to publish direct criticism of the Soviet Union during the period of occupation.1214 
Although IRD material started to win more coverage after the Austrian State Treaty was signed 
in 1955, the Austrians' familiarity of Soviet behaviour and their reluctance to expose people to 
excessively strong anti-communist propaganda with hardly any news value1215 did in many 
respects resemble the attitude adopted in Finland. 
The British campaign in Finland is placed into another important context when comparing it 
to the operations performed in other Nordic Countries. It is hardly surprising that IRD activity 
was considered easier in all of them. Various domestic factors did, however, mean that the British 
propaganda activities did not always enjoy as smooth a ride as the FO would have hoped for. The 
easiest path for anti-communist propaganda was, unsurprisingly, paved in Norway where the 
cooperation with the local labour party made the distribution of material more effective than in 
various other countries.1216 At times the domestic political battle did, however, limit the use of 
British printed content also in Norway as members of the local conservative party were not 
                                                 
1210 M.J. Creswell to H.A.H. Cortazzi, ‘Distribution and use of IRD material in Helsinki’, April 27, 1955, FO 
1110/808, NA; Ilta-Sanomat, December 24, 1954. 
1211 Jenks 2006, pp. 84-85. 
1212 British Embassy, Rome to IRD, ‘Six-monthly report on IRD material volume covering the period September 
1955 – April 1956’, FO 1110/899, NA. 
1213 British Consul, Genoa to IRD, ‘Report on the use of IRD material during the period June-October 1955’, FO 
1110/899, NA. 
1214 For example, R.S. Scriver to R. Murray, 'Report of the difficulties of getting IRD material published in the 
Austrian press', November 10, 1950, FO 1110/326, NA. 
1215 R.A. Burroughs to G.F.N. Reddaway, June 28, 1957; G.F.N. Reddaway to R.A. Burroughs, August 3, 1957, 
both FO 1110/991, NA. 
1216 Memorandum by B.J. Ching, 'IRD activities in Norway', May 13, 1953, FO 1110/576; British Embassy, Oslo to 
IRD, 'IRD Report - First Quarter 1956', April 17, 1956, FO 1110/905, both NA. 
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always that happy to distribute anti-communist propaganda unless it condemned their socialist 
rivals as well.1217 Another restricting factor was financial. Cuts introduced to British legations' 
information departments in the mid-1950s in Norway and in particular in Denmark1218 meant that 
the relative importance of the campaign in Finland actually grew during this period. 
The way IRD work was welcomed in Sweden, the most important country of comparison, 
also shows that distributing anti-communist propaganda in a country that was neutral yet free of 
direct Soviet pressure was not always that straightforward either. British anti-communist 
operations had got off to a good start in the country, as especially the social democrats were 
willing to reproduce IRD material and use it for distribution to speakers and incorporation in 
their party publications.1219 Towards the mid and late 1950s, however, it became increasingly 
evident for the British that the Swedes wished to adopt a more independent line also in political 
reporting based on the resentment of outsiders teaching them what to do and a more balanced 
presentation of the facts.1220 By the late 1950s, Swedish newspapers hardly ever published IRD 
feature articles as they preferred to produce their own original stories.1221 Furthermore, IRD 
publications had much fever recipients than, for instance, in Norway and in fact not that many 
more than they had in Finland.1222  
All this shows that the somewhat modest figures for the reproduction of longer articles in 
Finland was, in fact, not that unusual. Whereas in Finland the country's delicate position placed 
restrictions for anti-communist propaganda, a number of distinctively local conditions held 
back the use of IRD content in several other countries. This suggests that at least in terms of 
placing longer anti-communist articles in European newspapers, IRD propaganda was not as 
broad an activity in the mid-1950s as the FO would have hoped. The case of Sweden gives 
interesting evidence about how a more free operational environment for politicians and 
journalists did not automatically lead to the greater use of foreign content. In fact, the Finnish 
newspapers’ desire to directly publish privately-supplied foreign articles that were at times even 
aggressively anti-communist, made the IRD's work in Helsinki to some extent easier and more 
effective than that in Stockholm. When one also takes into account journalists' use of IRD 
publications as background material, which at least according to the British was broad1223, the 
convincing number of shorter IRD items included in Finnish publications, and the propaganda 
content's considerable covert and indirect use through organisations like the SAK and SYT, 
                                                 
1217 M.F. Cullis to J.H. Peck, February 18, 1953, FO 1110/576, NA. 
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1219 British Embassy, Stockholm, to Northern Department, May 12, 1948, FO 1110/27, NA. 
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British press operations in the 1950s can without much hesitation be regarded as effective, 
especially with the local circumstances in mind. 
 
Expansion Comes to Halt 
 
Despite a relative breakthrough having been made in Finland, the British were also quick to see 
new dark clouds emerging on the horizon as far as their propaganda activities were concerned. 
In a report written in July 1955, Ambassador Michael Creswell noted that the distribution of 
IRD material containing an anti-Russian slant and attributable to the British Embassy in any 
way was becoming increasingly embarrassing to the recipient, possibly even having an opposite 
effect to the one intended, which could impair Britain's relationship with Finns in official 
positions.1224 As a result, a somewhat more cautious distribution policy was adopted. The 
problem with IRD material, according to Creswell, was also that the anti-communist 
propaganda the Finns themselves produced was principally directed against their own 
communist party, while articles of the IRD were written for a wider public and the line between 
what was anti-communist and what anti-Soviet was often difficult to draw. 
British officials in Helsinki were now coming to the conclusion that the warming relations 
between Finland and the Soviet Union actually prevented a further expansion in the use of IRD 
material. According to them, the 'Geneva spirit', the return of Porkkala, and Finland’s entry into 
the Nordic Council and the UN had generated an environment in which newspaper editors did 
not feel free to criticise their neighbour.1225 This argument is interesting since the prevailing 
view among Finnish scholars has been that the return of Porkkala in particular gave Finnish 
newspapers more confidence to publish material criticising either the Soviets or leading 
politicians, mainly Prime Minister Kekkonen, who were regarded to cooperate with the eastern 
neighbours too closely.1226 Reading Finnish newspapers from that period shows that the 
adopted publishing policy was by far more liberal in terms of political reporting than it had been 
only a couple of years before. Indeed, one comes to the conclusion that the Finnish papers’ 
reluctance to publish even more IRD material had to do more with the content of the articles 
and their suitability to local circumstances. Moreover, the general atmosphere was definitely 
changing in Finland; people had had enough of the strictly fact-based hard-hitting political 
propaganda war. The Cold War battle was gradually taking a more cultural form, which was 
something IRD officials delivering the printed material did not entirely seem to grasp. 
The changing situation was, above all, reflected in the smaller number of Finnish 
publications printing IRD material. In 1956, short articles on East Germany, the satellites and 
Soviet cultural difficulties were still frequently reproduced by the Finns, but the activity was 
increasingly reliant on, in particular, Ilta-Sanomat and Kansan Lehti, the Tampere-based social 
democratic paper with a somewhat modest circulation. For instance, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, 
earlier the main instrument for British propaganda, published less IRD material than it had 
done only a couple of years before. The paper had, according to the British, now adopted the 
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role of being the main organ of one of the two government parties and as a result was not 
expected to digress too much from official policy. Furthermore, the publication had not found 
an adequate replacement for “Jahvetti” Kilpeläinen, which obviously reduced the number of 
included articles written in an anti-communist tone.1227 Browsing through editions of Suomen 
Sosialidemokraatti from the mid-1950s reveals that the British estimation was not entirely 
justified. While the paper did not include direct attacks against the Soviet Union nor the witty 
remarks made by Kilpeläinen, it did give visible coverage to negative developments in Eastern 
Europe, such as the mass demonstrations held in Poland in June 1956 that led to dozens of 
victims.1228 Furthermore, the publication continued its policy of giving a considerable amount of 
column inches to both British and American labour issues, such as workers’ social security, a 
theme promoted by propaganda units both in London and Washington.1229 It would seem that 
the disappointment the British expressed over Suomen Sosialidemokraatti reflected more the 
emerging concerns over the less critical attitude certain leading social democratic politicians, 
most notably Väinö Leskinen, were developing towards the Soviet Union rather than an actual 
suspicion of the paper’s publication policies.1230 
While Suomen Sosialidemokraatti reduced its use of IRD content, Kansan Lehti turned into one 
of the most effective outlets for British anti-communist propaganda. The paper’s desire to 
include IRD material was, undoubtedly, to a large extent determined by Arvo Tuominen’s 
appointment as its Leading Editor in 1956. As all the sensation over the publication of his 
memoirs proved, Tuominen continued to have a significant part to play in the political 
propaganda war, both at home and overseas. Both the British and the Americans considered 
him as one of their most important contacts in Finland and were in regular contact with him to 
discuss the suitability of their content for Kansan Lehti.1231 The former communist’s insights over 
the Soviet Union were also sought after by other international actors, including The Reader’s 
Digest, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation, which came up with the idea to interview Mr 
Tuominen for a talk series produced to discuss Marxism 75 years after Karl Marx’s death.1232 
Tuominen’s role as an expert of Soviet matters and communism reached something of a climax 
in June 1954 when he gave a lecture on communist parties in Finland and Scandinavia at 
Oxford University. The FO might have had its hands on this visit since the invitation was sent 
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1231 For instance in 1957, Tuominen was visited by Ambassador Hickerson and Press Assistant Gilbert Austin, who 
wished to discuss the suitability of USIS material for Kansan Lehti. J.D. Hickerson to A. Tuominen, October 29, 
1957, AT, box 7 G.F. Austin to A. Tuominen, November 14, 1957, AT, box 6, both KA. The British also ranked 
Tuominen as one of their most influential contacts. For example, D.L. Busk to M.G.L. Joy, February 18, 1959, FO 
1110/1201, NA. 
1232 S. Salminen to A. Tuominen, December 2, 1957, AT, box 14; H. Purre to A. Tuominen, November 11, 1958; 
V. Obolensky to A. Tuominen, February 20, 1958, both AT, box 11, all KA. 
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to Mr Tuominen through Rex Bosley, an old friend who also acted as the Finns’ interpreter 
during his visit.1233  
The dissatisfaction the British Embassy expressed over the diminishing number of Finnish 
publications reproducing British propaganda concerned, above all, Coalition Party-associated 
papers. From the British point of view, in particular Uusi Suomi's use of IRD content or even 
straight COI-produced material was much more sporadic than could be expected from a 
leading conservative publication.1234 Again, the British officials' disappointment does not tell the 
whole truth about the paper. In fact, Uusi Suomi kept publishing plenty of British political 
content particularly after Eero Petäjäniemi, who was now the paper’s Chief Editor, instructed 
the paper’s London correspondent Tauno Kuosa to use more content from papers like The 
Times, The Guardian, The Economist and especially The Daily Telegraph with which the Finnish paper 
continued to have a cooperative agreement.1235 Since at least The Daily Telegraph and The 
Economist had a close relationship with the IRD, this development did no harm to the British 
propaganda campaign.1236 Indeed, although Uusi Suomi did not directly publish a great degree of 
British anti-communist propaganda articles, most likely partly because of their extensive length, 
it is probable that the IRD managed to push its message through at least partly due to the 
publication’s comprehensive use of other British newspaper and news agency material. The 
inclusion of British propaganda in smaller Finnish newspapers remained a more direct affair. 
Many of the papers published in the provinces continued to be among the best outlets for 
British material, as Information Officer David Edwards was happy to declare in public when 
leaving the country in July 1955. Undoubtedly, Mr Edwards knew what he was talking about as 
he had visited every single Finnish editorial staff during his three-year stay in the country.1237 
As the expansion of reproduced British anti-communist content seemed to come to a halt, the 
British Embassy again focused on widening its field contacts. Contacting youth organisations and 
teachers and distributing material to them was particularly eagerly suggested by the IRD1238, but at 
least in 1956 there was no notable success in this field.1239 Even though the British officials posted 
in Helsinki regarded themselves as reasonably active in anti-communist work, this was another 
indication that their campaign was once again entering a new phase. When saying this, however, 
one must emphasise that this change did not take place overnight. Indeed, if in 1955, according to 
the British, the Finnish press had adopted a more uncritical policy towards the Soviet Union, 
events taking place in the next couple of years ensured that the Finns were at times more than 
willing to publish anti-communist IRD material again. 
It is also important to note that British anti-communist activities in Finland did not only 
concern the delivery of printed content. In June 1955, in order to counter the Soviet Peace 
Campaign, and undoubtedly to boost overall activity, the IRD not only urged British missions 
                                                 
1233 R. Bosley to A. Tuominen, January 24, 1954; A. Tuominen to R. Bosley, June 15, 1954, both AT, box 6, KA. 
For more about Tuominen’s visit to Oxford, see Seppälä 1983, p. 211. 
1234 H.M. Pullar to H.A.H. Cortazzi, February 11, 1956, FO 1110/921, NA. 
1235 E. Petäjäniemi to T. Kuosa, October 1, 1956; E. Petäjäniemi to T. Kuosa, October 9, 1956, both US, box 47, KA. 
1236 Jenks 2006, pp. 82-83, 86. 
1237 Hufvudstadsbladet, July 9, 1955. 
1238 J. Saunders to British Legation, May 9, 1955, FO 1110/808, NA. 
1239 H.M. Pullar to H.A.H. Cortazzi, February 11, 1956, FO 1110/921, NA. 
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to expand their influential contacts, but also demanded them to send more intelligence to 
London concerning communist activities and any weak spots that could be exploited by 
them.1240 The latter task was relatively easy in Finland as, in particular, the SDP was more than 
happy to supply the British and Americans with information they collected through their 
extensive intelligence organisation, which consisted of members from the worker level to the 
party leadership.1241  
British officials posted in Finland found a chance to resist the impact of the international 
peace campaign at first hand when it was announced that the communist-run World Peace 
Assembly was to be held in Helsinki in June 1955. Considering that Britain’s official policy 
towards such events was usually to undermine their importance, the British Embassy put a 
considerable amount of effort to protest about the sensibility of allowing such a gathering in 
Finland since it would, according to Ambassador Creswell, only lead to outside criticism over 
the country’s true position.1242 When the peace conference was given the go-ahead, the FO 
made sure that Britain’s presence in Helsinki would not be forgotten during the event by 
organising a visit by the Royal Navy’s fast minelayer Apollo to the city, a move that Mr Creswell 
had discussed with the Finnish Foreign Ministry beforehand.1243 At least as the IRD paper 
prepared over the communist gathering concluded, this operation stole the show from the 
assembly completely, as most Finnish newspapers gave Apollo extensive coverage while 
ignoring the communist gathering altogether.1244  
Once again, this was a rather bold claim considering that the American campaign against the 
peace assembly overshadowed even the British one. In addition to protesting the organisation of 
such an event in the Finnish capital in beforehand, the US response involved the opening of the 
USIA’s Atoms for Peace exhibition at Svenska Handelshögskolan in Helsinki, the visit of Chief 
Justice Earl Warren to the American Days held in Hämeenlinna and the concerts given by the 
Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra in Helsinki, which were the first performances in Finland 
under the Special International Program for Cultural Presentations.1245 The American objective of 
moving the attention away from the conference certainly proved successful judging by the 
number of column inches the Finnish press gave to all of the events1246, although it has to be said 
that many local newspapers had decided to give minimum coverage to the assembly regardless of 
                                                 
1240 IRD to all posts, June 6, 1955, FO 1110/716, NA. 
1241 Salminen, Juhani, Asevelijuntta – Kertomus asevelisukupolven kommunismin taistelusta 1940─1959 (Helsinki 
1996), pp. 84─91. 
1242 Memorandum: ‘Some remarks made by Ambassador Creswell’, by E. A. Wuori, February 3, 1955, Urho Kekkosen 
arkisto (Herafter UKA), box 21/44, Tasavallan presidentin arkistosäätiö (Herafter TPA), Orimattila, Finland. 
1243 The visit was officially made in remembrance of the 100th anniversary of the Crimean War. When discussing the 
matter with the Finns, Creswell inquired whether the authorities would oppose similar visits taking place every year. 
According to Permanent Secretary Rafael Seppälä, no complaints had been made over such visits. ‘Memorandum of 
the discussion with Ambassador Creswell', by R.R. Seppälä’, April 13, 1955, UKA, box 21/44, TPA. 
1244 ‘World Peace Assembly, Helsinki, June 22-29, 1955’, July 15, 1955, FO 975/96, NA. For newspaper coverage 
given to Apollo, see for example, Helsingin Sanomat, June 22, 1955 & June 24, 1955. 
1245 Progress Report on NSC 5403, United States Policy Toward Finland, November 23, 1955, White House 
Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-81, OCB Central File Series, box 29, DDEL; 'President Kekkonen's Visit, 
Background paper, 'Educational and Cultural Exchange Program with Finland'', October 9, 1961, CU, Post Reports 
(PR), box 317, UAL.  
1246 For Atoms for Peace, for example, Helsingin Sanomat, May 16, 1955, for Earl Warren’s visit, for example, Uusi 
Suomi, June 27, 1955, for the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra, for example, Ilta-Sanomat, June 26, 27 & 28, 1955. 
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all the American activities taking place.1247 What Washington's highly conspicuous response, from 
a British perspective, reaffirmed was that by the mid-1950s the Americans were playing in an 
altogether different league as far as overseas informational and cultural operations went. 
 
Revealing Communist Injustices 
 
A brief examination of the content of IRD material reproduced by Finnish newspapers 
supports the view that in the mid-1950s Finland was not remarkably different from many other 
countries when it came to the publication of even controversial political content. The British 
Embassy in Helsinki did not usually provide the FO with detailed lists of articles sent to and 
published by Finnish papers, but the reports written during this particular period1248 make it 
possible both to two draw some general conclusions of the material the British wished the 
Finns to read and to examine the articles' relation to other published content. 
What stands out when reading the feature articles and comparing them to the original IRD 
texts are their shorter length and concentration mainly on Eastern Europe rather than the 
Soviet Union. Even after British information officers had reduced the stories' size and made 
adjustments to their content, they remained so extensive and informative that they could hardly 
be missed by the reader. The Finnish newspapers publishing the articles, mostly Ilta-Sanomat and 
Kansan Lehti, made the stories even more visible by often placing them next to the editorials and 
perceivably stating their writer, often a prominent reporter assigned by the IRD. In this way, the 
publications made it clear that the article in question was by no means written by a member of 
their staff but a foreign commentator.  
The feature articles dealing with Easter Europe usually concerned a certain difficulty in one 
of the satellites, most commonly in East Germany or Poland. The reports were predominantly 
factual but they usually included some sort of a personal comment on the problem in a wider 
context. For example, an article published by Ilta-Sanomat in May 1955, with the headline ‘The 
Red German Army’ rather analytically anticipated the signing of the Warsaw Pact through the 
growing Soviet influence in the East German Army, but at the same time pointed out how the 
increasing number of fugitives to the West gave an illustrative picture of the East German 
Army's morale and of the intense political pressure under which particularly officers were.1249  
Reports on the worsening position of East German workers, for instance, concerning their 
rights to strike as well problems in industrial production and food supplies were even more typical 
subjects than the army or the number of refugees. News about shortages on foodstuff and other 
agricultural constraints were often successfully placed in Finnish provincial papers such as Ilkka, 
which in May 1955 published a report according to which only 86 per cent of East Germany’s 
most essential provisions could be supplied.1250 The position of East German workers was 
                                                 
1247 In addition to the US, the British observed that a number of leading Finnish papers decided to give minimum 
coverage to the assembly. ‘World Peace Assembly, Helsinki, June 22-29, 1955’, July 15, 1955, FO 975/96, NA. 
1248 The following document provides the most detailed list of IRD articles published in Finnish newspapers: H.M. 
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broadly covered in articles such as David Laidlaw’s, another of IRD's fake bylines1251, ‘Recalling 
the East German June Revolt’, which looked back at the rebellious activity that took place two 
years earlier. According to the writer, the situation had gone from bad to worse since then, as the 
East German state and the communist party had focused strongly on stripping the trade unions 
of their few remaining rights.1252 The East German situation was also visibly covered in Julius 
Gold’s unusually aggressive piece in which he compared the East German leaders’ attitude to 
tolerance and liberty to that of Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler. 1253  
As for the situation in Poland, the difference of opinion between some leading figures of the 
Polish Church and Vatican on communism was an obvious propaganda weapon for the British 
also in Finland, as was the popularity of religion and theological studies in Poland as compared 
to that of Communist-Marxist philosophy.1254 Poland was also used as an example of a 
communist country in which cultural life was very restricted and almost entirely party-run. A 
good example of this was a two-series report written by Andrzej Panufnik, the Polish composer 
who had deflected to Britain in 1954. In his text published in Ilta-Sanomat with the title 
‘Composers and Commissars’, Panufnik gave a thorough account of the poor conditions artists 
faced in communist countries both financially and artistically, and claimed that their only 
possibility was to succumb to party regulations.1255 An isolated position from any Western 
influence and the communists’ constant anti-Western propaganda made matters even worse 
and were among the main reasons why nothing interesting or original had been composed in 
communist countries, the writer noted.1256  
The British officials' realisation that the Finns' sensitivity to propaganda made the use of 
stories based on completely inaccurate information, or crude propaganda, more or less 
unnecessary meant that such material was rarely even offered to them. This also applied to the 
shorter news items that were distributed to Finnish newspapers through the weekly bulletin. A 
list of the short items placed in Finnish newspapers in the latter part of 1955 shows that they 
also most typically dealt with matters in the satellite countries as well as the decline of 
communism in Europe. The most circulated items had such titles as ‘Poland’s Refugees’, 
'Austrian Communists Leaving Party’, ‘Meat Shortage’, ‘History and “Truth”’, 'Arrested in 
Wismuth Uranium Mines’ and ‘Football Spectators Imprisoned’.1257 In addition to jokes from 
behind the Iron Curtain and reports on the ever impressive industrial and technological 
progress taking place in Britain, these kinds of stories made up the core of the British press 
bulletin's political and economic content in the mid-1950s.1258 
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1255 Ilta-Sanomat, June 22, 1955. 
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The published IRD articles' coverage of the Soviet Union supports the view that the mid-
1950s was a period when the Finnish press published content that they were not willing to 
publish earlier. The majority of the anti-Soviet articles criticised the country somewhat 
indirectly, but some articles included such fierce attacks against its regime that a Finnish writer 
could not have necessarily written them without any consequences even during this time. 
 By the indirect criticism of the Soviet Union, I mean the common way with which, in 
particular, shorter stories placed a specific part of the Soviet system under examination rather than 
judging it as a whole. This approach was most typically followed in articles on culture. For 
example, Soviet architecture was criticised, as was social realism, which, according to the article by 
journalist Armand Rousseau restricted all forms of art, in particular painting, to a point of 
banality. According to the writer, real emotions were impossible to express in a country where 
even love songs were forbidden.1259 The strategy of condemning the Soviet Union only indirectly 
was also followed in articles on difficulties faced by satellite countries as well as in jokes from 
behind the Iron Curtain, which made fun of the communist system in a pleasant way without 
hardly any sign of aggression or judgement. The jokes, published in Ilta-Sanomat, were most 
typically related to inefficiencies in production in the satellite countries, but at times also in the 
Soviet Union itself.1260 Many of the shorter IRD items reporting about a development in the 
Soviet Union, such as food supply shortages, were also often relatively neutral in tone as they 
rarely attacked the communist system, but merely noted some specific facts. In at least one article, 
published by Ilkka, the writer even gave credit for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union for giving 
information about their difficulties and, therefore, admitting their existence.1261 
These kinds of examples were rare in the longer stories dealing with communism and the 
Soviet Union in a more general sense, which made up the most visible anti-Soviet propaganda 
published by the Finnish press. The articles were most typically broad accounts on the decline 
of the popularity of communism in both Western and Eastern Europe and included detailed 
figures for the fall of party membership in every leading European country. These reports were 
not, however, mere fact lists as they often commented on the gloomy future of communism 
and the Soviet Union by, for instance, picking up the growing crime rates in Russia and 
interpreting them as signs of the damaging effects of the communist way of life, as Edward 
Carran did in an article published by Ilta-Sanomat.1262 Some articles condemning Soviet foreign 
policy were also published in Finland. The British must have felt that, for instance, political 
author Peter Calvocoressi’s ‘Neutral Zone Behind the Iron Curtain’ was particularly suitable for 
distribution in Finland as it claimed that after the declaration of a neutral Austria, it was in the 
Soviet interest to extend the neutralisation process to other European countries, such as 
Yugoslavia, Italy and even West Germany, and gradually win them over.1263  
Perhaps the hardest attacks the British made against the Soviet Union in IRD articles 
published in Finland concerned colonialism, a subject that the Soviets loved to use against 
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Britain. Articles such as Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart’s ‘Communist Colonialism’ first explained 
the traditions of British colonial policy and stated, accompanied by favourable comments from 
leading colonials, that it had prepared ground for home rule in, for instance, India and Pakistan 
and that in the long run the progress in the colonies was made at the expense of the owner. 
According to Lockhart, the objective of Soviet colonialism, on the other hand, was to subdue 
all nationalist ambitions, for instance, in the Baltic States by increasing the number of Russians 
in ruling positions all over the Soviet empire. “The Soviet policy differs from the tsarist era only 
for its even greater ruthlessness and it is based on the assumption that Moscow is and has to be 
the capital of communism”, the writer pointed out.1264  
Education was another subject favoured by the IRD that found its way to Finnish 
newspapers. In one of the more offensive articles, 'David Laidlaw' noted that children in 
communist countries, in particular the Soviet Union, were subject to party propaganda from a 
very early age and not able to develop as persons freely and naturally.1265 An even more 
common theme for the longer IRD items was the examination of Soviet leaders and their 
ruthless behaviour. An article written by Walter Kolarz gave a thorough account on how after 
his execution Lavrenty Beria had been used as a scapegoat by the Soviet leadership, allowing it 
to wash its hands of the gravest mistakes made in satellite policy and the accusations over 
Russia being a police state. “None of the living communist leaders is as useful to the 
communist cause in the Soviet Union as the dead Beria”, Kolarz pointed out.1266 The power 
struggle taking place in Moscow and its consequences were also covered from various 
perspectives in articles by writers like Robert Bruce Lockhart and Leonard Schapiro. As an 
expert of Soviet propaganda, Lockhart gave a detailed account on the difficulties the Kremlin 
faced when trying to re-explain the historic roles of Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky in, for instance, 
school textbooks.1267 Schapiro, another influential person specialising in the Soviet 
administrative system, analysed how the enforcement of political power through the army and 
the police had been used during the power struggle.1268 Both the feature articles and the short 
items also included reports on communism on other continents1269, a development that would 
become increasingly common in the upcoming years. 
When placing the published IRD articles into a larger context, one can notice that they were 
not always that different from the other foreign content published on the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. By the mid-1950s, for instance Helsingin Sanomat and Suomen Sosialidemokraatti 
had only increased their coverage of Finland's communist neighbour both through editorials 
and foreign news agencies' material. Although the majority of, for instance, Helsingin Sanomat's 
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content regarding the Soviet Union was neutral, the use of foreign commentary articles from 
figures like Walter Lippman and Henry Shapiro, UP's long-time correspondent in Moscow, 
made sure that the reader was regularly kept informed about recent political and economic 
developments taking place in the country.1270 For instance, Shapiro's long article series 
published at the turn of 1953 and 1954 gave a detailed account on the Soviet Union's foreign 
policy as well as the wage-price relation in the country and the demise of the Stalin cult.1271 An 
article series on the radical changes required to improve the Soviet Union's agricultural 
productivity, credited to The Times1272, also provided the Finns with information that could not 
necessarily been written by a local writer. Also these kinds of reports could easily have been 
produced by the IRD, and in some cases undoubtedly were, such was their analytical approach 
to the various large-scale problems with which the communist countries were dealing. What 
often made the IRD-based articles stand out from the other foreign content was, however, their 
writers' ability to provide the reader with a more in-depth focus on a single topic. This quality 
usually made their stories not only more detailed but also more interesting than the broader 
overviews focusing on, for instance, the industrial outlook in the Soviet Union. In other words, 
the IRD-produced material offered a level of expertise that often could not have been matched 
even by the most prominent of political observers. 
 
US Makes Its Presence Felt 
 
While the British focused on finding new ways to make the distribution of their individual anti-
communist articles more effective, the Americans gave more emphasis on developing their 
propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland as a whole. The rapid pace at which the USIS's 
operations had expanded since the early 1950s had made the overall campaign's coordination 
somewhat troublesome. Furthermore, developments related to Finland's political position, the 
United States' adaptation of a more evolutionary propaganda strategy and the rise of new media 
technologies generated the need to examine the informational and cultural programme in 
Finland in new light. 
 The first modifications to the operations were mainly made due to inadequate programme 
coordination. A report on an USIA inspector’s visit made in autumn 1955 gave a particularly 
gloomy picture of the way in which some of the tasks of the USIS/Helsinki were being carried 
out. In general, the inspector saw that there existed an opportunity for the office to implement 
a more active programme in the country by, for instance, expanding the areas of cooperation 
with other posts in the Nordic region. Moreover, he found no evidence of any attempt to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the programme in attaining the determined psychological 
objectives. As for individual media, the report criticised particularly the motion picture 
programme for its lack of general planning and detailed instructions for the selection of 
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organisations to which films were loaned out.1273 The serious deficiencies the inspector also 
found in the utilisation of IPS special feature material and the promotion of VOA English-
language programmes beamed to the Nordic area not only reveal that the officials in Helsinki 
had started to feel too complacent about their work, but also suggests that the American way of 
running a great variety of informational and cultural activities from a single office was not 
necessarily always the most efficient operational model. 
The inspection report led to almost immediate changes in the coordination of the US 
programme. In addition to increasing staff meetings, a special in-service training programme for 
the staff, including the ambassador, was introduced. As for media activity, the use of motion 
picture materials was now made more systematic by, for example, reorganising the film library. 
Moving the USIS Information Centre and its library to new premises found at Kaivotalo in 
central Helsinki brought a much-welcomed remedy to the difficulties caused by the lack of 
adequate space.1274 Particularly the latter development indicates that the inspector's visit led to 
concrete adjustments rather than mere words written to Washington.  
 The most significant development in the attempt of carrying the USIS message over to the 
Finnish public was the special emphasis placed on field activity, which included American 
officials' travels to the countryside and the attempt to build closer ties with prominent locals. 
The need to have more direct contact with Finns living outside the Helsinki region, the 
overwhelming majority of the population, had, of course, been realised before, and the 
ambassador, USIS officers and even Fulbright students had visited some of the leading cities 
each year. Ambassador Jack McFall took the provincial visits to an altogether new level by 
setting himself the target of visiting every single Finnish community with over 5,000 inhabitants 
during his stay in Finland.1275 As a result of his numerous travels, many of which won 
considerable media attention1276, McFall had developed a relationship with the Finns that the 
Finnish-American Society described as exceptionally close when he was forced to leave the 
country due to illness in autumn 1955.1277 In 1957, the USIS felt that even more should be done 
for reaching Finns living in the provinces and introduced a special field organisation that was to 
be managed by a separately appointed field programme officer. The Americans wished to plan 
the new unit's activities as thoroughly as possible and made sure that before the launch of any 
field operation the areas of misinformation they particularly wished to rectify were examined in 
studies made by the local Gallup Poll organisation Suomen Gallup Oy.1278  
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Not unlike the British, the Americans felt that a large network of contacts throughout the 
entire country would be of real value in implementing an information and cultural programme. 
The most useful persons for this purpose were, naturally, individuals familiar with the American 
way of life, such as ASLA returnees, Finnish-American Society members, other former visitors 
to the US and English study club members as well as leaders of such target group organisations 
as adult education centres, residential folk high schools and the cooperatives. In the latter 
category, special attention was given to contacting teachers at adult education centres and 
supplying them with American films and books. Timberjacks working in highly remote areas 
also continued to be close to the USIS officials' heart, and the mobile film unit visited several 
timber camps during the busiest part of the season when the camps were filled with men. As 
for the printed word, the new programme urged field programme assistants to pay more visits 
to local newspapers and report about their editors' views on the actual value of the American 
content sent to them. In addition, the assistants were requested to carry with them the standard 
USIS distribution materials, such as the illustrated maps, sample copies of Aikamme magazine 
and the Facts about the USA pamphlets, as well the Finnish translations of History of American 
Labour and American School System.1279  
Of all the expanded field activities introduced in Finland in 1957, the Americans ranked the 
trips made by Ambassador John Hickerson to the interior towns as perhaps the most successful. 
Mr Hickerson’s visits to, for example, the cities of Lahti, Jyväskylä and Oulu, and the public 
meetings held during them attracted good audiences as well as resulted in extensive media 
coverage.1280 A natural stop for Hickerson was also Haukipudas where a new labour institute was 
opened in 1957 partly thanks to the CIA money that had filtered through the ICTFU.1281  
The Americans also gave increasing attention to supporting the Finnish-American societies 
around the country simply because they regarded them as highly valuable public relations 
organisations for the US. The USIS soon started providing the local chapters with, for example, 
a larger number of American films as well as taped copies of VOA music programmes. In the 
mid-1950s, in particular, the societies’ role in presenting and distributing films about the US 
grew, as many of the films they loaned out, most often the historical documentary Coast to Coast 
and film director Sakari Kulhia’s Travel Glimpses of the USA, were now screened at Finnish public 
schools as well. Films, radio scripts and the loan collections of books the USIS library sent to 
local libraries that hosted English clubs were all used for teaching English to society members. 
American Fulbright lecturers also assisted in teaching, as did the British Council teacher-
secretaries, who partly coordinated the activity. Although clearly lagging behind the British in 
teaching English, the establishment of a language institute providing qualified language exams at 
the leading Finnish-American society in Helsinki from 1955 onwards offered the Americans an 
opportunity to make a proper entry to this particular field as well.1282 
                                                                                                                                                   
most. USIS Helsinki to USIA, Washington, ‘A Field Program for Finland’, April 23, 1957, RG 306, Office of 
Research (Hereafter OR), Country Project Correspondence 1952─1963 (Hereafter CPC), box 5, NARA. 
1279 Ibid. 
1280 Ibid. 
1281 J.D. Hickerson to E. Antikainen, April 24, 1957, SAK KV 1957, TA, Majander 2007, p. 234. 
1282 'Kertomus Suomalais-Amerikkalaisen Yhdistyksen toiminnasta v. 1955', Vuosikokousten pöytäkirjat, box 2, 
SAYL, KA; Suomi-Finland USA 6/1956. 
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The changes inspired by the inspector’s report, in particular the introduction of the new field 
programme, certainly gave USIS activities in Finland extra momentum. Due to the 
reorganisation efforts, the more liberal general climate drifting over Finland and the emergence 
of popular culture one can draw the conclusion that the American campaign was at its most 
successful between 1956 and 1958. Even if the environment had become more favourable for 
USIS operations, the Americans did not, however, change their basic approach to how they had 
envisioned their role in the country. The US Country Plan for Finland continued noting, 
following the lines of the NSC, that Finland was not a country in which the USIS should engage 
in open ideological warfare with the Soviet Union and that it was not the purpose of the US 
Mission to convince the Finnish Government to join Western coalitions.1283 Within this 
framework, the USIS's objective was to administer a selective programme designed so that it 
would not expose Finland to retaliatory pressures from the Soviet Union. The Americans 
wished to follow in the execution of their operations a ‘middle way’, a programme that would 
be prudent and selective while not being passive or anaemic.  
The way in which American documents evaluate the Finnish propaganda environment in the 
mid-1950s also bolsters the claim that the US campaign was at its most powerful during this 
period. Officials in Finland did not share the British view that the more liberal breeze blowing 
over Finland would not necessarily increase the Finns' use of political propaganda. Although 
the Americans recognised that Finland remained a challenging country for distributing more 
controversial content, the founding of SYT together with the expanding global anti-communist 
movement gave their task of exposing the flaws of communism plenty of valuable support. 
Among the organisations with a wider international influence was Moral Re-Armament (MRA), 
the organisation founded by Frank Buchman in the 1930s on the foundation of the so-called 
Oxford Group. MRA based its ideology on Christianity and morality and acted in the belief that 
a moral recovery would not only lead to peace but bring economic and social stability to the 
world as well. In the 1950s, the organisation started to emphasise its resentment of 
communism, and as a result attracted a number of prominent international figures such as 
Konrad Adenauer as its supporters.  
While no evidence suggests that the US officials and MRA, funded mainly by private 
businesses1284, cooperated in Finland, it is clear that that the rapidly growing organisation made 
the American quest of creating a more anti-communist climate in Finland easier. Apart from 
winning plenty of media coverage, the movement received open support from several actors 
mainly from the political right, most notably the Coalition Party MP Margit Borg-Sundman. As 
MRA's activities in Finland date back to the 1930s, this development did not take place 
                                                 
1283 J.J. McTigue to Director of USIA, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA. 
1284 In Finland, MRA’s activities were funded by a number of large businesses and private donors such as Kone Oy, 
whose President Heikki Herlin strongly endorsed the movement's philosophy both at the workplace and in his 
personal life. Besides funding MRA, Herlin took an active part in, for instance, its informational operations. After 
the movement went through radical changes in the mid-1950s, Herlin became alienated from its work and finished 
his backing for the activities. Some claims have been cast about the CIA’s involvement in MRA’s funding both in 
Finland and abroad, but at least Finnish sources do not provide any evidence of this. Michelsen, Karl-Erik, Kone - 
Perhe, yrittäjyys ja yritys teollisuuden vuosisadalla (Helsinki 2013), pp. 211-212, 222-224, 266-267, 275, 286; 
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overnight.1285 The organisation remained somewhat passive in the first post-war years, but for 
instance the arrangement of a tour for the industrial play The Forgotten Factor and the distribution 
of Peter Howard's book Ideas Have Legs gradually increased its conspicuousness among the 
public.1286 In the mid-1950s, MRA’s increasing activities in Finland included the organisation of 
film tours for such productions as the Finnish MRA movie Vastaus ('The Answer'), which 
presented the message that workplace conflicts could not be solved through class struggle to 
tens of thousands of Finns1287, and the distribution of more books from Mr Howard as well as 
MRA:n uutisia, MRA:n tiedotuslehti and MRA:n kuvalehti, the organisation’s publications in 
Finland. The latter papers often included thorough analyses of not only Christianity and 
morality, but also labour issues around the world.1288 
While the expanding anti-communist movement increased the coverage of more 
controversial issues in Finnish newspapers, American officials in Finland could realign their 
broader objective of giving more attention to the promotion of the scientific, economic and 
social achievements of their country. The image of the US being the leading country of 
innovation and progress was enhanced, in particular, by the distribution of stories on the 
breakthroughs made in the treatment of cancer, polio and painkilling drugs.1289 The most visible 
science-related operation in the mid-1950s was the Atoms for Peace campaign, which in 
addition to the exhibition held in Helsinki involved the distribution of printed material on the 
numerous possibilities the peaceful use of the atom would bring, the screening of atom-related 
movies and the donation of a special atom library collection to the Helsinki University of 
Technology.1290 What was common to all these activities, besides projecting American 
technological superiority, was that they regarded the United States’, and in particular President 
Eisenhower’s, proposal of the establishment of an international agency for the peaceful 
management of atomic energy as crucial in making the world a safer and more enlightened 
place.1291 In Finland, as in the rest of the world, the massive propaganda campaign following the 
proposal had the obvious aim of forcing the Soviets on the defensive again by placing the 
responsibility for disarmament directly in their hands.1292 
                                                 
1285 In the 1930s, a group of Finns started to spread the moral message mainly by importing relevant literature and 
offering extracts of them for publication in Finnish newspapers and magazines. Ekstrand, Sixten, Tro och moral. 
Oxfordgrupprörelsen och MRA i Finland 1932-1955 (Turku 1993), pp. 42-65. 
1286 For example, M. Borg-Sundman to P. Blake and L. Hemphill, October 1, 1948, Margit Borg-Sundman's 
collection, box 9, KA; Invitation to see ‘Unohdettu Tekijä’, September 15, 1948, Moraalisen varustautumisen säätiö 
(Currently IofC Suomi-säätiö) (Hereafter MRA), Helsinki, Finland. 
1287 The Finnish MRA movie ‘Vastaus’ caught plenty of attention both in Finland and among foreign MRA 
activists. New versions of it were produced at least in English and Dutch. J. Albert de Brauw to MRA Finland, 
October 21, 1953; MRA Finland to J. Albert de Brauw, December 3, 1953, MRA. Suomen Kuvalehti, 16/1952; 
Vesikansa 2004a, p. 62. 
1288 For example, MRA:n uutisia, 2-3/1952; 3/1952; 5-6/1952, MRA. 
1289 Aikamme was particularly eager to include such articles, but they were frequently included by larger papers as 
well. For example, Aikamme 3/1953. 
1290 For example, Ilta-Sanomat, May 16, 1955; Helsingin Sanomat, June 2, 1955. 
1291 ‘Atomi – ihmisen palvelija’ (USIS Helsinki 1955) (published also in Aikamme 2/1954); The movie scripts for 
’Atomic Power for Peace’, Foreign Version, December 28, 1953 and ’ The Atom in the Service of Humanity’, English 
and Foreign Versions, January 17, 1956, both RG 306, Movie Scripts, 1942-1965, Entry 1098, Box 3, NARA. 
1292 The propaganda in Finland followed very closely the campaign's two-level tactic, which on one level discredited 
Soviet peace overtures and on another sought to manage people's fears of nuclear annihilation by cultivating the 
image of the "friendly atom". For example, Osgood 2006, pp. 154-155. 
 
 
246 
 
The growing share claimed by science and technology in American overseas propaganda from 
the mid-1950s onwards is well reflected by the USIA films from that time period. Documentaries 
on, for instance, medicine, aeronautical innovations, communications technology and industrial 
skills were produced in their hundreds and they, together with films promoting American culture, 
formed an integral part of the USIA’s overseas motion picture campaign.1293 16-mm films like 
Wings to the Future and Television in Your Community were now also presented in the Finnish 
language, giving viewers an image of the US as a superior player in the commercial airline business 
and a mass producer of television broadcasts.1294 The first title, in particular, epitomised the 
USIA’s quest of presenting the US as a country that offered people of the free world entirely new 
lifestyle possibilities through the introduction of such innovations as the large American aircraft, 
which would enable humans to “fly like birds”, and the helicopter, which could be effectively 
used for, for instance, emergency healthcare and fire fighting also in peacetime. 
 
Using Surveys as Propaganda Tools 
 
As US propaganda turned more sophisticated in the mid-1950s, the importance of the USIA’s 
vast research and analysis division grew. The collection of information from around the world, 
together with the evaluation of the results of certain publicity campaigns and the general 
international opinion, started to play a major role in the way in which American operations were 
planned and executed. USIA officials gave particular attention to the way their country was 
perceived by people in larger Western Union countries, which, albeit in general complementary, 
continued to include an element of disdain for its more materialistic values.1295 The use of 
evaluation studies and polls as valuable background information was also common practice in 
Finland. In fact, USIA documents reveal that the USIS/Helsinki engaged in more evaluation 
than the average comparable posts.1296 
The studies conducted in Finland consisted of larger polls and so-called flash surveys, which 
were of smaller scale and intended to give a quick overview of public reaction to specific events. 
At least all the larger studies were carried out by Suomen Gallup, which used its normal 
statistical methods in their execution. The way the company dealt with its research targets 
impressed USIA officials, who felt that their wording of the questions and the presentation of 
results were very well done, objective and easily understood.1297 
The surveys concerning the Atoms for Peace exhibition held in Helsinki in 1955 offer a good 
example of how the studies were executed and what the Americans wished to learn from them. 
Similar studies were carried out throughout the world, so in this way they also reflect the US 
Government's informational strategy on a broader scale. First of all, Suomen Gallup conducted 
                                                 
1293 ‘United States Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Motion Pictures and Filmstrips – Selected and Available for 
Use Abroad' (USIA, Washington 1958). 
1294 The films ‘Wings to the Future’ (USIA 1954) and ’Television and the Community’ (USIA 1955), KAVI. 
1295 This conclusion was drawn, for instance, in a 140-page survey on the image of the US in Western Europe 
written in 1959. 'The Image of America in Western Europe', Office of Research and Analysis, USIA, US President's 
Committee on Information Activities Abroad, Records, 1959-61, box 4, DDEL.  
1296 ‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA. 
1297 USIA to USIS/Helsinki, ‘Usefulness of the “Flash” survey’, March 29, 1957, RG 306, OR, CPC, box 5, NARA.  
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two surveys on the subject for the USIS/Helsinki, one before the exhibition in April and the 
other afterwards in July, to discover how successful the event had been. The main purposes of the 
surveys were to explore to what extent the people of Helsinki were aware that atomic energy is 
being developed and used for peaceful purposes and whether they had heard of President 
Eisenhower’s proposal over the establishment of a supranational atomic agency.1298 Exactly the 
same questions were presented to a sample group of similar size after the exhibition.  
As it turned out, there was a clear need for informing the Finns about the way in which the 
US wished to present the development of atomic energy. According to the first study, the 
majority of respondents named the US as the country in which most work is done to adapt 
atomic power to peaceful purposes, but very few knew about the Eisenhower proposal and 
most Finns supposed that it was of Soviet origin.1299 The second study suggested that the 
exhibition and the publicity it generated did not bring considerable change to these views. As 
the percentage of respondents choosing the option ‘cannot say’ for both main questions 
remained at almost 70 per cent, the results of the atom exhibition were not at least in this 
respect all that encouraging. 
The USIA’s effort to present the US economy as a new form of capitalism developed into 
another leading propaganda theme of the 1950s. ‘People’s Capitalism’, the slogan describing the 
American economic system, was deliberately chosen as appropriate to communist discourse, and 
the campaign suggested that in the US, the workers were themselves capitalists as capitalism 
provided higher wages, better products at lower prices and greater returns to investment, and the 
rewards were in general shared by the workers.1300 The USIA had plenty of work to do in this 
field as international opinion often considered the US system as one based on nineteenth-century 
laissez-faire capitalism, labour exploitation and a lack of social protection.  
A survey commissioned from Suomen Gallup showed that much of this applied to public 
opinion in Finland. Conducted in summer 1956 during the very early stage of the campaign, 
which in Helsinki focused around the steady distribution of printed and visual material on the 
subject rather than the importation of the USIA's special People's Capitalism exhibition1301, the 
study suggested that Finnish attitudes towards various economic systems were remarkably 
similar to those in major Western Europe countries. The Finns, for example, preferred the term 
‘socialism’ to ‘capitalism’, even if for the general public 'socialism’ appeared to primarily mean 
social welfare instead of government ownership. In interpreting the survey results, USIA 
officials came to the conclusion that, as in Western Europe, it would be inadvisable for a 
campaign in Finland to attack ‘socialism’ under that name and to imply that it is incompatible 
with People’s Capitalism. The study also suggested that there was a need to make a sharp 
                                                 
1298 ‘Knowledge and thoughts of atomic power, Opinion survey in Helsinki conducted by Suomen Gallup Oy in 
April 1955’, RG 306, OR, Country Project Files 1951─1964 (Hereafter CPF), box 27, NARA. 
1299 Ibid. 
1300 Osgood 2006, pp. 270─272. 
1301 The USIS/Helsinki's decision to withdraw from ordering the exhibition was, above all, based on expense 
factors, but the office also felt that the USIA presentation was perhaps too simplistic for the Finnish audience, 
which would be more efficiently served through the distribution of more versatile facts and figures. USIS/Helsinki 
to USIA, 'People's Capitalism', March 1, 1956; Telegram No. 57 from USIS/Helsinki to USIA, March 9, 1956, both 
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distinction between socialism and communism in Finland and that the campaign’s emphasis on 
the fairness of distribution and the absence of exploitation in the US should be continued.1302  
USIA officials in Washington appreciated this kind of information highly, but at the same 
time noted that the 'flash' surveys would increase their validity if it were possible to use a 
somewhat larger sample of the public, especially in Turku and Tampere.1303 Although the 
conducted surveys were not the broadest around, they did not go unnoticed in Finnish 
communist circles. In April 1955 the communist daily Vapaa Sana attacked Suomen Gallup for 
“operating according to the American pattern and more and more distinctively serving certain 
propagandistic purposes”.1304 According to Lester Ott, Acting Public Affairs Officer at the 
USIS, this particular story did them no harm since even criticism of US campaigns would only 
whet the curiosity of communist papers' readers, a group the Americans were anxious to reach 
in any case.1305  
The USIA’s evaluation studies and polls carried out in Finland did not only concern upcoming 
or completed campaigns and exhibitions. The Americans also wished to receive regular 
information about Finns’ views on international developments as well as US policies.1306 As 
economic development, and the promotion of European economic cooperation in particular, was 
a central theme to US policy in the 1950s, Finnish views in this field were also thoroughly 
explored more than once. A survey conducted in March 1957 must have made happy reading for 
USIA officials, as it suggested that a clear majority of respondents who had a view on the matter 
saw that the creation of an economically united Western Europe would have a positive influence 
on the continent’s development.1307 All in all, documents show that the Americans’ collection of 
information in Finland was systematic and thorough. As new, somewhat softer, propaganda 
methods were introduced in the latter part of the 1950s, this data proved highly valuable for the 
way in which propaganda campaigns and informational operations in general were adapted to 
local conditions, which in Finland’s case were, of course, exceptional. 
 
Presenting American Progress and Prosperity 
 
As the USIS/Helsinki apparently did not provide Washington with detailed lists about the 
articles it distributed and managed to have published in Finnish newspapers, a thorough 
content analysis of American print propaganda implemented through the Finnish press in the 
mid-1950s is more or less impossible to conduct, or at least would require an overwhelming 
                                                 
1302 ‘Finnish and Icelandic Attitudes Related to the People’s Capitalism Campaign’, March 1958, RG 306, OR, 
Program and Media Studies 1956─1962, box 1 of 2, NARA. 
1303 USIA to USIS/Helsinki, ‘Usefulness of the “Flash” survey’, March 29, 1957, RG 306, OR, CPC, box 5, NARA. 
1304 On this occasion the paper actually did not get its facts straight as it mixed up the ‘Atoms for Peace’ poll with 
surveys on the following Finnish presidential elections L.R. Ott to USIA, ‘Communist Newspaper Attack on 
Finnish Gallup Poll’, April 22, 1955, RG 306, OR, CPC, box 5, NARA. 
1305 Ibid. 
1306 The surveys most typically included studies on the Finns' impression of the leading powers and their military 
strength as well as on events such as the Geneva Conference. For example, 'International Survey, Geneva Conference, 
July 1955’, RG 306, OR, Multi Country Project Files 1952─63, Western Europe 1952─56, box 1, NARA. 
1307 ‘Attitudes of the Finns Towards Some Foreign Countries and International Problems, A survey conducted in 
March 1957’, RG 306, OR, CPF, box 27, NARA. 
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amount of work browsing through the papers. A glance at some national and provincial 
publications does, however, give an indication of what kind of topics the articles provided by 
the USIS covered and from what angle. More printed details of American propaganda 
objectives can be obtained by reading, for instance, available USIS-produced pamphlets and the 
Suomi-Finland USA magazine. Particularly the latter publication does not, however, really shed 
new light to the issue, since by the mid-1950s the magazine of the Finnish-American Society 
predominantly focused on matters related to the society itself rather than the promotion of the 
US and its culture. Indeed, when examining American printed content during this particular 
period, the best option is to concentrate on the field magazine Aikamme, which was published 
specifically for the Finnish environment. In addition to giving valuable information about what 
the main messages the Americans wished to hammer home to the Finns were, an examination 
of Aikamme is important as its content followed closely the broader themes that the USIA in 
particular wished to promote throughout the world.1308 
A browse of Finnish newspapers from the mid-1950s reveals that many of them occasionally 
published USIS-provided articles, although nowhere near as often as reports from private news 
agencies, mainly UP. Another rather simple discovery is that USIS articles concerning the Soviet 
Union and Eastern European satellites continued to be highly factual and neutral in tone. They 
were not only shorter than the British anti-communist ones, but also lacked their harder-hitting 
comments. A large share of USIS content focused on bringing up the declining popularity of 
communism in Western European countries1309 along with the increasingly troublesome 
relationship between communists living in the free world and the Soviet Union, due to, among 
other things, their conflicting views over official Soviet propaganda concerning the outcome of 
a possible nuclear war.1310 Some of the political USIS contributions published by Helsingin 
Sanomat and, in particular, Ilta-Sanomat, perhaps the most enthusiastic user of such content, did 
at times present critical comments on, for instance, the Soviets’ true intentions before the 
Geneva Conference1311 or, as this was a time when the roll-back strategy was still fully embraced 
in Washington, promises from President Eisenhower to assist Eastern European nations in 
their quest to regain freedom.1312 All in all, however, one comes to the even surprising 
conclusion that the content supplied by agencies like UP, including for instance Henry 
Shapiro’s series on the Soviet Union, provided Finnish readers with much more insight to the 
flaws of communism than the USIS articles, which, in fairness, were mostly meant to explain 
US policies and promote American culture. The more profound analysis of developments in the 
Soviet Union continued to be presented to a small number of Finnish specialists through the 
pages of Problems of Communism.1313 
                                                 
1308 For a more thorough account of these themes, see, for example, Hixson 1997; Osgood 2006. 
1309 For example, Etelä-Suomen Sanomat, May 11, 1955. 
1310 For example, Länsi-Suomi, May 13, 1955. 
1311 Ilta-Sanomat, July 19, 1955. 
1312 Helsingin Sanomat, June 16, 1954. 
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As US propaganda in Finland predominantly focused rather on promoting the positive than 
directly attacking its Cold War enemies, the Americans posted in Helsinki placed high hopes for 
the influence the field magazine Aikamme could have on its readers. As the editor Pentti Lehti 
declared, the publication, which had the full name of Aikamme – Länsimaita sanoin ja kuvin ('Our 
Time – The Western World in Words and Pictures'), had the general objective of rectifying 
European misconceptions about the United States while giving its readers reliable information 
about both the pros and cons of the country as well as its society and culture.1314 As impressive 
as Mr Lehti’s words were, this goal was only rarely met in real life since the definite majority of 
the magazine’s content was highly complementary of American society, leaving the more 
negative aspects in the background. The emphasis given to scientific and technological 
innovations and their effect on human life, as well as the magazine’s blind belief in progress, 
might seem somewhat naïve to today’s reader, but they do capture well the mood of the 1950s 
and give a valuable account on the sort of material that was considered effective in influencing 
people’s perception of the US.  
Reading the first editions of Aikamme already reveals a great deal about what kind of matters 
the Americans wished the Finns to read and what their main themes of focus were. In addition 
to providing a large number of flamboyant colour photos of life in the US, often including a 
number of smiling, healthy and successful-looking young people, the magazine included several 
long feature articles on subjects that were high on the order of importance in the USIA’s 
worldwide activities. Besides new innovations, Aikamme's main themes can be categorised into 
economic, labour, cultural, racial and anti-communist issues. The extensive use of Finnish 
comments on the US was another dimension that was characteristic for the publication. 
The structure of the US economy was perhaps Aikamme's leading theme. Several articles 
focused on explaining the American economy, and its unprecedented success, which was 
mainly based on private entrepreneurship, technological innovations and the growth of mass 
consumption. The very first edition pointed out that the American way could be labelled as 
'consumer capitalism' as consumers, with their healthy salaries, held a key position in the 
development of the country’s economy.1315 Another article published in September 1956 
concentrated on presenting the structure of the economy according to the lines of the People's 
Capitalism campaign, noting how ownership of, for example, stock was widely spread 
throughout society.1316 The magazine acknowledged that there were some weaknesses in the US 
economy, mainly the occasional emergence of trusts and cartels, but at the same time stressed 
that legislation enabled the use of effective measures against corporations threatening free 
competition. In giving plenty of attention to the American economy, Aikamme did not, in fact, 
differ much from other Finnish publications. Economic magazines such as Talouselämä by now 
covered the US economy relatively frequently. The publication went great lengths to trying 
explaining the reasons behind the dynamism behind the American economy, above all the 
                                                                                                                                                   
on European communism and the ideology of Soviet patriotism. See, for example, Problems of Communism 
6/1956 & 1/1958. 
1314 Aikamme 1/1952. 
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general sense of entrepreneurship1317, but at the same time acknowledged, in a way not 
unfamiliar to today's reader, the crisis debt-fuelled consumer spending might generate.1318 
The way in which the expanding US economy was presented in Aikamme illustrates well that 
labour groups were the magazine’s main target. Articles published in several editions 
emphasised the 'working man’s' considerable pay level and his growing purchase power, which 
enabled him to buy a proper house, a car, healthy food and other commodities, even a 
television set. In this context, the magazine published stories about American purchasing habits, 
including the daily visits to the local supermarket, which was at that time an unfamiliar concept 
in Finland.1319 Although some of the stories boasted that “the average family’s prosperity would 
without doubt amaze industrial workers of some of the communist countries”1320, excessive 
gloating remained fairly rare as the magazine’s staff knew that this kind of an approach would 
not impress the Finns. The writers behind stories such as ‘The Steel Worker’ published in 1953, 
were often more than happy to point out that the Americans were hard workers and that their 
well-being is stable but by no means unreasonable.1321 
The importance of the working class for Aikamme was also evident in the way that the 
magazine gave plenty of coverage for explaining the trade unions’ role in the US and 
speculating what kind of changes growing automation would bring to working life. General 
articles on the country and its development, such as ‘The Mental Climate in the United States’, 
always highlighted the individualistic aspect of American life and the animosity to anything 
referring to collectivism.1322 The trade unions were presented to hold a powerful position in the 
US, although the magazine also reminded that they did not support socialist ideas in the 
European sense. As for the workers’ future, the revolutionary progress made in utilising 
automation in manual work would, according to several articles, increase the demand for more 
highly skilled labourers and evidently lead to new arrangements in work distribution, such as a 
possible four-day working week.1323 These stories, as the general articles on working life, saw 
labourers’ future as rosy and almost without exception reminded readers about America truly 
being the land of opportunity. 
Stories about Finns living in America supported this cliché. Throughout Aikamme’s 
existence, it published several ‘from rags to riches’ -type articles about Finns ‘who had made it’ 
in the US. Stories about Finnish immigrants and their life became one of Aikamme’s most 
popular themes and because of them the magazine won plenty of subscribers also from 
America.1324 The people appearing in these articles were often owners of a small business or 
shop. Some more successful individuals were also presented, such as Emil Peterson whose 
construction firm had turned into a massive business.1325 Articles on immigrants who had 
                                                 
1317 For example, Talouselämä 15/1956, 16/1956, 17/1956, 18/1956, 19/1956 & 20/1956. 
1318 Talouselämä 28-29/1956 
1319 See, for example, Aikamme 1/1952. 
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already been famous before their move, such as Gunnar Bärlund, the former champion boxer 
who became a bridge builder on the East Coast1326, were also published as were stories about 
successful Finnish artists in America. Not surprisingly, the world-famous architect Eero 
Saarinen and his life and work were covered in at least three editions of Aikamme.1327 A 
common feature for all these articles was that the Finns living in the US were presented as 
successful, fairly well earning and, above all, happy with their lives.  
Articles that were written by or dealt with Finns visiting the US, such as returning Fulbright 
grantees, offered an important addition to the favourable presentation of America. Although 
Aikamme from time to time brought the experiences of returning students to the limelight, it 
gave more visible coverage for eyewitness accounts of American society, which were written by 
people who had visited the country on a leader scholarship. One of these articles was written by 
Aarre Simonen, the social democratic MP and later, for instance, Minister of Finance, who had 
taken part in the Interparliamentary Union Conference in Washington in autumn 1953. Mr 
Simonen’s visit had included a tour to different parts of the country during which he, in 
particular, had familiarised himself with American cities and their traffic arrangements. The 
resulting article was, as all published reports by returning Finns, complimentary to the US, but 
also, as a somewhat rare feature, recognised some drawbacks caused by the rapidly growing car 
pool, such as worsening traffic jams and the decline of city centre commerce.1328  
Even if Aikamme, naturally, promoted all the main aspects of American culture, most visibly 
the Hollywood film industry and its world-famous stars, the magazine gave jazz music and its 
popular 'negro' artists a special position. This was rather innovative as the USIA did not start its 
systematic promotion of the musical genre until the latter part of the 1950s. The history of jazz 
and its most popular figures were presented in a number of articles as were American artists 
visiting Finland. The very first report on jazz seemed to concentrate on assuring Finnish readers 
that this type of music was now very popular, and made perfectly acceptable listening also 
among white people, “despite its black origins”.1329 As time went on, jazz-related articles started 
to have a more in-depth approach. Although Aikamme gave plenty attention to such jazz greats 
as Louis Armstrong, the composer George Gershwin and his works were given the most 
sizeable coverage. Especially his ‘folk opera’ Porgy and Bess was the topic of several reports1330, 
which was not highly surprising since the composition, mainly because of its hopeful view of 
race relations in the US, was used as a propaganda tool by the USIA throughout the world.1331  
The improving position of African-Americans was not only promoted through famous 
artists or athletes. In order to prove that America was, indeed, the land of opportunity for 
everyone, Aikamme published a number of feature stories about black Americans who had built 
successful professional careers, for example, in public administration. One typical article 
presented Lois Lippman, secretary of President Eisenhower’s special advisor, and her rise from 
                                                 
1326 Aikamme 3/1954. 
1327 See Aikamme 5/1953, 10/1956 & 9/1957. 
1328 Aikamme 2/1954. 
1329 Aikamme 2/1952. 
1330 See, for example, Aikamme 4/1952. 
1331 For example, Osgood 2006, p. 226. 
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obscurity into a challenging job in Washington.1332 Even though Aikamme in general gave a 
positive picture about the future prospects of African-Americans, the magazine was sensible 
enough to admit that their opportunities were not quite yet equal. Racial segregation was never 
mentioned, but some articles did note that a considerable share of the black population still 
lived in slums and that gang crime, which was also committed by white people, was a serious 
issue in the US.1333  
While the clear majority of Aikamme’s content, including reports on for example culture and 
sporting events, as well as colour photos of women’s fashion and new cars, merely promoted 
the American way of life in a favourable light, the magazine did occasionally, and between 1954 
and 1956 in particular, publish political articles, some of which held a strong anti-communist 
element. The more objective or neutral reports, which formed the clear majority of the 
magazine's political content, dealt with the US economy in particular and defended its strength 
and capability to avoid slipping into recession. Another dominating topic was European 
integration, an idea that the Americans backed wholeheartedly. The Schuman Plan and the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were visibly covered by Aikamme, 
which regarded the progress as a significant step in bolstering the European economy and its 
future unity.1334 The economy also held centre stage in articles that could be defined as anti-
communist propaganda. In their comments, figures like Professor Alexander B. Heron 
emphasised the weakness of the communist system and pointed out that the communist 
economy was nowhere near reaching a level of productivity that would meet even reasonable 
consumer demands.1335  
The limited freedom of people living in communist countries, as well as their quest to resist 
the restrictions, was another anti-communist theme to which some of Aikamme’s stories gave 
special attention. For instance, Peter Meyer, who commented on the political developments in 
East Europe for The New Leader, pointed out in his article that the younger generations living in 
Eastern Europe were to a growing extent seeking individualism and inventing new ways 
through which they could express their reluctance to requisite uniformity. According to Meyer, 
the communist regimes’ attempt to portray these youngsters as ‘hooligans’, and as victims of the 
demoralising American influence, only broadened the larger masses’ discontent with them.1336 
Communism and its impact on society and social interaction were also criticised in special 
reports on life in leading Eastern European cities such as Warsaw and Budapest.1337  
An interesting dimension of Aikamme was that it published stories about both anti-
communist and anti-American propaganda activities from a somewhat different perspective 
than many other publications. For instance, a broad article published in May 1954 focused on 
giving a detailed account on communist propaganda techniques in the field of caricatures and 
                                                 
1332 Aikamme 5/1953. 
1333 On gangs and crime, for example Aikamme 2/1954, on slums and their demolition, for example Aikamme 
4/1952.  
1334 See, for example, Aikamme 4/1953 & Aikamme 5/1953. 
1335 Aikamme 1/1955. 
1336 Aikamme 2-3/1955. 
1337 On Budapest, see Aikamme 1/1955, on Warsaw, see Aikamme 10/1955. 
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cartoons.1338 Even greater coverage was given to the American political cartoonist Herbert 
Block, who made a mockery of communist dictators in particular and was regarded as an 
influential opinion shaper. 1339 The lighter angle to the propaganda war was also complemented 
by rather harmless jokes and satirical stories on the inefficiency and low popularity of 
communism in the satellite countries.1340 
The last two annual volumes of Aikamme reflect the publication's policy of mainly 
promoting the most important aspects of American life even further. Articles concerning 
Eastern Europe became extremely rare and even the almost uncritical hype of America cooled 
down to some degree. Pentti Lehti’s editorial from August 1956 stating that Aikamme’s 
intention was to become a lighter magazine for the entire family outlined an even greater 
change.1341 A growing share of the published material now concerned exclusively Finnish 
matters as well as harmless reports on entertainment, fashion and sport. Although Aikamme was 
never intended to be a highly political magazine, it is easy to see why its lack of more thoughtful 
material frustrated the Americans throughout its lifespan. In the magazine's final years, the State 
Department and the US Embassy’s dissatisfaction grew to such levels that it is not difficult to 
conclude that it stirred up the decision to end its publication even more than its financial 
difficulties. General Cold War propaganda methods had also changed by the latter part of the 
1950s to such a degree that the publishing of a separate magazine could no longer be as strongly 
justified as during the first years of the decade.  
The decision to abandon Aikamme seems rational also when one places, in particular, its later 
editions’ content into the wider Finnish media context. By the late 1950s longer articles 
covering the aspects of American society had become an increasingly common feature for 
Finnish newspapers and magazines. Indeed, when the publishing of Aikamme was ended, the 
only factors making the magazine stand out from various other publications were the inclusion 
of anti-communist content, which had become increasingly rare, and the feature articles’ style of 
writing that was based on treating all things that were American in a manner that was even too 
uncritical for the increasingly informed reader.  
The growing desire of the Finnish press to use long articles concerning the US in the mid-
1950s not only made the distribution of American printed propaganda relatively easy, but also, 
rather paradoxically, gives another reason why an extensive analysis of the inclusion of USIS 
content is very difficult to make. The fact that Finnish newspapers often left the articles’ true 
original source unattributed, as was the case for political reports in particular, means that one 
can only give a somewhat general estimation of the American campaign’s true efficiency in this 
particular field of activity. When assessing the USIS/Helsinki’s press operations in the mid-
1950s, many of the factors that have already been mentioned in relation to the British activities 
come to mind, in spite of the latter being more focused on distributing anti-communist 
                                                 
1338 The article noted how cartoons of leading Western politicians, obeying orders given by high-ranking party 
officials, always followed the same pattern and portrayed, for example, Konrad Adenauer as a Nazi. Aikamme 
5/1954. 
1339 Aikamme 4/1954. 
1340 See, for example, Aikamme 7/1954, Aikamme 10/1956 & Aikamme 7/1957. 
1341 Aikamme 8/1956. 
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propaganda. Firstly, USIS material was actively used by the Finns and in particular by provincial 
papers operating with smaller resources. Secondly, an overwhelming majority of the content 
that was reproduced in one way or another can be categorised as ‘white’ or ‘grey’ propaganda in 
which the focus was on the promotion of certain, usually positively regarded, values. The third 
factor has to do with the delivered material’s relation to other content published by the Finnish 
media during this particular period. In the American case, even more than with the British one, 
the propaganda campaign benefited from the Finnish media's growing trend to publish rather 
similar content either by producing it themselves or by using foreign news agency material. 
What the USIS, above all, did was to provide the Finns with an extra channel for gaining highly 
detailed information about the US, for which there was increasing demand. Whether this 
demand was actually mostly created through USIS activity leaves us with another question for 
which there is no one simple answer. 
As with British print propaganda, the extent and the efficiency of the American press 
campaign can also be evaluated by comparing it to other countries. As the Americans based 
their operations on rather standardised distribution methods and delivered press content that 
was to a great extent similar for all countries, the examined country’s special characteristics did 
not bring as much variation to the activities as in the British case. For example, the USIS 
campaign in Sweden was not, at least on paper, that different from the one in Finland. 
Although Finland was regarded as a more critical area for propaganda operations, the 
Americans’ ability to launch a fairly extensive and successful campaign also in its Western 
neighbour gives yet another indication that their propaganda activities were by no means 
restricted to potential danger areas. Research conducted by Mikael Nilsson not only gives proof 
of American influence in the Swedish press, but also shows that, like in Finland, local USIS 
officials paid particular attention to forming close ties with the local social democrats as well as 
newspaper editors throughout the country.1342 For this purpose, they used the very same 
methods as in Finland: personal contacts and the delivery of both regular news bulletins and 
more irregular feature articles. Although there is evidence that not all Swedish newspapers were 
always enthusiastic about acting as a mouthpiece for the Americans1343, Nilsson’s analysis on the 
extent that USIS-produced material was used by the media both directly and indirectly shows 
that the Swedes were more willing to use American than British propaganda content, most 
likely due to their less anti-communist tone. Furthermore, Nilsson’s finding that Swedish 
journalists only rarely attributed articles for which American content had been used to their true 
source1344 supports the view that the use of USIS-produced content in Finland was also much 
more frequent than official documents reveal.  
 
Hungarian Uprising Reheats the Battlefield 
 
The Hungarian Uprising and the invasion by Soviet troops that followed brought some notable 
changes to American and British propaganda content, also in Finland. Although the 
                                                 
1342 Nilsson 2012, pp. 321-327. 
1343 Ibid., pp. 333-338. 
1344 Ibid., pp. 322, 324, 331. 
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introduction of more positive propaganda techniques remained the main trend in Cold War 
propaganda, for a year or so events in Hungary gave the content, once again, a more aggressive 
tone on both sides of the war over the hearts and minds. In Finland, both British and US 
officials wished to make sure that the Finns were supplied with plenty of news material about 
what had actually happened in the streets of Budapest. Particularly the British suspected that the 
task of protecting Finland’s neutral position could make leading politicians and newspapers 
downplay the true size of the events.1345 This turned out to be an unnecessary worry since, as 
later research has shown, the Finnish press actually covered the events in detail and expressed 
their criticism over the Soviet involvement in Hungarian matters rather directly.1346 Among the 
publications revealing the whole extent of the killings in Hungary was Viikkosanomat, a Time-
style magazine1347 owned by Sanoma Oy and under the leadership of Aatos Erkko, Eljas 
Erkko's son. The publication’s reports left its readers with little room for imagination by 
printing whole-page images of Hungarian victims lying in the street.1348 Even though 
Viikkosanomat represented the more pro-Western publication in Finland and had included 
plenty of anti-communist articles in previous years1349, the way the events in Budapest were 
covered almost throughout the Finnish media could hardly be labeled as overly abstemious. 
This view is also backed by the strong attack the new leading communist paper Kansan Uutiset 
directed against 'reactionary' Finnish newspapers over the way they had "supported the idea of 
using violence as a tool for reform against the country's legal government".1350 
Even if the British did not fail to acknowledge that the Finnish press was, in general, far 
more outspoken than the Finnish Government over the Hungarian Uprising1351, the FO felt 
that more print material regarding Hungary should be available for the Finns. For this purpose, 
the reports covering the events written by Peter Fryer, correspondent of The Daily Worker who 
was made to resign soon after making his first critical comments over the Soviet activities in the 
country, fitted perfectly. His articles, which gave a detailed account of communist oppression 
and the executions that followed the uprising, were picked by, in particular, social democratic 
newspapers throughout the country.1352 The use of Fryer’s extensive coverage of events was not 
only restricted to simple article publication. The provincial newspaper Savon Kansa decided to 
publish a special edition of a collection of Fryer’s reports, which were then distributed by party 
                                                 
1345 This suspicion even led to some inaccurate observations of the situation in Finland. The British Legation's first 
reaction to the Finnish approach to the Soviet intervention in Hungary was that the press coverage of the events 
and the reaction of the Finnish public was damped down by the Government, which in fact was not the case. M. 
Creswell to FO, ‘All mention of events in Hungary has been kept out of the Finnish Press’, November 5, 1956, FO 
371/122383, NA. 
1346 For example, Salminen 1982, pp. 207, 217-218. 
1347 Viikkosanomat represented both the American and European traditions of a news magazine, which published 
extensive articles, most typically travel stories, relying heavily on supporting photographs. Kivikuru, Ullamaija, 
Vieraita lehtiä. Aikakausilehti ajan ja paikan risteyksessä (Helsinki 1996), pp. 60-61. 
1348 Viikkosanomat 44/1956 & 45/1956. 
1349 In the mid-1950s, Viikkosanomat published, for instance, feature articles about life in East Berlin and the anti-
Soviet sentiment taking place in Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary. Viikkosanomat, 21/1956 & 41/1956. 
1350 Kansan Uutiset, December 28, 1956. 
1351 British Embassy to FO, ‘Quarterly Report on Communism in Finland’, February 9, 1957, FO 371/128573, NA. 
1352 For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, January 31, 1957, February 2, 1957, February 2, 1957, February 3, 
1957. 
 
 
257 
 
officials throughout the country.1353 The printing house Savon Kansan Kirjapaino Oy also 
published a pamphlet Kansa nousi Unkarissa sortajia vastaan, a more compact summary of the 
universal condemnation of Soviet intervention. In addition to the SDP, this leaflet was placed 
into further distribution by at least SYT.1354 In 1958, Fryer’s reports were given even more value 
after the British Embassy arranged for the publication of a Finnish translation of Fryer’s book 
The Hungarian Tragedy, which to a large extent consisted of his earlier eye-witness reports.1355 
The most visible and effective American contribution to the presentation of the Hungarian 
Uprising was the screening of the USIA-produced short film Hungarian Fight for Freedom, which 
gave the viewers a dramatic story of how “the popular revolt against tyranny” was ruthlessly 
crushed by the additional Soviet troops that “built destruction everywhere”.1356 The film, 
compiled mainly from newsreel material, gave particular emphasis on both the sufferings of 
Hungarians who had lost their loved ones and the broad protests that had followed the Soviet 
intervention in capital cities around the world. Considering how directly the film condemned 
the Soviet actions in Hungary, and how closely it revealed dead bodies in the streets, it is 
somewhat surprising that the Finnish Film Censorship Board, still closely guided by the Finnish 
Foreign Ministry, gave the USIS/Helsinki screening permission.1357 The approval included, 
typically for the time, the precondition that neither the Finnish nor the Swedish language 
versions of the film would be screened on television, not least because they called Soviet actions 
in Hungary ‘brutal’, as the board’s Chairman Arvo Paasivuori explained to Pentti Lehti, who 
had filed the import application.1358 Existing copies of the film reveal that Hungarian Fight for 
Freedom had been in heavy use1359, which indicates that the USIS made the most out of its 
permission to present the movie to the Finns.  
The events in Hungary not only sharpened the Western powers’ political propaganda in 
Finland, but also made them determine their position in regard to the new Finnish President 
Urho Kekkonen once again. Kekkonen, whose position was far from indisputable in the first 
years of his presidency, had for quite some time been examined with some suspicion by US 
officials in particular. Particularly his, and his Agrarian Party associates’, newspaper comments 
promoting Finland’s neutrality were closely followed at the US Embassy.1360 What was common 
for both US and British officials was that they partly blamed Kekkonen, who in general was 
regarded as sharp and extremely ambitious, for Finland’s unnecessarily subservient attitude 
                                                 
1353 Y. Saaristo to Regional offices, February 13, 1957, SDP:n tiedotusosasto 1957, HAB19, TA. 
1354 ’Kansa nousi Unkarissa sortajia vastaan’, SDP:n tiedotusosasto 1957, HAB19, TA and SYT, box 87, KA. 
1355 D.L. Busk to M.G.L. Joy, February 18, 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA. 
1356 The film: ‘Hungarian Fight for Freedom’ (USIA 1956), KAVI. 
1357 Although the board rarely censored foreign documentaries completely, films like 'Ninotchka' remained 
censored for years to come. Towards the late 1950s the board's policy continued as rather strict, generating 
criticism from a number of foreign legations in Finland. R. Oittinen to VETA, January 20, 1958, Ea 4, VETA, KA; 
Sedergren 2006, p. 71. 
1358 A.K. Paasivuori to P. Lehti, March 5, 1957, Da:2, VETA, KA; Sedergren 2006, p. 71. 
1359 According to Juha Kindberg, archivist at KAVÍ, both of KAVI’s existing copies of Hungarian Fight for 
Freedom, which the archives had received from Adams Filmi’s collections, had been screened between 500 and 
1,000 times. Interview with Juha Kindberg, June 15, 2011.  
1360 For instance, in May 1955 the Americans reported in great detail about Kekkonen’s writings on the ‘Finnish 
line’, published by Maakansa after the signing of the Austrian Treaty, which declared the permanent neutrality of 
the country. H. Bartlett Wells to SD, May 24, 1955, RG 59, 660E.00/5-2455, Tk 15, Printed copies of records from 
NARA, KA. 
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towards the Soviet Union.1361 The elected President’s behaviour during the Hungarian Crisis 
lifted some more eyebrows both in Washington and London, as he did not, apart from 
attending a religious concert given in sympathy to Hungary, make any public condemnation 
over the Soviet actions.1362 Kekkonen's approach to the matter became even more disturbing 
for Western observers after the execution of Imre Nagy. The British view was that the Finnish 
leader's chosen policy prevented some of the moral outcry such actions would have deserved 
from every free person.1363  
Urho Kekkonen's policy regarding the Hungarian Uprising did not prevent the Cold War 
entering centre stage again in Finland, a development which was well evident in newspapers’ 
publishing policies. British reports from 1957 carried a more positive tone than they had done 
before the crisis in terms of pushing Britain's message through to the people of Finland. The 
Embassy saw that the climate in Finland was more favourable to the increased use of IRD 
material as well. The fact that many Finns had become more outspokenly critical of the Soviet 
Union did not, however, make the British launch an excessively aggressive anti-communist 
campaign in the country. Indeed, according to a report by a FO inspector, the Finnish 
independence of attitude needed no strengthening from Britain as the people were evidently 
much more aware of the Soviets as a threat.1364 Where the Finns fell short, and where the 
opportunity for the use of IRD material seemed most obvious, was in the knowledge of events 
in countries behind the Iron Curtain, the FO again underlined. As a consequence, the material 
supplied for Finnish consumption should concentrate predominantly on enlightening this 
ignorance, it was pointed out.1365 
The Finns’ increasing demand for news from the Eastern satellites also encouraged the British 
to increase the number of outlets for their anti-communist material. In early 1958, the FO 
approached the Finnish Embassy in London to require if it wished to receive some of the most 
regular IRD products. Arrangements over the supply of material had already been made with all 
the Scandinavian missions in London. Although the FO understood that offering its publications 
to the Finnish Embassy could cause some embarrassment to the Finns, the advantage of having 
direct contacts in London to help the material reach all the interested political and information 
departments was seen as considerable.1366 As a consequence, Hugh Cortazzi of the IRD contacted 
Risto Solanko, Counsellor at the Finnish Embassy, who expressed his interest to receive samples 
of The Interpreter, The Handbook on Soviet Communism in Theory and Practice and Facts about Communist 
                                                 
1361 Vares, Vesa, 'Foes Who Grew Better With Time: The Image of János Kádár and Urho Kekkonen in the West 
from 1956 to the End of the 1960s', in Halmesvirta, Anssi (ed.), Hungarologische Beiträge 14. Kádár’s Hungary – Kekkonen’s 
Finland (Jyväskylä 2002), p. 42. 
1362 M. Creswell to FO, ‘All mention of events in Hungary has been kept out of the Finnish Press’, November 5, 
1956, FO 371/122383, NA. 
1363 D. L. Busk to S. Lloyd, June 25, 1958, FO 371/134858, NA; Vares 2002, p. 43. 
1364 ’Report by Mr T.B. Shaw’, June 1957, FO 1110/1030, NA. 
1365 The FO’s view that Finnish newspapers were willing to publish a growing number of articles on Eastern 
European countries was backed by an extra £100 annual allocation for special translations of IRD material into 
Finnish H.A.H. Cortazzi to J.M. Leadbitter, ’Special Translations into Finnish of IRD Material’, September 1957, 
FO 1110/1030, NA. 
1366 H.A.H. Cortazzi to A.B. Horn, December 17, 1957, FO 1110/1030, NA. 
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Front Organisations in particular.1367 The FO made sure that the Finns could investigate a whole 
variety of IRD work by also providing them with examples of The Asian Analyst and the more ad 
hoc studies on communism especially in Europe.1368 
After contact was made, the FO began to send the Finnish Embassy IRD material on a 
regular basis. The British decided that mainly the weightier publications, i.e. the ones 
incorporating research findings rather than the ones which were primarily propagandistic in 
intention, would be sent to the Finns. In 1958, these included, for instance, the works Moslems in 
the Soviet Union and China, Five Years of Collective Leadership and From Peasant Farmer to State 
Labourer.1369 Finnish officials were made well aware that all papers could be used freely as long 
as they were not referred to by title or in print and that the Foreign Office was not revealed as 
the documents' origin.1370 After Mr Solanko’s departure from London, IRD publications were 
mainly sent to Finnish military attachés. Captain Lauri Koho, Assistant Military and Air Attaché 
at the Finnish Embassy in 1962, was particularly keen to receive a wide range of anti-
communist material. According to him, however, the diplomatic members of the Embassy “had 
to be very careful to be neutral and were a little uneasy about receiving IRD material”.1371  
Another channel for the circulation of IRD material was also opened in early 1958 after the 
British Embassy in Helsinki reported that one or two leading Finnish correspondents in London 
could be offered suitable publications. The two journalists who would best repay the attention 
were noted to be Toivo Heiskanen of Helsingin Sanomat and Tauno Kuosa of Uusi Suomi. The idea 
of passing IRD products to Mr Heiskanen was favoured by Eljas Erkko, whereas Mr Kuosa was 
an old acquaintance of Jasper Leadbitter, First Secretary at the British Embassy.1372 Supplying 
Finnish correspondents with IRD material reflected the constant eagerness on the British side to 
find more possibilities for pushing its anti-communist message through more effectively in an 
environment that was gradually becoming more challenging again. 
The superior resources US officials had for propaganda activity, albeit suffering from a further 
cut in 1957 both throughout the world and in Finland1373, enabled the USIS/Helsinki to feed the 
Finns with a greater mass of written content compared to the British, who relied more on 
developing personal contacts with Finnish editors and adjusting the material according to their 
needs. After the fiercest protest over the events in Hungary had died down, the Americans shifted 
their focus onto countering communist propaganda through specific press campaigns concerning 
a number of issues back home. The one topic to which the USIS now paid particular attention 
was racial equality in the US, particularly after the events evolving in Little Rock, which had widely 
been exploited in communist rhetoric. Like in any other country, USIS officials in Finland gave 
                                                 
1367 Minutes by H.A.H. Cortazzi, January 31, 1958, FO 1110/1030, NA. 
1368 L. Tuominen to Finnish Foreign Ministry, ‘Kommunistien kansainvälinen toiminta; julkaisuja’, February 17, 
1958, 35A , UMA. 
1369 R. Solanko to Finnish Foreign Ministry, ‘Kommunismia koskevia julkaisuja’, April 23, 1958, 35A, UMA. 
1370 H.A.H. Cortazzi to Mr Solanko, February 6, 1958, FO 1110/1142, NA, and 35A, UMA. 
1371 N.J. Barrington to IRD, ’IRD Material for the Finnish Embassy’, May 11, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA. 
1372 A.B. Horn to H.A.H. Cortazzi, January 8, 1958, FO 1110/1142, NA. 
1373 After some more lavish years, the USIA budget was cut by the senate by 16 per cent in May 1957. In Finland, 
the USIS budget was reduced by as much as 40 per cent, which in addition to the abolishment of Aikamme 
reduced the total staff by seven persons. Belmonte 2008, p. 78;’Ilmoitus koskien Yhdysvaltain tiedoitustoimiston 
määrärahoja ja Aikamme-lehteä', September 17, 1957, Amp XV, SUPO, KA. 
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great care to ensuring that the damage inflicted by images of the vicious mob surrounding the 
Little Rock Central High in September 1957 and the arrival of federal troops to protect the black 
students would be offset by releasing written coverage and pictures of interracial activities.1374 
Whereas the events that took place in Alabama in the previous year did not cause US prestige in 
Finland almost any harm1375, the Little Rock incident gave the Americans extensive and at times 
questionable publicity in a number of leading Finnish publications.1376 Even after this, the USIS 
was not overwhelmingly concerned of the long-term effects the racial troubles might have on the 
United States' image in Finland. The vast majority of Finns were in any case regarded as strongly 
pro-Western and unlikely to be won over by communist rhetoric, at least not in the unforeseeable 
future. Even the expansion of cultural activities by the Soviet Union and their satellite countries in 
Finland and the more positive image the Soviets managed to win among the Finns through the 
launch of Sputnik did not change this view.1377 
From the American point of view, more positive developments were taking place in 
Washington. Unlike in the British case, USIA officials hardly had any special desire to supply 
the Finnish Embassy with their anti-communist propaganda. The State Department was, 
undoubtedly, pleased about the Finns having by the mid-1950s sharpened informational 
activities of their own. This included correcting American newspaper reports questioning 
Finland’s ability to remain independent. One such incident took place in December 1954, when 
Finnish Ambassador Johan Nykopp discussed an article published in US News and World Report 
with two of its directors and enlightened them that comments questioning Finland’s ability to 
resist Soviet demands, even if directed only against then Prime Minister Kekkonen, could harm 
the country’s political position, which remained delicate.1378 As both British and US officials had 
for quite some time encouraged the Finns to take a more active role in promoting their country 
not only as neutral, but also as free and democratic, this kind of activity supported their broader 
objectives as well.  
While correcting miscomprehensions about their homeland, the Finns had also started to 
follow the general trends of American propaganda more closely.1379 Even though Finland 
                                                 
1374 Belmonte 2008, pp. 78-79. This activity followed broader guidance on the promotion of racial desegregation, 
which stressed that the continuous progress being made in desegregation had the backing of the overwhelming 
majority of the American people. USIA to All USIS posts, ’Desegregation Developments’, March 20, 1956, RG 84, 
USEH CGR, box 39, NARA. 
1375 USIS/Helsinki to USIA, ’Reaction to Alabama Racial Developments’, March 23, 1956, RG 84, USEH CGR, 
box 39, NARA. 
1376 In October 1957, the Americans reported with a worried tone that the news from Little Rock kept generating 
coverage in prominent publications like Suomen Kuvalehti, which continued to report about the situation and 
labelling it as "nothing short a civil war", weeks after the actual events took place. The article's main claim was that 
the opposition to racial desegregation continued to be strong, as it had been throughout American history. US 
Embassy to SD, ‘Joint Weeka No. 41’, October 11, 1957, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 38, NARA; Suomen Kuvalehti, 
40/1957. 
1377 The Americans acknowledged that the successful launch of Sputnik had ”deeply impressed the individual Finn, 
even though he may dislike admitting it”. This did not, however, change the Americans’ overall estimation of Finnish 
sentiments. US Embassy to SD, ‘Joint Weeka No. 41’, October 11, 1957, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 38, NARA. 
1378 J. Nykopp to E.A. Wuori, December 22, 1954, 5B Washington, UMA. 
1379 When working as Press Attaché at the Finnish Embassy in Washington in the mid-1950s, Max Jakobson wrote 
about the various dimensions in American foreign propaganda in several of his reports and letters sent to Finland. 
For example, M. Jakobson to E.A. Wuori, May 17, 1956, Eero.A. Wuori's collection, box 2, KA. 
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continued to officially object the international war of words being fought on her soil, Finnish 
officials no longer regarded Western propaganda campaigns as dangerous to their country’s 
position as they had done some years earlier. Giving the USIS/Helsinki the approval to launch 
an overt combat against communism in Northern Finland in 1954, which saw the Americans 
direct publications, films and exhibitions to the inhabitants of logging camps and communities 
in the provinces of Lapland, Oulu and Kuopio1380, epitomised the more open and confident 
mood of the Finnish Government. Another sign of the new approach was the agreement finally 
reached between YLE and BBC over the possibility of a BBC reporter also assisting the Finnish 
broadcaster. Although this marked considerable progress, the fact that YLE still refused to 
officially credit the reports prepared by Esko Saarinen and Erkki Arni, who both worked for 
the two radio stations simultaneously, to the BBC shows that a direct association with a foreign 
broadcaster was still undesirable to the Finns.1381  
Naturally, Finland's more open cooperation with foreign actors and the more outspoken 
criticism of communism spreading around the country bore their consequences. The new policy 
adopted by Moscow did not mean that the Soviets would stop issuing the Finns official 
complaints about newspaper content they regarded hostile. The number of balloons containing 
Russian language anti-Soviet propaganda leaflets that the Finns discovered in different parts of 
the country throughout the mid-1950s gave the Soviets and Finnish communists yet another 
reason to keep up the tension.1382 Although there is no reason to doubt, for instance, Jack 
McFall’s sincerity when he told the Finns that he was unaware of the balloons’ origin1383, the US 
Government remained the communists’ prime suspect behind the operation when they expressed 
their protest over the matter.1384 As it turns out, they were not much off the mark, either. At least 
a large share of the balloons were sent from West Germany by the refugee association 
Nationalnyi Truduvoi Sojus (NTS) with the intended destination of the Soviet Union, and 
although Suojelupoliisi at the time regarded its cooperation with American actors unlikely1385, it is 
highly probable that the operation was sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe 
(NCFE), a New York-based organisation heavily financed by the CIA and responsible for 
                                                 
1380 Progress Report on NSC 5403, Annex “A” – Detailed Development of Major Actions, October 21, 1954, 
White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-81, Disaster File, box 67, DDEL. 
1381 For example, J. Koskiluoma to D. Winther, February 10, 1954; D. Winther to J. Koskiluoma, February 15, 
1954; J. Koskiluoma to D. Winther, May 2, 1957; D. Winther to J. Koskiluoma, June 11, 1957, all KK, boxes 7 and 
8, YLE, ELKA; Salokangas 1996, p. 53. 
1382 During the mid-1950s, Finnish officials received numerous reports of anti-Soviet propaganda material that had 
fallen in different parts of the country, mainly in Southern, Eastern and Northern Finland. The issue was 
investigated by both the Finnish Foreign Ministry and Suojelupoliisi. For example, Memorandum: ‘Suomessa heinä-
elokuulla 1953 tavatut lentolehtiset’, September 22, 1953; Kaakkois-Suomen rajavartiosto to Rajavartiostojen 
esikunta, May 3, 1955, both 12 L Neuvostoliitto, UMA; Memorandum: ’Suomen alueelle pudonneet N.T.S.:n 
propagandalehtiset’, March 18, 1954; 'Ilmoitus: Lentolehtisiä Vesilahdella', September 27, 1957, both Amp 
XXXVI/3, SUPO, KA. 
1383 When meeting with officials of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, McFall insisted that he had no idea of where the 
balloons had come from. His accounts to Washington together with further reports mentioning the issue also give 
the impression that the Americans in Finland were unaware of the balloons’ actual origin. For example, 
Memorandum: ‘Neuvostoliitonvastaiset lentolehtiset’ by O. Wartiovaara, September 12, 1953, 12 L Neuvostoliitto, 
UM; US Embassy to SD. ‘Joint Weeka No. 41’, October 11, 1957, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 38, NARA. 
1384 For example, Työkansan Sanomat, October 24, 1953. 
1385 Memorandum: ’Suomessa heinä-elokuulla 1953 tavatut lentolehtiset’, October 10, 1953, XXXVIB, SUPO, KA. 
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releasing around 300 million pieces of propaganda to Eastern Europe.1386 The US Embassy’s 
apparent ignorance of the balloons’ actual origin just shows how the American propaganda war 
was fought on many fronts without the various actors necessary aware of each other.  
 
New Forms of Culture Spark Operations into Light 
 
If American informational activities were successfully improved in Finland, the exchange of 
persons programme operating mostly with ASLA and Fulbright funds had turned into one of 
the most extensive State Department-conducted operations abroad. In order to make the 
activity even more efficient, the USIS/Helsinki increased the use of both Finnish and American 
Fulbright grantees in its field programme operations. The Americans also wished to improve 
the Finnish grantees’ stay in the US, and the content of the orientation programme in particular. 
For this reason, the USIS developed a separate evaluation programme, systematically 
interviewing returning grantees about their time in the US and the value their grants had given 
to their work.1387 As one of the objectives was to attract more people to apply for the 
programme from outside the capital area, the USIS cultural officer made field trips throughout 
Central and Northern Finland publicising and explaining various aspects of the programme.1388  
The most important development that took place in the mid-1950s in terms of personal 
exchange was, however, the steady expansion of the overall programme. This took place both 
by an increase in the number of Fulbright grants and the inclusion of Finland in new exchange 
activities. The number of Finnish undergraduate students travelling to the US reached the forty 
mark in 1954.1389 In the area of specialists, the annual figure remained around ten. What was 
notable about this particular segment was that more attention was paid to younger professionals 
working not only in science-related fields but also in journalism, in particular. Almost every 
rising journalist talent catching attention was now invited to travel across the Atlantic, as noted 
by Simopekka Nortamo, future editor of Helsingin Sanomat, who was awarded a specialist grant 
after reporting about the Hungarian Uprising in Viikkosanomat in a manner that clearly pleased 
the Americans.1390 The number of young Finnish professionals in the US only grew in 1957, 
after 25 grants were awarded to Finnish trainees seeking to work in either American firms or 
public sector organisations.1391 This scheme was put into practice mostly by the Finnish-
American Society and the America-Scandinavian Society in New York, which in 1960 finally 
accepted the former as its full member organisation.1392  
                                                 
1386 Wilford 2008, pp. 31-34.  
1387 For example, L.R. Ott to SD, ‘Educational Exchange: Census of Influence Study for FY Grantees’, January 26, 
1956, RG 59, SDDFF 1955─1959, box 2172, 511.60E3/1-2556, NARA. 
1388 G.F. Austin to SD, ‘Educational Exchange: Request for Fiscal Year 1959 Country Program Proposal’, June 27, 
1957, HBS, RG 59, SDDFF 1955─1959, box 2173, 511.60E3/6-2757, NARA. 
1389 'Board of Foreign Policy Analysis. Finland, Academic Year 1954-1955', FUSEEC, box 15, KA. 
1390 Interview with Simopekka Nortamo (Interviewed by Aleksis Stenvall, August 23, 1986), Sanoma Oy:n 
historiaprojekti, Valmistuneet historiahaastattelut 1984-2011, PLA. 
1391 Office Memorandum: 'Debriefing on May 15, 1957, for Everett Chapman, PAO, Helsinki', RG 59, BPA, 
International Educational Exchange Service, Joint Review Conference Files, 1955-57 (IEES JRCF), box 2, NARA. 
1392 'Kertomus Suomalais-Amerikkalaisen Yhdistyksen toiminnasta v. 1957'; 'Kertomus Suomalais-Amerikkalaisen 
Yhdistyksen toiminnasta v. 1960', both Vuosikokousten pöytäkirjat, box 2, SAYL, KA. 
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The growing attention paid to younger people was also evident in other American exchange 
activities. An increasing number of Finns regarded as potential future leaders took part in the 
Salzburg Summer School and the Cleveland Youth Leaders Exchange Programme. The latter 
brought together youth leaders mainly from Europe for a four-month stay to first study 
American group work methods and then to practice them at, for instance, youth camps and 
children's homes.1393 As for upper secondary school students, the launch of the Youth for 
Understanding (YFU) programme in Finland in 1958 soon took the number of Finnish 
youngsters visiting the US as exchange students to an altogether new level.1394 
The exchange of persons programme had expanded also in terms of leader grant 
nominations. Whereas a large share of the persons who were awarded a leader grant in the first 
years of the decade were closely connected to the SDP or the trade union movement, funds 
were now provided for visits by such figures as Teuvo Aura, who already had ministerial 
experience, and Tuure Junnila, regarded as a promising conservative politician.1395 This 
development reflected the US Government’s gradually growing desire to warm up its ties also 
with Finnish liberal and conservative circles and to attach them more closely to the quest of 
containing communism. A similar tendency can be concluded from the Ford Foundation leader 
grants awarded through the American Scandinavian Foundation from 1957 onwards. As the 
Ford Foundation's International Program, another activity associated with the CIA1396, focused 
particularly on the fields of international communications and arts, the first Finns awarded with 
the grant included, for instance, Uusi Suomi’s Eero Petäjäniemi.1397 Increasing investment in 
Finnish conservatives was a sentiment shared by the British who, for example, invited Junnila to 
take part in the British Council’s The City of London Course, during which the politician and 
economist became above all acquainted with the British banking system.1398  
The USIS/Helsinki’s cultural section was also reported to be going through an expansion in 
the late 1950s. The new Information Centre's auditorium was busily utilised by Finnish 
organisations for lectures, seminars, films screenings and music programmes. The weekly 
cultural programmes sponsored by the USIS were designed to interest teachers, advanced 
                                                 
1393 'Department of State Instruction: Youth Leader Exchange Program of Cleveland, 1958', July 3, 1957, FUSEEC, 
box 19, KA; Executive Secretary, USEF/F to Acting Cultural Officer, US Embassy, October 22, 1956, RG 59, 
BPA, IEES JRCF, box 2, NARA. 
1394 When in 1958-1961 the number of youngsters studying in the US through YFU was 47, the figure reached an 
annual figure of 200 by the late 1960s. Mämmelä 2011, pp. 49, 66. 
1395 ASLA Directory: ASLA grantees 1950-1963 (Helsinki 1965); G.F. Austin to SD, ‘Educational Exchange: 
Nomination of Dr. Tuure Junnila for an FY 1957 PL 265 Leader Grant in Political Affairs’, RG 59, SDDFF 
1955─1959, box 2173, 511.60E3/5-257, NARA. 
1396 It has often been noted that the CIA channelled its money also through the Ford Foundation. Berghahn, 
however, insists that there is no evidence that the foundation ever accepted the CIA's offer to fund its activities. 
According to him, the organisation's close contacts with CIA officials together with its funding of such CIA-
sponsored movements as the CCF have marred the foundation's reputation. Berghahn 2001, pp. 221-225; Gienow-
Hecht, Jessica, 'Culture and Cold War in Europe' in Leffler, M.P. & Westad, O.A. (eds.), The Cambridge History of the 
Cold War, Vol. 1: Origins (Cambridge 2010), pp. 409-410. 
1397 Suomi-Finland USA 7/1956. For more about Ford Foundation’s support for media studies, in particular Cold 
War communications research, see Schwoch, James, Global TV. New Media and the Cold War, 1946-69 (Urbana 
and Chicago 2009), pp. 62-71. 
1398 'The British Council: ‘City of London’, a course to be held in London from 5th to 18th June, 1955'; T. Junnila: 
‘Kertomus matkastani Lontooseen 5.5. – 17.6.1955', both TJ, box 69, KA. 
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students and cultural leaders, and they attracted convincingly large audiences. The popularity of 
the USIS library, also located at the new premises, was also on the rise. The attendance figures 
for a nine-month period between 1957 and 1958 totalled 35,494, while book circulation reached 
9,017 loans and magazines 10,669 loans. The book collection programme circulated 
publications on a six-month loan period to as many as 56 public libraries throughout Finland. 
In terms of library operations in general, the big question had to do with the possible dispersal 
of the central USIS library and the redistribution of its 11,000 volumes to the circulating library 
system or to the Finnish-American societies. After contemplating the pros and cons of such a 
move, the USIA decided that the library should still be preserved as a single unit.1399  
The growing library activities were a particularly welcome development for the Americans in 
Finland, because they had started to underline the importance of the book programme for the 
overall propaganda effort due to its tactful approach and, hopefully, lasting effects.1400 The 
ASLA funds reserved for books guaranteed that Finnish educational institutions had new high 
class publications on offer. Although both the quantity and range of the publications was 
mainly impressive, USIA officials made sure that not any kind of book would be shipped to 
Finland through them. Relatively strict instructions determined in Washington prevented the 
Finns from receiving books dealing with certain issues, mainly communism, or people, for 
instance the radical poet Ezra Pound, and those published by International Publishers, which 
was listed as a communist agency.1401 The clear emphasis was on exporting books dealing with 
more neutral issues, mostly natural sciences. 
Towards the turn of the decade, the share of scientific books sent to Finland under the 
programme was in fact considered too large in Washington, limiting the availability of books 
related to language or culture in Finnish libraries.1402 Since the demand for non-fictional foreign 
books was growing strongly in Finland in the late 1950s, this was something of a hindrance to 
the American campaign. On the other hand, the Finnish publishers’ growing eagerness to 
launch Finnish translations of the most notable works made sure that a greater variety of 
American non-fiction became available to the Finns.1403 By far the most popular Western book 
remained, however, the more entertaining and cheaper novel. The increasing publication of 
translations of works from renowned writers like Ernest Hemingway, John Steinbeck and 
Norman Mailer, partly implemented in the CIA's influence1404, made sure that the Finns became 
familiar with more serious American contemporary literature as well.1405 In 1958, the share of 
American books translated into Finnish reached 27 per cent of all foreign books, only six points 
behind the British, whose literary traditions were, of course, much greater. By 1963, the order 
                                                 
1399 ‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA. 
1400 US Embassy to SD, ‘Statements to Facilitate Inspection, International Educational Exchange Program’, 
September 14, 1956, RG 59, BPA, IEES JRCF, box 2, NARA. 
1401 F.L. Burdette to R.L Riley, February 8, 1955, RG 306, Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953-2000 (Hereafter 
HC SF), box 177, NARA. 
1402 W.L. Grenoble to M.H. Doyle, March 14, 1960, RG 306, HC SF, box 177, NARA. 
1403 Häggman 2003, pp. 186-192.Although more translations of non-fiction were being published in the late 1950s, 
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considerably. Aho 2013, p. 311. 
1404 Gienow-Hecht 2010, pp. 409-410. 
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had already changed: the share of American books made up for 36 per cent, while the 
corresponding share of British titles had fallen to 26 per cent.1406 Considering that as early as in 
1955 the share of translated novels overtook that of Finnish works1407, the Finns' knowledge of 
American literature in particular was growing at spectacular pace. 
If the Americans’ role in teaching the English language still left plenty of room for 
improvement, the more frequently produced exhibitions and small paper shows sent from the 
US gave Finns another valuable opportunity to learn more about the cultural activities as well as 
the social, economic and political interests of the American people. The growing use of 
worldwide USIA exhibitions, including Atoms for Peace, in Finland followed the general US 
Cold War strategy of promoting the positive sides of American culture together with scientific 
and economic development. Even though the more extensive exhibitions, naturally, caught the 
biggest attraction in large cities, the USIS/Helsinki made sure that the American message would 
also be received by the inhabitants of smaller towns by maintaining over forty exhibit windows 
throughout the country presenting exhibition-related news photographs obtained from IPS.1408 
Considering that the British Council had held a number of art exhibitions in Finland in the 
first post-war years, the Americans entered this field rather late. The first American major art 
exhibition was not put on show until February 1951, when the Finnish-American Society put a 
collection of paintings and sculptures of younger American artists who had completed their 
studies in Paris on display at the Galerie Hörhammer in Helsinki.1409 In the mid-1950s, the 
promotion of American art became rapidly more relevant to the American campaign also in the 
northern country. This was a direct consequence of the idea of harnessing American modern 
art into a Cold War weapon, which saw the CIA give large sums to MoMA’s International 
Program.1410 The main American argument for using the new artistic movement and in 
particular abstract expressionism as a propaganda tool was that its rise could be held as proof of 
the creativity, intellectual freedom and the cultural power of the US.1411 This idea was sold to a 
foreign audience not only through the exhibitions themselves, but also by explaining the 
concept in pamphlets, books and short films.1412 
After the success of the American Home 1953, the next MoMA exhibition including Finland 
in its tour schedule was ‘Twelve Modern American Painters and Sculptors’, which was on 
display at Ateneum in January 1954. This exhibition was also a significant event in Helsinki, 
drawing several members of Government to its opening ceremony.1413 The Finns’ general 
feedback on modern American art was also mainly positive, with newspapers noting that the 
exhibition demonstrated how the US was quickly gaining ground in the international art 
                                                 
1406 Jalonen 1985, pp. 175, 188. 
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1408 For example, ‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA. 
1409 Suomi-Finland USA 7-8/1951. 
1410 Stonor Saunders 1999, pp. 268-273. 
1411 Ibid., pp. 263-265; The Independent, October 22, 1995. 
1412 For example, ‘What Is Modern Art?', RG 306, Movie Scripts, 1942-1965, Entry 1098, box 49, NARA. 
1413 The exhibition was successful also in terms of attendance. The figure of 5,000 visitors seems small, but was, in 
fact, larger than for some other exhibitions held at Ateneum around the time. 'Helsingin Taidehallin Säätiön 
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scene.1414 The Finns were given the opportunity to inspect another, albeit smaller, MoMA 
exhibition during 1957 and 1958 when the ‘Thirty American Printmakers’ collection was put on 
display in ten Finnish towns.1415 The quest of promoting the US as the leading country of 
contemporary, and above all individualistic, art was also closely supported by exhibitions 
organised by the Finnish-American Society and the USIS/Helsinki, which saw to the 
distribution of another collection of twentieth-century American paintings around Finland in 
1959.1416 The promotion of new architecture was not neglected, either. Indeed, among the other 
significant exhibitions presented in Finland during the late 1950s was MoMA’s ‘Built in USA II: 
Postwar Architecture’, a successor to the exhibition organised by the Finnish-American Society 
in 1945. This collection of modern architecture was displayed in the exhibition section of Sokos 
Department Store in May 1958 and attended by, for example, President Kekkonen.1417 Since 
MoMA decided to donate the entire collection to the Finnish Architectural Museum for 
permanent use, this was not to be the only occasion when Finns could become acquainted with 
American architecture. 1418 
As much effort as the Americans made to convince the Europeans in particular that their 
country had plenty to offer in the more traditional arts, in the latter part of the 1950s it became 
conclusively evident that foreign people’s conception of America was predominately shaped by 
popular culture. Indeed, the USIA goal of projecting the country as a more sophisticated place 
than a mere provider of consumer goods, gadgets, Hollywood films and jazz music can be 
regarded as something of a failure on the old continent. Nations like the French or the 
Germans continued to mostly regard cultural expressions coming from the US as poor copies 
of the European originals, no matter what the Americans came up with.1419 Europeans’ growing 
hunger for mass products and culture, instead of the ‘high culture’ with which the USIA sought 
to provide them, clearly makes the arguments over effectively planned and executed American 
cultural imperialism particularly in the early Cold War period rather inaccurate.1420 
In this sense Finland made no exception. As in the rest of Europe, American officials in the 
country tried for a long time to do their best to promote their county as a haven for more 
classic art forms. This was well evident in the type of performers they imported to the country 
under the Cultural Presentations Programme. After the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra's 
                                                 
1414 The exhibition was most strongly praised in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, which noted that American art was 
rapidly becoming of such high quality that the Europeans had much to learn. While giving credit to the exhibition 
as such, Uusi Suomi, on the other hand, pointed out that the collection was not broad enough to capture the whole 
nature of contemporary art in the US. Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, January 17, 1954; Uusi Suomi, January 17, 1954. 
1415 In addition to larger cities, the towns where the exhibition was displayed included such smaller localities as 
Pietarsaari and Lieksa. ‘Thirty American Printmakers: Publicity’, International Program Records in the Museum of 
Modern Art Archives (http://www.moma.org/learn/resources/archives/EAD/ICEf) (January 13, 2013).  
1416 See, ‘Ulkomaisen taiteen näyttelyt Suomessa vuoteen 1969’, Suomalaisen kuvataiteen bibliografia. 
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concerts given in 1955, the performances made in Finland under the programme in the late 
1950s and early 1960s consisted of those by the Robert Shaw Chorale, the American Ballet 
Theatre, the New York Philharmonic, the one-man theatre group 'Mark Twain Tonight' and the 
American Repertory Company, starring Academy Award winner Helen Hayes.1421 In spite of 
the American efforts, the Finns greatly shared the European view that appreciated American 
mass culture much more than the country's traditional arts. 
The mid and late 1950s was the time when Finns became especially accustomed not only 
with the American model of a consumer society, but also of a larger phenomenon known as the 
American lifestyle, which became to symbolise modernity, prosperity, high living standards, 
freedom, peaceful life and, above all, the quest for happiness, in other words ‘the American 
dream’.1422 Now it became more common for leading magazines such as Suomen Kuvalehti to 
publish reports, some of them from ASLA grantees, marvelling the high level of consumption, 
the amount of electric equipment in American homes and the possibilities science and 
automation could provide for further economic growth.1423 All of a sudden, such mass products 
as jeans, sunglasses and chewing gum made a successful entry into the Finnish market, not least 
thanks to the modern advertising methods used also in the country.1424 The demand for these 
goods was obviously triggered by a rapidly emerging youth culture, which evolved around such 
popular film stars as James Dean and Marlon Brando. Rock and roll music was also finding its 
way to Finnish shores with both Bill Hayley’s single Rock Around the Clock and the similarly 
named film reaching large masses in autumn 1956 and consequently laying a foundation for the 
actual breakthrough of rock music in the 1960s.1425 
The pace and ease at which Finns adopted various characteristics of American society, such 
as entrepreneurship and mass culture, has often been explained by their relatively young culture 
and 'wild west mentality', which saw them embracing new values without prejudice.1426 Even if 
rock music and Hollywood youth icons did not necessarily represent the primary values the 
USIA wished to promote in Finland, there is little doubt that their popularity made US presence 
increasingly powerful in the country. This was gradually understood even by officials in 
Washington, who towards the late 1950s started to make more use of the popular ingredients of 
American culture, mostly Hollywood films and jazz music, in their promotion of the US.1427 
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sodanjälkeinen amerikkalaistuminen', Lähikuva 2/2005, p. 6. 
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This task was made considerably easier by the introduction of television, which would bring 
American society directly to people’s homes.  
While American popular culture flourished in Finland, the promotion of British culture 
remained on the same level as in the early 1950s. The British Council Helsinki office's lack of 
funds prevented any expansion of activities and was in August 1954, according to Michael 
Creswell, so serious that it threatened the organisation’s very existence in the country.1428 This 
observation was taken seriously by the FO and the BC, which both aimed to convince the 
Treasury of the need of more adequate funding for operations in the country. Finland was not 
mentioned in the Drogheda Report, but the FO regarded the allocated annual sum for Helsinki, 
which had by 1956 been cut by over a third to £11,000, as extremely modest for a country 
“marching with the Soviet Union”.1429 As severe as the situation was, Helsinki was still in a 
better position than many other BC posts in Europe, some of which had been abolished 
altogether. In fact, the Helsinki office made up something of a final bastion for BC operations 
in the Nordic Countries since, for instance, in Stockholm inadequate resources had led to 
various organisational changes, such as transforming the country representative’s post into that 
of a cultural attaché working under the Embassy, the closure of the British Council Library and 
the establishment of the British Centre, a semi-independent Swedish organisation that 
promoted British culture and English language.1430 
With all the complaints about the funding cuts having been presented in Whitehall, it is 
probable that the doubts Mr Creswell’s expressed over the Helsinki office’s future were made to 
persuade London to grant more money for the post rather than actually give an objective 
account of its ability to survive. The BC representative’s annual reports sent from Helsinki to 
London were likely to have the same objective. They often justified the importance of investing 
in Finland by making rather dramatic observations about how essential it was for the Finns to 
nourish their cultural associations with the West as it was for others to co-ordinate their defence 
by military measures.1431  
The conscientious work done in the numerous anglophile societies made the promotion of 
Britain easier even with smaller funds. The Finns’ grassroots level voluntary work greatly made 
up for such material setbacks as the British Council’s decision to abolish the publishing of 
Britain Today, which had been actively distributed by society members.1432 Apart from the 
teaching of the English language, still expanding, the societies kept performing their other 
activities, such as film screenings and library services, and organising British lecture tours and 
special club events. One considerable development was the foundation of an English language 
kindergarten at the Steiner School premises in Helsinki, which was hoped to eventually lead to a 
full-time English school.1433 
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The British Council's opportunities to perform its activities were further narrowed down by 
the greater share of resources Whitehall was willing to invest in the promotion of trade. Britain's 
growing awareness of its economic difficulties directed the emphasis of British diplomacy and 
information activity increasingly towards the protection of the country's commercial interests 
also in Finland. The emphasis placed on industrial visits to Helsinki was not, however, 
necessarily a bad thing for the BC, since officials in London became to understand that the 
promotion of both trade and culture could, in fact, be done simultaneously. The perfect 
example of this new approach was the British Trade Fair held at Messukeskus, Helsinki in 
September 1957, for which the BC planned a strong supporting programme of special events.  
British officials' main strategy for the fair was to overshadow the previous trade exhibitions 
held in Helsinki by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Italy and Switzerland by giving a 
large-scale display of machinery and heavy plant rather than focusing merely on consumer 
goods.1434 When the FO and Board of Trade eventually decided to include the British Council 
in the fair’s organisers, they wished to see that the country would win as much positive publicity 
as possible. In addition to the representation of approximately 500 British firms, a Shakespeare 
exhibition and an Anglo-Finnish football match, as well as the visit of the Lord Mayor of 
London, guaranteed the event extensive coverage in the Finnish media.1435 British industry and 
way of life were also promoted through providing the Finnish press with COI-produced 
technical and general interest articles as well as publications such as Britain in Brief, which was 
translated into Finnish and distributed at the fair.1436 Undoubtedly, the extensive cultural and 
informational programme played a large part in making the trade fair a great success and 
attracting as many as 240,000 visitors to the Messukeskus set, a figure that even the Americans 
would envy for years to come.1437 In addition to the general public, the associating Finnish 
industrial actors were pleased with the British giving a large-scale exhibition, as at least some of 
them felt that was about time the Finns had the opportunity to see something interesting 
coming from the West rather than merely the East.1438  
Both the British Council’s inability to expand its activities and the growing challenges faced 
by the British Embassy in implementing a broader anti-communist press campaign, once again, 
increased the BBC Finnish Service's role in Britain's overall campaign. The fact that the 
reductions proposed by the Drogheda Report did not have a significant effect on the service 
(only the half-hour Sunday morning jazz broadcast was abolished) illustrated Finland’s 
exceptional position. Indeed, in the late 1950s, Finnish was one of the few languages spoken 
outside the Iron Curtain in which regular broadcasts were still provided.  
The growing emphasis given to the BBC‘s Finnish Service did not, however, mean that the 
corporation introduced a considerably more aggressive policy in terms of the service’s 
broadcasting content. Even though the BBC was receiving more information and advice from 
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Whitehall than in previous years, for example as a result of the appointment of a permanent 
officer liaising between the Foreign Office and the corporation1439, the FO was in the latter part 
of the 1950s more willing to recognise that the clear majority of broadcasts to Finland should 
include ‘straight’ information rather than anti-communist propaganda and that it should ease 
the pressure on the service. The Finnish Service’s content followed this view conscientiously. 
While the channel continued to broadcast weekly political programmes, mainly reviews of 
international events, such analyses on communism as 'Eastern Europe' were for some time 
excluded from the broadcasts. The overwhelming majority of the aired content was now 
independently produced by the Finnish staff and dealt more with British culture and the 
English language than politics.1440 For example, the topics tackled by Sirkka Ahonen varied 
from fashion and Christmas shopping to theatrical plays, food fairs and famous English 
locations such as Windsor.1441 The greater attention given to such reports, together with 
Moscow's looser policies, was directly reflected in the Soviet Union's decision to reduce the 
jamming of the Finnish Service substantially in April 1956.1442 
In teaching English to Finns, the BBC’s role was also stronger than before. In addition to 
the Finnish Service’s own language programmes, the corporation produced two new language 
series to Finnish listeners in cooperation with YLE accompanied with the textbooks Practical 
English and English Conversations by Radio.1443 In all respects the BBC Finnish Service was in the 
mid-1950s more versatile than it had been when it predominantly focused on news and political 
commentaries. What had become characteristic also for the station by this time was the open 
promotion of British industries and products through programme series like ‘British Industries 
and their Workers’ and ‘Anglo-Finnish Trade’.1444 
 
Battle over Finnish Television 
 
The phenomenal rise of the television offered propagandists on both sides of the Iron Curtain 
revolutionary ways to influence people's perceptions both home and abroad. News reports, 
political documentaries, cultural performances, television series and films as well as children's 
programmes would all play a vital part in the Cold War mind game. The radio remained the 
more popular media around the world for quite some time, but many of the most crucial battles 
over global television supremacy were already fought in the 1950s.  
Both the FO and the BBC realised the possibilities television broadcasts offered at an early 
stage and were willing to launch the broad-scale production of programmes for overseas 
broadcasts as well as to provide other countries with support in introducing television technology. 
The lack of sufficient resources, however, held British actors back from making a stronger entry 
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to either field.1445 While the BBC kept complaining about being constantly denied additional funds 
for new activities, the Americans became the dominating force in the export of television content. 
Although this seems a self-evident observation today, the fact is that US officials were actually 
rather slow to understand the true propaganda value global television was going to have, and only 
gradually started to show interest in German television in particular.1446 All this changed in the 
mid-1950s when television sets became more common throughout Europe, and the Soviet Union 
started to regard TV as an antidote to lure listeners away from Western shortwave broadcasts. By 
building transmitters to the borders of its satellites, the Soviets also made sure that television 
broadcasts from behind the Iron Curtain could be watched in countries like West Germany, 
Austria, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Afghanistan and Iran.1447 
In Finland, both Western powers were deeply concerned that the Soviets would obtain a 
significant propaganda advantage before a Finnish Service was even launched by the forced 
importation of Soviet TV sets and the possible broadcasts transmitted through a relay on the 
Porkkala peninsula. The launch of a Soviet television station in Tallinn in July 1955 only 
increased these fears. The British, together with many Finns, suspected that the station was not 
built wholly for the service of Estonia but also with the idea of providing a service to Southern 
Finland.1448 Ambassador Creswell pointed out that regular TV transmissions from Tallinn made 
it reasonable to suppose that the sets assembled in Finland would be adapted to the Russian line 
system and would not be able to receive programmes from the West.1449 
Creswell’s suspicions were not eased off even by the British Embassy in Moscow, which 
assured that the Tallinn broadcasts were mainly intended to the Baltic area and that Soviet 
television transmissions directed to the home front were comparatively innocuous from the 
propaganda point of view.1450 The Ambassador to Finland still feared that the Tallinn station 
might start sending out regular Finnish-language transmissions especially designed for Finland. 
Furthermore, he saw that even if the programmes were in Russian, one should not assume that 
there would be little interest in them in Finland as especially young people would follow 
Russian entertainment with some curiosity. Creswell went as far as to point out that “the tactful 
use of this weapon (television) could lead to a growing interest in Russia and in the Russian 
language, especially among young people, and its long-term effects could be considerable”.1451 
Amidst all the concerns over the future of television in Finland, both the British and 
Americans started to strongly encourage the Finns to promote their own television 
transmissions as quickly as possible. Above all, the BBC prepared to supply the Finns with 
transmitting equipment in the hope of securing a good market for British television receivers 
and making the Finnish transmission system compatible with the British one.1452 The FO was 
also keen to see Finland joining Eurovision as soon as its service was ready for transmissions. 
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Although YLE's Director Einar Sundström did not regard outside technical assistance as 
necessary, Finnish officials received valuable information about television transmissions from 
various Western European countries, including Britain.1453 
After it became evident that the Westerners' darkest fears concerning the Tallinn station 
were unlikely to materialise, the USIS/Helsinki also adopted a more active role in the matter of 
television technology and TV sets used in Finland by, for instance, requesting a series of articles 
from Washington emphasising the ultimate value of Finland adopting a Western television 
system. USIS officials were also closely associated with the work of the experimental TV station 
in Helsinki, since it used primarily USIS film material in its test transmissions.1454 In December 
1955, the Americans were relatively confident that their activities had played a key role in 
making it highly probable for the future YLE station in Helsinki to operate on West European 
standards, and that Finnish manufacturers would build the bulk of television receivers for local 
consumption.1455 This development did not, however, stop either the Americans or the British 
from following with some alarm the Soviet pressure on Finland to adopt Soviet TV standards, 
which took the form of promoting Soviet television receivers to Finnish citizens so that they 
could establish a viewing base for Russian television programmes.1456 
The fact that Finland initially restricted the import of Soviet TV sets and made a decision to 
purchase television transmitters from RCA gave Western observers some relief. Contrary to 
American reports, the ultimate decision to choose a Western television standard was not mainly 
made as a result of USIS propaganda, but because RCA had offered their system for half the 
normal price, and because the Soviets were late to make an offer for the French SECAM 
system, which they used.1457 The American victory was not, however, as comprehensive as they 
must have assumed at first. The Soviet Union quickly made a decision to redesign its TV sets 
offered for sale in Finland so that they would meet Finnish safety standards, and to develop 
new televisions capable of receiving both Western and Soviet standard television transmissions. 
According to the Americans' interpretation, the reports saying that Finnish TV sets would be 
for dual-reception use indicated that Finland was willing to allow at least limited Soviet 
television reception in Finland. “By pricing their sets attractively, the USSR can still hope to 
attract customers in Finland for their TV sets, and keep alive their desire to have an audience in 
Finland for Soviet propaganda through television”, estimated a CIA report written in August 
1956.1458 In the summer of 1957, when YLE was still busy testing its transmissions and the first 
commercial television programme was transmitted in Finland, it became obvious that most TV 
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sets would be bought from Finnish producers after all. As a result, fears of Soviet dominance in 
this field more or less vanished. 1459  
The question concerning the Tallinn television station continued to puzzle Western 
observers even in the latter part of the 1950s. Both the Americans and British feared that the 
limited selection of Finnish television programmes would only drive several Finns to use the 
Tallinn frequency and that YLE could, for the lack of other material, find it to a great extent 
necessary to rely on the Russian and Estonian programmes.1460 It now became increasingly clear 
to the Western powers that YLE and other players in the field should be given even more 
support and encouragement in their activities, which mostly involved offering them with 
appropriate broadcasting content.  
As the BBC overseas programme production was more or less on hold in the late 1950s, and 
the corporation’s domestic material was not yet always regarded as to meet Finnish tastes, the 
promotion of British productions, at first, largely focused on making Finns to transmit British 
newsreels and documentaries. The more frequent transmissions of British programmes would 
not have made that much difference anyway, as the number of television licenses in Finland 
could have still be given in the tens of thousands. As this figure started to pick up rapidly in the 
early 1960s, the presentation of British programmes became all the more important.1461 By then, 
the BBC gave increasing attention to promoting its productions in Finland in cooperation with 
the British Embassy and the British Council, which arranged several film screenings of its own 
for Finnish television notabilities.1462  
After the Americans learnt that Finland was to adopt a television standard compatible with 
the general European one, they quickly turned their focus on providing Finns with suitable TV 
programmes. In fact, it did not take the USIS too long to completely exhaust YLE and the 
small commercial station TES-TV with its backlog of usable films with TV rights.1463 
Ambassador Hickerson turned out to be particularly active in this field and urged officials of 
NBC to provide YLE with film prints of some of the big American network shows. Also with 
this purpose in mind, Hickerson had emphasised his view in a letter to NBC noting that “I feel 
very strongly that it will be in our national interest to assist the Finns in every way we properly 
can to develop television facilities and programmes of their own to offset programmes directed 
to them from the East”.1464 The American broadcaster was, undoubtedly, easy to recruit to this 
cause partly since Romney Wheeler, NBC’s Director for European Operations, had met up 
with officials of YLE already in early 1957 and given them assurances about the company’s full 
support for the Finnish television service.1465 
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After NBC agreed that some sample prints would be provided to YLE on a trial basis, USIS 
officials held detailed conversations with Vilhelm Zilliacus, Programme Director at YLE, over 
which material he felt was the most appropriate for the Finnish audience. Mr Zilliacus, for 
example, noted that war series such as ‘Victory at Sea’ might not be suitable for Finnish viewers as 
he felt that audiences in Finland “have had a surfeit of war stuff”. His true interest was in 
receiving drama series, particularly those with a minimum amount of dialogue, as translating 
dialogue was considered difficult. In the end, YLE did transmit Victory at Sea, whereas after 
closer examination series like ’The Medic’ and ‘Watch the World’ were not picked for screening 
when the regular Finnish television broadcasts began in autumn 1957, as they were regarded 
unsuitable for Finnish tastes. Apparently, Mr Zilliacus would not have made a good fortune-teller 
since he questioned the suitability of comedy programmes for Finland and was not that 
enthusiastic about the future of US westerns, either.1466 Considering his rather conservative views, 
it is not surprising to learn that the Americans had already earlier resorted to their usual method 
and awarded him with a Ford Foundation grant to visit various TV studios in the US in 1956 in 
order to make the programme director more familiar with American television production.1467 
Among the USIS-supplied series that were aired were ‘Report from America’, ‘Industry on 
Parade’, ‘This Is America’ and ‘Magic of Atom’.1468 The Americans’ successful entry into 
Finnish television was well reflected by the continuous interest YLE personnel expressed in 
receiving test prints of any US commercial programmes that could be made available. The 
Finns’ inadequate news production resources offered another fruitful channel for the 
promotion of American content. During the first years of Finnish television, the need for 
newsreel material was so vast that even clearly propagandistic content was aired without too 
much hesitation.1469 The opportunity to make YLE broadcast even politically questionable 
material was also made easier by the Film Censorship Board’s initial disinterest in introducing 
comprehensive instructions for television content, including USIS films and newsreels.1470 Even 
though the Americans were now able to provide the Finns with their view of world events, it 
must be stressed that the majority of foreign content aired on Finnish TV represented white 
propaganda, as was normally the case during the Cold War.1471 
All in all, the USIS/Helsinki saw that the field of television provided a golden opportunity 
for its operations. Its activities in this area were also strongly backed by Washington, which 
wished to see that “the agency leave no stone unturned to meet the TV needs of the Post”1472 
The Americans' dedication to this mission was not only restricted to providing television 
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programmes, either. Indeed, USIS officials, for example, offered YLE some regular production 
assistance and continued to invite selected TV leaders and professionals to study in the US. 
They must have been doing something right, since in October 1958 80 per cent of foreign film 
footage used by YLE was reported to be of US origin.1473 The American influence in Finnish 
news reporting also continued to be substantial, particularly after YLE decided to choose UP as 
its sole provider of foreign news material after a trial period also involving CBS, the 
Independent Television Authority and the British Commonwealth International Newsfilm 
Agency.1474 Even though exposing Finns to Western news coverage was, naturally, a significant 
development, in the long run the way television made the Finns more familiar with particularly 
American commodity culture can be regarded an even more important process, not least 
because it, without doubt, made much of Soviet propaganda in Finland more difficult than it 
had been before the launch of the new technology.  
 
Towards Modern Informational and Cultural Promotion 
 
The introduction of Finnish television reflects British and American activities in Finland in the 
mid-1950s well since the period was characterised by the phenomenal rise of available popular 
culture, which took up an increasingly significant role in the Western governments' Cold War 
effort. Due to the relative relaxation in East-West relations the anti-communist operations also 
enjoyed exceptional success. The propaganda material published in Finland continued to reveal 
several injustices taking place in the communist world and focusing on people’s better living 
standards in the West, but as time passed this content started to become slightly old-fashioned 
and was gradually replaced by a more culturally-oriented message. This was not, however, an 
even process as indicated by the expansion of political propaganda launched in Finland after the 
Hungarian Uprising. Even if the anti-communist message was picked up in Finland more 
openly than before, neither the British nor the Americans were entirely complacent about their 
campaigns. While the British felt the need to expand their distribution outlets further, US 
officials implemented a number of new operational methods, most importantly the use of 
surveys and the new field programme, which made their activities meet the more modern 
standards of information work. 
What modernised particularly the US campaign even further was the growing focus given to 
popular culture. This was not, however, a fast process and although the popularity of Western 
culture grew most rapidly during this particular period also in Finland, only part of it was a 
result of USIS activities in Helsinki. As US officials gradually began to understand the potential 
of the promotion of popular culture, it gave them the possibility to reach the Finnish masses 
more directly than had been the case earlier when political messages were distributed mainly 
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through politicians and politically-associated journalists, who in Finland formed a particularly 
close set. Even though the British cultural programme started to lag behind the American one 
due to financial problems and the lack of new incentives, British officials were not entirely 
inflexible in their activities either, as proved by the idea of giving a highly visible presence to 
culture during the British Trade Fair held in Helsinki. 
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8. PERIOD OF TURMOIL, 1958-1960 
 
Dark Clouds Appear on the Horizon 
 
If the mid-1950s was a period when particularly the Americans were able to expand their 
propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations in Finland, due to the relatively stable 
conditions, the developments that took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s brought radical 
change to the two Western governments’ overall campaign in the country. The Night Frost 
Crisis of 1958 and the Note Crisis of 19611475 not only altered Britain's and the United States’ 
general policy towards Finland, but also made the implementation of informational and cultural 
activities in the country even more important and more difficult at the same time.  
Before the first of these crises began, things were running relatively smoothly for Western 
officials in Helsinki. Particularly the Americans felt optimistic about Finland’s ability to maintain 
its status as an independent and democratic country without undue reliance on the Soviet Union. 
In his comments for the OCB Progress Report in May 1958, Ambassador Hickerson went as far 
as to suggest that the time had come for a more active and bold policy towards Finland, which 
would mean interposing “a psychological alternative to the prevailing impression of Soviet 
monopoly over the future of Finland”.1476 The British did not entirely share this view, partly as a 
result of the even more pragmatic policy adopted by Sir Douglas Busk, who was appointed as 
Ambassador to Finland in May 1958. Soon after his arrival in Helsinki, Busk sent a political 
despatch to London in which he warned the FO of the risk of Finland drifting into the Soviet 
Bloc.1477 Although Sir Douglas recommended an increased publicity effort in Finland, as 
according to his view, “the purpose of our policy should be to prevent opinion from drifting into 
acceptance of the country’s position as ‘a good thing’ in itself rather than a political necessity”1478, 
there was not much that the British were actually willing or able to do. 
The Americans’ optimistic attitude to their chances of influencing the Finns' perception of 
the world becomes more understandable if ones reads an USIA inspector’s report on the 
USIS/Helsinki’s activities in 1958. The paper indicated that the growing focus given on the 
execution of the operations and the implementation of the reorganisations programme was still 
delivering the goods. In particular, the inspector claimed that press operations were reaching 
new heights of success. The Finnish-language bulletin, now issued four times a week to 260 
recipients and composed of topical items, selected briefs and longer feature material, was 
reported to receive very good pickup both in and outside Helsinki.1479 A part of this success was 
explained by the more intensive efforts the Americans had made to find new associates around 
the country. In 1958, the USIS had contacted 95 per cent of the journalists working outside 
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Helsinki and made them more familiar of its services, for instance, through the combination of 
films shows and talks given by the public affairs officer. 
Even if the British had for quite some time noted that Finland had become a more difficult 
environment particularly in terms of anti-communist propaganda, their campaign in 1958 was 
far from unsuccessful, either. The use of IRD material in Finnish newspapers was in May 1958 
still regarded as satisfactory.1480 Furthermore, the British Embassy was particularly impressed 
with how strongly all leading Finnish non-communist newspapers, with the exception of 
Maakansa, had reacted to the execution of Imre Nagy in June 1958.1481 The way the Finnish 
press was performing was not, however, enough to bring any change to the view that was 
gaining increasing support among British officials: that they should give much more attention to 
the production and promotion of films as well as radio and television programmes than 
concentrate on expanding the distribution of IRD material which by now seemed a rather 
unlikely quest. 
In the field of films, the Americans continued to dominate the scene. The demand for USIS 
films was in 1958 nothing short of tremendous, not least because the Finns themselves had 
become able to import more 16mm motion picture projectors after the foreign currency 
restrictions had been eased. Furthermore, the increase of Soviet non-theatrical film activities 
seemed to have a psychological affect on pro-Western Finns, who now insisted on having a 
Western feature to show in screenings that included Soviet films.1482 In order to provide Finns 
with appropriate material, the Americans even employed a new interesting method of film 
evaluation, which saw Finnish experts, for example artists and scientists, rate USIS films and 
give suggestions for changes that could be made in the narration if a Finnish version were 
made.1483 Although the main focus was still on reaching the labour movement, the US 
Government's growing interest in supporting the activities of the political right was also evident, 
for instance, by the way the USIS loaned out its projectors to the recently established 
Kansallinen Tiedotuspalvelu, an anti-communist organisation that wished to reach younger 
people in particular. The screenings set up by Kansallinen Tiedotuspalvelu, which included the 
presentation of Hungarian Fight for Freedom, attracted large audiences around the country and 
generated ferocious criticism in the Finnish communist press.1484 Similar activities were out of 
the British Embassy's reach, even if the screening of COI-produced films had made the Film 
Department the Information Service's busiest section. The unit supplied documentaries to film 
users throughout the country, most of which were schools and anglophile societies. For 
instance, in 1956 5,699 film loans were made with the most popular subjects being the royalty, 
the English countryside and the Commonwealth.1485 These films also made up the core of the 
British material aired on Finnish television, the share of which was growing in the late 1950s. In 
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spite of the agreement made between YLE and UP, the British continued to be successful in 
presenting their view of things also through news material.1486 
The radio was the one medium in which the British continued to outperform their American 
colleagues. The most important developments in the late 1950s were the renewed interest to 
include a larger share of topical broadcasts in the BBC Finnish Service and, in particular, the 
launch of more music programmes. In addition to classical music, the British began, rather late 
it has to be said, to recognise the popularity and importance of more modern music, mainly 
jazz. This discovery was made only after it became evident that the discontinuation of the 
weekly half-hour jazz programme presented in Finnish was losing the channel a considerable 
number of younger listeners, in particular.1487 What the BBC saw as especially alarming was that 
at the same time the Soviet Union seemed to be waking up to the propaganda value of dance 
music. Indeed, in early 1959 a relatively large share of music was included in the 42-hour weekly 
Soviet broadcasts in Finnish.1488 This served as a wake-up call also for the FO, as it was quick to 
approve the reintroduction of a weekly jazz programme. In May 1959, the Finnish Service’s 
output was increased to eight and a half hours per week and the share of music programmes 
started growing. At first, jazz dominated the modern music programmes, but it did not take 
long for rock and pop music to take over and become one of the main features for which the 
BBC was, and still is, famous. 
Radio operations in Finland was the only USIS activity that continued to give the Americans 
some headache. The effective placement of VOA-voiced material was restricted by the state-run 
YLE, which wished to keep all programmes in either Finnish or Swedish and had not the required 
funds to permit the translation of the normally supplied VOA material. Although the placement 
of VOA taped music programmes and American plays presented by Finnish radio was on the rise, 
USIS officials remained dissatisfied with the developments and, mainly in order to encourage the 
use of more American material and “to ensure the continuation of the radio company’s pro-
Western orientation”, they aimed to make closer personal contact with YLE officials. At least 
some success was achieved in placing the material of the Intercollegiate Broadcasting System’s 
(IBS) weekly newsletter, produced by Esa Arra, largely because the programme was unattributed 
and, thereby, did not encounter the usual difficulties faced by a foreign broadcast.1489 As for VOA 
transmissions in English, the Americans regarded their reception quality as not very good and felt 
that the programme schedule was still not adequately promoted in the Finnish press. Even these 
obstacles did not stop ‘Music USA’ from becoming a popular broadcast in Finland. The 
programme, heard nightly from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. Finnish time, kept winning new listeners by 
adopting a playing list that by 1960 almost exclusively consisted of jazz.1490 Quickly embracing the 
                                                 
1486 In early 1959 the British estimated that 50 per cent of the first newsreels supplied to the Finns were used. 
Minutes by D.C. Hopson, March 2, 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA. 
1487 According to Cyril Conner, Head of the BBC's Overseas and Foreign Relations, the service's listener 
correspondence dropped by 80 per cent after the programme was ended. C. Conner to T. Peters, March 5, 1959, 
E40/185/1, WAC. 
1488 Acting Head of Central European Service to C. Eur. S., ’Restoration of Finnish Jazz Programme’, January 13, 
1959, E40/185/1, WAC. 
1489 ‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA. 
1490 From USIA to all USIS posts, ‘Music USA Program Notes for March 13─19, 1960’, RG 59, SDDFF 
1960─1963, box 1063, 511.602/2-360 C6/A, NARA. 
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programme, Finnish music fans were no different from their fellow listeners all over Europe, as 
Music USA soon turned into VOA's most famous broadcast, attracting an estimated 30 million 
listeners during the height of the Cold War.1491 
In particular, the Americans' confident mood regarding their campaign in 1958 is, in 
hindsight, somewhat confusing considering that the Soviet Union was at the same time piling 
renewed pressure on Finland. The communist giant had in 1957 again lifted Finland higher up 
on its political agenda and increased its financial support to, above all, the SKP.1492 The 
numerous official and unofficial critical comments by Russian officials in 1958, including those 
given by Nikita Khrushchev during Urho Kekkonen's visit to the Soviet Union, over the 
Finnish media’s publishing policies, film censorship and the bookstores’ inclusion of works that 
could be interpreted as anti-Soviet were delivered in a tone that was becoming increasingly 
threatening.1493 While the Finnish Foreign Ministry was able to control film screenings by 
instructing the Film Censorship Board to pay more attention to foreign propaganda1494, the 
more outspoken representatives of the print media remained a more difficult prospect. By the 
time Helsingin Sanomat published the famous work ‘Volgan Lautturit’ (Barge Haulers on the 
Volga) by cartoonist Kari Suomalainen, who in Washington was regarded as the Herblock of 
Finland1495, the Fenno-Soviet relationship had reached burning point and was about to turn a 
new chapter. As these developments were closely followed by the US Embassy, the buoyancy 
reflected in reports on the USIS/Helsinki's performance did not necessarily tell the whole truth 
about American informational prospects in the country. As a whole, the operations were as 
efficient as they had ever been, but the tightening climate in Finland must have generated more 
uncertainty among the USIS ranks than they were willing to admit to Washington. 
 
The Night Frost Crisis - Strong Reactions and Readjustments 
 
The Night Frost Crisis1496 made both the US and British governments question Finland's 
political position more than they had done for several years. Particularly the Americans became 
                                                 
1491 Nelson 1997, p. 177. 
1492 Kujala, Antti, Neukkujen taskussa? Kekkonen, suomalaiset puolueet ja Neuvostoliitto 1956-1971 (Helsinki 
2013), p. 67. 
1493 Comments on the media also started to become increasingly common again in 1957. The amount of criticism 
only grew towards autumn 1958, when the Night Frost Crisis truly began. Kähönen, Aappo, The Soviet Union, 
Finland and the Cold War. The Finnish Card in the Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956-1959 (Helsinki 2006), pp. 80-81; 
Salminen 1982, pp. 79-86; 'Memorandum of a meeting with Ambassador Lebedev' by P.J. Hynninen, April 23, 
1958; 'Memorandum of a meeting with G.E. Golub' by A. Alhava, October 23, 1958, both 12 L Venäjä, UMA. 
1494 R. Oittinen to VETA, 'Filmien ennakkotarkastus', January 20, 1958, Ea 3, VETA, KA. 
1495 Suomalainen's cartoon led to a strong protest by Soviet officials in Helsinki and consequently to the withdrawal 
of the plan to place a large copy of it on the roof of the Assembly of Captive European Nations' building in New 
York. For example, Suomi 1992, p. 163; Helsingin Sanomat, October 18, 1958. 
1496 The so-called Night Frost Crisis, taking place in the latter half of 1958 and early 1959, had its origins in the 
formation of a new Finnish Government in August 1958. Since the Government, led by K.A. Fagerholm, included 
such politicians from the right wing of the SDP as Väinö Leskinen and Olavi Lindblom, the Soviet Union objected 
its appointment straight from the onset. Moscow's displeasure with the Government, as well as parts of the Finnish 
media, led to heavy economic and political pressure on Finland, which ended when President Kekkonen appointed 
a new minority Government in January 1959. In addition to the Finnish political scene, the Night Frost Crisis can 
also be placed in the larger international context since the Soviet Union wished to increase stability in its sphere of 
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again more concerned over the Finnish leadership's ability to prevent their country from 
gradually turning into a Soviet satellite. While the British shared this worry, they did not see that 
Finland's position had changed as a result of the crisis as dramatically as the Americans.  
In the existing literature, the United States' reaction to the Night Frost Crises has largely 
been examined from the same perspective as its position to other developments in Finland: the 
main emphasis has been on the American officials' views on Finland's future position, President 
Kekkonen's character and his potentiality to main firm under Soviet pressure and the economic 
support the Americans offered to the Finns.1497 As important as all these aspects are for 
understanding the American way of thinking during this particular episode, placing too much 
focus on them does not tell the whole truth about the policy the US adopted towards Finland in 
the upcoming years. While it is true that the Soviet Union's stronger influence in Finnish 
domestic politics brought new limitations to the methods by which the Americans could 
support the country, documents concerning US informational and cultural activities in Finland 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s tell a story of a more active policy. The altered political 
situation and the fact that Finland was again becoming a clearer target for Soviet propaganda 
and cultural activities made the USIS operations' importance for the overall US programme in 
Helsinki greater than ever before.  
Above all, the Night Frost Crisis triggered a series of modifications to the USIS/Helsinki's 
country objectives and working methods rather than produced an instant response from the 
Americans. Indeed, most of the changes stimulated by the crisis took a year or so to actually 
become noticeable. The first alterations to US informational strategy in Finland were made 
already in November 1958 when Soviet pressure on the Finns was at its hardest. The USIS 
country report reflected the implementation of a more direct tactic by, for instance, including 
the aim of developing more public understanding of European economic cooperation through 
the OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation), the EPU (European 
Payments Union) and the projected EFTA (European Free Trade Area) to the service's 
objectives.1498 Although the Americans had encouraged Finland to join such Western 
organisations since the mid-1950s1499, this was the first time the desire of turning Finland into a 
more active player in international politics through, for instance, publicity campaigns was 
openly recognised in a USIS country report. 
As for the short-term objectives determined during the time of the crisis, the USIS saw that 
it should complete its intensive personal contact campaign in order to persuade mass media 
leaders to increase their usage of USIS output, such as the series of brief pamphlets on US 
disarmament, labour, agriculture and the American press. The main target groups were also 
                                                                                                                                                   
influence after the crisis that had erupted in West Berlin. For example, Kähönen 2006, pp. 107-139; Meinander, 
Henrik, Tasavallan tiellä: Suomi kansalaissodasta 2010-luvulle (2nd edition) (Helsinki 2012), pp. 337-339. 
1497 In general, the US saw that the crisis had a damaging effect on Finland's future since as a consequence Moscow 
now held a much stronger influence in Finnish politics than before. Urho Kekkonen was under special scrutiny; his 
behaviour was generally regarded as weak and suspicious. The fact that the US decided to offer economic support to 
Finland shows that Washington was interested at least in testing its ability to assist a free nation to withstand Soviet 
pressure. The Finnish Government never came up with an official response to the loan offer of $5 million. For 
example, Jensen-Eriksen 2005, pp. 100-102; Kähönen 2006, pp. 133-136, 145-147; Rautkallio 1991, pp. 241-313.  
1498 ‘Finland – Country Objectives’, November 3, 1958, RG 306, OR, CPC, box 5, NARA. 
1499 Jensen-Eriksen 2004, pp. 190-191. 
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redefined. Approaching political and governmental organisations now held top priority, 
followed by labour groups and leaders in mass media, industry and education. Giving political 
leaders the main focus concluded the Americans' new policy according to which assuring 
influential Finns of at least moral and economic support from the US and convincing them of 
the dangers their model of neutralism held for the future of both Finland and Scandinavia was 
done most effectively when performed discreetly or even face to face.1500 
The more offensive policy and the USIS's greater role in protecting US interests in Finland 
was also evident in the NSC policy statement on Finland dating back to October 1959, which 
declared that the US should “seek by an appropriate means to strengthen democratic elements, 
encourage anti-communist segments, and particularly promote cultural resistance to the 
USSR”.1501 Especially, the ‘encouragement of anti-communist segments’ represented a new 
approach compared to past policy declarations, which avoided such direct comments. Although 
it was still apparent to American officials both in Helsinki and Washington that any opportunity 
for specific political action was rare, their overall sentiment was that a "holding operation" in 
Finland was no longer recommendable and that the US should try to influence developments in 
Finland with both overt and covert methods.1502 Finland was not regarded as a vital part of the 
world for US interests, but complete Soviet domination of the country would have been a 
heavy blow to Western morale. Therefore, it was concluded in Washington that this 
development should be opposed as strongly as the local circumstances allowed.  
How was the more robust response reflected in the USIS/Helsinki's everyday operations? 
Above all, as an intense search for new ways of influence, that is for certain. As the US 
Government wished to increase its moral support to the Finns and convince them of the 
benefits of a more active orientation to the West, the USIS campaign became more thoroughly 
planned than ever before. The activities, whether they concerned the establishment of new 
outlets for US propaganda, the expansion of the USIS office or the content of distributed print 
propaganda, were all given specifically defined operational targets that were reported about with 
greater detail than was the case in the more relaxed mid-1950s. 
In forming closer ties with political leaders, the US Embassy's prime goal was to expand its 
contacts beyond the social democrats and the occasional representative of Kokoomus towards 
the Agrarian Party, in spite of the so-called K Line's increasingly dominant influence on the 
party's policies.1503 In terms of USIS operations, this activity partly paid off already in October 
1958 when Agrarian Party officials, including Party Secretary Pekka Silvola, expressed their wish 
                                                 
1500 For example, J.D. Hickerson to SD, 'Finland and the Problem of Nordic Neutrality', May 29, 1959, RG 84, 
USEH CGR, box 41, NARA. 
1501 National Security Council Report, NSC 5914/1, Statement for US Policy Toward Finland, October 14, 1959, 
RG 273, Policy Papers, Entry 1, box 51, NARA. 
1502 G.G. Hilliker to E. Sessions, 'United States Policy and Action Proposals: Finland', January 8, 1960, RG 84, 
USEH CGR, box 39, NARA. 
1503 The so-called K Line (K-linja) was made up by several influential Agrarian Party politicians, who strongly 
supported Urho Kekkonen's policies. Above all, the group emphasised the superiority of foreign policy over 
domestic politics and stressed that following the Paasikivi Line was Finland's only option as far as foreign policy 
was concerned. The Night Frost Crisis strengthened the fraction's position in the party considerably. Hokkanen 
2002, pp. 454-458. 
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to start screening USIA-produced films in order to combat communist propaganda in rural 
areas.1504  
Another group of Finns to notice the more direct US approach was Finnish army officers. A 
report sent by the US Embassy to Washington in February 1960 noted that even closer contact 
should be established between American officials and the Finnish military “in order to help 
maintain the moral of the Finnish Defense Forces as a strong non-communist element”.1505 In 
addition to increasing the number of Finnish officials visiting military installations, the 
“bolstering of Western orientation of Finnish military activities” would soon also include selling 
US military equipment at discount rates.1506  
The US Government's growing concern over the Finnish situation after the Night Frost Crisis 
made the US Embassy also to plan a programme that would see all American officials posted in 
Helsinki to spend even more time visiting key locations in provincial Finland. The worry over 
growing communist influence particularly in provincial areas was also taken into account in the 
field of cultural operations, as more emphasis was now given to “specific groups and 
organisations vulnerable to communist interaction such as labour, youth, sports and farm 
organisations.”1507 In October 1960, the American political officer and the information officer 
made yet another trip to Lapland in order to examine the reasons for communist appeal in the 
region and come up with solutions to contain it. The subsequent report recommended 
considerably expanded USIS activities in the north, including the greater use of personal contacts, 
film shows, television appearances, printed material and returning Fulbright grantees. While 
stressing that direct public attacks against the Soviet Union were to be avoided, the two American 
officers described a more extensive campaign in the region as "an excellent testing ground for a 
subtly-conceived program of psychological warfare chiefly waged by a system of personal 
contact".1508 Even though US presence in Northern Finland was growing in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s through, for instance, press contacts, many of the more ambitious programme 
proposals, including the establishment of a separate USIS branch office in one of the "strategically 
situated cities" (Kuopio, Kemi, or Oulu), were never actually turned into practice.  
Nonetheless, in the late 1950s an updated USIS office was opened in central Helsinki, now 
known as the America Center. The office continued to act as the central point for informational 
and cultural activities, attracting more than 34,000 visitors to use its library and auditorium 
facilities in 1960. The increased significance of the centre and the work of the USIS in general 
was further reflected in the assessment reports posted to USIA headquarters in the early 1960s. 
These accounts, in particular, had taken a more professional shape compared to the reports 
written only a few years earlier. What is most striking about them is the level of detail given to 
                                                 
1504 G.G. Hilliker to SD, 'Conversation with Agrarian Party Officers', October 10, 1958, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 
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1505 ‘Dispatch from the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State’, February 2, 1960, FRUS 1958─1960, 
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the specifically defined USIS goals in Finland and the steps taken for their execution. In 1960 
and 1961, the four main objectives in Finland were listed as follows: 1) to increase Finnish 
understanding and support of US foreign policies 2) to interpret US life and culture in a manner 
that would increase Finnish confidence in the country 3) to maintain Finnish awareness of the 
strength of the Free World 4) to demonstrate the dangers to Finnish independence inherent in 
communist-oriented neutralism. These goals were met with concrete ‘projects', which varied to 
some extent according to developments both in Finland and overseas. Most typically, the 
projects used more traditional operational methods, such as the supply of printed and filmed 
material on specific foreign policy issues to selected leaders and media representatives, the 
organisation of cultural events and the generation of closer contacts with labour, agrarian, youth 
and sports organisations. At times, the projects carried a more specific goal, such as the 
presentation of the US election campaign, the delivery of media material regarding the US space 
programme, or the organisation of a student forum series held at the America Center 
auditorium.1509 The continuously growing lists of operations depict a programme that was 
energetic and innovative rather than restricted to a routine activity determined by the Soviet 
Union’s more direct involvement in Finnish affairs.  
As can be gathered from the goals listed above, the supply of printed material continued to 
employ USIS officials the most. The office now translated up to 7,000 words of news items per 
day besides providing Finnish newspapers and opinion leaders with more in-depth articles and 
publications on the US as well as international communism.1510 Since the USIS's main objective 
in press operations was to offer the Finns "a more balanced view of the world", the clear 
majority of the delivered feature stories and pamphlets continued to focus on the promotion of 
American society, instead of analysing international developments or political ideologies. The 
heavily distributed pamphlet, Amerikka Tänään (America Today), presented many virtues related 
to the US, ranging from workers' earnings and scientific achievements to the achievements of 
the most accomplished American artists and athletes1511, while other publications, such as 
Nainen Yhdysvaltain talouselämässä, focused on a single topical issue, in this case the growing 
number of women working outside the home.1512 Although cultural and educational matters 
were included in some of the pamphlets, the general trend in USIS publications was to 
introduce the American economic system as well as industrial and agricultural innovations even 
more strongly than before.1513 At least from the USIS/Helsinki’s perspective, which obviously 
was not entirely impartial, the American message was still finding its way through in the Finnish 
press, if not directly then indirectly as background material. Even the more scholarly anti-
                                                 
1509 USIS/Helsinki to USIA, ‘Annual Assessment Report for Period Ending December 31, 1960’, February 28, 1961; 
USIS/Helsinki to USIA, ‘Annual Assessment Report, 1961’, March 1, 1962, both RG 59, CU PRCS, box 27, NARA.  
1510 R.M. Melbourne to C.D.W. O’Neill, ‘Official American Program Activities in Finland’, February 10, 1961, RG 
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communist periodicals Problems of Communism and Iron Curtain Briefs were regarded as useful tools 
for “destroying the glossy image of the movement and the claims of those who espouse it”.1514 
 As progressive a picture USIS reports from the early 1960s give about the operations, they 
do include some rather surprising remarks also, most significantly about the use of American 
material on Finnish television. While the office reminded that almost all of their documentary 
films had been aired on TV, it recognised that YLE had rather rapidly drifted into a position 
"left of neutral" and had even become critical of a number of American productions. USIS 
officials were not entirely happy to see that the vast majority of relayed American programmes 
were now of the lighter sort, such as ‘Father Knows Best’, ‘Dennis the Menace’ or ‘Wagon 
Train', since according to them these productions hardly enhanced the image of the US in 
Finland as efficiently as the larger inclusion of USIA’s more educational and political 
documentaries would do. In the more traditional business of loaning out USIA-produced films 
and film projectors, the Americans fared better and continued to make cooperative 
arrangements with a number of interesting Finnish organisations such as the Finnish Army 
Reserve Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, which screened some of the films in more 
provincial areas.1515 
USIS operations’ entry to the very core of American ambitions in Finland is particularly 
evident when going through the overall US Embassy programme activities in Finland. A large 
number of the pointed tasks, including the promotion of Finland's EFTA membership, the 
import of prominent American visitors to the country, the encouragement of Finnish marketing 
efforts in the West and the increase in contacts with Finns throughout the country, were a 
direct concern for both the USIS and the US Embassy's Political Department.1516 It is no 
wonder that American diplomats in Helsinki, including the new Ambassador Edson Sessions, 
wished Washington to give a higher prioritisation for USIS operations in Finland and invest 
larger funds in them as well as to launch cross-departmental coordination with, for instance, the 
Ministry of Labor for their execution.1517 Even though no dramatic expansion was made to the 
USIS/Helsinki's budget1518, the closer attention given to its operations reflected the growing 
importance of informational and cultural operations in Finland for the Americans after the 
Night Frost Crisis.  
The more active position chosen by the US towards Finland was in some contrast to the 
British response to the Night Frost Crisis, which was, not surprisingly, more cautious and 
pessimistic about Finland's chances to resist Soviet pressure. The FO’s general conclusion of 
                                                 
1514 USIS/Helsinki to USIA, ‘Annual Assessment Report for Period Ending December 31, 1960’, February 28, 
1961, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA.  
1515 Ibid. 
1516 W.K. Miller to E.O. Sessions, 'US Program Suggestions', January 7, 1960; W. Willoughby to E.O. Sessions, 
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the Finnish crisis was that there was no political or economic action, overt or covert, that could 
be taken with any advantage to Finland. Ambassador Busk made particularly gloomy remarks 
about Finland's future prospects and Britain's possibilities to have any influence over them 
during his special visit to London to discuss the matter.1519 After the situation had calmed down 
somewhat, Con O'Neill, appointed as Ambassador after Mr Busk, and other FO officials 
returned to the view that the Soviets were unlikely to be interested in robbing Finland of its 
independence and that the US Government's concerns of the country's future and reactions to 
recent events were perhaps slightly exaggerated.1520 
While giving a cautious assessment of the Western governments' opportunities to actually 
have any say on Finland's future, Ambassador Busk reached rather the same conclusion as the 
Americans: that the only way to have any effect on the Finns would be through informational 
and cultural operations. The active Ambassador came up with plenty of ideas, not only on how 
these activities could be improved, but also on how more concrete support could be expressed 
to Finland through them. For instance, he wished to see British officials encouraging Western 
international organisations to hold conferences and meetings in Finland, increase the number of 
British exhibitions and British Council lecturers, and persuade ministers to make visits to 
Finland. As for propaganda activities, he suggested that Reuters could be urged to include more 
anti-communist material in their service for the use of the Finnish news agency STT. Although 
this was seen as the safest way for the Finns to reproduce such items, Mr Busk was given little 
hope that such an arrangement could be made.1521  
These remarks were made during a time when it was becoming increasingly evident that the 
Night Frost Crisis had had a damaging effect as far as the placement of IRD articles in Finnish 
newspapers was concerned. An FO official summarised the changed situation somewhat 
bluntly in a report written in September 1959 by noting that even if it was true that the use of 
IRD publications in Finland was difficult to assess, the British Embassy now had little 
opportunity of placing material in the Finnish press.1522 The situation had become even worse 
when it came to the Finnish radio. The Finnish Government's ownership of YLE made the 
British rate the possibility of “engineering any angled comment in this medium very low 
indeed”.1523 Nor was much promise given to the FO's suggestion of making arrangements for 
the Finns to publish reviews of commercially published anti-communist books that were placed 
in the Information Section Library for loan to interested visitors, as, according to Busk, such 
books would need to be outstanding to merit any review at all in the Finnish press. 
As the use of newspapers as distributors of the anti-communist message was becoming 
increasingly difficult, the British had no choice but to take advantage of their other channels for 
informational operations. In February 1959, FO officials recommended the growing use of the 
                                                 
1519 Although Busk was not as sceptical about the true intentions of President Kekkonen and his ability to stand up 
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BBC’s Overseas Service as well as the arrangement of more visits to Finland with the view that 
the IRD could assist in both kinds of activities, especially if the visits were made by people or 
organisations that could stir anti-communist sentiments.1524 The BBC Finnish Service continued 
to follow the FO's request, now becoming almost the only channel through which the British 
were able to spread more political propaganda to the masses. An examination of programmes 
transmitted in the late 1950s, and in autumn 1958 in particular, shows that the number of 
topical news broadcasts and political reports was growing fast during this time. Programmes on 
communism and the Soviet Union were also on the rise again. In addition to the ever-popular 
series In Eastern Europe, the Finnish Service now included several one-off political talks with 
titles like ‘Tough Policy in Communist Satellites’ and ‘Russia and the Satellites’, which reveal 
enough about their nature.1525 The transmission of this kind of content was by now almost a 
daily affair and on some occasions, as on October 21, 1958, two programmes that could be 
easily identified as anti-communist were aired during the same broadcast.1526 The service's 
systematic summary of Finnish newspaper reports in its transmissions, especially of those 
published by the communist papers, proves that the station was also willing to respond to local 
developments in Finland.1527 
As for visits, Douglas Busk's boldest plan was to bring Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to 
Helsinki on his way back from Moscow in March 1959. According to the Ambassador, such a 
visit would "hearten the friends of the West in Finland and help to counteract the depressing 
effect of the Kekkonen-Khrushchev talks."1528 Although both the FO and the Finnish 
Government warmed to this idea, it turned out that Mr Macmillan's schedule had no room for 
such a stopover, and the Finns would have to wait for another four years for his visit.1529 In the 
meantime, both the British Embassy and the British Council focused on encouraging as many 
prominent British politicians, officials, artists and scientists Finland as possible to come to and 
sending invitations to Finns who were of a similar stature to visit Britain. The inclusion of 
Finnish politicians in the conferences held at Wilton Park not only gave the British another 
channel to impact prominent Finns, but also helped to implement the broader policy of 
strengthening Finnish politicians' links with their Western colleagues. The first Finns to visit 
Wilton Park represented the political right and industrial circles, with figures like Niilo Honkala, 
Teuvo Aura and Tuure Junnila taking part in conferences dealing with, for instance, Western 
European defence and economic policy, as well as British social policy.1530 
As Finland’s political situation placed growing limits to anti-communist activity in the 
country, the British Embassy re-evaluated its informational operations and made a conscious 
                                                 
1524 Minutes by G.F.N Reddaway, February 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA. 
1525 For example, Finnish Transmission, October 21, 1958’; ‘Finnish Transmission, November 3, 1958’, both P as 
B: Overseas, European Service, July 1958 – November 1958, WAC. 
1526 On this day, the service relayed the ‘In Eastern Europe’ series and the programme ‘Russia and the Satellites’ 
during the same broadcast, ‘Finnish Transmission, October 21, 1958’, P as B: Overseas, European Service, WAC. 
1527 For example, ‘Summary of the Finnish Press, May 1957’, E3/545/1, File 1, WAC. 
1528 Memorandum by T. Brimelow, February 7, 1959, FO 371/142870, NA. 
1529 FO to British Embassy, February 16, 1959, FO 371/142870, NA. 
1530 C. O'Neill to P. Hetemäki, August 10, 1962; P. Hetemäki to C. O'Neill, August 16, 1962; '46th Wilton Park 
Conference, October 14 - October 27, 1962', all PH, box 7, KA; '69th Wilton Park Conference, January 10 - 
January 23, 1965', TJ, box 73, KA. 
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decision to give more emphasis to positive publicity and cultural relations. The growing focus 
given to the flow of ‘straight’ information did not mean that IRD work was abandoned 
altogether. Even though in 1959 the FO did not regard Finland as a promising country for IRD 
activities, or even a provider of ‘revisionist’ stories in a similar vein as Yugoslavia, the circulation 
of material was kept at the same level as before. The British Embassy made several efforts to 
extend the channels of distribution of IRD material, but at the same time stressed that one of 
the biggest problems concerning this activity was that so few Finns had a good enough 
knowledge of English to benefit from most of the publications.1531 As some potential recipients 
were more likely to have a better command of German, a few German-language versions of the 
booklets were sent to Helsinki.1532 
One of the few English-language publications that the British thought could be effectively 
used to demonstrate the Soviet Union's new expansionary policies was the February 1959 
edition of The Interpreter, which included a short analysis of the Night Frost Crisis and of 
Moscow's insistence of having even greater influence in Finland's domestic affairs.1533 While the 
article was actively delivered and used in many parts of the world, there is no evidence that it 
was broadly distributed in Finland.1534 
The growing cooperation between Britain and the US in Finland offered some help to the 
struggling British campaign. Officials of the two countries started to engage in detailed 
discussions on Finland's more delicate position in early 1961 after the State Department's 
initiative. Although the Anglo-American talks were unofficial and largely speculative, they did 
lead to a general agreement over the two administrations mutually supporting the Finns' 
association with Western organisations by expanding political, informational and cultural 
cooperation.1535 While the collaboration on media activities mostly meant increasing the 
exchange of information, the most concrete joint operations were established in language 
teaching particularly after the British Council, constantly struggling with resources, gradually 
came to accept the inclusion of American support. The USIS/Helsinki’s role grew steadily in 
this field, especially after it started to provide British teacher-secretaries with a considerable 
amount of functional material and offer assistance in provincial areas.1536 This development 
reflected a broader understanding emerging between Washington and London, which in 1961 
led to the declaration that competition in language teaching should be stopped and that Anglo-
                                                 
1531 British Embassy to IRD, December 14, 1960, FO 1110/1297, NA. 
1532 This activity was rather limited, but picked up slightly after the IRD decided that more systematic translations 
of their publications should be completed in London rather than in Bonn or Vienna IRD to British Information 
Services, Bonn, February 16, 1961, FO 1110/1297; H.H. Tucker to P.W.R.C. Haley, February 22, 1962; H.H. 
Tucker to P.A. Rhodes, May 3, 1962, both FO 1110/1487, all NA. 
1533 The Interpreter, February 1959, FO 1059/53. 
1534 One reason for the article's limited use in Finland was that at least according to the Finnish Foreign Ministry it 
contained a serious mistake in claiming that the Soviet Union was planning to demand military concessions from 
Finland. The Finnish Embassy in London even paid the FO's attention to the sentence in question. R. Solanko to 
Finnish Foreign Ministry, 'Kommunismia koskevia julkaisuja, The Interpreter', February 19, 1959; T. Brimelow to 
R. Solanko, February 18, 1959, both 35A, UMA. 
1535 Memorandum by R.H. Mason, January 30, 1961; Brief No.4, 'Anglo-American discussions, Western policy 
towards Finland', both FO 371/159309, NA; B.A. Gufler to SD, 'US-UK Bilateral Talk, April 14, 1961', May 18, 
1961, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 41, NARA. 
1536 For example, ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1959─1960’, BW 30/14, NA. 
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American cooperation should minimise the perception of the idea that the two nations spoke a 
different language.1537 In general the two governments continued to run distinctively separate 
operations in Finland, but the growing collaboration in cultural presentations, particularly the 
exchange of visitors and lecturers between the Finnish-British Society and the Finnish-
American Society1538, increased the campaigns' interconnection. 
 
Dealing with the Change in Political Landscape 
 
The one topic to which British and Americans kept returning during their talks was Urho 
Kekkonen and the possibilities to influence his policies. The Night Frost Crisis had only 
increased particularly the Americans' suspicions over the President's abilities to resist to 
threatening Soviet dominance. While the British regarded Mr Kekkonen as a more complex 
figure who was not only intelligent but also a patriot1539, the general American view was that he, 
and in particular his growing collaboration with the Soviet leadership, was a key weakness that 
could turn out to be costly to the Finns.1540 After considering a number of options on how to 
deal with the President, including openly supporting his opponents, which could lead to either 
his removal from office or a reduction of his authority1541, the Americans started to admit that 
Kekkonen’s re-election as President in the 1962 elections was probable and that establishing a 
closer relationship with him would be increasingly vital.  
Even if influencing Finland's most powerful man through unofficial channels turned 
increasingly relevant for the two Western governments in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 
quest of establishing contacts with him had been lifted onto their agenda some years earlier. 
This had suited Kekkonen well, as he sought to strengthen his political position as well as to 
increase his information channels. For making closer contact with American actors, Kekkonen 
used his right-hand man Kustaa Vilkuna, who managed to form ties with NATO and CIA 
officials during his travels in Central Europe. Previous research suggests, however, that these 
contacts remained somewhat distant and unfruitful due to Soviet pressure.1542 Indeed, it would 
seem that the British fared much better in forming a close relationship with the Finnish 
politician. Mr Kekkonen’s long-time acquaintance with intelligence officers, most notably Rex 
Bosley1543, offered the British Government one more channel to influence the President. 
Michael Creswell also managed to form a confidential relationship with him. This became 
evident in 1957 when Kekkonen accepted the Ambassador’s proposal for the formation of an 
unofficial channel between him and London that would provide the President with British 
intelligence information on a regular basis.1544 Considering that Kekkonen, a heavy reader by 
                                                 
1537 Arndt 2005, p. 192. 
1538 For example, S. Laukkanen to R. Hughes, December 14, 1962, FBS. 
1539 For example, C. O'Neill to R.H. Mason, February 15, 1961, FO 371/159309, NA. 
1540 R.M. Melbourne to W.G. Burdett, 'Comments upon the talking paper for US - U.K. discussions of Finland', 
April 4, 1961, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 41, NARA. 
1541 Ibid. 
1542For example, Herlin, Ilkka, Kivijalasta harjahirteen. Kustaa Vilkunan yhteiskunnallinen ajattelu ja toiminta 
(Helsinki 1993), pp. 248-256. 
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1544 Suomi, Juhani, Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962 (Helsinki 1992), p. 108. 
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nature, had already been a regular recipient of the Press Bulletin as well as the IRD’s 
background material when Prime Minister, the British were successful in ensuring that the 
Finnish leader would always be fully aware not only of their policies but also of broader 
international developments.1545  
After the Night Frost Crisis, the US campaign of acquainting Kekkonen with Western 
policies, aimed to make him view his own policies in a different light, involved providing 
additional American reading material, including the Rockefeller Report 'The Challenge of the 
Democratic Idea', which was presented to him by Ambassador Sessions.1546 Although in 1959 
the Americans also managed to create a direct information channel between the US Embassy 
and the President that was similar to the British one1547, certain mutual suspicion and even 
dislike characterised the relationship between Kekkonen and American officials in Helsinki for 
some years to come.1548 
As for Britain at the turn of the decade, Douglas Busk was particularly clear about his 
mission to convert President Kekkonen into a more pro-Western way of thinking. The 
Ambassador was not afraid of approaching Kekkonen on other matters, either, and his 
unofficial discussions with the President became almost a regular feature during his stay in 
Helsinki.1549 Mr Busk's successor Con O'Neill shared the view that the British should exert 
maximum influence on Kekkonen in order to convince him of the strength of the West, but at 
the same time was under no illusion that any decisive change in the President's overall attitude 
could be achieved.1550 Both ambassadors were successful in convincing the FO about the 
advantages of inviting Mr Kekkonen for a state visit, an idea that Mr Busk had advocated ever 
since it became apparent that Harold Macmillan's visit to Finland was not in the offing. While 
seeking to arrange the President's visit to London, Mr Busk also checked that his American 
colleagues were contemplating a similar move, which turned out to be exactly the case.1551 The 
Americans' first reaction to the Night Frost Crisis had been to arrange President Eisenhower to 
Helsinki for a stopover during his planned trip to Moscow, a move that won support also from 
the Finnish Foreign Ministry1552, but as this did not materialise1553, their eyes turned to bringing 
the suspicious Finnish head of state to Washington instead.1554  
                                                 
1545 During his years as Prime Minister, Kekkonen was often included on the Legation’s IRD material distribution 
lists. Kekkonen’s archives also hold a number of British Press Bulletins from the mid-1950s. UKA, box 21/44, 
TPA.. 
1546 SD to US Embassy, Telegram No. 150, September 19, 1960; SD to US Embassy, 'Presentation materials', 
September 30, 1960, both RG 84, USEH CGR, box 41, NARA. 
1547 Suomi 1992, p. 245. 
1548 If the assessment of Kekkonen and his policies was largely negative in tone, the Finnish President's opinion of 
the American ambassadors was not that complimentary, either. In his eyes, both John Hickerson and Bernard 
Gufler were simply 'fools'. The short-term ambassador Edson Sessions, on the other hand, won Kekkonen's 
approval, perhaps partly because he was not a professional diplomat. Kekkonen, Urho, Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 
1 (ed. Suomi, Juhani) (Helsinki 2001), December 1, 1961, p. 450. See also, for example, Rautkallio 1992, p. 20; 
Suomi 1992, p. 242. 
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173─174. 
1550 C. O'Neill to R.H. Mason, February 15, 1961, FO 371/159309, NA. 
1551 D.L. Busk to T. Brimelow, June 2, 1959, FO 371/142870, NA. 
1552 The Finnish Foreign Ministry, not unlike when arranging Macmillan's unmaterialised visit to Finland, supported 
the idea of inviting Eisenhower to the country and, in fact, played an active part in the process in order to 
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The split in the Finnish labour movement, both in the SDP and the SAK, also had a direct 
impact on Western activities in Finland. The development pushed Finland higher on the agenda 
of, for example, AFL-CIO's International Affairs Committee, led by the federation's president 
George Meany, which in February 1960 recommended more assistance to the Finns through 
the federation's Special Purposes Fund.1555 The fear over the growing popularity of communism 
within Finnish labour circles once again renewed the American desire to channel more financial 
and moral support to Finnish social democrats. This time around, finding the most effective 
channel for the distribution of CIA funds was much more complicated than before. While large 
sums of money, thanks to the relentless efforts of Olavi Lindblom1556, continued to flow to the 
right-wing members of the SDP, support was provided to the fraction led by long-time 
chairman Emil Skog also after the formation of its new party, the Social Democratic Union of 
Workers and Smallholders (Työväen ja Pienviljelijöiden Sosialidemokraattinen Liitto, TPSL).1557 
This group became particularly important for the Americans after the SAK began to turn into a 
battleground between the so-called Skogists and the communists. When the trade unions that 
had left the SAK formed their own new central organisation SAJ (Suomen Ammattijärjestö) in 
November 1960, run by right-wing social democrats, it soon became the natural target of 
investment for CIA-originated funds.1558 This also meant that the leaders of the new trade union 
federation, including General Secretary Jaakko Rantanen, with whom the Americans quickly 
established a close relationship, were to receive their share of both USIS/Helsinki publications 
and international trade union propaganda provided by the ICTFU.1559  
                                                                                                                                                   
strengthen President Kekkonen's ties with the West. Soikkanen, Timo, Presidentin ministeriö. Ulkoasiainhallinto ja 
ulkopolitiikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella I. Kansainvälistymisen ja muutosvaatimusten paineessa 1956-1969 (Helsinki 
2003), p. 228. 
1553 Urho Kekkonen's official invitation for Eisenhower to visit Finland "if an opportunity presents itself in 
connection with the trip he was to make to the Soviet Union in June 1960" was eventually rejected in spite of the 
strong backing of Ambassador Sessions. In his view, a short stopover from the President would have been of 
highest political importance in order to "provide a base for the US to regain lost ground in Finland". The decision 
to unaccept the invitation was justified to Eisenhower by noting that such a stop would require additional stops in 
the other Nordic countries and that a visit to Finland might adversely affect the impact of his trip to Moscow. 
Telegram No. 397 from E.O. Sessions to Secretary of State, January 29, 1960; Telegram No. 406 from Helsinki to 
Secretary of State, February 5, 1960; Telegram No. 427 from E.O. Sessions to Secretary of State, February 8, all 
White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Records 1952-61, box 5; Memorandum for the President by 
C.A. Herter, 'Invitations to Visit Certain European Countries in Conjunction with Your Forthcoming Trips to Paris 
and the Soviet Union', February 2, 1960, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman 
File), Dulles-Herter Series, box 12, all DDEL. 
1554 E.O. Sessions to SD, 'Proposed US Program for Finland', February 2, 1960, RG 84, USEH, CGR, box 41, 
NARA. 
1555 Memorandum of International Affairs Committee Meeting, February 10, 1960, RG 18, IADCF, F, Series 1, box 
1, GMMA. 
1556 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Olavi Lindlom was often in contact with not only Irving Brown and Jay 
Lovestone, but also, for instance, George Meany, either asking for more support from the AFL-CIO or thanking 
for the funds already sent. For example, O. Lindblom to G. Meany, March 15, 1961; O. Lindblom to I. Brown, 
March 7, 1960; both RG 18, IADCF, F, Series 1, box 1, GMMA. 
1557 See, for example, Rautkallio 1996, pp. 150-154. 
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1559 For example, O. Becu to All affiliated organisations in Europe, January 31, 1961 & February 8, 1961; H.A. 
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As covert as the Americans wished to keep the SAJ's connection with the CIA, the funding 
arrangement was revealed already in 1967 when a former employee leaked it to the public.1560 The 
foreign money sent to Finland led to somewhat confusing situations already in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, as for example Emil Skog managed to gain simultaneous funding from both the US 
and the Soviet Union.1561 This kind of double funding also concerned the SAK publication Päivän 
Sanomat, which the Americans still regarded as an anti-communist publication in the late 1950s. 
The shift in the source of outside funding from the US to the Soviet Union could not be 
unnoticed in the newspaper's content. Whereas in 1958 and 1959 Päivän Sanomat covered a large 
amount of Western topics, such as statements made by AFL-CIO and the TUC1562, two years 
later the paper included more articles either of Soviet origin or written by Finnish communists 
commenting on, for instance, the doomed future of capitalism around the world.1563 
At the turn of the decade, the Soviet Union's role in the Finnish media and cultural scene 
continued to be much larger than that of a mere funder. In addition to newspapers, the Soviet 
officials' criticism on Finnish media content was again directed onto films with the Finnish 
movie theatres decision to screen Hungarian Fight for Freedom instead of the Hungarian account 
on the uprising, Igy Történt ('As It Happened') , generating strong complaints from the 
Soviets.1564 The ending of the actual crisis period did not bring any notable change to Soviet 
behaviour, as representatives in Helsinki continued to make regular remarks to Finnish 
politicians over the screening of "American films with clear propagandistic intention" in a 
number of theatres.1565 As for the Soviet Union's own activities, the emphasis was directed on 
expanding cultural cooperation with Finnish actors from all classes of society. 
Generally speaking, neither the Americans nor the British were too concerned that the 
largely Western-oriented Finns would change their overall attitude to life as a result of this 
activity. Indeed, their worries concerned more of pushing their message in a tightening 
environment rather than witnessing Soviet propaganda winning more approval among the 
public. In January 1961, however, the US Embassy noted that there was a growing concern 
among pro-Western Finns that the U-2 incident and the shaken belief in American 
technological superiority as a result of Soviet space achievements "had lost ground forfeited in 
the Finnish public mind".1566 The growing number of Finns visiting the Soviet Union under 
various cultural programmes was also something that Western officials followed with some 
anxiety, realising that the magnitude of this exchange was something they would never be able 
                                                 
1560 In September 1967 Niilo Honkanen, research secretary at SAJ, sent a circular letter in which he revealed the 
way CIA money was channelled into the federation. According to him, in 1967 the SAJ was receiving 720,000 
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to match.1567 Yuri Gagarin's visit to Finland in the summer of 1961, officially as a guest of SNS, 
was arguably among the Soviets' most successful propaganda moves, which the Americans also 
followed with some envy.1568 The lead taken by the Soviet Union in the conquest of space was 
the one topic with which US officials seemed deeply irritated, not least because Gagarin's space 
flight was fully exploited in the propaganda activities of both Soviet officials in Finland and 
local communists who, for instance, handed Finnish workers printed leaflets covering the flight 
almost immediately after it had been conducted.1569 
One of the most effective ways for the two Western governments to react to the expanding 
Soviet activities was to turn the Finns' eyes to the Soviet Union's recent activities both home and 
abroad. The Berlin Crisis of August 1961 provided an obvious topic for anti-Soviet propaganda in 
Finland, just as in other parts of the world. The USIS/Helsinki's campaign on Berlin included the 
organisation of an exhibition at the America Center, the screening of related USIA-supplied 
documentaries and newsreels to journalists and civil servants and the distribution of 12,000 copies 
of the pamphlet The Berlin Crisis1570, which presented post-war developments in the divided city 
and declared West Berlin as being "the lighthouse of freedom in a gloomy sea of 
totalitarianism".1571 In addition to political developments, particularly the Americans started to 
attract more of the world's attention to Soviet censorship policies and used such banned books as 
Boris Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago as propaganda tools also in Finland.1572 
When responding to Soviet propaganda, both the British and Americans acknowledged 
more than they had done in the mid-1950s that excessively strong attacks on the Soviet Union 
should be avoided to prevent the Finns from falling into unnecessary trouble. As a result, 
finding the right line in propaganda content became even more of a balancing act. On the one 
hand, both Western embassies wished to support anti-communist activities and distribute 
suitable material through a number of channels, but on the other, they laid great stress on trying 
not to be associated with any activity regarded as too aggressive. An example of an operation 
that the Americans felt went too far was the MRA pamphlet 'Ideologia ja rinnakkaiselo' (Ideology 
and Co-Existence) that was posted to every Finnish home in autumn 1959. The publication, 
originally meant for American readers, emphasised the dangers of communist peace 
propaganda and promised that the introduction of a deeper sense of morality would make class 
struggle unnecessary.1573 The whole operation caused a great sensation, leading to the Soviet 
                                                 
1567 R.M. Melbourne to SD, 'Soviet and Satellite Activities in Finland', January 31, 1961, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, 
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Union's official protest and the strong condemnation not only by Finnish communists but also 
by other political parties and even the church.1574 As for example President Kekkonen linked 
the MRA with American propaganda in general1575, which resulted in more press statements 
critical of the US, the Americans regarded the whole episode as particularly damaging to their 
objectives in Finland.1576 Even though various US governmental departments had expressed 
their interest in cooperating with the MRA at least on the domestic scene, in Finland American 
officials now wished to distance themselves from the organisation's activities as far as possible. 
The same applied to a great extent to Whitehall's policy towards the movement.1577  
The overall behaviour of the Finnish press gave the Americans and the British more reason 
to feel relatively confident about the Finns' ability to resist if not directly the Soviet Union, at 
least President Kekkonen's policy of appeasement, as the Westerners saw it. Since newspapers 
like Helsingin Sanomat and Hufvudstadsbladet had published several critical comments on the 
handling of the Night Frost Crisis1578, particularly US officials remained fairly positive about the 
future. Although according to them self-censorship in Finnish newspapers did occur, especially 
in the way many publications preferred to take quotations from the foreign press on Soviet 
affairs instead of writing critically about the country themselves, the Finnish press's consistent 
inclusion of a large amount of Western content was regarded as a healthy sign.1579  
As an example of this, Uusi Suomi's cooperative agreement with Time-Life guaranteed that at 
least topical American news reports and articles on American culture continued to be visibly 
covered by the Finnish press.1580 Uusi Suomi brought its Western sympathies forward also with a 
special EFTA supplement published in June 1961, which focused on presenting Britain’s 
industry and foreign trade as well as British-Finnish relations as commented on by Ambassador 
Con O’Neill.1581 In this way, the Finnish paper contributed to one of the main British 
informational tasks of the time, which first involved convincing the Finns as well as other 
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EFTA members over the sensibility of Finland joining the trade area1582, and after the Finn-
EFTA deal had been signed in February 1961 advertising the greater number of British 
products now available to them. 
Uusi Suomi’s editorial content also offers a good example of the increasingly problematic 
position in which Finnish newspapers found themselves after the Night Frost Crisis. Albeit 
rare, the paper’s criticism of the Finnish Government and its foreign policy provoked, for 
instance, Urho Kekkonen to make several hostile comments to Leading Editor Eero 
Petäjäniemi in the early 1960s.1583 At the same time, the more right wing of Uusi Suomi readers 
and members of Kokoomus expressed their outcry over the paper’s handling with the 
Government, communism in general and, indeed, the Soviet Union, which they felt was 
toothless.1584 Acting in between the more restricted editorial freedom demanded by, above all, 
Kekkonen and the wishes of party officials as well as loyal readers was a situation in which a 
number of Finnish newspapers would increasingly find themselves in the upcoming years. 
 
Culture Enters Centre Stage 
 
As British and US officials learnt that their chances of having any impact on Finland through 
political means, or indeed the media, became to some extent more limited in the late 1950s, 
both embassies recognised strengthening cultural links as one of the few, if not the only, 
methods they had left to encourage the Finns to resist Russian encroachment. The increasing 
attention on cultural diplomacy at the turn of the decade was not only a symptom of the 
situation in Finland, but also followed the two Western governments' policies in a larger 
context. This was the period when the Cold War truly turned more into a contest that was 
performed through cultural activities, symbolic gestures and East-West cooperation rather than 
mere crude political propaganda.1585 
 The Western governments' relationships with indigenous societies illustrate well the great 
differences between the approaches the two campaigns had adopted in Finland by the late 
1950s. US officials in Helsinki emphasised collaboration with the Finnish-American Society 
with greater intent than ever before. The Americans made sure that their renewed interest in 
cultural presentation on the grassroots level was not a mere gesture of sympathy, either. The 
                                                 
1582 See, for example, Aunesluoma 2011, p. 209. 
1583 Kekkonen’s letters and phone calls, sometimes made by his adjutant, to newspaper editors became more 
frequent again in the 1960s. For example, U. Kekkonen to E. Petäjäniemi, September 10, 1960; U. Kekkonen to E. 
Petäjäniemi, April 29, 1963; 'Telephone conversation between R. Grönvall and E. Petäjäniemi', May 12, 1960, all 
EP, box 1, KA. 
1584 In the late 1950s and early 1960s Uusi Suomi received a number of complaints from actors like Tauno Jalanti 
and Tuure Junnila, according to whom the paper no longer represented party values and was too soft when 
reporting about the government as well as foreign news. T. Jalanti to E. Petäjäniemi, April 13, 1959, box 1; T. 
Junnila to Uusi Suomi, 'Uuden Suomen ja Kokoomuksen suhteista', January 26, 1961, box 3, both EP, KA; Vares 
2008, pp. 383-385. 
1585 In addition to the cultural exchange agreement signed between the US and the Soviet Union, Britain launched 
its cooperation with a number of communist countries as a result of a conscious decision made to influence the 
Eastern Europeans through the slower methods conducted by the British Council. I.T.M. Pink to K. Szarka, ' 
Hungarian Cultural Programme', January 23, 1962; B.M.H. Tripp to S. Viederman, 'Note on British Council 
activities in connection with Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary', February 6, 1962, both FO 
924/1431, NA. 
 
 
296 
 
most significant development was the USIS/Helsinki's increasing involvement in language 
teaching in the various local chapters. Particularly, hiring more English teachers from the US 
and the establishment of a summer seminar for their Finnish colleagues, both activities that 
would have been impossible without USIS support, gave this activity some eagerly desired 
stimulus.1586 USIS officials cooperated with society members also on the organisation of the 
annual American Days by displaying their own exhibitions and providing assistance in inviting 
prominent visitors to the festivities. The greater value now given by the Americans to the event 
was well evident in the way Ambassador John Hickerson insisted on bringing the 686th Air 
Force Band stationed in Germany, known also as 'The Ambassadors', to play at the America 
Days in Joensuu in 1958 after the orchestra's performances in Lappeenranta in 1956 and Vaasa 
in 1957 had generated wide appeal among younger Finns, something to which the Americans 
were drawing greater attention.1587 
Whereas the Americans only expanded their cultural cooperation with the Finns, the 
relatively slim resources with which the British had to operate brought considerable change to 
the British Council's main tasks in Finland, which throughout the 1950s had included the 
projection of Britain in general, the promotion of the English language and the support given to 
the network of anglophile societies. Although the importance of these societies, some fifty of 
them in 19591588, as venues for social activities and, above all, for learning the English language 
was undisputed, the BC’s decision to adapt a more passive role in supporting the societies’ 
activities was introduced gradually. The British felt that there no longer was a similar kind of 
need to encourage spontaneously-sprung Finnish-British societies as there had been in the first 
post-war years when the societies “provided a needed emotional outlet by means of which it 
could be demonstrated that Finland stood in desperate need of friendship with and from the 
world in general and with Britain in particular”.1589 In 1961, the Council stressed that it should 
no longer artificially sustain life in the smallest moribund societies by providing them with, for 
example, lecturers and films, and deliberately passed the initiative to the Finns themselves.1590 
Naturally, all this did not mean that support, usually in the form of teacher-secretaries, was no 
longer provided to larger societies on request.1591 
As the British Council no longer regarded anglophile societies as its number one priority, the 
focus was gradually moved to other areas. In 1962, the Council determined strengthening its 
relationship with the universities and other educational bodies as its main task, ahead of 
supporting the Finnish-British societies.1592 The other listed primary objectives, i.e. to make 
known and develop the use of the library and to make a significant contribution to cultural life 
                                                 
1586 'Kertomus Suomalais-Amerikkalaisen Yhdistyksen toiminnasta v. 1957'; 'Kertomus Suomalais-Amerikkalaisen 
Yhdistyksen toiminnasta v. 1961', Vuosikokousten pöytäkirjat, box 2, SAYL, KA. 
1587 E.G. Chapman to SD, 'Thirteenth Annual American Days Festival, Joensuu, Finland', September 26, 1958, RG 
59, CU, PRCS, box 28, NARA; Suomi-Finland USA 4-5/1959.  
1588 ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1958─1959’, BW 30/6, NA. 
1589 ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1960─1961’, BW 30/14, NA. 
1590 Ibid. 
1591 C. O’Neill to Earl of Home, June 20, 1961, BW 30/14, NA. 
1592 ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1961─1962’, BW 30/14, NA. 
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in general, not only in Helsinki, but also in the provinces, show that the British were 
increasingly giving thought to suitable methods for projecting their country. 
The British Council’s role in the field of education was by no means restricted to lobbying 
for an increasing number of English lectureships or expanding the number of scholarships and 
the exchange programme for both Finnish and British students and academics. Indeed, the 
Council, for example, provided constant support for institutions such as the Teachers’ Training 
College at Jyväskylä and, in a more general sense, sought to form a warm relationship with the 
Finnish student bodies and encourage exchange between the students of Finnish and British 
universities. In order to accomplish the latter objective, the BC was deeply involved in schemes 
for the establishment of special relationships between, for example, the Universities of Turku 
and Southampton and Helsinki and Hull.1593 What the British Council felt was crucial in 
expanding all educational cooperation was the fruitful relationship formed with the Finnish 
Education Minister Heikki Hosia, whose visit to London in January 1961 produced a reciprocal 
visit from his British colleague, Sir Davis Eccles in May 1961.1594 
The conditions for all kind of British Council activity certainly remained favourable in 
Finland. On several occasions BC representatives, almost with a sense of surprise, pointed out 
that in spite of Finland's political neutrality, the Finnish people felt themselves part of the West. 
The interest in studying English kept growing year after year and the British estimated that there 
must have been few countries in the world where enthusiasm in learning the language was 
greater than it was in Finland. In this area the British, rather arrogantly, continued to claim that 
they almost had a monopoly in Finland. In spite of all of the newly emerged American effort, it 
was not until 1968 that US officials were reported to have made a serious effort to influence 
English language training by appointing teachers to schools.1595 For instance, the facts that in 
1960 the University of Helsinki was reported to have the largest English department in Europe 
and that two bookstores in the city centre of Helsinki jointly claimed to have the largest range 
of English books in any European bookshop outside Britain also indicated that the demand for 
BC activities could not have been described as being anything but vast. 
While Ambassador Busk strongly stressed the importance of using the British Council' 
resources in a country so exposed to Soviet influence as efficiently as possible, he felt that the 
Council was lacking the drive to do so. Particularly worrying, noted Sir Douglas, were the 
limited use of the BC library, the slow expansion of Finnish-British societies and, above all, the 
inadequate number of visitors from Britain.1596 According to the Ambassador, visits by lecturers 
were of the greatest value and should be given top priority "in a country besieged by visitors 
from the East”.1597 For this reason he felt that arrangements should be made for distinguished 
people visiting the Soviet Union under British Council auspices to stop in Helsinki on their way 
to or from Moscow to meet professional and scientific bodies and, when appropriate, to lecture 
to Finnish-British societies. Mr Busk did not deny the importance of the BC sending musical 
                                                 
1593 ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1961─1962’, BW 30/14, NA. 
1594 ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1960─1961’, BW 30/14, NA. 
1595 ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1967─1968’, BW 30/14, NA. 
1596 D.L. Busk to Earl of Home, August 3, 1960, FO 924/1351, NA. 
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and theatrical manifestations and exhibitions to Finland, either, but he was frustrated to see that 
a large number of exhibitions sent to the three Scandinavian countries never made it to Finnish 
shores.1598 
Even though a large share of Busk’s criticism resulted from the limited resources available, 
the Ambassador’s report did serve as something of a catalyst for the British Council. 
Particularly the arrangement of more frequent visits by senior British figures to Finland was 
taken into account at the Foreign Office.1599 Indeed, the following years produced a much richer 
catalogue of visits by prominent British lecturers and artists. For example, in 1962 Finland was 
visited by several British experts especially in the fields of medicine and drama, which was to 
become a particular area of focus in the upcoming years. The establishment of the Drama 
Department at what was then known as the Finnish Theatrical School in September 1962 was 
one interesting development in which the British offered their valuable expertise.1600 
The British Council’s relocation to larger and more central premises in Eteläesplanadi in July 
1961 also had an immediate effect in terms of expanding its cultural activities. The number of 
library members and borrowed books grew particularly fast, the latter figure reaching almost 
12,000 in 1961.1601 In addition to benefits of a more central location, one of the principal 
advantages of the new premises was that they offered room for lectures, film shows, recitals and 
other such activities. For example, the majority of the weekly meetings of the Helsinki Finnish-
British Society were now held on the BC premises.1602 Besides the new premises and the 
growing number of British visitors, the other significant step of progress recorded by the 
Council in the late 1950s and early 1960s included the growing number of international 
congresses held in Finland.1603 Among the most successful BC exhibitions at the turn of the 
decade was the one on Charles Darwin, whereas the most popular feature films distributed 
through the Council included The Pickwick Papers and The Importance of Being Earnest.1604  
The fact that after several years of inactivity the British Council returned to the field of visual 
arts in Finland by organising two exhibitions on twentieth-century art shows that the Council 
was now not only in a better position to import such collections, but that the British were also 
at least to some extent ready to reinvent their cultural programme rather than carry on focusing 
merely on the promotion of literary works from the likes of Charles Dickens or Oscar Wilde. 
Both the first exhibition on English modern graphic art, opened at Ateneum in June 1960, and 
the collection 'English Aquarelles and Drawings from the Twentieth Century', also on display in 
other major towns in 1962, presented an overview of new works from entirely new artists as 
well as more established names such as Henry Moore.1605 Although the Americans continued 
                                                 
1598 D.L. Busk to Earl of Home, August 3, 1960, FO 924/1351, NA. 
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1600 The visits of theatre companies also became more frequent with the visits of the Royal Shakespeare Company 
made in 1964 and 1968 as particular highlights. ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 
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1602 ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1962─1963’, BW 30/14, NA. 
1603 For example, ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1959─1960’, BW 30/14, NA. 
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their promotion of modern art, most notably through MoMA's 'Modern American Drawings' 
exhibition held at Taidehalli in spring 1962, the BC activities did, at least according to 
newspaper reviews, confirm that the US was no longer the only forerunner in the presentation 
of contemporary visual arts.1606 
As the increased activities suggest, to say that the lack of adequate resources held back 
British cultural operations in Finland would to some extent miss the point. Once again it has to 
be noted that the funds provided for British Council activities in Helsinki continued to be 
comparatively high.1607 More extensive Foreign Office support was, however, far from being 
axiomatic, which meant that the British Embassy in Helsinki continued its constant plea for 
extra funds for cultural diplomacy by determining the significance of such a move. For 
example, Ambassador Con O’Neill defended the need for more resources in June 1961 by 
noting the following to the FO: “In any foreign country the activity of the British Council on 
the cultural front can play a big part in maintaining good relations and increasing British 
influence and prestige. In Finland, which is Western in culture and outlook, and needs and 
desires to maintain the closest possible contact with the West – but with which, because of its 
neutrality, it is impossible to establish political links – the British Council has a particularly 
important role to play. It cannot do so on the cheap”.1608 
Even though the British managed to step up their cultural operations in the early 1960s and 
carry out a reasonably successful programme, their, in real terms fairly narrow, resources always 
made the task difficult. Furthermore, the expanding cultural activities of other countries in 
Finland meant that Britain faced growing competition in the field. The BC agreed with the 
general description of Helsinki being 'the world’s smallest metropolis' as the capital was 
frequently visited by soloists, conductors, orchestras and ballet ensembles from several 
European countries.1609 The British were, to a certain point, pleased to report about the growing 
efforts made by the United States and France, but the reaction to the growing operations of 
West Germany was somewhat more complex. The West German Government started in the 
late 1950s to invest more in cultural diplomacy also in Finland, for instance by organising a 
number of impressive film festivals, musical performances and special exhibitions.1610 The 
opening of a Goethe Institut branch in Helsinki in October 1963, in particular, symbolised a 
new beginning in Finnish-German relations. In general, the British were satisfied with the 
renewed German activities, but a feeling of emerging rivalry and even envy can be sensed from 
the way they reported about the much larger number of scholarships and bursaries the 
Germans were able to offer to Finnish students or the decision to again grant students of the 
German School in Helsinki the possibility to gain matriculation certificates in accordance with 
                                                 
1606 For example, Uusi Suomi, July 10, 1960; Aamulehti, February 27, 1962. 
1607 In the middle of all the complaints made over the size of funding, the British Council's annual budget for 
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the regulations applicable in West Germany.1611 The Germans were also regaining lost ground in 
the field of language. Indeed, when telling the story about the expanding popularity of Anglo-
American culture and English language in Finland, one should not forget that in 1960 around a 
half of Finnish school children still learnt German as their first foreign language.1612 
 As for the cultural activities of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the British were not 
particularly worried about their magnitude or long-term impact.1613 East Germany made 
something of an exception due to the growing cultural competition in which it started to engage 
with the West Germans also in Finland.1614 The impact of this campaign did not as such 
concern British officials, but they wished to convince the Finns that it was not in their interest 
to give East Germany a free hand in distributing excessively anti-Western propaganda in the 
country. Although his task remained a part of British operations in Helsinki, by the 1960s the 
British Embassy had adopted a somewhat more patient approach to communist countries' 
propaganda in Finland compared to the strongly responsive policy it had practised ten years 
earlier. This became evident in February 1959 when both the US and France made a formal 
protest to the Finnish Foreign Ministry over the hostility some drawings displayed at an East 
German art exhibition expressed against their respective countries, but the British decided to 
resort to mere unofficial criticism.1615 
 As much as the Americans increased their cooperation with the Finnish-American Society, 
the exchange of persons programme remained overwhelmingly the most important part of the 
USIS's cultural and educational section. The steady growth in the number of people visiting the 
US through the various exchange programmes had by now become a truly worldwide 
phenomenon as the US Government had started to invest even more in bringing promising 
young people to their country.1616 Although the Americans transformed, for instance, the 
Leader Program into a global activity, one should remember that between 1950-1962 over 60 
per cent of the grants awarded under this category were given to Western Europeans.1617 
In relative terms, Finland continued to enjoy a greater share of the exchange of persons 
programme's activity than most other countries. In addition to the rising number of students 
and scholars spending time in the US, the Americans now paid particular attention to two 
groups of Finnish people: specialists and youth. For the former group, US officials identified 
media, marketing and management professionals as the individuals they regarded as the most 
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suitable for their overall foreign policy objectives.1618 Now the ASLA-Fulbright programme, 
together with the Ford Foundation, enabled an even more impressive number of prominent 
Finnish journalists and influential media directors, such as Aatos Erkko and Jussi Koskiluoma, 
to visit American shores.1619 While the Americans also placed increasing emphasis on inviting 
more representatives from the political right and centre to their country, the traditional target 
group, the social democrats, was hardly neglected. A good indication of this was another ASLA 
leader grant awarded to Väinö Leskinen in 1959, which he used for a three-month trip “to learn 
about the US as a holiday destination, to get more acquainted with the trade unions and observe 
the planning of new hospitals”.1620 
1961 was a particularly busy year in terms of bringing Finnish leaders and specialists to the 
US. One of the main reasons for this was the 'Operation Neutrality' campaign that the State 
Department had launched for increasing long-term activities that would hopefully undermine 
the Finns' concept of neutralism.1621 Not only was the number of grants awarded to Finns 
increased considerably, but at the same time various special projects were executed. One of 
these schemes led to the invitation of a group of Finnish marketing trainees to the US, while 
another saw representatives of fifteen Finnish youth organisations cross the Atlantic.1622 The 
American objective of having at least some kind of an impact on future Finnish leaders was, 
without doubt, hitting its goal as can be concluded from the fact that out of the ministers in 
office for example in 1970, almost 50 per cent had spent some time in the US.1623 The exchange 
of people programme also managed to reach leading politicians coming to power in later 
decades with the most famous example being long-time Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, who 
won a Fulbright scholarship to study at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, in 1960-1961. 
While it might be too much to say that this experience reshaped his political ideology 
completely, not many people can define his foreign policies as having been anti-American.1624 
The objective of associating with younger Finns was also taken into account when awarding 
grants to Americans wishing to work or study in Finland. In this area, developing and 
expanding American Studies as a discipline remained as the number one priority. The number 
of professors and lecturers travelling to Finland to teach American civilisation and literature 
continued to grow steadily.1625 At the same time, the Teacher Development Programme also 
                                                 
1618 US Embassy to SD, ‘Annual Report on the Educational Exchange Program, FY 1958’, August 12, 1958; US 
Embassy to SD, ‘Educational Exchange: FY 1959’, July 20, 1959, both , RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA.  
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flourished, as US officials underlined the long-term importance of increasing Finnish teachers’ 
knowledge of American society and educational methods. This operation now included 
awarding grants to Finnish teachers, ranging from elementary and secondary teachers, to 
vocational school teachers, as well as funding, for instance, an American professor to the 
Jyväskylä University College’s Institute of Special Education.1626 Another dimension in 
increasing American influence in Finnish youth was the growing cooperation in the field of 
sport. This collaboration saw an exchange programme arranging a two-week coaching session 
given to the famous Finnish basketball team Pantterit by Ohio State University’s basketball 
coach Floyd S. Stahl.1627 These kinds of short visits only show how more specific and 
thoroughly planned the American specialist programme had become by the late 1950s. In 
addition to cultural activity, ranging from lectures on negro spirituals given by sociologist Zelma 
George1628 and support provided to the Finnish theatre to more general book exhibitions1629, 
the exchange programme also provided funds for prominent American politicians who wished 
to travel to the small northern country. The most visible visit took place in July 1958 when 
leading Democratic politician Adlai Stevenson made a four-day stop to Finland as a Ford 
Foundation grantee on his way to Moscow.1630  
One key aspect to, in particular, the US campaign in Finland throughout the study period 
was the gestures of goodwill expressed to the Finns. Besides encouraging Finland to promote 
its culture abroad, the Americans wished to give the country the message that they appreciated 
its history and national character. The sense of goodwill that many Americans felt towards 
Finland was, of course, a consequence of the widely advertised claim of the northern country 
being the only state to pay its entire First World War debt to the US. While this dimension of 
'Finnish honesty' continued to be emphasised, the US Government took the importance of 
providing at least moral support to the projection of Finnish culture and history into account 
also in a number of other contexts. For instance, the Americans assisted the Finns in presenting 
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the works of Jean Sibelius. Whereas the BBC devoted a number of special programmes to the 
composer's achievements1631, the Americans' support to the cause materialised, for example, in 
granting Dr. Harold E. Johnson a Fulbright research scholarship to write a biography of 
Sibelius, which was eventually published in 1959.1632 A more direct example of expressing 
support to the Finns was the project in which the US Embassy in Helsinki, with the help of the 
USIA and the State Department, saw to it that the Champions of Liberty US postage stamp 
series issued a stamp in honour of Carl Gustaf Mannerheim.1633 The issuance of the stamp, 
published in the 1960 series, was marked with twin ceremonies in Helsinki and Washington. As 
the project was widely covered throughout the Finnish media, US officials felt that it strongly 
contributed to the quest of "demonstrating American interest in Finland and the common 
cultural heritage and identity of political beliefs shared by the two countries". The 
USIS/Helsinki also fulfilled the task of showing greater interest in Finland by keeping 
prominent Finnish politicians, such as Väinö Tanner, up to date about what had been written 
about them in American publications.1634  
The American Trade Fair held at Messukeskus, Helsinki in May-June 1961, known as 
'Amerikka Tänään' (America Today), gave USIS officials an excellent opportunity to present 
their country to the Finnish public. Even though the fair focused mostly on presenting 
American businesses and consumer products, the promotion of American culture and way of 
life was given centre stage in promoting the event. The fair's supporting programme included 
such attention-seeking events as performances of the air force's Skyblazers jet team, concerts 
and parades by the Air Force Band and basketball matches played by the Harlem Globetrotters. 
The American presence was also highly visible in the streets of Helsinki through posters of 
Uncle Sam as well American goods displaced at department stores and other shop windows.1635  
Although the American Trade Fair caught plenty of attention, the event did not quite live up 
to its expectations. One of the central themes for the exhibition, i.e. to present the Finns with 
products that most of them had never seen before and such potentially large-selling equipment 
as the colour television1636, was not presented adequately enough, the Americans concluded.1637 
The Finns, on the other hand, claimed that most of the exhibited products were already 
available to them. Whereas the American Home 1953 was unanimously praised, now some 
Finnish publications, such as the economic weekly Talouselämä and Kotiliesi, devoted to 
                                                 
1631 Over the years, the BBC aired a number of programmes on Sibelius and his music. In 1955, the BBC wished to 
produce a TV film to mark Sibelius' 90th birthday, but the project never materialised due to the composer's old age. Y. 
Kaarne to Finnish Embassy, March, 19, 1955; A. Vartia to Foreign Ministry, June 29, 1955; both 41E Englanti, UMA. 
1632 W.L. Grenoble to SD, 'Educational Exchange: Program Results - Dr. Harold E. Johnson', August 19, 1959, RG 
59, Records of the Plans and Development Staff, Evaluation Branch, 1955-1960, Lot 62D 321 CU/EV, box 27, 
NARA. 
1633 USIS/Helsinki to USIA, ‘Annual Assessment Report for Period Ending December 31, 1960’, RG 59, CU, 
PRCS, box 27, NARA. 
1634 For example, H.F. Nelson to V. Tanner, May 2, 1961, Väinö Tanner's collection II, box 5, KA. 
1635 B. Gufler to SD, 'The "America Today" Exhibition, May 26 - June 11, and Related Activities', July 3, 1961, RG 
84, USEH CGR, 1936-1962, Entry UD 2440, box 148, NARA; Pantzar 2000, pp. 168-172. 
1636 E, Cox to The Councellor of Embassy, 'Suggestions for US Trade Fair in Helsinki', October 10, 1960, RG 84, 
USEH CGR, 1936-1962, Entry UD 2440, box 148, NARA. 
1637 B. Gufler to SD, 'The "America Today" Exhibition, May 26 - June 11, and Related Activities', July 3, 1961, RG 
84, USEH CGR, 1936-1962, Entry UD 2440, box 148, NARA. 
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household life, directly criticised the displayed products and even questioned American taste for 
home decoration.1638 While these comments could be interpreted as some of the first symptoms 
of Finns becoming slightly more critical of everything related to the US, the fact that the same 
exhibition had previously been presented in Moscow, with the title 'People's Capitalism'1639, 
partly explains why it seemed outdated to the Finnish market.1640 The visiting numbers for the 
fair backs the notion of an exhibition that was poorly adjusted to local conditions. The figure of 
116,000 paled in comparison with what the British had achieved in 1957 and was even 4,000 
smaller than the number of people the Soviets managed to attract for their exhibition in 
19591641, which must have been a great embarrassment to the Americans. 
 
CIA-Funded Activities Find Their Way to Finnish Shores 
 
Although in recent years our knowledge of the sheer magnitude of CIA operations around the 
world, and also in Finland, has decisively increased, the continuing classification of a great 
number of agency files as secret makes the evaluation of its activities to some extent guesswork. 
What we do know about the CIA and the significance of its activities regarding Finland 
concerns by and large its role as collector of intelligence as well as a financier. The former, of 
course, comprised the agency's core activities also in Finland, a country seen as one of the 
important centres for gathering information about the Soviet Union’s military bases and the 
country’s technological developments as well as about communist activities in general. In 
collecting intelligence, the CIA continued to receive plenty of help from the Finns in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. The exchange of information between Suojelupoliisi and the CIA kept 
increasing during this period, which can be concluded, for instance, by the way the defection of 
KGB Major Anatoli Golitsyn was handled.1642 The Americans also received a flurry of reports 
on, above all, Finnish communists from organisations like the Finnish Foreign Ministry, SYT 
and the SDP.1643  
When discussing Finnish actors' relationship with the CIA, the topic must be placed into the 
right historical context. In the Cold War decades, the agency's strong involvement in Finland 
resulted, naturally, in a growing number of connections established between its officials and 
Finnish politicians and civil servants. Whereas the Americans used the information they received 
for intelligence and propaganda purposes, the Finns engaging in discussion with them did so 
                                                 
1638 In addition to criticising the decoration's taste and the lack of new household equipment, Kotiliesi was 
particularly irritated with the fact that the few new products on show at the exhibition, such as the electronic oven, 
could not even be purchased. Ibid.; Kotiliesi 13/1961; Talouselämä 23/1961; Pantzar 2000, p. 172. 
1639 Pantzar 2000, pp. 168-169. 
1640 In particular, Talouselämä's commentator felt that the Americans had underestimated the Finns by putting up a 
show based on mere superficiality and meant for a third world audience. Talouselämä 23/1961. 
1641 B. Gufler to SD, 'The "America Today" Exhibition, May 26 - June 11, and Related Activities', July 3, 1961, RG 
84, USEH CGR, 1936-1962, Entry UD 2440, box 148, NARA. 
1642 In December 1961, Anatoli Golitsyn, KGB officer posted in Helsinki, applied for asylum in the US from Frank 
Friberg, head of CIA operations in Helsinki. Golitsyn was quickly moved to Washington where he gave 
information concerning Finns with KGB connections, including such notable politicians as Urho Kekkonen and 
Emil Skog. During the incident, the CIA and Suojelupoliisi busily exchanged information between each other. 
Rentola 2009, pp. 25-45. 
1643 For example, Rislakki, Jukka, Erittäin salainen - Vakoilu Suomessa (Helsinki 1982), p. 332. 
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mainly for political and ideological reasons, not unlike their compatriots who were in regular 
contact with KGB officials. As forming contacts with foreign officials posted in Helsinki was a 
natural part of the 'political game' in Finland, the public revelations that are every now and again 
made by the Finnish media over certain politicians' CIA contacts are as a rule drawn out of 
proportion. The last piece of information about which the Finnish press reported in a sensational 
tone was based on a lecture given by Kimmo Rentola, in which he mentioned that figures like 
Väinö Leskinen, Max Jakobson and Johannes Virolainen had shared information with CIA 
officials in Helsinki mainly in the 1960s and 1970s.1644 For anyone familiar with Finnish politics 
during the Cold War decades this claim could not have come as a total surprise, particularly with 
regard to Leskinen and Jakobson. When one takes into consideration the US objective of 
increasing contacts with Agrarian Party politicians, particularly those not belonging to the 'K Line' 
group, there is nothing scandalous about Mr Virolainen's appearance on the list, either. In 
addition to collecting political information from Agrarian Party politicians, the Americans wished, 
above all, to convince them of the importance of forming coalition governments with the social 
democrats and excluding the communists. In order to make Virolainen, who already had 
profound ministerial experience, more acquainted with their country, the US Embassy even 
awarded him a leader grant twice, which the Finn declined from using.1645 In the early 1960s, 
Virolainen was also a regular receiver of IRD material. At one point this caused some confusion 
among IRD officials, as they felt that someone with Mr Virolainen’s sympathies was not a suitable 
recipient of, for instance, The Interpreter.1646 Even after the British Embassy decided that providing 
Virolainen with IRD publications was unlikely to serve any purpose1647, the politician continued to 
receive such COI-produced publications as Commonwealth Survey.1648  
The lack of detailed information about CIA operations in Finland also restricts one from 
making a thorough analysis of the agency's involvement in propaganda operations in Finland. 
At present, neither conclusive documents showing how much exactly the CIA influenced the 
journalistic line of, for example, AP, UP, NBC or Time-Life, nor reports on how much of this 
material was actually reproduced in Finland are available. As has previously been noted, the 
agency's impact on propaganda and cultural diplomacy around the world was so conclusive that 
it is safe to say that a considerable share of even non-USIA-produced American journalistic and 
cultural products available in Finland, including films, magazines and books, particularly the 
ones published by Praeger1649, had the CIA's handprint on them in one way or the other. The 
agency's involvement in propaganda operations in Finland was not limited to this kind of 
indirect impact, either. The late 1950s and early 1960s was still a time when the CIA placed a 
                                                 
1644 See, for example, Helsingin Sanomat, June 14, 2013. 
1645 Virolainen was awarded the ASLA Leader Grant for 1960 and 1963. E.O. Sessions to J. Virolainen, December 
3, 1959; R.M. Hughes to J. Virolainen, March 17, 1964, both Johannes Virolainen's collection (JV), box 14, KA. 
1646 By Virolainen sympathies the officials presumably meant his then relatively close ties with Kekkonen and 
support for his foreign policy, E.R. Allott to B. Spencer, April 13, 1964, FO 1110/1786, NA. 
1647 The British Embassy explained Virolainen's inclusion on the list by noting that in Finland private sympathies 
may not always coincide with outward appearance, but in the end agreed to stop supplying him with IRD content. 
B. Spencer to E.R. Allott, April 17, 1964, FO 1110/1786, NA. 
1648 J.B. Denson to J. Virolainen, October 21, 1959: B. Spencer to J. Virolainen, July 13, 1964, both JV, box 5, KA. 
1649 For example, Lindfors, Jorma & Rislakki, Jukka, CIA – Selvitys Yhdysvaltain tiedustelupalvelun toimista 
maailmalla ja Suomessa (Helsinki 1978), p. 394. 
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small number of selected personnel undercover in USIS offices.1650 Considering that the share 
of CIA agents at the US Embassy in Helsinki was exceptionally high1651, the close cooperation 
between the intelligence agency and the USIA was more than obvious in the country. Indeed, as 
some of the American press attachés posted in Helsinki had direct CIA connections1652, it is 
often more or less impossible to distinguish the two agencies' operations from each other. What 
the CIA's strong involvement in the USIS/Helsinki's propaganda activities clearly indicates is 
that the intelligence agency's role in Finland was much more complicated than that of a mere 
collector of information, as it has traditionally been viewed. 
In the late 1950s, the CIA's influence in Finland grew also through the organisations it 
supported. The rise of cultural operations to the very core of anti-communist activities in 
Europe expanded, in particular, Congress for Cultural Freedom activity. Forming a larger 
network of notable authors and academics to discuss topical events and condemn communist 
policies now became the organisation's primary task. Northern Europe was one of the areas in 
which the CCF wished to invest more, since activity in the region had clearly lagged behind as 
compared to many parts of Central Europe. The Congress had two offices in Scandinavia, in 
Copenhagen and Uppsala, but the scale of their activities left plenty of room for 
improvement.1653 The relatively slow pace at which CCF activities were implemented in North 
Europe did not, however, mean that they were altogether insignificant. In Denmark, the local 
CCF committee, for instance, organised cultural evenings and cooperated closely with the 
political and cultural magazine Perspektiv.1654 In Sweden, the local CCF sub-branch, Svenska 
kommittén för kulturens frihet, also attracted a respectable number of authors and other 
intellectuals from the non-communist left as its members and published its own magazine 
Kulturkontakt, which voiced strong criticism of the repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe as well as the situation in South Africa.1655 CCF-related content was also to some extent 
used by the broader Swedish press, most notably Dagens Nyheter, whose Editor-in-Chief Herbert 
Tingsten was among the leading Swedish CCF activists.1656  
Finland's relation to the CCF was somewhat limited throughout the 1950s. This is hardly 
surprising as, for instance, opening a separate office in Helsinki would have been a highly 
controversial move given Finland's sensitive situation. Furthermore, Finnish cultural 
personalities' international connections were so scarce that it prevented the organisation from 
having almost any influence in the country. No Finns took part either in the CCF's founding 
meeting in Berlin in 1950 or the large international conference held in Milan in 1955.1657 When 
                                                 
1650 Arndt 2005, p. 221. 
1651 Lindfors & Rislakki 1978, p. 319. 
1652 Ibid., pp. 400-404. 
1653 The establishment of a single Scandinavian office was proposed in 1952, but the disagreements between the 
Danes and the Swedes prevented turning the idea into practice. Philipsen, Ingeborg, 'Out of Tune: The Congress 
for Cultural Freedom in Denmark 1953-1960' in Scott-Smith & Krabbendam (eds.) 2003, pp. 239-241. 
1654 Ibid., pp. 242-248. 
1655 Blanck, Dag, 'Television, Education, and the Vietnam War: Sweden and the United States During the Postwar 
Era' in Stephan (ed.) 2006, p. 94. 
1656 Nilsson 2009, pp. 150-159. 
1657 'Kongress für Kulturelle Freihet: Teilnehmer am Berliner Kongress', June 1950; '"The Future of Freedom" - 
Fifth International Conference Sponsored by The Congress for Cultural Freedom, Milan 12-17 September 1955', 
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Finnish actors were involved with CCF-associated persons, it mainly took place in a 
Scandinavian context. In addition to Finnish authors and academics travelling mostly to 
Stockholm to take part in some CCF-sponsored cultural event, on some occasions the congress 
headquarters in Paris offered funding for lecturers visiting Scandinavia to include Finland in 
their itinerary.1658 Otherwise, CCF activity in Finland was largely restricted to contacting certain 
influential individuals, for instance by posting them CCF-sponsored publications. Among the 
Finnish intellectuals to receive these magazines was L.A. Puntila, Professor of political history 
and an active anti-communist, to whom the CCF, via the USIS/Helsinki, started to offer Der 
Monat in 1955.1659  
Towards the late 1950s, the CCF started to pay even more attention to the north. In 1960, 
the congress finally opened a separate Scandinavian office in Copenhagen under the leadership 
of librarian and journalist Jörgen Schleimann. Besides making the Danish operations more 
effective, Schleimann gave great care in increasing CCF contacts throughout the northern 
region. In the late 1950s, acting still as the unofficial representative of the CCF in Scandinavia, 
he made at least two trips to Finland. During the first visit in March 1958, Schleimann, for 
instance, talked to Arvo Tuominen. Their meeting resulted in the Dane writing an article on 
communist politician Yrjö Leino's controversial memoirs that was published in several CCF-
funded papers.1660 Schleimann's second trip to Finland in January 1960 was devoted to forming 
more contacts with Finnish journalists from papers like Hufvudstadsbladet and Uusi Suomi as well 
as with such authors and literary critics as Tuomas Anhava.1661  
While Schleimann was expanding his contact network in Finland, CCF work related to the 
country also increased through the committee in Sweden. In the late 1950s, Swedish CCF 
activists started to invite a greater number of Finnish intellectuals to their country to take part in 
various cultural programmes. Among the events receiving three guests from Finland was the 
young writers' conference held in Stockholm in January 1957 that was attended by Tuomas 
Anhava, Jörn Donner and Jouko Tyyri.1662 An example of an activity specifically designed for 
Finns, and closely followed by CCF headquarters, was the organisation of literary evenings in 
Stockholm and Uppsala in November 1959 given by four Finnish Swedish-speaking poets, 
Gunnar Björling, Rabbe Enckell, Solveig von Scholtz and Bo Carpelan.1663 This was not the 
only CCF-sponsored activity in which Carpelan, later to become one of Finland's most highly-
regarded authors, took part in Scandinavia. In the previous year, he had already lectured on 
                                                                                                                                                   
Press Summary, Svenska kommittén för kulturens frihet (Herafter SKFKF), both box 3, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och 
bibliotek (Herafter ARAB), Stockholm, Sweden. 
1658 Philipsen 2003, pp. 246, 252. 
1659 B.A. Thirkield to L.A. Puntila, February 3, 1955, L.A. Puntila's collection, box 165, KA. 
1660 J. Schleimann to A. Tuominen, July 5, 1958; J. Schleimann to A. Tuominen, January 5, 1959, both AT, box 12, 
KA. 
1661 J. Schleimann to N.B. Storbom, January 28, 1960; J. Schleimann to A. Sarajas, January 29, 1960; J. Schleimann 
to T. Anhava, March 3, 1960, all Congress for Cultural Freedom Collection (Herafter CCFC), Series II, box 101, 
University of Chicago, Illinois (UC); J. Schleimann to B. Alexandersen, November 21, 1959, SKFKF, box 2 ARAB. 
1662 B. Alexanderson to J. Schleimann, April 6, 1960, SKFKF, box 2, ARAB; Helsingin Sanomat, February 15, 1957. 
1663 B-M. Persson to J. Schleimann, September 24, 1959; J. Scheimann to B-M. Persson, September 28, 1959; B. 
Carpelan to B-M. Persson, October 10, 1959; B-M. Persson to B. Carpelan, October 20, 1959; 'Svenska kommittén 
för kulturens frihet - Årsberättelse 1959'; all SKFKF, box 4, ARAB. 
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Finnish literature at the University of Uppsala at the Swedish committee's request.1664 In spring 
1961, he was invited to participate in a seminar in Norway, which was made possible with CCF 
funds posted from Paris.1665  
The quest of involving Finnish actors more closely with the international activities of the CCF 
took another leap forward in 1960 when the international authors' conference in Copenhagen was 
attended not only by Carpelan and Tyyri, but also by Kai Laitinen, critic and Leading Editor of 
the literary magazine Parnasso. The intention of this event was to hold a discussion on writers' 
relationship with the welfare state, which would eventually lead to the publication of a book on 
the same topic.1666 As the CCF felt that the conference had included representatives from too 
many cultural backgrounds, it came up with the idea of arranging a separate session on the issue 
for Nordic authors. For arranging such a meeting, Pierre Emmanuel, French poet and CCF 
official, contacted Jouko Tyyri, whom he now regarded as the most active Finnish contact.1667 Mr 
Tyyri agreed with Mr Emmanuel's suggestion and organised the seminar in Helsinki in November 
1960 under the name 'The Writer and Society'.1668 The increasing cooperation between Finnish 
and Scandinavian authors opened the path for the CCF to contact more Finns also from the 
world of academia. The Congress was now finally able to attract Finnish participants to its 
worldwide conferences, as was the case with the Berlin Conference of 1960 for which invitations 
were sent to two Finnish academics: Heikki Waris, Professor of social policy at the University of 
Helsinki, and Tuttu Tarkiainen, Professor of political science at the Yhteiskunnallinen 
korkeakoulu ('The School of Social Sciences').1669 
As the Finns' association with CCF activity remained somewhat scarce in spite of their 
growing participation in various conferences, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the 
organisation's strongest impact on Finland was generated by the expansion of its publication 
activities. While CCF-associated publications, above all Encounter, had been received and at 
times even used by larger Finnish newspapers1670, the foundation of the new Forum Service in 
autumn 1957 increased the flow of available material. As the CCF's publications had previously 
been directed to small cultural and intellectual circles, the aim of the news service was to reach 
the broader masses more directly by offering expert analyses of political, cultural and intellectual 
developments to newspapers and magazines around the world free of charge.1671 That the 
service was formed under the general direction of Melvin Lasky, former Editor of Der Monat 
                                                 
1664 'Svenska kommittén för kulturens frihet - Årsberättelse 1958'; SKFKF, box 2, ARAB. 
1665 G. Stang to I. Katz, April 8, 1961, CCFC, Series III, box 33, UC. 
1666 For example, P. Emmanuel to B. Carpelan, August 3, 1960, CCFC Series II, box 101, UC. For Kai Laitinen's 
report on the conference, see Helsingin Sanomat, October 7, 1960. 
1667 P. Emmanuel to J. Tyyri, Septermber 20, 1960, September 30, 1960 & October 10, 1960, all CCFC, Series II, 
box 101; P. Emmanuel to J. Schleimann, November 21, 1960, CCFC, Series III, box 33, all UC. 
1668 P. Emmanuel to J. Tyyri, October 10, 1960; J. Schleimann to S. Charles, both CCFC, Series III, box 33, UC. 
1669 J. Schleimann to K. Laitinen, June 3, 1960, CCFC, Series II, box 101, UC. 
1670 Articles originally published in Encounter were re-produced in a number of leading newspapers in the 1950s, 
including Helsingin Sanomat. The inclusion of Encounter material was not very extensive and was usually made by 
shortly referring to the original stories. The reproduction of some of the longer articles did, however, offer an addition 
to the readers' conception of such issues as the discriminated position of Soviet composers. See, for example, 
Helsingin Sanomat, August 15, 1954 & March 27, 1959. For the Soviet composers, see Ilta-Sanomat, June 23, 1955.  
1671 J.C. Hunt to B. Stenberg, October 10, 1957; N. Nabakov to Undefined recipients, October 23, 1957, both 
SKFKF, box 2, ARAB; Coleman 1989, pp. 101-102. 
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and upcoming Editor of the Encounter as well as one of the driving forces behind the CCF, not 
only ensured that the distributed material contained articles from a great number of prominent 
academics and journalists, but also that the content did not follow a single pre-determined angle 
through which developments were explained.1672 
Not that long after the Forum Service had started to run at full force, its content reached 
Finnish newspapers. Partly due to the contacts Jörgen Schleimann had managed to forge during 
his visits to the country, the service, along with other new CCF publications, such as the Soviet 
Survey and the China Quarterly, was at first offered to papers like Hufvudstadsbladet, which was of 
special interest to Schleimann due to its extensive coverage of international affairs1673, and Uusi 
Suomi, to which the CCF started to deliver two 'Forum features' a week from October 1959 
onwards.1674 Ilta-Sanomat also soon became one of Forum's most effective outlets by using the 
delivered content right until the service's connection with the CIA was revealed by Ramparts.1675 
The cooperation with all of these newspapers also took the form in the CCF offering several ad 
hoc articles on issues they saw as interesting to Finnish readers, such as Mr Schleimann's travel 
reports from West Africa.1676  
Enlightening their readers was not only the task of CCF publications dealing with cultural 
and political issues. The Congress also wished to make sure that the academic world was not 
neglected and started to distribute a biannual Science and Freedom Bulletin to universities around 
the world.1677 This bulletin reached Finnish shores in the early 1960s when a number of Finnish 
professors throughout the country were added to its mailing list.1678 Among the magazines the 
CCF wished to be distributed more extensively in Finland was also the Swedish committee's 
Kulturkontakt, but its delivery and sales figures remained modest mainly due to the constant 
financial difficulties in which the magazine found itself.1679 
In spite of managing to conquer column inches in some of Finland's leading newspapers, the 
CCF realised that cultural magazines could give considerably more coverage to its printed 
content. After making contact with Kai Laitinen, Parnasso appeared as the most likely outlet for 
CCF material, particularly as it regularly included writings from Anhava, Carpelan and Tyyri, 
among others. The Congress now started to provide Laitinen with a number of publications1680 
and, according to Rislakki, even offered to purchase the magazine.1681 These efforts did not, 
                                                 
1672 For Melvin Lasky, his work related to the CCF, and his main editorial ideologies, see: Scott-Smith, Giles, ''A 
Radical Democratic Political Offensive': Melvin J. Lasky, Der Monat, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom', 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (April 2000), pp. 263-280. 
1673 For example, J. Schleimann to N-B. Storbom, January 28, 1960, March 22, 1960, April 3, 1960 & April 5, 1960, 
all CCFC, Series II, box 101, UC. 
1674 M. Mindlin to E. Petäjäniemi, October 9, 1959; E. Petäjäniemi to M.J. Lasky, October 13, 1959, US, box 49, KA. 
1675 Rislakki 2010, p. 177. 
1676 For example, J. Schleimann to N-B. Storbom, April 3, 1960; J. Schleimann to H. von Bonsdorff, April 27, 1960, 
both CCFC, Series II, box 101, UC. 
1677 Coleman 1989, p. 98. 
1678 For example, P. Polanyi to M. Koskenniemi, March 15, 1960; P. Polanyi to E. Ekelund, March 29, 1960; P. 
Polanyi to A.E. Penttilä, June 20, 1960, all CCFC, Series II, box 80, UC. 
1679 For example, J.C. Hunt to B. Stenberg, February 11, 1959; J. Schleimann to B. Alexanderson, September 28, 
1959, both SKFKF, box 4, ARAB. 
1680 J. Schleimann to K. Laitinen, January 29, 1960; I. Jaffe to K. Laitinen, February 15, 1960, both CCFC, Series II, 
box 101, UC. 
1681 Rislakki 2010, p. 184. 
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however, produce formidable results. Parnasso stayed in Finnish hands and apart from 
occasionally dealing with some of the topics CCF publications had covered1682, the inclusion of 
Congress material remained rare in the early 1960s. This did not entirely change both CCF and 
US officials' view that Mr Laitinen's role as the editor of a leading cultural publication was 
significant enough to maintain close contacts with him. In 1961, Laitinen was invited to the 
Harvard International Seminar, yet another programme backed by the CIA, to convince 
promising younger foreigners of the cultural virtues of the US in addition to its materialistic 
superiority.1683 The Finnish critic's report on his experiences of the seminar indicates that in his 
case this objective was met.1684 
As Parnasso did not quite live up to the CCF's expectations, the organisation continued with its 
mission of finding influential actors from the Finnish intellectual circles who would be interested 
in reproducing printed content. After discovering that Reijo Wilenius, founder and Leading 
Editor of Katsaus, a cultural magazine that would later become the official publication of the 
Kriittinen korkeakoulu educational and cultural association, had expressed his desire to cooperate 
with the Congress, CCF officials in Paris did not hesitate to contact the rising philosopher.1685 
Soon after the first samples of CCF material were sent to Wilenius, Katsaus noted that it had been 
granted the formal right to use articles from Encounter, Preuves and Der Monat as well as the Forum 
Service. The magazine took full advantage of this opportunity and started including the delivered 
content on a fairly regular basis, the first being a translation of Iris Murdoch’s essay ‘Against 
Dryness’ that had been published in Encounter.1686 Other published CCF material included 
writings from Arthur Koestler and an article series on developments in five African countries by 
journalist Brian Crozier, who was also a regular contributor to the IRD.1687 Although a magazine 
of small circulation, in Katsaus the CCF had found a publication that was willing to reproduce its 
content and able to reach members of the Finnish intelligentsia. The only thing that seemed to 
bother Schleimann and his colleagues to some extent was that the magazine had adopted a rather 
generalistic approach in covering cultural matters rather than being the more bold literary critic 
the CCF would have preferred it to be.1688 
Another Finnish magazine to publish some CCF-originated articles was Tilanne, a publication 
founded to present 'the third way' in leftist ideology which opposed many of the leading 
                                                 
1682 Parnasso did relatively often refer to literary reviews and essays published in, for instance, Encounter. One 
example of this was the Finnish publication's review of Iris Murdoch's novel 'A Severe Heart', which was examined 
by taking extracts of her essay published in the Encounter. One could, of course, argue that in a broader sense 
Parnasso did serve the CCF's interests in Finland under Laitinen's leadership by generally embracing and promoting 
literary modernism. See, for example, Parnasso 8/1961.  
1683 Wilford 2008, pp. 124-128. 
1684 Besides being pleasantly surprised by the level of the organised debates, Laitinen noted how his seven-week stay 
at Harvard had made him understand how versatile American culture was also from the literary perspective. This 
impression was only enhanced through the new contacts he made with American publishers and booksellers for 
instance when visiting San Francisco. The growing flow of American books to Parnasso is likely to have increased 
the number of American titles reviewed by the magazine. For example, L. Ferghnetti to K. Laitinen, Kai Laitinen's 
collection, Kirjekokoelma, box 802, Kirjallisuusarkisto, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura; Parnasso 7/1961. 
1685 N.W. Aldrich to R. Wilenius, March 1, 1961 & June 15, 1961, both CCFC, Series II, box 80, UC. 
1686 Katsaus 1/1961. 
1687 Katsaus 2/1961; Katsaus 3/1962; Defty 2004, pp. 16, 116 
1688 P. Emmanuel to J. Schleimann, November 21, 1960, CCFC, Series III, box 33, folder 4, UC. 
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communist dogmas.1689 The CCF content included in the magazine supported the task of 
challenging the old ways of leftist thinking by, for instance, questioning the simple, uncritical way 
in which the Soviet Union was perceived in the West.1690 What makes examining Tilanne 
particularly interesting are the many claims that its cooperation with the CCF was not merely 
restricted to the exchange of journalistic content. For example, Hannu Rautkallio has, based on 
his interview with Frank Friberg, former head of the CIA post in Helsinki, claimed that the 
publication was partly funded with CIA money.1691 Jaakko Blomberg, who worked as Tilanne's 
sub-editor, has noted that while no evidence of foreign funding exists, the termination of the 
magazine around the same time as the CCF ended its activities can be regarded as perhaps more 
than just a curious coincidence.1692 The absence of Tilanne from any lists regarding CCF-
sponsored publications, on the other hand, supports the view that no money was received at least 
through the Congress headquarters in Paris.1693 Of course, CIA funds could have been infiltrated 
to the Finnish magazine through other channels. The fact that Tilanne did exactly what US 
officials and the CCF wished Finnish leftist writers to do, namely causing disunity among the 
communist ranks, gives more reason to believe that the publication received at least some foreign 
financial backing in addition to the funds it received, among others, from SYT.1694 The tension 
Tilanne caused in leftist cultural circles led directly to the SKP's decision to establish a cultural 
magazine of its own. Among the people fulfilling this task was the famous radical poet Pentti 
Saarikoski who emphasised that the publication, which became known as Aikalainen, should not 
compete with Tilanne as such, but be rather based on "a larger cultural programme that would 
institutionally be tied to political and social programmes and openly promote Marxism".1695 
Although CCF work in Finland was small-scale and had only an indirect impact on the 
Finns, it would be too harsh to say that it was meaningless. The operations increased 
international contacts within the Finnish cultural and academic circles and offered an alternative 
channel for Western anti-communists to stir Finnish cultural discussion. Even if CCF 
operations were nowhere near the size of either the USIA or the IRD, their subtle style of 
approaching Finnish intellectuals was precisely the kind of activity on which the CIA wished to 
spend its money. The opening of a Scandinavian office in Copenhagen made the activities 
concerning Finland more effective, but the decision made in 1962 to give up the idea of having 
national and regional committees and concentrate on working through personal contacts, 
                                                 
1689 This policy was determined in the first edition of Tilanne, which declared to promote open international 
discussion on the theoretical and practical sides of socialism free of any political party. This discussion included the 
rather direct denouncement of Stalinist despotism and criticism of Finnish communists for limiting the open 
exchange of opinions. For example, Tilanne 1/1961,Tilanne 1/1962, Tilanne 2-3/1962. 
1690 The article on the image of the Soviet Union in the West was based on a story published by the CCF-sponsored 
Survey and an article published in the New Statesman in May 1962. Tilanne 5-6/1962. 
1691 Rautkallio 1999, p. 294. 
1692 Blomberg, Jaakko, 'Tilanne-lehden rahoitus', Työväentutkimus (Helsinki 2007), pp. 56-57. 
1693 For example, 'A list of CCF-sponsored magazines', Undated, George F. Kennan Papers, box 21, Seeley G. 
Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, NJ, US. 
1694 Vesikansa 2004b, p. 238. The plan to use the publication for breaking the communist camp was so significant that 
it was followed closely by Urho Kekkonen's associate Kustaa Vilkuna, who, undoubtedly, informed the President 
about the matter. 'Suunnitelma Tilanne-lehden käytöstä kentällä', Undated, Kustaa Vilkunan arkisto, box 21, TPA.. 
1695 Memorandum: 'Ajatuksia "vasemmistolaisesta kulttuurilehdestä' by Pentti Saarikoski', Undated; Memorandum: 
'Kulttuuripoliittisen lehden perustaminen', November 26, 1962, both SKP:n kulttuuripoliittinen jaosto, 1B, Kansan 
Arkisto; Tarkka, Pekka, Pentti Saarikoski. Vuodet 1937-1963 (Helsinki 1996), pp. 505-506, 561-567. 
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instead, again took the operations further away from Finland.1696 This did not bring CCF work 
in Finland to a complete standstill, since the organisation continued to encourage the Finns' 
international exchanges by, for example, partly funding the annual international writers' 
conference held in Mukkula, Lahti.1697 
Of course, the CCF was not the only organisation involving Finns while receiving CIA funds 
in the late 1950s and early 1960. A growing number of Finnish students were taking part in the 
activities of the International Student Conference (ISC-COSEC), and by doing so accelerated the 
younger Finns' internationalisation process also in a broader sense. Apart from personal contacts, 
the international student organisation's presence became evident also in printed form as its 
publications The Student and Information Bulletin became available for students at, for instance, the 
University of Helsinki.1698 All this gave an additional dimension to the, albeit indirect, influence 
the CIA had on Finns through the numerous agency-affiliated foundations sponsoring Finnish 
students' visits to the US and presenting funds to several Finnish universities.  
 
Renewed Tension in Finland Alerts the Western Powers 
 
In conclusion, the developments taking place in Finland in the late 1950s had an extensive 
impact on British and American informational and cultural operations in the country. The 
Night Frost Crisis made the Western governments see Finland’s future again in a more negative 
light, which resulted, in particular in the US expanding its overall campaign and making it more 
direct. As the new political situation started to place new restrictions on the use of the printed 
word, the Americans began to make considerable changes to the way their activities were 
planned and implemented. The greater investment in contacting representatives of the Finnish 
media and youth throughout the country indicates Washington's desire to find more innovative 
ways to increase its more long-term influence in Finnish society. The most important 
development resulting from both changes in Finland and new Cold War propaganda strategies 
was, however, the even greater importance cultural factors started to play in the Western 
administrations’ overall campaigns. This was also evident in some CIA-backed organisations’ 
growing presence in Finland. 
That the change in the Finnish environment had a strong impact on Western informational 
operations also indicates that in the Finnish case domestic factors often determined the nature of 
the activities to a far greater extent than international developments or policies drawn up in 
Washington and London. Indeed, the late 1950s and early 1960s to some extent resembled the 
late 1940s more than the mid-1950s in the sense that Western actors were once more facing 
greater difficulties in having the Finnish media to pick up their anti-communist message. Even if 
this change was a significant one, its impact on the American and British presence in the country 
should not exaggerated. The Finns remained overwhelmingly Western-oriented in their world 
view, and both British and American officials knew that a partial exclusion of more controversial 
news items from Finnish newspapers would do little to change this even in the longer run. 
                                                 
1696 Philipsen 2003, p. 249. 
1697 Rislakki 2010, pp. 183-184. 
1698 Kolbe 1993, pp. 540-543. 
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9. INTO A NEW ERA, 1961-1962 
 
Note Crisis and the Tightening Propaganda Environment 
 
If the Night Frost Crisis had made both US and British officials increasingly worried about 
Finland's position as a truly independent country, the Note Crisis proved these fears justified in 
many Western eyes. The crisis and its consequences not only had a profound impact on Finnish 
domestic politics, but also altered the British and American approach towards the country as 
well as undermined its international position. For Western propaganda, the years following the 
crisis marked a clear turning point in the operations' scale, nature of execution and reception. 
The Note Crisis1699 began in dramatic fashion when President Kekkonen was informed 
about the Soviet Union's note to Finland while he was on holiday in Hawaii a couple of weeks 
after his official meeting with John F. Kennedy. The discussions with the American President 
formed a part of Kekkonen's tour of the West, which both the British and the US 
administrations had started to organise a couple of years earlier. In May 1961, the idea of 
bringing the Finnish leader to Britain finally turned into reality when he visited London and met 
with Prime Minister Macmillan. This visit famously produced a brief communiqué according to 
which Britain "expressed her understanding towards the Finnish policy of neutrality".1700 Since 
its signing, this declaration has been celebrated in many Finnish circles as proof of Western 
support for the foreign policy Kekkonen led with great conviction.1701 When one looks at the 
situation from a Western perspective, however, this declaration can be interpreted as being 
more of an act of goodwill. As far as the British Government really was concerned, Finland's 
position in regard to its eastern neighbour remained far from neutral. When one estimates the 
true value of the British 'recognition of Finnish neutrality', the different objectives the parties 
had set for these meetings should also be kept in mind. Whereas British and American officials 
aimed to get to know Mr Kekkonen better, perhaps convince him of Western power and 
potential support to Finland, and to learn about his views on developments in the Soviet Union, 
the Finnish leader's goal was to win some public understanding for his policies from the West, 
which would strengthen both his national and international pedigree as well as offer him some 
space to manoeuvre his foreign policies. Mr Kekkonen prepared for this task conscientiously by 
for instance hiring John Haycraft, an English teacher provided by the British Council, to live as 
a member of the President's household in spring 1961.1702 
                                                 
1699 The Note Crisis began on October 30, 1961, when the Soviet Union handed a note to Finland in which it, based 
on the FCMA Treaty and referring to the threat of war, proposed consultations in order to secure the defence of both 
countries. This threat of war was connected to West German militarisation and the Berlin crisis. The Soviets 
postponed any military consultations after a meeting between President Kekkonen and Nikita Khrushchev in 
Novosibirsk in November 1961. The crisis had a great relevance not only to the international situation, but also on 
Finnish domestic politics. After the note was postponed Olavi Honka, a leading candidate to challenge Kekkonen in 
the 1962 presidential election, withdrew his candidacy. As a result of the crisis and Honka's withdrawal, Kekkonen was 
re-elected with an overwhelming majority. See, for example, Meinander 2012, pp. 342-344. 
1700 Memorandum: 'Tasavallan Presidentin tapaaminen pääministeri Macmillanin kanssa Admiralty Housessa 
12.5.1961', by Max Jakobson, May 16, 1961, UKA, box 22/4, TPA.. 
1701 For example, Suomi 1992, p. 383. 
1702 ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1961─1962’, BW 30/14, NA. 
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Kekkonen gained more or less what he wanted also from the two meetings with President 
Kennedy in Washington. Although the discussions between the two focused mostly on the 
Berlin Crisis, Kennedy and, in particular, Secretary of State Dean Rusk assured the Finnish 
leader that the US Government understood and respected Finland's desire to maintain a good 
relationship with the Soviet Union and did not wish to interfere in Finnish affairs in a way that 
would harm this relationship.1703 Again, this statement should not be interpreted as proof of 
American approval of Finnish foreign policies let alone neutralism as such, but rather as a mere 
notification of how the US wished to see Finland's position. In reality, US officials remained 
neither convinced of Finland's possibilities to remain impartial or truly independent in the long 
run nor impressed with the potential scenario in which the concept of neutralism won 
increasing support in Europe. 
The first Western reactions to the Soviet note over military consultations reflected more of a 
sense of alarm than total surprise. Both the US and the British governments took the situation 
seriously and contemplated the matter in various forums. Although it is not entirely irrelevant 
for this study to speculate whether Urho Kekkonen had, in fact, been behind the note in order 
to ensure his re-election, or indeed if the West was aware of his possible involvement1704, the 
question can be covered by noting that the Western analysis of the situation would have been 
more or less the same under both scenarios in any case: that Finland and its leadership was now 
kept on an even tighter leash by the Kremlin than before. 
The Americans were again more willing to do something concrete about countering this 
kind of an outcome. On the eve of the Mr Kekkonen's trip to Novosibirsk to negotiate the 
situation with Mr Khrushchev, US Ambassador Bernard Gufler delivered a message from John 
F. Kennedy to the Finnish President in which he repeated US support for Finnish neutrality 
and gave promises for political and economic assistance.1705 The British response was once 
again more restrained than that of her main ally. During his meeting with Kekkonen, 
Ambassador Con O'Neill merely acknowledged that the British Government supported Finland 
and its policy of neutrality and assured the Finnish leader that NATO would not violate the 
country's borders.1706 This approach was more highly respected by Kekkonen himself, who felt 
that the Americans' understanding of the situation was, once again, weak, and that their 
promises put the Finns into an awkward and embarrassing position.1707  
                                                 
1703 Memorandum: 'Tasavallan Presidentin keskustelut presidentti Kennedyn kanssa Valkoisessa Talossa 16.10.1961', 
by Max Jakobson, October 16, 1961; Memorandum: 'Tasavallan Presidentin Washingtonissa 16. - 17.10.1961 käymät 
viralliset keskustelut', by Max Jakobson, November 14, 1961, both UKA, Vuosikirja 1961-1962, TPA; 'Memorandum 
of Conversation', October 17, 1961; L.D. Battle to M. Bundy; 'Memorandum of Conversation Between the President 
and President Kekkonen of Finland', October 28, 1961, both National Security Files, box 70, JFKL. 
1704 For years, a number of Finnish historians have speculated on Kekkonen's role in the Note Crisis. Many, among 
them Hannu Rautkallio, claim that Kekkonen had planned the note together with the Soviet Union in order to 
strengthen his political position and ensure his re-election. Rautkallio also suggests that both the US and Britain soon 
became well aware of this involvement. Others, above all Juhani Suomi, have denied these claims and noted that 
Kekkonen was actually embittered by the note and its timing. See, Rautkallio 1992, pp. 249-255; Suomi 1992, p. 485. 
1705 SD telegram to US Embassy, November 20, 1961. Papers of JFK, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, 
Series 09, box 116 (http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-116-008.aspx) (May 20, 2012), JFKL. 
1706 Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 1, November 21, 1961, p. 447.  
1707 Suomi 1992, pp. 511-513, 582-584. 
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To declare the British policy with regard to the Note Crisis entirely passive would, actually, 
be incorrect. The crisis saw the FO discuss its Finnish policy and the possible measures, 
including propaganda operations, that might be taken more thoroughly than during the Night 
Frost Crisis. The essential question was whether the British really wished the Finns to adopt the 
same attitude as they had done under Soviet pressure in 1939 or if it would feel that a calmer 
approach was more sensible. At the height of the crisis, the Northern Department’s intention 
was to do something through Sweden. FO officials felt that they could, for example, endorse 
Swedish comments warning the Russians that the more they sought to gain control over 
Finland, the more Sweden might gravitate towards NATO. The option of using the more 
robust reactions in the Scandinavian press and promoting unattributable publicity designed to 
strengthen resistance in Finland was seen as the most effective way of action as far as 
informational activities went.1708 This way of thinking was shared by the Americans, who also 
felt that they could stimulate the Swedes into taking a more active role in resisting Finland from 
succumbing to Soviet dominance. The State Department even instructed US Ambassador J. 
Graham Parsons to meet with Prime Minister Tage Erlander in order to persuade him to offer 
the Finns, or mainly the SDP, help in averting communist gains in the Finnish parliamentary 
elections held in February 1962.1709 The Americans were not really surprised to see that not 
much came out of these discussions and that the Swedes remained predominantly passive 
during the whole incident.1710 
The idea of including Sweden to forward the British cause regarding Finland fitted well with 
the IRD's wider objective of cooperating with the Swedes in the world of propaganda. 
Although the use of British anti-communist propaganda in Sweden remained fairly scarce, due 
to the Swedes' own extensive production of international news1711, IRD officials in London, 
including Ralph Murray, felt that the wider Cold War front required extending the collaboration 
on anti-communist propaganda into neutral countries, and Sweden in particular.1712 While this 
plan was not realised in 1961, due to obvious political and practical reasons1713, a couple of years 
later, somewhat surprisingly, officials of the Swedish Foreign Ministry suggested cooperation in 
the exchange of propaganda material concerning Africa and Latin America in particular.1714 This 
initiative resulted in several Swedish embassies as well as the Swedish Foreign Political Institute 
and, finally, the local social democrats distributing IRD material.1715 If British and American 
officials were left somewhat disappointed with Sweden's passive attitude during the Note Crisis, 
                                                 
1708 ’Record of a meeting held in Mr Mason’s office on November 20, 1961, to discuss recent Fenno-Soviet 
developments’, November 21, FO 1110/1400, NA. 
1709 SD Telegram to American Embassy, Stockholm, January 18, 1962, National Security Files, box 70, JFKL. 
1710 Telegram from American Embassy, Stockholm to SD, January 20, 1962, L.D. Battle to M. Bundy, 
'Memorandum of the Current Finnish Situation', January 25, 1962, both National Security Files, box 70, JFKL. 
1711 G.R. Coate to D.C. Hopson, 'Report on IRD work in Sweden, July, 1960', July 1, 1960, FO 1110/1291, NA. 
1712 The main argument behind this was that Sweden's international position made the country and its activities 
more acceptable to neutralist opinion. R. Murray to J. Coulson, February 13, 1961, FO 1110/1389, NA. 
1713 J. Coulson to F.R.H. Murray, February 21, 1961; F.R.H. Murray to J. Coulson, March 27, 1961, both FO 
1110/1389, NA. 
1714 R.T. Eland to C.S.R. Barclay, October 2, 1963; C.S.R. Barclay to R.T. Eland, November 29, 1963, both FO 
1110/1649, NA. 
1715 R.T. Eland to D.G. Allen, March 23, 1965; R.T. Eland to D.G. Allen, April 21; D.G. Allen to R.T. Eland, May 
17, 1965; R.T. Eland to E.R. Allott, July 14, 1965, all FO 1110/1906, NA. 
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later cooperation between the three governments was, undoubtedly, warmly welcomed by 
them, not least because it also had an impact on developments in Finland. This was particularly 
the case in the field of military affairs, as Sweden played an important role in exchanging 
military information with Finland and arranging contacts between Finnish and NATO officials, 
which would expand considerably in the 1960s and 1970s.1716  
Naturally, the FO's final instructions for the handling of the Note Crisis depended on the 
outcome of Kekkonen’s talks with Khrushchev. However, even before the negotiations started, 
the FO had decided that the distribution of ordinary IRD material in Finland should be increased. 
The other operations on standby included, yet again, the dissemination of suitable material on the 
Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1948 in Finland and Scandinavia and “making use of other possible 
covert IRD activity to counter the effect of the Soviet move on Finland and the other 
Scandinavian countries”.1717 As the circulation of IRD content in Finland in 1961 was somewhat 
low, the idea of influencing Finnish political parties more directly by providing parliamentarians 
with suitable material through, for example, the IPU was also presented at FO meetings.1718 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Note Crisis-related discussions held at the FO 
concerned the possibility of influencing President Kekkonen more directly, a mission 
continuously regarded as difficult even by covert means. This time, the intention was to 
convince the President through the diplomatic channel that no such military threat existed from 
the West as described in the Soviet note. The FO also had ready plans for how to influence Mr 
Kekkonen in case Soviet pressure on Finland became even more acute and if the President was 
finally forced to include communists in government. In this kind of a situation, it was reported, 
the British might make use of a valuable, unnamed, contact in the Finnish Secret Service “who 
saw a lot of the President and might be the channel by which we could feed ideas to the 
President particularly on the dangers of a communist takeover”.1719 The fact that the FO also 
contemplated the possibility of stiffening resistance in the Finnish Armed Forces gives yet more 
proof on not only how serious British officials considered the situation to be, but also on their 
desire to at least attempt to do something about it this time. 
Even though the tension between Finland and the Soviet Union eased after the talks 
between Kekkonen and Khrushchev, and the covert measures described above were unlikely to 
have been taken, the way the Note Crisis was solved and, in particular, the way the whole 
episode had a direct influence on domestic politics in Finland, i.e. strengthening Urho 
Kekkonen's position, left neither the British nor the Americans under any illusions of the 
country's political position. Neither Western government was convinced that the agreement 
                                                 
1716 Recent research has showed that Sweden cooperated closely with NATO already in the mid-1950s by for 
instance providing the organisation a secret flight path over Sweden. The military cooperation between Sweden, 
Finland and NATO also started around the same time, accelerating in the 1960s. For example, Holmström, Mikael, 
Den dolda alliansen. Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser (Stockholm 2011), pp. 123-126, 163-188, 442; Nilsson, 
Mikael, 'Amber Nine: NATO's Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the Incorporation of Sweden in 
NATO's Infrastructure', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 303-307. 
1717 ’Record of a meeting held in Mr Mason’s office on November 20, 1961, to discuss recent Fenno-Soviet 
developments’, November 20, 1961, FO 1110/1400, NA. 
1718 Minutes by M. Russell: ’The Soviet-Finnish Crisis’, November 24, 1961, FO 1110/1297, NA. 
1719 ’Record of a meeting held in Mr Mason’s office on November 20, 1961, to discuss recent Fenno-Soviet 
developments’, November 21, 1961, FO 1110/1400, NA. 
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Kekkonen reached with the Soviet leader would end Soviet pressure on the Finns, on the 
contrary. The Finnish President's role as the Kremlin's trusted man only increased Western 
worries over the Soviets, or at least the communists, eventually seizing power in the country.1720  
The way Urho Kekkonen's firmer hold on power in Finland, which became fully evident 
after his re-election as President in January 1962, affected British and American informational 
and cultural operations only increased the Westerners' concern of the country's future. 
Kekkonen was now able to place the Finnish press under even tighter control by convincing 
Finnish newspapermen that it was neither in their nor their country's interest to upset the 
Soviets with their comments. In particular, British officials in Helsinki were quick to note how 
the Note Crisis saga had restricted their possibilities for the distribution of anti-communist 
material even further. The Finnish press's reluctance to publish almost anything that might 
provoke the Soviet Government rapidly pushed the number of IRD articles included in Finnish 
newspapers down to levels not witnessed for quite some time. By late 1962, the success reached 
ten years earlier in the use of anti-communist material already seemed a distant memory. 
According to Information Officer Ray Muston, the Finns were more painfully than ever aware 
of their country’s delicate position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The practice of newspaper self-
censorship on Soviet Bloc affairs was now true even when Finland’s interests were concerned, 
he observed.1721 Almost the only criticism of Soviet events in Finnish newspapers seemed to 
take place through quoting the foreign press. The slowing down of anti-communist activity in 
Finland could also be noted in the distribution of IRD's background papers, which remained at 
the same level it had been for some years already. The Interpreter had some twenty recipients in 
1962, while for example The Asian Analyst and International Communist Front Organisations were 
sent to approximately ten people. No real changes were made to the list of recipients, 
either.1722A growing problem for all propaganda operations was, as Muston successfully pointed 
out, that “the Finns would quickly resent any activity on our part in this country which seemed 
designed to alter or cast doubt on Finland’s neutrality”.1723  
This useful observation captured something essential about what the Finnish environment 
would be like for years to come. The political leaders' desire to defend the country’s neutral 
position and friendly relations with its mighty neighbour became so strong that, in addition to 
domestic media, they became even more sensitive about what the foreign press wrote about 
their country than they had been during the previous decade. In order to improve Finland's 
global image, which had become particularly tarnished in the aftermath of the Note Crisis, the 
Finnish Foreign Ministry gave embassies abroad instructions on how to answer to accusations 
over the true nature of the country's neutrality and the Soviet Union's growing involvement in 
                                                 
1720 According to CIA estimations, while the Soviet Union wished to use Finland as a "show-case" to the world as 
an example of its magnanimity, the Russians were also likely to continue with their strategy of keeping Finland 
gradually moving toward greater subservience to them. Staff Memorandum No. 71-61, 'Finland Between East and 
West', November 28, 1961, CIA Office of National Estimates, CREST. 
1721 R.F. Muston to D.R.M. Ackland, September 10, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA. 
1722 IRD material continued to be sent mainly to the leading non-communist newspapers and prominent politicians 
from the National Coalition party and the SDP, British Embassy to IRD, ’Distribution of IRD Material’, 
September 10, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA. 
1723 R.F. Muston to D.R.M. Ackland, September 10, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA. 
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its domestic affairs.1724 Writings published, for instance, by US News and World Report was 
precisely the kind of publicity the Finns both felt was incorrect and wished to avoid. The paper 
famously suggested that Finland belonged to countries in which the press was under political 
control, as well as claimed that the Soviet Union was forcing Finland to purchase Russian 
aeroplanes, missiles and technology in order to make an ally of its western neighbour.1725 An 
article published by Reader's Digest in November 1962 was also a something of an 
embarrassment to the Finnish leadership, as it dealt with the way Urho Kekkonen had 
enhanced his position by taking advantage of the Note Crisis. On this occasion, officials of the 
Finnish Embassy in Washington complained about the inclusion of such a story to colleagues at 
the State Department even before it was published.1726 The Finnish protest did not end at that, 
as direct criticism over the article was made both to the Reader's Digest's representative in 
Washington and its editors in Pleasantville, New York.1727 Naturally, this had little effect, and 
the inclusion of a slightly altered version of the article in Valitut Palat in February 1963, with the 
blessing of Eljas Erkko1728, only increased in particular Kekkonen's dismay of certain American 
publications' way of handling Finnish affairs. 
As stories published in their newspapers and magazines indicate, the general sentiment 
among Americans over the direction towards which things were moving in Finland was that of 
disappointment. The developments in Fenno-Soviet relations did not, however, directly restrict 
the USIS/Helsinki's activities in the country as much as they did the British officials' chances of 
distributing IRD propaganda. American reports from the period after the Note Crisis continued 
to present the reader with an image of a relatively effective and successful informational 
programme. USIS officials did acknowledge, not unlike their British colleagues, that the nature 
of Finnish neutrality did have a limiting effect on how directly the policies of, above all, the 
Soviet Union could be condemned in their distributed content. In general, however, they were 
fairly positive about meeting their main psychological objective, which was now defined as: "To 
strengthen the confidence of the Finns in themselves, the US and the Free World in order to 
stem the Soviet influence in and over Finland which endangered the country's freedom of 
action."1729 This goal reflected closely the many reactions the Note Crisis generated among State 
Department and US Embassy officials that called for more active American reassurance to the 
Finns that the West had not written their country off.1730 
In press operations, the relatively confident mood at the USIS can be mainly explained by 
the fact that the great majority of American content distributed to the Finns remained neutral in 
tone. Even if more controversial themes were increasingly avoided by many Finnish 
newspapers, they continued to display great demand for Western news articles as well as longer 
                                                 
1724 These instructions followed the Ministry's earlier decision to introduce a more centralised structure for 
Finland's incoherent overseas informational operations in order to, among other things, bring greater efficiency to 
correcting misunderstandings of the country's political position. Soikkanen, T. 2003, pp. 243-245, 358-359.  
1725 Salminen 1982, p. 177; Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 12.2.1962, p. 471; Suomi 1992, p. 584. 
1726 A. Vartia to M. Jakobson, November 19, 1962, 5B, UMA. 
1727 R.R. Seppälä to M. Jakobson, December 13, 1962; M. Korhonen to Editors of Reader's Digest, December 13, 
1962, both 5B, UMA. 
1728 Rautkallio 2010, p. 353. 
1729 USIS/Helsinki to USIA, 'Country Assessment Report', February 12, 1963, RG 59, CU, RCS, box 27, NARA.  
1730 For example, Telegram from US Embassy to SD, January 11, 1962, National Security Files, box 70, JFKL.  
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feature stories. According to USIS officials, their office even managed to have a considerable 
impact on the way international developments were covered in the Finnish media. The best 
example of this kind of thinking was the American claim that they had a direct and strong 
influence in the way the Cuban Crisis was reported in Finland. In USIS officials' eyes, the 
special 'gridirons' explaining the US Government's analysis of Soviet intent and American 
moves that were dispatched to editors played a decisive role in the Finns' interpretation of the 
events. The coincidence that the news directors of each of the two Finnish television networks 
happened to be in the US at the time on USIS-recommended grants producing footage 
regarded as favourable to American policies also supported the view of a successful campaign 
around the incident.1731 
A closer examination of the coverage given to the Cuban Crisis in Finnish newspapers 
reveals that this claim was something of an exaggeration. The way in which leading newspapers 
such as Helsingin Sanomat, Uusi Suomi, Hufvudstadsbladet and Suomen Sosialidemokraatti commented 
on the developments was fairly balanced in tone, rather being inclined to the US. While it is true 
that publications continued to use UP and AP content to cover the events, and therefore 
offered a Western perspective to their readers, none of them directly condemned the actions of 
the Soviet Union.1732 The outcome of the crisis was in general greeted with great relief and an 
observation that sense had finally prevailed in the diplomatic superpower battle.1733 The fact 
that the Americans on two occasions complained to the Finns about the way the leading 
Agrarian paper Maakansa had claimed that the US was "rattling arms" in Cuba even before the 
actual crisis had escalated, first to Foreign Minister Veli Merikoski while he was visiting New 
York and later to President Kekkonen in Helsinki1734, not only shows how seriously the 
Americans took the matter, but also indicates that not even they felt that all coverage was 
favourable to them, after all. Although not many publications agreed with the view presented in 
Kansan Uutiset, which first strongly accused the US for causing the danger of war and then 
praised the Soviets for saving the world1735, the Finnish press in general abstained from giving 
credit to either of the superpowers for risking a global conflict. 
The coverage of the Cuban Crisis is a good indication of the broader publishing policies 
adopted by the Finnish press in the early 1960s. Even if, as Esko Salminen has noted, Finnish 
newspapers increased its criticism of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the Night 
Frost Crisis and the Note Crisis1736, content published in the latter part of 1962 suggests that 
particularly the British were correct in observing that Finnish press had again adopted a more 
cautious policy. News concerning Eastern European and Soviet affairs had by now declined in 
                                                 
1731 Ibid.; Pernaa, Ville, Uutisista hyvää iltaa. Ylen TV-uutiset ja yhteiskunta (Helsinki 2009), p. 56. 
1732 For example, Helsingin Sanomat, October 24, 1962; Uusi Suomi, October 24, 1962; Hufvudstadsbladet, 
October 24, 1962. 
1733 For example, Helsingin Sanomat October 27 & October 28, 1962; Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, October 30, 
1962. 
1734 Maakansa not only accused the US for its war-risking policies, but also labelled particularly some of Helsingin 
Sanomat's writings during the Cuban Crisis as "irresponsible". SD telegram to Secretary of State, October 8, 1962, 
RG 59, SDDFF 1960─1963, box 1856, 760e.5611/10-762, NARA; B. Gufler to Secretary of State, December 14, 
1962, National Security Files, box 70, JFKL; Maakansa, September 28, 1962 & October 25, 1962. 
1735 For example, Kansan Uutiset, October 24, 1962, October 25, 1962, October 29, 1962 & October 30, 1962. 
1736 Salminen 1996, p. 36. 
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number, and the nature of political commentary in general seemed to have calmed down from 
the rather fierce form it had adopted in the 1950s.1737 Helsingin Sanomat, which by the early 1960s 
had managed to become an even more dominant player in the Finnish media field, formed 
something of an exception as it continued to include a great number of political commentaries 
of Western origin and criticise the Finnish foreign policies when seeing it appropriate. This 
approach was embraced at the State Department to the degree that when Eljas Erkko died in 
February 1965, a drafted letter of condolence praised the way with which the newspaperman 
"had used the full influence of his paper to explain objectively US policies and actions, and to 
counter vilifying propaganda directed against the US by the Soviet Union".1738 When saying that 
the publishing policies followed by Helsingin Sanomat differed from other Finnish papers, it is 
important not to overemphasise this matter. The great majority of Finnish newspapers 
continued to be reliant on foreign news agency content for covering international 
developments. What was different, however, was that the more extensive critical articles on 
world events seemed to diminish in number in most leading papers in the early 1960s. This 
trend would only strengthen as the decade went on. 
The USIS/Helsinki also discovered that something had changed in Finland when running its 
film operations. The Americans had for some time been relatively content with the policy of the 
Finnish Film Censorship Board, regarding it as fair to all importing counties, but the ban on the 
USIA-produced documentary Cuba Waits in early 1963 raised their eyebrows once more. In 
USIS officials' view, this move indicated that criticism of the Soviet Union, and in particular its 
leadership, was no longer tolerated by Finnish authorities. The reasoning behind this claim was 
that the Finns had had no problems in approving Berlin Wall, the USIA film on the Berlin 
Crisis, which, although critical, did not contain similar specific references to Soviet leaders as 
the latter movie.1739 As the clear majority of USIS-distributed films were in no way 
controversial, the tighter censorship policies had only a limited effect on American operations.  
In television, American productions continued to dominate the foreign programmes aired in 
Finland, but fictional films and series rather than political documentaries made up an even 
greater share of the content than before.1740 In YLE's news programmes, American topical 
productions fared much better, in particular after the Finnish channel's news department 
extended its daily broadcasts in the leadership of Erkki Raatikainen. As YLE's foreign news 
                                                 
1737 In addition to previous research and Western documents, this evaluation is based on the six leading Finnish 
newspapers published between September 1, 1962 - November 15, 1962 that were examined for this study. During 
this period, very few articles dealing with East Europe could be assessed as being critical to the communist regimes. 
1738 Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy by B.H. Read: 'Message of Condolence to Patricia Seppälä', February 
24, 1965, National Security File, Country File: Finland, box 169, LBJ Presidential Library, Austin, Texas. 
1739 'Country Plan for Finland', approved April, 26, 1963, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA. 
1740 The large amount of lighter American films and series aired in Finland reflects the broadcast content during the 
first years of Finnish TV also in a more general sense. As the production of broadcasters' own television 
programmes was still taking its first steps, foreign films were used to fill the gaps. Foreign fiction, dominated by 
American productions, was often if not the largest then the second largest programme group aired by YLE and 
Tesvisio. In broadcasts shown by MTV, the share of foreign fiction programmes in 1960 was as high as 38 per 
cent. Kertomus Oy Yleisradio Ab:n toiminnasta vuonna 1961 (Helsinki 1962), pp. 83-84, Kertomus Oy Yleisradio 
Ab:n toiminnasta vuonna 1962 (Helsinki 1963), p. 75, 78-80; Aslama, Minna, Hellman, Heikki, Lehtinen, Pauliina & 
Sauri, Tuomo: 'Niukkuuden aikakaudesta kanavapaljouteen. Television ohjelmisto ja monipuolisuus 1960-2004' in 
Wiio (ed.) 2007, pp. 68-70. 
 
 
321 
 
coverage was dominated by American and British material, Western influence on Finnish news 
production kept growing, while coverage of the Soviet Union remained very rare.1741 YLE's 
inclusion as a full member of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in 1960 only enhanced 
this development. Even if Finland was at first relatively passive in exchanging programmes with 
the other member countries1742, the flow of international news coverage through the satellite 
technology introduced by Eurovision in 1962 and its inclusion in YLE's broadcasts soon put 
the Finns in touch with world affairs in a way that they could not have even imagined only 
some years earlier.1743 
What measures did the US and British governments take to make their informational and 
cultural operations meet the new circumstances? The answer to this question is, again, closely 
related to the resources available to their officials. As the Americans operated with sums that 
were by now manifold to those accessed by the British, they were able to extend their campaign 
in Finland and even introduce new forms of operation. The British, on the other hand, had to 
settle for trying to make their existing informational operations more efficient by, for instance, 
finding new partners and distribution channels. 
The once again expanding American investment in USIS operations in Finland can, first of all, 
be concluded from the growing size of the America Center. By 1962, the office already had an 
operating budget of $175,000 and employed a total of 29 people, 21 of them locals.1744 This 
enabled the Americans not only to extend their library, lecture and exhibition services to the Finns 
in Helsinki, but also made it possible for embassy officials to make more trips to rural areas and 
establish new contacts with Finns living in them, like they did in Eastern Finland in April 1962.1745 
The larger available resources also helped the USIS to increase its flow of printed content to 
Finnish newspapers and political leaders in the form of bulletins, separate feature articles and 
pamphlets. In order to tie closer contacts with Finnish workers, still regarded as a key group for 
USIS operations and Finland's future for that matter, in 1962 the Americans launched a new 
monthly labour bulletin in Finnish, which sought to increase Finns' knowledge of the American 
labour movement and "strengthen the feeling of identity and comradeship between American and 
Finnish workers."1746 As the new bulletin, which included both IPS material and articles written 
from a more local angle, quickly received plenty of praise from Finnish trade unionists and 
reached a total circulation of 2,000, it is safe to say that it provided a more efficient outlet for 
American labour-related propaganda than its predecessors had ever done. 
The importance of influencing Finnish youth was something that became even more 
strongly underlined by officials both in Helsinki and Washington, particularly in relation to the 
exchange of persons programme. This focus followed directly the State Department's policy to 
                                                 
1741 Pernaa 2009, pp. 26-27, 54. 
1742 For example in 1961, YLE exchanged much fewer programmes than the other Eurovision broadcasters. 
Although particularly children's films were actively aired by YLE, the channel used only 8.9 per cent of all offered 
content. 'Eurovision Programme Statistics', EBU/Ohjelmavaihtotilastoja 1961, Kansainvälinen toiminta, box 8, 
YLE, ELKA. 
1743 Kertomus Oy Yleisradio Ab:n toiminnasta vuonna 1962 (Helsinki 1963), p. 76; Pernaa 2009, p. 51. 
1744 'Background paper: The USIA Program in Finland, 1962', Undated, National Security Files, box 70, JFKL. 
1745 R.M. Melbourne to SD, 'Trip to Eastern Finland by Embassy Officers', April 11, 1962, RG 59, SDDFF 
1960─1963, box 1854, 760e.00/4-1162, NARA 
1746 USIS/Helsinki to USIA, 'Country Assessment Report', February 12, 1963, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA. 
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give more consideration to younger potential leaders in grant selections. In 1961, plans for a 
separate Young Leader category were introduced, and the following year saw the 
announcement of the 'Emphasis on Youth' programme in American embassies around the 
world.1747 The stronger investment in influencing future leaders made it possible to invite 
another twelve university student leaders for a five-week stay in the US "to bolster their 
opposition to continuing Soviet attempts to win additional levers of influence over Finnish 
youth".1748 Furthermore, the USIS field program officer made closer contact with Finnish youth 
organisations by organising special events at the America Center and giving lectures to them in 
their respective regions as well as by providing them with USIA-produced books and 
brochures. This activity established the relationship between the Americans and Finnish youth 
organisations to such a degree that in 1962 the USIS was for the first time invited to participate 
in the activities of the Finnish Youth Boards. During this particular year, the USIS field 
program officer also took part in a meeting of professional youth workers and the bi-annual 
Congress of Youth Leaders, while at the same time being also in closer contact with trade union 
youth sections.1749  
The growing American activity concerning Finnish youth, as well as the exchange of people 
programme in general, epitomises the strategy the US Government adopted towards the 
northern country in the early 1960s: as the opportunities for implementing more direct political 
propaganda had become somewhat limited, increasing attention was given to influencing a 
greater variety of people with the longer term impact in mind. Another good example of US 
activity based on this motive was the establishment of so-called sister city affiliations between 
American and Finnish towns. Launched in co-operation with the Finnish-American Society, the 
sister city project was regarded in Washington as an important part of the People-to-People 
Program, which sought to encourage ordinary Americans to develop friendly contacts with like-
minded foreigners in order to convince them of the "basic goodness" of the American 
people.1750 As many other Cold War-related US activities, this particular project was warmly 
endorsed by American city officials, and rather quickly several leading Finnish towns started 
affiliating with a community located on the other side of the Atlantic.1751 
The British objective of making their informational operations more efficient was related to 
the growing frustration among embassy officials about the diminishing circulation and use of IRD 
publications in Finland as well as the shortage of suitable contacts that might take advantage of 
the material. Specialist commentators and students, normally typical recipients of IRD content, 
seemed almost nonexistent in Finland from the British viewpoint. The number of newspaper 
editors wishing to receive some material did, however, rise to some extent in the early 1960s due 
                                                 
1747 Scott-Smith 2008, p. 80. 
1748 USIS/Helsinki to USIA, 'Country Assessment Report', February 12, 1963, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA. 
1749 Ibid. 
1750 For example, E.S. Chambers to O.W. Nordstrom, July 29, 1960, Mark Bortman Papers, 1956-67, box 22, 
DDEL, Osgood 2006, pp. 232-233. 
1751 As early as in October 1958 it was reported that several leading Finnish communities had started to affiliate 
with an American counterpart. For instance, Helsinki's news sister city was New York City, Tampere's Houston, 
Texas and Turku's Phoenix, Arizona. USIS/Helsinki to USIA, October 22, 1958, Mark Bortman Papers, 1956-67, 
box 22, DDEL. 
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to the British Embassy’s constant efforts to seek new distribution channels. The British were, for 
example, able to stir up the Social Democratic Press Agency’s (Työväen Sanomalehtien 
Tietotoimisto, TST) interest in several IRD publications.1752 The FO, however, blocked the 
circulation of material to the papers the agency serviced due to the rule according to which “the 
distribution of IRD papers should always require a reasonably confidential relationship between 
the Information Officer and the recipient”, which was not the case on this occasion.1753  
As no real success was achieved in finding new distribution channels for their printed 
propaganda, the British Embassy provided a greater amount of material to the organisations 
and individuals for whom they had been supplying content for years already. The archives of, 
for instance, the SAK, Kokoomus and SYT suggest that in addition to providing these outlets 
with the more typical IRD publications, the British delivered them with more ad hoc IRD 
pamphlets dealing with such issues as the nature of leadership in the Soviet Union, the position 
of the workforce in communist countries and the Berlin Crisis, as well as new issues of, for 
instance, Facts About Soviet International Front Organisations.1754 At the same time, the supply of 
COI-produced material on the British political and governmental system and newspapers like 
the Manchester Guardian also seemed to have picked up.1755 What the available archived British 
publications from the early 1960s also show is that the British Embassy was by no means the 
only actor to extend its supply of printed content to the Finns. Both leading British political 
parties seemed to deliver more of the their political pamphlets to their respective sister parties 
in Finland. Particularly the Conservative Party increased its flow of information to Finland by 
providing Kokoomus with topical pamphlets published by the Conservative Political Centre 
and more in-depth booklets produced by the Conservative Research Department.1756  
Even if the British managed to increase their delivery of political propaganda to certain 
organisations, the narrowing possibilities for spreading the anti-communist message around in 
Finland made it increasingly obvious for the British Embassy in Helsinki that the focus of their 
informational activities should be on providing the Finns with positive information about 
British society. As a result, the British gave even greater care to emphasising the favourable 
aspects regarding British institutions and culture, as well as the British Government's position 
on a number of domestic and international issues. Among the themes receiving growing 
attention was also the economy. When the campaign for Finland's EFTA membership was 
over, the British redirected more of their informational efforts to emphasising industrial and 
economic growth in Britain and, above all, the high quality of British companies and their 
                                                 
1752 R.F. Muston to D.R.M. Ackland, October 30, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA. 
1753 D.R.M. Ackland to R.F. Muston, November 14, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA. 
1754 For example, the pamphlets: 'From Marx to Khrushchev' by Walter Kolarz, undated, and 'The Workers' State' 
by Margaret Dewar, May 1960, both box 334, 'Facts About Soviet International Front Organisations', October 
1964, box 89, all SYT, KA; 'The Meaning of Berlin', 1962, KK, Ee, PTA. 
1755 For example, the pamphlets 'The Organisation of Political Parties in Britain', July 1959, and 'Local Government 
in Britain', December 1959, both KK, Ee, PTA; H. Atkin to J. Rantanen, March 25, 1960, SAK KV 1960, TA. 
1756 Most of these publications focused on the Tories' position in regard to domestic issues such as the welfare 
state, science and education, but at times some of them also commented on international topics including China's 
relationship with the UN and the discussion over worldwide disarmament. For example, the pamphlets: 'Welfare 
State Developments', March 1961; 'Blueprint for Disarmament - Britain's Proposals Outlined'; 'The International 
Situation', Notes on Current Politics (NCP), Number 23, December 1960; 'Education and Training', NCP, Number 
2, January 1961; 'Science and Technology', NCP, Number 8, April 1961, all KK, Ee, PTA. 
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products. This development followed closely the British Embassy's involvement in the 
promotion of British businesses to the Finns, which was increased in the late 1950s and the 
early 1960s in order to secure markets for the most important fields of British exports to 
Finland, namely oil, coal, coke and motor vehicles.1757 
Shifting the focus from the distribution of anti-communist propaganda to the promotion of 
British society, above all, made the British Council's role in Britain's overall campaign in Finland 
even more essential than before. As the decade went on, even Foreign Office officials started to 
come to terms with the ever-growing political importance of cultural activities in Finland. A FO 
memorandum from June 1964 summarised this sentiment well by declaring the following: “The 
Finns are a particularly receptive audience, and the Russians cannot object to their accepting 
Western cultural manifestations. We should keep the present standard and volume up as far as 
possible”.1758 
 
Cold War Comes to Town 
 
The World Festival of Youth and Students held in Helsinki in summer 1962, the location of 
which was another reflection of the Soviet propaganda strategy giving more emphasis to more 
open international interaction1759, made a remarkable exception to the somewhat cautious policy 
both the US and British governments had to follow in their propaganda operations. During the 
festival, particularly the Americans' objective was to counter communist propaganda as 
effectively as possible and to ensure that no such event would be organised again in a Western 
country. The propaganda war fought between the communist and Western camps in various 
facilities and the streets of Helsinki gave the Finns a rare glimpse of the increasingly fierce Cold 
War battle over young people's hearts and minds. The vast US investment in anti-festival 
activity made the event the CIA’s largest direct propaganda effort in Finland.  
The story of American operations during the event has been rather extensively covered in a 
number of Finnish studies, particularly Joni Krekola's recent book on the festival.1760 Examining 
Western operations is important also for this thesis as its provides valuable information about 
CIA involvement in propaganda operations and about the great variety of actors the US was 
able to use for its anti-communist campaign even in Finland during such exceptional 
circumstances. As previous studies have somewhat underestimated both the role of the 
                                                 
1757 Jensen-Eriksen 2006, pp. 83, 106-107, 112. 
1758 ‘Summary to Helsinki despatch No. 36 of June 5, 1964: The political importance of cultural manifestations in 
Finland’, BW 30/8, NA. 
1759 The way the communist festival had changed from a celebration of communism and the Soviet Union during 
the Stalinist era to an event in which a more free exchange of opinions between the visitors was at least to some 
degree encouraged was already evident at the festival held in Moscow in 1957. This development was only 
enhanced by the decision to organise the following festivals in neutral countries, first in Vienna in 1959, and then in 
Helsinki in 1962. See Koivunen, Pia, Performing Peace and Friendship. The World Youth Festival as a Tool of 
Soviet Cultural Diplomacy, 1947-1957 (PhD Thesis, University of Tampere 2013), pp. 227-231, 341-343.  
1760 Studies and writings that give details about both Finnish and American activities during the festival include: 
Kolbe, Laura, Eliitti, traditio, murros, HYY 1960-1990 (Helsinki 1996); Krekola, Joni, Maailma kylässä. Helsingin 
nuorisofestivaali (Helsinki 2012); Lindfors & Rislakki 1978; Rislakki 1982; Rislakki 2010; Sedergren, Jari, Kylmän 
sodan kulttuuripolitiikkaa, July 24, 1962 (http://sedis.blogspot.fi/2005/07/kylmn-sodan-kulttuuripolitiikkaa.html) 
(August 24, 2013); Vesikansa 2004a. 
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USIS/Helsinki and the British Embassy during the festival, this thesis also offers some new 
light on the overall Anglo-American response to the event. 
For American and British officials, the approval given by the Finnish Government to 
organisers to bring their festival to Helsinki was yet another sign of its leniency towards the 
Soviet Union. Both Western governments expressed their objection to the Finnish leadership 
over the festival, and particularly Con O'Neill pleaded strongly to the Finnish Foreign Ministry 
that the whole event should be cancelled.1761 As this always seemed rather unlikely to happen, 
the US and British administrations started to plan their propaganda activities during the festival 
well over a year before its opening ceremony.1762 The Americans took the initiative by 
discussing the matter at the secret Psychological Operations Panel held in Frankfurt in June 
1961 and by gradually implementing some pre-festival activities, such as distributing critical 
comments on the event to the American, Finnish and international press.1763 As British officials 
were also requested to express their views about the measures they felt were appropriate to take 
in Helsinki, the coordination of the anti-festival activities was by no means as strictly an 
American affair, as previous studies might suggest. 
Earlier accounts on the American operations during the event have, first of all, revealed how 
in order to combat communist propaganda the CIA granted $125,000 to Gloria Steinem, head 
of the organisation Independent Research Service (IRS), who was in charge of the agency’s 
cultural programme in Helsinki. The funds enabled as many as 160 young Americans to travel 
to Finland with the intention of challenging the festival guests’ arguments and spreading 
American propaganda material.1764 The cultural programme focused largely on the 'Young 
America Presents' exhibition and its jazz concerts, while the printed CIA-funded material 
included the anti-festival newspaper Helsinki Youth News, printed in three languages with a 
circulation of 30,000, as well as numerous magazines, booklets, cartoons and books, including 
an atlas, which presented Finland as a country “in which communists cause instability”.1765 
Other activities in which the Americans were involved included running the IRS International 
News Bureau and the jazz concerts given in smaller venues around the city.1766 
Among other scholars, Rislakki suggests that the CIA’s operational methods were not always 
all that innocent: he claims that the anti-festival demonstrations and riots that took place in 
Helsinki before the festival had even begun would have been set up by the agency. Although 
this argument is unproved, the fact remains that the CIA was strongly involved in the resistance 
of communism during the festival. In this quest it was not by any means alone. Indeed, long 
                                                 
1761 Mr O'Neill let the Ministry know about Britain's view on organising a communist festival in Finland in February 
1961 and November 1961. 'Memorandum written by J. Hallama', February 17, 1962; Memorandum: 'Englannin 
hallituksen toivomuksia ja näkökohtia nuorisofestivaalien suhteen', January 16, 1962, UKA, box 21/95, TPA. 
1762 W.B. Cobb to B.A. Gufler, ' 'US Paper: 8th World Youth Festival - Helsinki', April 17, 1961, RG 84, USEH 
CGR, box 42, NARA. 
1763 Ibid.; Telegram from Finnish Consulate, Cologne to Foreign Ministry, February 19, 1962; 'Nuorisofestivaalit 
Helsingissä 1962', both UKA, box 21/95, TPA; Krekola 2012, p. 35; Sedergren, Jari, Kylmän sodan 
kulttuuripolitiikkaa II , July 27, 2005 (http://sedis.blogspot.fi/2005/07/kylmn-sodan-kulttuuripolitiikkaa-ii.html) 
(August 24, 2013). 
1764 For example, Lindfors & Rislakki 1978, p. 387. 
1765 Rislakki 1982, p. 425. 
1766 Krekola 2012, pp. 189-191. 
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before the event started, the Americans were already in direct contact with Finnish student 
circles over anti-festivals activities.1767 In addition to the central student organisation SYL, 
organisations like SYT and VAL were also closely involved in protesting against the event, first 
by encouraging people to boycott the festival, and later on by deciding to follow a policy of 
passive resistance by distributing anti-festival material mainly to a local audience.1768 Although 
the CIA-backed activities regarding the youth festival primarily targeted foreign visitors, as well 
as the general international opinion, the agency’s strong involvement suggests that it was 
prepared to invest heavily in anti-communist propaganda operations in countries exposed to 
communism particularly during exceptional events. 
The omission of USIS activities from previous research is likely to have resulted from their 
nature of execution. Unlike the independent American associations that were able to act more 
freely, the USIS was again restricted to follow a rather cautious policy in its operations in order 
to avoid giving governments or unfriendly local elements grounds for claiming that the US was 
carrying anti-festival agitation or that it was briefing local festival delegates.1769 As the official 
American and British actors had a background role in the execution of the anti-festival 
campaign, it is worthwhile to examine them in more detail. First of all, the support the USIS 
provided to the American activities taking place in the field was greater than it has perhaps been 
earlier realised. Thanks to the central location of the America Center and its library, the USIS 
was able to offer an important base for both Finnish and American anti-festival activists and 
easily provide them with additional printed material that they could hand out to festival 
delegates. The available printed content included books on American economic, political and 
cultural life as well as USIA-produced pamphlets on the American position on such topics as 
co-existence, disarmament, nuclear testing and colonialism. The content in question was 
defined well before the festival and ordered in advance from Washington and the USIS posts in 
London and Stockholm.1770 The USIS/Helsinki also organised some activities of its own, for 
instance the screening of USIA films, including Friendship 7, a one-hour documentary on 
astronaut John Glenn's orbit flight that was shown to specifically chosen Finnish labour and 
youth leaders as well as newspaper film critics a week before the festival. This film fell directly 
under one of the broader propaganda themes the Americans were increasingly investing at the 
time, i.e. their ability to beat the Soviets in the space race.  
The USIS also provided assistance to the Program for Young American Culture of Yale 
University in the implementation of the Young America Presents programme held at Ateneum. 
The exhibition was a curious combination of modern American art partly gathered from 
MoMA's collections, more precisely the catalogue under the name 'Recent American Paintings 
and Sculpture'1771, and daily jazz concerts by several highly rated artists. This mixture turned out 
to be a highly successful one, since the exhibition, or in reality mainly the jazz bands, offered 
                                                 
1767 Krekola 2012, pp. 54-56. 
1768 Kolbe 1996, pp. 56-58; Krekola 2012. pp. 36-40, Vesikansa 2004a, pp. 221-223. 
1769 H.F. Nelson to SD, August 26, 1962, 'Joint State-USIA Message: Eight World Festival of Youth and Students', 
August 26, 1962, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 44, NARA. 
1770 Ibid.; Two telegrams from US Embassy to SD, July 13, 1962, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 44, NARA. 
1771 For more details about the exhibition catalogue, see International Program Records in the Museum of Modern 
Art Archives (http://www.moma.org/learn/resources/archives/EAD/ICEf) (January 13, 2013).  
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something that most of the festival visitors had never been able to experience in their home 
countries. Thanks to the great interest it generated among foreigners, the total number of 
visitors to Young America Presents exceeded 32,000. Newspaper reviews of the exhibition were 
also mainly positive, with Helsingin Sanomat stating that the way Young America Presents was 
able to contact both Finnish and foreign youngsters made up for the few surprises the actual 
paintings and sculptures were able to offer.1772 The observation of the actual exhibition 
presenting only few things that had not been seen earlier could have been a reference to 
MoMA's 'Modern American Drawings' exhibition the USIS/Helsinki and the Finnish-American 
Society had assisted to organise in Helsinki earlier in the spring. Even though this exhibition 
reached a much smaller crowd, only some 2,000, its impressive itinerary suggests that it may 
have actually been of higher quality than the American presentation of modern art during the 
communist festival.1773 
As the USIS also gave extensive commentary on the event to both the Finnish and 
international press, it is safe to say that in spite of its low-key presence, the official American 
informational organ played an active part in the anti-festival campaign. The festival was also 
taken into account in USIA activities around the world, as each of the information agency’s 
most important overseas posts received orders to increase their attention to youth and student 
audiences before and during the event.1774 The USIS/Helsinki was naturally in a key position 
also when the Americans tried to make sense of what had actually happened during the intense 
summer days and nights in Helsinki. The joint US Embassy-USIA report written after the event 
noted, above all, that the anti-festival activities carried out by both locals and foreign visitors 
together with the local public's general indifference to the event made the communist mass 
meeting nothing but a big failure.1775 
What has also been overlooked is that the communist youth festival gave the British a much 
desired opportunity to expand their activities and experiment some new methods of operation. 
The FO’s view was that, as during previous similar festivals, the British Embassy as well as the 
information offices of other Western embassies, should be equipped with both positive and 
objective material in a variety of languages for the use of visitors from uncommitted countries 
in particular.1776 The detailed way with which FO officials discussed what kind of content 
foreign embassies should be able to offer potential visitors indicates that by the early 1960s the 
British Government had increased its cooperation in informational operations not only with the 
US but other Western governments as well. In the months leading to the Helsinki Festival, the 
British shared their views most extensively with other NATO members planning to engage in 
some kind of activities before and during the event, most notably West Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Italy.1777 
                                                 
1772 Helsingin Sanomat, July 29, 1962. 
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1774 USIA to Principal USIS posts, ‘International Youth Activities', May 23, 1962, RG 306, OR, CPC, box 5, NARA. 
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1776 J.G. Taylor to R.F. Muston, February 22, 1962, FO 1110/1610, NA. 
1777 S.J. Rose to T.C. Barker, March 2, 1962, FO 1110/1610, NA. 
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The British complemented the anti-festival newspaper Helsinki Youth News by printing some 
thousands of copies of the IRD’s more simple factual pamphlets, which clarified such themes 
as ‘The Record of Colonialism’, ‘Aid to Underdeveloped Countries’ and 'Aid to Students'. The 
British information officer made the pamphlets, with the imprint of ‘Index Ltd’, available for 
open distribution to the public and for personal distribution to newspaper editors.1778 As for 
books, since the USIS focused considerably on the distribution of commercial literature, the 
British decided to concentrate only on a couple of relevant books that they wished to be made 
available in Helsinki bookshops in the leading European languages. These publications included 
Moscow Diary written by Francis Sejersted, a Norwegian student from Moscow University, and 
A Student in Moscow, the IRD-produced booklet by the Nigerian A. Amar.1779 
The British Embassy agreed with its American counterpart that the Helsinki festival turned 
out to be less successful than expected, mainly due to the hostility and indifference shown by 
the Finnish public. The British also gave credit to most Helsinki-based newspapers for not 
publishing any news of the festival. The activities of Britain and other Western governments 
also had an important role to play, the report concluded. In addition to the anti-festival paper, 
the several competing attractions launched in Helsinki during the festival, which in addition to 
the American projects most notably included an exhibition illustrating the working of Swiss 
democracy, were regarded as significant factors in the successful containment of communist 
propaganda.1780 In this particular case, both British and American views on the success of their 
operations seem largely justified, considering that Helsinki became the last non-communist city 
to host the youth and student festival. While their campaigns were by no means the only factor 
behind the decision to organise the event in strictly communist countries henceforth, the 
Anglo-American objection to the festival, undoubtedly, had a strong impact on it. One reason 
for this was that the two administrations' campaign against holding a communist mass event on 
their side of the Iron Curtain continued for quite some time after the festival delegates had left 
Helsinki. Apart from supplying a great number of articles evaluating the communist gathering 
to newspapers around the world, the Americans and British also analysed the events in their 
more scholarly propaganda publications, Problems of Communism and The Interpreter respectively. 
Both journals claimed that the festival had been a great failure to their organisers and correctly 
predicted that it was to be the last of its kind in the West.1781 
While the communist youth festival brought the Cold War right to the Finns' doorsteps and 
exposed them to more open communist and anti-communist propaganda, the event's long-term 
effects in Finland remained relatively slim. Rather soon after the open war of words, images and 
sounds was over, propaganda activities in the country returned to their normal cautious and 
                                                 
1778 IRD to R.F. Muston, March 23, 1962, FO 1110/1610, NA. 
1779 Ibid. 
1780 P.D. Stobart to Lord Home, ’The 8th World Youth Festival’, August 17, 1962, FO 1110/1610, NA. 
1781 The articles published in Problems of Communism and The Interpreter were also closely translated and 
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somewhat limited mode. It would, however, be wrong to say that the festival had no influence 
on the American and British operations in Finland. Perhaps most importantly, the event gave 
both US and British officials more experience of coordinating informational activities not only 
as a two-party basis but also in cooperation with other Western governments. The implemented 
anti-festival activities also deepened the relationship between Finnish youth organisations and, 
in particular, the USIS even further, a development the Americans regarded as highly important 
for future activities.1782 
 
1963 and Beyond 
 
A short review of British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in the mid-1960s is 
necessary in order to evaluate how the operations discussed above can be placed in a wider 
context. The summary not only provides an analysis on the effects the profound changes taking 
place both in Finnish society and British and American operations in Finland in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s had on the two Western campaigns on a long-term basis, but also helps one to 
understand just how exceptional the period examined in this study actually was. 
Above all, both American and British documents from the mid-1960s reveal that in terms of 
anti-communist propaganda in Finland, the late 1950s and early 1960s marked a definite turning 
point. After the Note Crisis had finally cooled off, Western officials in Helsinki wrote 
increasingly pessimistic reviews about the environment in which they were supposed to arrange 
their operations. In particular, British information officers gave detailed accounts on how the 
growing dominance of Urho Kekkonen and the K Line he represented, together with younger 
generations' more radical ideas, made the practice of traditional anti-communist propaganda 
even more of a challenge. As many of the leading Finnish newspapers were by now using more 
of their own material to cover foreign affairs and were not that willing to cause more 
disturbances to Finnish-Soviet relations by including content that could be interpreted in 
Moscow as controversial, the demand for heavy political articles produced by the IRD, or by 
any other official foreign actor for that matter, continued to diminish. These developments 
made the British increasingly use the concept of self-censorship when defining the Finnish 
press's publishing policies and the broader reasons behind them. US officials also observed the 
growing significance the practice of self-censorship was, yet again, starting to have in the 
country, but even more often they wished to catch the State Department's attention to the 
"Finnish style of neutrality", or "Finland's unbalanced neutrality", which placed increasing 
restrictions for American operations.1783 
The wide practice of self-censorship did not mean that no anti-communist articles were 
published by the Finnish press or that the British and Americans had given up all hope of them 
doing so in the future. Both Western governments continued to reshape their informational 
activities according to the changing circumstances. In October 1963, for example, the British 
Information Officer Ray Muston was pleased to report that the FO had provided the British 
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Year 1965', July 12, 1965, both RG 59, CU, PRCS, boxes 27 & 28, NARA.  
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Embassy with booklets that were more suitable to the Finnish environment in the sense that 
they did not directly slant communist practice.1784 While the British focused on delivering the 
Finns with content that would be more suitable for their particular environment, the Americans 
continued to rely on the power of their superior resources. The USIS/Helsinki now paid more 
attention to increasing its links with representatives of the media, defining them a number one 
priority group rather than politicians. This policy saw the American deliver with even more of 
their printed and visual content to the Finnish media and increase the organisation of special 
events and exhibitions for local journalists and book publishers. 
Although some articles covering wider international themes were published by Finnish 
newspapers, a great deal of the IRD's regular articles and scripts sent to Helsinki were in the 
mid-1960s considered unusable in the prevailing political climate. A particularly worrying 
development for both the British and American activities was the SDP’s increasing attempts to 
discard the incubus of its incapacity for government office because of its anti-Sovietism. This 
new policy also meant that the social democratic newspapers were becoming increasingly 
uneasy about publishing anti-communist material. By 1965, with the exception of Kansan Lehti, 
they hardly ever reproduced material that was highly critical of communist countries.1785 
Although the British must have felt exasperated by the limited possibilities of IRD work in 
Finland, even in the early 1960s they were not convinced that any increase of anti-communist 
activity was desirable or in Britain’s best long-term interests. The main body of local opinion 
remained firmly opposed to communism and, as was pointed out in a FO report sent from 
Helsinki in April 1964, “there seems to be a real danger of devaluing our currency in other 
directions if we are seen to be too “propagandistic” in the ideological field”.1786 This approach 
had some effect on the British Information Service’s practices, as it decided to only translate 
articles that either had a distinct local interest and/or a possibility of reproduction because of 
their subject matter or manner of treatment. In the British view, only stories that were 
comparatively sophisticated (for example, those that poked gentle fun at the communist system) 
or that criticised communism or its aims vis-à-vis China rather than the Soviet Union were 
likely to meet any success.1787 
By 1965, the possibilities for British propaganda operations were already seriously limited. 
The changing policy of the SDP, together with the British position that it was not considered 
wise to give an impression of dissatisfaction concerning the orientation of President 
Kekkonen’s foreign policy and an interest to influence public opinion to that end, enhanced the 
view that the Embassy should redirect its energies somewhere else. As all this happened during 
a time when promoting exports were given even greater priority in British informational 
activities in any case, it is no surprise that a greater share of the Information Section's focus was 
shifted onto commercial publicity.1788 Towards the late 1960s, the situation had changed to such 
                                                 
1784 According to Muston, the material covered themes from the international perspective, mentioning in the 
appropriate context where communist practices were invidious and contrary to what was good to the world R.F. 
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1786 B. Spencer to IRD, April 8, 1964, FO 1110/1786, NA. 
1787 Ibid. 
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an extent that export promotion more or less dominated the section's work, while virtually the 
only objective for the distribution of IRD material in Finland was to keep a small group of 
selected Finns up to date with developments in the communist camp, which might not come to 
their notice through the normal channels of information.1789 
Compared to the actual study period, Britain's diminishing anti-communist activities in 
Finland also began focusing on other areas altogether, a development that evolved from both 
the difficulties in having propaganda material published and the IRD's desire to launch more 
versatile operations. The Faculty of Journalism at the School of Social Sciences in Tampere was 
one of these fields. Together with the Americans, the British aimed to combat the faculty’s 
communist tendency by inviting its leading scholars to Britain and the US, by providing it with 
British lecturers and by donating books to the school. Some success was achieved in this area as 
Professor Raimo Vehmas gave his consent to these arrangements during his visit to Britain, 
which was preceded by a stay in the US.1790 While this operation provides a good example of 
the new methods through which British and American officials were now working, it also gives 
yet more proof of how the narrowing possibilities for having their anti-communist propaganda 
published in Finnish newspapers made the two governments work even more closely with each 
other. The inclusion of West Germany in the coordination of the activity in question suggests 
that this collaboration was also expanded to other NATO countries.1791 
A brief look at the IRD articles published in Kansan Lehti in the mid-1960s confirms the 
British claim that only material dealing with communism on other continents besides Europe 
now had any realistic chance of being reproduced. Details about distributed and published 
material show that the British occasionally sent some anti-Soviet articles to Finnish newspapers, 
but they were almost never reproduced. The very few articles about developments in East 
Europe that were still published included journalist C.F. Melville’s ‘East German Angry Young 
Men’1792 in which he claimed that East German youth would not support the current regime as 
long as Walter Ulbricht isolated them from the rest of the world.  
The clear majority of the IRD material published in Finland in the mid-1960s dealt with 
China and the country’s policies and culture. China had by now become a valuable tool that 
could be used, for instance, for the criticism of socialist realism.1793 As with stories on Europe, 
many of the articles commenting on Chinese policies clearly reflected the change that had taken 
place in Cold War propaganda over the years. For instance, a report on Prime Minister Chow’s 
claims regarding China’s growing aid to underdeveloped countries calmly presented the facts 
about global development aid rather than directly condemned the policy or the communist 
country in itself.1794  
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Above all, IRD articles distributed to the Finnish press in the mid-1960s show that by that 
time British propagandists were putting less effort into attacking rivalling countries or their 
social systems than in the more aggressive 1950s, and that the main focus of informational 
activities was shifted to presenting Britain as an ever active player in world politics. This 
development, a rather general one in Cold War propaganda, saw an increase in the amount of 
‘straight’ information about Britain distributed to foreign actors at the expense of more 
propagandistic material. The trend became even more evident as tension between East and 
West was even further reduced at the time of actual détente starting from the late 1960s. The 
change that took place in British informational policy was no sudden process, either. As early as 
1964, a FO steering committee report on the effects of communist countries' policies on British 
overseas informational operations noted that while, for instance, IRD activities still offered a 
valuable dimension to British policy, such international developments as the emergence of 
polycentrism, the Sino-Soviet dispute and the rapid growth of nationalism in Africa made it 
vital to readjust British propaganda to the changing environment.1795 For example, Lord Strang's 
extensive inspection of IRD activities recommended that the efficiency of the unit's operations 
needed to be increased by introducing the production of regionally-specific propaganda content 
and by expanding the department's collaboration with other FO branches.1796 Together with the 
idea of focusing on the more positive projection of Britain, through for instance its scientific 
achievements1797, this view won plenty of support among FO officials and was influential in 
making Britain's overseas informational operations meet the more sophisticated approach now 
favoured in the Cold War propaganda war. Even though in the Finnish case local circumstances 
determined to a great extent the scope of British propaganda, the broader policies defined in 
London also had a direct effect on the operations in Helsinki. The change that the new strategy 
generated was so distinctive that it reaffirms the conclusion that the period examined in this 
study was truly exceptional in terms of political propaganda. 
The effects that the altering international climate and the more cautious policy that the 
Finnish leadership adopted towards the Soviet Union had on American operations in the 
country were not as dramatic as in the British case. The State Department's growing attention 
on the overseas promotion of the US through more positive methods, together with the 
continuous introduction of new media technology, most importantly television, enabled the 
Americans to increase their informational activities and make their presence felt through a 
greater variety of channels. The USIS's desire to form even closer contacts with representatives 
of the Finnish media not only reflected the growing concern the Americans had on the Finnish 
newspapers' publishing policies in the 1960s, but also indicated that they felt that they were still 
                                                 
1795 FO memorandum: 'The Steering Committee Paper on "Current Trends" in the Policy of Communist Powers 
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in a good position to influence at least their coverage on the US. Indeed, the Country Plan for 
1965 claimed that while informational material including open anti-Soviet statements could not 
be widely used in Finland, official texts of important foreign policy statements, even when 
describing US policies versus communist ones, were still heavily distributed and had a great 
impact on Finnish editors whether or not they were printed.1798 This estimation can be regarded 
as perfectly credible considering the close relationship the Americans had managed to build 
with some of the leading Finnish journalists in the 1960s. The fact that USIS officials held 
detailed talks with editors of Helsingin Sanomat and Hufvudstadsbladet directly after the Note Crisis 
had begun shows that this connection was already strong in the early part of the decade.1799 The 
main change taking place in the mid-1960s was that the Americans now gave even more 
attention to spreading their influence to newspapers published outside the capital region. 
While American officials in Helsinki shared their British colleagues' concern over the SDP's 
new policies, they seemed more willing and able than their British colleagues to actually form 
new contacts with Finns that would make up for the social democrats' diminished enthusiasm 
for anti-communist propaganda activity. As a result, the trend of using more right-wing actors 
for distributing American political propaganda grew even stronger in the mid-1960s with such 
anti-communist figures as Georg C. Ehrnrooth now being increasingly contacted by not only 
the USIS/Helsinki, but also by the likes of Jay Lovestone, who encouraged the Finn to write 
about President Kekkonen's policies to the Free Trade Union News.1800 Ehrnrooth's growing 
cooperation with the Americans is hardly surprising considering that by the early 1960s he had 
already visited the US several times, first as a young reporter and then as an ASLA Leader 
Grantee. The influential American politicians and journalists Ehrnrooth was able to meet 
during his trips had had a decisive impact on his future political ideology, which he 
predominantly based on Anglo-American conservative traditions, including a hatred for 
communism.1801 One of the increasingly few Finns who were outspokenly critical of Kekkonen 
became an arbiter of political reports not only for the USIS, but also for, for instance, US News 
and World Report, which provided him with reports on communism from around the world.1802 
Even if it was useful for the Americans to receive such assistance, the cooperation with 
Ehrnrooth shows that even they had to settle for working with relatively marginal political 
figures after the SDP's interest in reproducing harder hitting propaganda waned. 
Together with the investment in media contacts, the focus the Americans gave on Finnish 
youth was the other main trend that only became clearer in the 1960s. American reports from the 
early and mid-1960s reveal that the USIS paid growing attention to reaching younger people living 
both in cities and rural areas. Besides enhancing their contacts with youth organisations, the 
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Americans increased their emphasis on youngsters when determining the kind of people they 
would like to see visiting Finland under the Specialist Program. For example, in 1963 American 
personnel in Helsinki came up with plans of arranging a number of professionals in the field of 
theatre, dance and music to Finland. The goal also was to expand Finnish-American cooperation 
in the field of sports by encouraging a greater number of American basketball, ice-hockey, 
swimming and track and field coaches to spend time in Finland and share their knowledge with 
local youngsters. In the field of literature, the Americans wished to introduce more controversial 
figures to the Finnish audience. The idea was that such names as J.D. Salinger would appeal to 
university students in particular and stir a lively discussion between them.1803 As it turned out, at 
least Mr Salinger was not very keen on becoming involved in such activity, and the Americans had 
to settle for presenting authors from an older generation to the Finns. The four-day visit Nobel 
prize winner John Steinbeck made to Finland in autumn 1963 as a touring State Department 
Specialist en-route to the Soviet Union was a particularly impressive event, generating plenty of 
interest among Finnish writers, journalists and students.1804 
From the American perspective, the ASLA-Fulbright programme remained their most 
effective channel to influence Finns of all ages throughout the 1960s. Figures for awarded grants 
in the 1960s show, however, that the expansion of the exchange activity had come to a halt in the 
early years of the decade, which can be regarded as the programme's heyday. The main reason for 
this was not that the activity was viewed as unimportant in Washington, but that the costs for 
bringing foreigners to the US had risen considerably. Inspection reports reveal that State 
Department officials were not that impressed with the direction particularly the educational 
exchange programme had taken by the mid-1960s, either. The programme for Finland was 
criticised, for instance, for lacking systematic coordination when naming suitable grantees, for not 
using visiting American Fulbright scholars as productively as possible, and in general for 
unnecessary bureaucracy.1805 These insights made American officials both in Helsinki and 
Washington pay more attention to making the programme more simple and systematic.1806  
When saying that the Americans were more successful than the British in their informational 
and cultural operations in Finland in the 1960s does not mean that they did not face a number 
of problems of their own. The USIS office in Helsinki also started to suffer from budget cuts, 
which for instance led to the closure of the America Center auditorium. This became as a 
particular blow for USIS film operations, which in the mid-1960s were also being held back by 
the lack of supply from Washington as well as some American officials' reluctance to screen 
                                                 
1803 L.C. Mattison to SD, 'Educational and Cultural Exchange: FY 1964 American Specialists Program: Emphasis 
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films that they regarded as "sheer propaganda", and therefore unsuitable for the Finnish 
environment.1807 The propagandistic label a growing number of Finns had started to give to 
USIA-produced films also made their placement on Finnish television an even more difficult 
task. As annoying as these problems were to the Americans, they did not, however, unsettle the 
superior position USIS-distributed features screened by the Finnish-American Society, in 
particular, continued to have in Finland compared to the short film activities of other 
governments. Although particularly SNS increased its film operations again in the 1960s, the 
popularity of the screenings remained small, with the exception of Russian and Eastern 
European children's animation movies, which many Finns greeted warmly.1808 
As for propaganda content, both the reality of the Finnish environment and the broader 
Cold War developments made the Americans emphasise their governmental policies, in 
particular US foreign policy and the race issue, as well as their economic progress even more 
than they had done during the previous decade.1809 In order to make sure that the publicity 
campaigns met their goals and people's image of the US remained positive, the USIA again 
increased its use of international opinion surveys in the mid-1960s.1810 As a result, the execution 
of economy-related informational operations became even more systematically planned also in 
Finland. Explaining American policies only grew in importance with the progression of the 
Vietnam War and the anti-American sentiment that had increased in Europe as a result. In 
Finland, the criticism directed against the US war effort remained relatively small, even though 
the number of demonstrations, organised mainly by university students, did to some extent 
grow towards the end of the decade.1811 Otherwise, the presentation of scientific achievements 
continued its rise to the very core of American propaganda. Due to the lead the Soviet Union 
had managed to take in the space race, the US space programme and its presentation to people 
around the world became almost an obsession to the Americans. In Finland, the progress made 
by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was promoted through 
printed pamphlets giving highly technological details about spacecraft development1812 and such 
special USIA exhibitions as 'USA - The Scientific Revolution', which presented US astronauts' 
space walking accomplishments alongside American achievements in other fields of science, 
most notably medicine.1813 
                                                 
1807 'Post Inspection Report on USIS Finland, September 1 - 16, 1965' by L. Squires & S. Kalish; C.B. Blosser to 
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The most notable development for both American and British operations in Finland that 
already began in the late 1950s and only continued to strengthen in the 1960s was that cultural 
matters gained growing significance in their execution. In the case of the US, this twist followed 
a broader policy change defined by officials in Washington. Unlike ten years earlier, even the 
most conservative American official now seemed, partly due to growing Soviet competition, to 
fully understand the true value the promotion of popular culture could have on their country's 
future world position. As a result, the budget for the Cultural Presentations Program was 
expanded and the State Department's role in, for instance, selecting jazz musicians for future 
world tours grew.1814 These kinds of developments were something of which officials 
coordinating British overseas cultural operations could only dream. Due to the ever diminishing 
resources allocated for such activities, the British had to settle for making their presence 
properly felt in well selected parts of the world. The political developments in Finland ensured 
that the country belonged to this category and that in the mid and late 1960s the British Council 
in Helsinki continued to enjoy relatively large operational budgets that enabled the office to at 
least maintain the scale of its traditional activities involving the promotion of British culture and 
the English language.  
Even if both Western governments continued to invest in cultural promotion in Finland, by 
the mid-1960s their campaigns had taken distinctively different shapes. While the Americans 
had adopted a more open attitude to the presentation of rising popular culture, the British relied 
on promoting their institutions and traditional forms of art. The difference in approach became 
well evident during and after the visit of Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to the America 
Days in Helsinki in 1963. The Americans were proud to report about the vast number of 
activities related to the event, which in addition to the more traditional USIA exhibitions on 
American books and education, included several performances by the US Air Force Band and 
the now 17-piece dance band The Ambassadors, a ticker-tape motorcade in honour of Mr 
Johnson in central Helsinki and a Texas-style barbeque at the Kaivopuisto park1815, but the 
British Council representative felt that the show had gone too far to the Finnish sense of 
fitness, which favoured more dignified presentations and gestures such as the ones carried out 
by the British during Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to Finland earlier that year.1816 The more 
traditional approach followed by the British cultural effort in Finland did not, however, mean 
that the British Council was unable to take advantage of the increasingly common medium of 
television. Already in the early 1960s, the BC achieved some significant progress in the field of 
English language broadcasts, as particularly the language series ‘Walter & Connie’, shown by 
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L. Battle, February 25, 1963, both CU, CPP, box 47, UAL. 
1815 L.C. Mattison to USIA, 'American Days 1963', November 22, 1963, RG 306, Subject Files, 1953-1967, Entry 
A1 56, box 44, NARA. 
1816 For Macmillan's visit to Finland in August 1963, the British had three principal objectives: to gain Urho 
Kekkonen's insight to Soviet foreign policy, to convince the Finnish leader of Western power and to settle some of 
the problems regarding British trade with Finland. The British decided not to carry out a broad promotional 
publicity campaign during the visit, and apart from the news conferences and a television interview given by 
Macmillan to YLE, their presence during the event remained rather limited. P.A. Rhodes to C.A. Thompson, April 
23, 1963, FO 371/171682; ’The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1962─1963’, BW 30/14, 
both NA. 
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YLE, became highly popular.1817 The share of British productions shown in Finland could, 
however, never match the daily exposure of American input on Finnish television viewers at the 
time, if not through the USIA's more political documentaries then at least through the 
screening of Hollywood-produced films and TV series as well as musical performances. 
 
The Beginning of Finlandisation? 
 
The forcefulness of the change taking place in the Finnish media environment in the early 
1960s leaves us with one broader question that is relevant for this study, namely whether the 
term 'Finlandisation' could be used to describe the nation's behaviour during this time. Before 
seeking answers, it is highly important to stress that the objective of the discussion below is not 
to provide a thorough analysis of the term or its possible use for explaining the characteristics 
of Finnish society, or to observe the behaviour of political figures in that era. Indeed, the goal 
here is to approach the term and its use from a Western perspective. Therefore, the focus is 
merely on answering whether the term, as controversial as it may be, could truly illustrate the 
reasons for Finland becoming a less fertile environment for Western political propaganda 
during the given time frame. While it is true that Western scholars have not held as much 
interest in the post-Cold War Finlandisation debate as the Finns, and the concept in itself is 
rather vague1818, I believe that since the term has been so widely used in accounts about 
Finland's position during the Cold War and because it is closely connected to the concept of 
self-censorship, its total exclusion from this study would be something of a shortcoming. 
When assessing the question introduced above, one should note that Finlandisation is a 
complicated and broader concept going beyond mere self-censorship. The term was often used 
in political discussions in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s describing a certain political 
process as ’to become like Finland’. Under this concept, a country such as Finland is formally 
independent but highly influenced by pressure exerted by the Soviet Union. Therefore, one 
could say that a nation that experiences Finlandisation loses part of its sovereignty and mitigates 
its criticism of a larger country. Although the word has mainly been used as a negative term to 
express Finnish weakness as well as concern over the situation of other Western European 
countries1819, Finland's performance during the Cold War has also received some 
understanding.1820 
                                                 
1817 ’The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1962─1963’, BW 30/14, NA. 
1818 See, Majander, Mikko, 'The Paradoxes of Finlandisation', The RUSI Journal, Vol. 144, Issue 4 (1999), p. 79. 
1819 The usual motive shared by the first people using the term, such as political scientist Richard Löwenthal, was to 
reflect the feared effects of the withdrawal of US troops from West Germany. Even though Finland’s policy 
towards the Soviet Union was rarely directly criticised, using the country as an example of loss of sovereignty can 
hardly be interpreted as a neutral statement about the Finnish situation. At least the Finns saw the term as offensive 
and tried their best to rectify it. For example Klinge, Matti, ’Ecce Finnia Tridentem! – Tässä Suomi valtikkasi!’ in 
Bäckman, Johan (ed.), Entäs kun tulee se yhdestoista? Suomettumisen uusi historia (Helsinki 2001), pp. 35─41.  
1820 For instance, Hans-Peter Krosby has claimed that Finland should not be judged if one does not understand the 
geographical position and history of the country. Finlandisation has also been seen as an example of Realpolitik, in 
which Finland’s policy was based on an acknowledgement of the realities behind power politics and the position of 
the country. Therefore, not all scholars see Finland’s politics during the Cold War as negative or biased towards the 
Soviet Union. Some say that under the situation the practised policy was rather clever, and recognise that Finland 
strengthened its relations also with the West at the same time. Salminen 1988, p. 275; Maude, George, The Finnish 
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The concept of Finlandisation has obviously penetrated Finnish society much more 
profoundly than has been the case in other countries. It is more closely related to the criticism 
of the political culture in the country. Many people say that Finland was, in fact, on its knees in 
front of the Soviet Union: its behaviour was too friendly and the nation practised unnecessary 
self-censorship, among other things. For many Finns, Finlandisation meant a sort of a voluntary 
acceptation of certain limits and norms in order to gain something.1821 This kind of behaviour 
was, of course, not at the least spontaneous, but followed the Finnish leadership's quest to 
create an institutionalised system leaning towards the Soviet Union. As many people followed 
this way of thinking, some even sincerely believing in it, one can say that an understandable 
caution in Finland at times gave way to unnecessary humiliation, especially in the 1970s.1822 
Scholars have held some mixed views about the time period for which the term 
Finlandisation could be used to describe the nation's conduct. Although the term is often used 
to describe the political position of Finland in the 1970s, some have argued that the concept has 
its roots in the late 1940s. Back then, in particular J.K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen frequently 
reminded newspaper editors about their responsibility in foreign policy matters; as a 
consequence, a new kind of a political culture began to gain ground in Finland.1823 Hannu 
Rautkallio has placed the beginning of Finlandisation to Kekkonen's appointment as President 
in 1956, seeing this event as a catalyst for a process leading to the Soviet Union's greater 
interference on Finnish domestic matters through the Finnish leader.1824 On the other hand, 
commentators mainly from the political left have claimed that the Finnish media was by no 
means as ‘Finlandised’ in the Cold War years as it has been generally assumed and that the use 
of them the term, or even self-censorship, for any period is inappropriate.1825 
The rapid, systematic manner in which most Finnish newspapers reintroduced self-censoring 
practices in the early 1960s suggests that this period was among the most decisive in the 
Finlandisation process. In other words, no matter how vague and controversial the concept 
may be, when examining Finnish society during this particular era from a Western perspective, 
in particular vis-à-vis the changes in the operational environment that forced British and 
American actors to realign their strategies, with hindsight it can be suggested that the use of the 
term in this context is, by and large, valid. The political leadership's strong grip on the press 
resulted in exaggerated caution, which would fit the term's characterisation. The newspapers' 
avoidance of criticism of the Soviet Union or the Finnish Government's adopted foreign policy 
was also far more evident during the early 1960s than in the 1950s, or even the late 1940s. At 
the same time, it must be emphasised that the developments leading to more systematic self-
censorship and flattery of the Soviet Union were only at their early stages. Furthermore, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Dilemma - Neutrality in the Shadow of Power, (London 1976), p. 47. For a compact summary of the term's use 
and the debate it generated in Finland in the 20th century, see also, Soikkanen, Timo, 'Suomettumiskäsite – 
historialliset vaiheet ja muuttuminen', Faravid, Vol. 25 (2001), pp. 223–235.  
1821 Valkonen 1998, p. 34. 
1822 Lilius 1988, p. 137. 
1823 For example, Jukka Nevakivi sees Urho Kekkonen’s first appointment as Prime Minister in March 1950 as the 
catalyst for the process towards Finlandisation. Nevakivi 1996, p. 15; Salminen 1988, p. 272. 
1824 Rautkallio 2010, p. 25. 
1825 Nordenstreng, Kaarle, ’Me, media ja menneisyydenhallinta’ in Bäckman (ed.) 2001, p. 219. 
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Finns' extensive use of international news agencies made sure that foreign news reported in 
their country in the 1960s and 1970s mostly continued to follow the same pattern as in other 
Western European countries in terms of reported topics. The distinctively greater and more 
positive coverage given to Eastern European news in Finnish media during this time1826 does, 
however, indicate that a rather profound change had already taken place in the country. 
When using the term Finlandisation, one must also remember that the behaviour of many 
Finns during the Cold War was mainly just a cover. Although their actions often followed 
official recommendations, in their hearts they remained very much anti-Soviet and pro-Western. 
Several Finnish officials' activities, at times even behind the political leadership's backs, 
illustrates that for many Finlandisation was a mere fabric to please the Soviets and maintain 
consensus in foreign policy. Operations related to cultural diplomacy gave the Finns the 
opportunity to express their views in a slightly more open fashion. In this field, the Western 
orientation continued to dominate even during times when closer cultural cooperation with 
communist countries was more strongly promoted by the political leadership. 
 
Political Propaganda Gives Way to Positive Promotion 
 
From the perspective of Western propaganda and cultural diplomacy, the early 1960s reaffirmed 
many developments in Finland that started to take form at the end of the previous decade. The 
Finnish Government's closer relationship with the Soviet Union restricted the publication of 
Western anti-communist propaganda even further and dampened the Finnish press's criticism of 
Moscow and its policies. This was evident, for instance, during the Cuban Crises when the 
majority of newspapers refrained from commenting on the Soviet Union's actions in negative 
light. The altered situation was a blow to the British political propaganda operations in particular, 
as they continued to predominantly rely on analyses of the injustices in the Soviet Bloc. As the 
new multifaceted informational policy defined in Whitehall during the first half of the decade 
placed more attention to the promotion of British products and culture, the limited possibilities to 
distribute an anti-communist message in Finland did not, however, harm the British Embassy's 
informational activities as seriously as the case would have been a decade earlier. As for the 
Americans, their reactions to the changing propaganda landscape, albeit at first rather panicky, 
reflected a degree of confidence over their possibilities to influence the Finnish nation also in the 
future. The USIS/Helsinki's increasing contacts with Finnish politicians, journalists, academics 
and youth organisations ensured that American presence remained strong even after the practice 
of political propaganda had, again, become a tougher prospect.  
The way in which both domestic and international developments reshaped informational 
and cultural operations in Finland from the early 1960s onwards had a decisive impact on all 
foreign governments' future operations in the country. Although the Cold War was nowhere 
near over and would again enter more intense periods, the more aggressive political propaganda 
implemented in Finland, as in many other parts of the world, particularly in the 1950s would no 
                                                 
1826 Pietiläinen, Jukka, ’Ulkomaantutkimuksen vaiheita ja tuloksia’ in Kivikuru Ullamaija & Pietiläinen, Jukka (eds.), 
Uutisia yli rajojen – Ulkomaanuutisten maisema Suomessa (Lahti 1998), pp. 27─28. 
 
 
340 
 
longer play as central a role as before. The new way of thinking on both sides of the conflict 
brought the more positive promotion of culture, ideas and images through traditional and the 
increasingly popular new art forms centre stage. As this development strengthened, it also 
enhanced the broader trend that saw the importance of official, government-led propaganda 
gradually diminish and give way to a more spontaneous and coincidental forms of informational 
and cultural activity. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The main finding of this thesis is that by implementing extensive propaganda and cultural 
diplomacy operations in the country, both Britain and the United States were willing to support 
Finland's attachment to the West in the first Cold War decades more actively than it has often 
been realised. The relatively large amounts of work and money invested in these fields indicates 
that the two Western governments' Cold War propaganda campaign was not only confined to 
larger Western European countries, but extended into more peripheral countries like Finland, 
both geographically and politically located between East and West.  
The fact that the political measures of supporting Finnish independence were largely 
restricted only increased the importance of the Western powers’ informational and cultural 
activities in Finland. The methods and channels used for these operations were to a certain 
extent the same as in other parts in the world. However, Finland’s unique international position 
required both the British and the Americans to make considerable adjustments to their standard 
propaganda and cultural diplomacy procedures. In the field of propaganda, in particular when 
distributed through the Finnish press, the broad practice of self-censorship in Finland, as well 
as Finnish legislation, made the execution of the operations more challenging than in many 
other countries.  
Because of this, British and American standard propaganda material was often as such 
unsuitable for the Finnish environment, and the possibility of executing wide-scale propaganda 
activities was to some extent limited. Both the British and the Americans themselves recognised 
that due to Finland’s delicate relationship with the Soviet Union, they needed to follow a 
predominantly subtle and sensitive approach in their informational and cultural operations. As a 
consequence, the Western powers confronted a constant dilemma in Finland: how to support 
the Finnish nation’s ties to the West and expose the defects of communism without 
encouraging the Finns too much or causing them difficulties in their relationship with their 
mighty neighbour. Even though officials from both countries were well aware that Finland did 
not always offer the most fruitful soil for propaganda operations, they put great care in carrying 
out these activities and making them as appropriate as possible for the Finnish environment. 
This study shows that in readjusting their operations to fit local circumstances, both Western 
governments showed a great deal of innovation and flexibility. While the British stressed the 
importance of working through local contacts and tailoring their output to local needs, the 
Americans launched a great number of entirely new programmes and practices, some of which 
were more successful than others. The operations and their implementation were determined 
by broader Cold War developments and the British and American informational and cultural 
policies that reflected them, but most of all by the Finnish-Soviet relationship. 
The Soviet Union's strong influence in Finnish society made the Western operations more 
vulnerable. It also meant that, at times, the broader changes in Western operational policies did 
not concern Finland, whereas on other occasions they had a stronger impact on the activities in 
the northern country than in many other parts of the world. The introduction of anti-
communist propaganda in the late 1940 is a primary example of a development that had a much 
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slower effect on activities in Finland, while the intensity by which cultural diplomacy was 
pushed higher up in British and American operational strategies after the Night Frost crisis in 
1958 and the Note Crisis in 1961 was greater than usually was the case.  
It is also safe to say that the Western campaign in the country was, in general, successful. 
Both governments were in most cases able to find ways to reach their target audiences and 
convey the preferred message to them even when faced with outside restrictions and problems 
related to funding. In anti-communist propaganda, British and American activity was largely 
limited to delivering the message to their specific target groups, mostly consisting of members 
of labour organisations, rather than seeking for maximum visibility. With this context in mind, 
the operations can be ranked almost as successful as the more overt programmes related to 
cultural diplomacy. In making all activities more efficient, the Finns played a central part. The 
majority of the nation was clearly Western-orientated, showing great interest in British and 
American news reports and cultural products. This formed a solid platform for any activity 
launched by the British and US governments. The Finns' close involvement in the operations' 
execution, both directly as producers of propaganda and indirectly as its distributors through 
the media and political parties, also played a key part in making the content more appropriate 
for the local market and increasing the activities' overall credibility.  
In Britain’s case, the propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations carried out by the 
Legation, the BBC and the British Council were highly effective despite their rather slow start. 
All three actors had their specifically defined roles in day-to-day work, but the close liaison 
between them enabled the British to plan their activities thoroughly and use the most 
appropriate channels and methods as efficiently as possible. This was extremely important for 
the execution of a believable informational and cultural programme as available resources for 
such a task were somewhat limited.  
In press operations, the majority of the material the British Legation offered to Finnish 
newspapers focused on reporting factual matters and presenting British society in a positive 
light. The establishment of the Foreign Office's anti-communist unit Information Research 
Department was, however, a welcomed move among British officials in Helsinki, as they felt 
that its material could be of much use in Finland due to the Finns' limited possibilities for 
obtaining objective information about developments in Eastern Europe, let alone the Soviet 
Union. Considering Finland’s sensitive position and the practice of self-censorship, the 
placement of the IRD’s anti-communist material in Finnish newspapers was, generally speaking, 
even surprisingly successful, especially in the early 1950s.  
Listener research reports suggest that the BBC’s Finnish Service also carried out a successful 
campaign in Cold War Finland. The praise the service received for its objectivity and accuracy 
shows that there was great demand among Finns to learn about international developments, 
above all in Eastern European countries, through a foreign medium as their own sources were 
not always regarded as reliable. The Foreign Office's wish to add some ‘political punch’ to the 
Finnish broadcasts led to a somewhat classic struggle between the FO and the BBC, which 
constantly emphasised its independence in decisions concerning broadcast content. The 
majority of the Finnish Service’s content remained impartial in tone, but the inclusion of such 
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centrally-produced series as ‘In Eastern Europe’ meant that the service played a part in the FO’s 
anti-communist propaganda campaign. As previous studies suggest, however, the projection of 
British culture and in particular jazz music broadcasts played as important a role as did the anti-
communist talks in the long-term propaganda effort; this was also clear in the Finnish case.  
The relatively meagre funds available for British Council activities around the world made the 
promotion of British culture and language a less straightforward affair also in post-war Finland. 
When saying this, one should also point out that the complaints made by British officials over 
their resources were not always justified, given that the Helsinki office enjoyed greater funding 
than many other posts. Be that as it may, one of the greatest British breakthroughs during the 
study period was achieved in the field of English teaching. The replacement of German as the 
first foreign language taught at many schools gave British cultural activities an enormous boost, 
even if the influence of the German language remained strong in the Finnish educational sector 
strong for quite some time. The British Council played a vital part in increasing the popularity of 
English as it supported the numerous Finnish-British societies around the country, and made the 
sound decision to appoint teacher-secretaries to the largest ones of them. The line between 
propaganda and cultural diplomacy was particularly thin in many of the BC's activities and is, in 
fact, often impossible to draw. This was particularly the case in the early 1960s when the Council's 
role in projecting Britain was finally boosted, partly due to the changing situation in Finland and 
partly due to larger developments in Cold War propaganda. 
As most American activities were conducted by the US Legation in Helsinki, mostly by the 
USIS staff, the coordination of daily tasks was easier than in the British case. On the other hand, 
one could argue that because of this, the Americans were not able to specialise in various areas as 
profoundly as their British counterparts. The superior resources available to the Americans, 
naturally, enabled them to perform operations on a much broader scale. As for press operations, 
according to an American estimate the extent of USIS-based material published in Finnish 
newspapers reached saturation point in the early 1950s. In spite of this, the Legation confronted 
similar problems as their British colleagues in pushing their anti-communist message forward and 
even questioned the freedom of the Finnish press. As US officials in Helsinki felt that the 
working class, i.e. the primary target group, could not be reached effectively enough, they 
introduced new channels for the distribution of their propaganda. Both the VOA Finnish Service 
and the Finnish-language field magazine Aikamme were distinctively tools of American 
propaganda. The fact that neither of them lasted for many years illustrates how difficult an 
operational environment Finland was. USIS short films loaned out to all parts of the country 
fared much better. The industrious ways the Americans were able to find for their presentation 
and distribution made this activity among the most effective in Finland. 
Undoubtedly, the United States’ most successful operation was the exchange of persons 
through the ASLA-Fulbright programme. The exceptional scale of this activity clearly captured 
the State Department's desire to attach influential Finnish individuals closer to the West and to 
influence Finland's societal development on a long-term basis. In addition to acknowledging the 
programme's impact in the long run, the Americans emphasised the benefits scholarship 
holders, both Finnish and American, could bring for reaching the shorter term propaganda 
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objectives and were eager to use them and their favourable comments on the US with this 
purpose in mind. The ASLA-Fulbright programme was also regarded as an excellent channel 
for having both direct and indirect impact on the development of Finnish politics as well as the 
modernisation of industry and business, rather than merely influencing the perceptions of 
individuals inside academia.  
An evaluation of US propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland is made significantly 
trickier by the large number of actors involved and especially by the omnipresent influence of 
the CIA. It would appear that the agency was at least indirectly involved in a great deal of the 
activities, mainly as their financier. It is unlikely that it took active part in defining any of its 
front organisations', such as the Congress of Cultural Freedom, activities concerning Finland. 
On the other hand, everything is not yet known about the CIA's true involvement, especially as 
comes to propaganda. The agency’s role during the youth festival in Helsinki in 1961 gives 
some indication of the CIA's true abilities in this area, although one has to remember that in 
this particular case the primary target group of the activities were foreign festival visitors, not 
the locals.  
As the British and US governments ran two predominately independent campaigns in 
Finland, it is worthwhile to make some general remarks about their execution. A direct 
comparison between the two operations would not be fruitful due to their different size, but on 
the other hand the degree of efficiency the British were able to accomplish in their campaign 
throughout most of the study period shows that the size of available resources did not mean 
everything.  
Whereas the US Government focused on carrying out a somewhat similar propaganda 
campaign as in many other countries, the British Government needed to come up with new 
ideas for promoting its message. Especially in the field of press activities, British officials 
seemed to be more active in finding ways to make their material more appropriate for the 
Finnish environment and discovering new channels of distribution by establishing close 
contacts with, for instance, Finnish newspaper editors and politicians. The USIS/Helsinki, on 
the other hand, based its work largely on supplying Finns with Washington-produced bulk 
material without making any major changes to its content, except in special cases. 
Another major difference between the two Western powers and their activities in Finland 
concerned their relationship with Finnish organisations. A number of American actors were 
willing to provide financial support to Finnish organisations, mainly the Social Democratic 
Party and the trade union organisation SAK, along with their propaganda activities, which were 
regarded as crucial in the battle against communism. The British, on the other hand, refrained 
from doing this. The lack of resources offers the obvious explanation for this, but FO 
documents also suggest that the decision not to give indigenous groups any direct financial 
support was, most of all, a strategic one, following the view that it was best for the British 
Government not to become too closely involved with local actors. Above all, the cooperation 
with the Finns concerned the distribution of overt press content and the more covert anti-
communist material.  
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In spite of the different strategies adopted in the direct financial backing of Finnish 
organisations, the Americans and the British shared one essential characteristic in their policies 
towards the northern country: they both were willing to invest considerable funds in their 
Helsinki-based activities. The categorisation of Finland as one of the important 'frontier 
countries' made sure that the sums directed to the British information services in Finland, even 
if in real terms fairly small, remained among the largest in Western Europe when taking the size 
of population into account. The steady expansion of USIS operations in Helsinki suggests that 
Finland's rank as one of the countries particularly exposed to communist aggression closely 
determined the size of US funds allocated to the country, as well. Indeed, it would seem that the 
amount of American money invested in propaganda operations abroad was in line with the 
sums handed to foreign organisations; in other words, the largest amounts were most likely 
invested in areas, including Finland, in which local actors also enjoyed the greatest American 
financial support. Without precise information about the volume of CIA funding or the annual 
budgets of USIS offices around Europe, this is, however, only a rough estimation. Indeed, it 
could well be that the caution American officials often followed in the distribution of anti-
communist propaganda kept the funds allocated to US information operations in Finland 
slightly smaller in relation to the covert support of local organisations. 
As for cultural diplomacy, the British Council’s active role in language teaching was 
something the Americans really envied. As in propaganda operations, the USIS noted that the 
British way of operating, including numerous field trips around the country and liaison with 
several Finnish authorities, was more active and flexible than their own. By the late 1950s, the 
Americans had become aware that their role outside Helsinki was rather invisible and 
consequently introduced a special field programme to rectify things. In educational exchange 
and art exhibitions the situation was the opposite. British officials knew that they could never 
match the scale of the ASLA-Fulbright Programme or the larger Museum of Modern Art-
related exhibitions displayed in Helsinki.  
The two Western campaigns also took different paths. Britain's activities were of great 
importance after the first post-war years and during the early 1950s when anti-communist 
propaganda was introduced in its full scale, but started to fade after both the country's 
international position and operational resources weakened. US officials, on the other hand, 
were slow to launch broader activities in Finland, but when they started doing so in the early 
1950s, their impact on the Finns grew convincingly. For this, the USIS had wider developments 
to thank for, mainly the expanding popularity of consumer and youth cultures, which drilled an 
image of the American way of life to the mind of every Finn, especially after television started 
to become more common in the early 1960s. At this point the cooperation between the British 
and Americans in Finland was also expanding, especially in the field of language teaching. In 
general, however, the liaison between the two Western powers remained somewhat limited 
throughout the study period and was mostly restricted to sharing information and discussing 
broader political objectives.  
Even though British officials in Helsinki put more effort than the Americans into making 
their propaganda content more suitable for Finland, and the anti-communist material produced 
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by the IRD was, in general, more sophisticated than that of the USIE/USIA, the overall 
propaganda content of the two governments was highly similar. Both campaigns predominantly 
emphasised the positive aspects of their respective societies and culture as well as the benefits 
of democracy in general. As both the FO and the State Department were quick to learn that an 
aggressive campaign was unnecessary in the Finnish case as compared to other Western 
European countries, British and American propaganda in Finland focused more on the 
distribution of ‘straight’ information and the projection of their societies. The US campaign was 
particularly effective in this field, as the USIS/Helsinki constantly bombarded the Finnish press 
with articles praising the American economy and the high living standards of the 'Average Joe', 
and the country’s scientific achievements, as well as the general American message of freedom 
and opportunity for all, including African-Americans. 
Otherwise, the broader informational and cultural policies determined in Washington and 
London were closely reflected in the campaigns launched in Finland. In particular, the 
adaptation of a more evolutionary propaganda strategy in the late 1950s was evident, for 
example, by the way the Americans organised many of their worldwide exhibitions, such as 
‘Atoms for Peace’, also in Finland and started to use Gallup surveys for reshaping their 
operations into more sophisticated form. In distributed content, the USIA-produced material 
began from the late 1950s onwards to give increasing emphasis on American popular culture, 
particularly jazz music, and more general topics such as equal opportunities in the US. The 
British Government also made some modifications to the nature of its operations in Finland, 
but they were rather a result of its diminishing resources for informational activities and 
changes in the Finnish environment than a broader change in general strategy. 
Although British and American propaganda in Finland can in general be labelled as ‘white’ 
propaganda, i.e. objective truth-telling from an open source, the reasonably successful 
placement of anti-communist articles in Finnish newspapers, together with the transmission of 
political radio programmes and the publication of the American field magazine, indicate that a 
fair share of the content clearly belonged to the category of ‘grey’ propaganda, i.e. the 
distribution of biased information and partial truths from an indeterminate source. The 
difficulty to push direct criticism of the Soviet Union for publication in Finland only increased 
the share of this type of propaganda. Indeed, the British and Americans as well as the Finns 
were more or less forced to develop a new way of attacking the Russians and communism in 
general indirectly, namely by directing the sharpest sting at the smaller Eastern European 
countries. A very small share of Western propaganda in Finland could also be called ‘black’ as 
the true source of the stories was sometimes disguised. Furthermore, the covert and indirect 
distribution of hard-hitting anti-communist material through indigenous agencies was also likely 
to include misleading information.  
The success of British and American press operations depended on the effectiveness of their 
distribution methods and channels and, above all, the Finnish general climate at a given time. 
Some clear trends can be recognised in how the British and US governments were able to 
promote their message in the exceptional Finnish environment. The first post-war years were a 
time when the Western governments concentrated mainly on developing their operational 
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methods. During this period, British and American propaganda remained small-scale activity 
and focused on informing the Finnish nation about the governments’ policies. As the Cold War 
heated up in the late 1940s, Western propaganda activities expanded also in Finland. After the 
British learnt what IRD material was appropriate for Finnish newspapers to publish, they were 
able to launch a relatively extensive press campaign especially in the early 1950s. This was the 
time when US press operations also turned into higher gear. The distribution and placement of 
British propaganda was at its most successful between 1953 and 1955, when the inclusion of 
IRD content by the Finnish media was, in fact, rather on the same level as in other comparable 
countries such as Austria and Sweden. For a brief period in the mid-1950s, Finnish newspaper 
editors were not that keen on undermining the Soviet Union mainly as a result of the return of 
the Porkkala Naval Base. Nevertheless, this tendency proved temporary since the more liberal 
period of 1956─1957 offered increasing opportunities for pursuing the Finnish press to publish 
anti-communist material. The final four years of this study period, 1958-1962, were plagued by 
two political crises and an internal power struggle in Finland, which had a profound impact on 
the Western operations' future form.  
The periodisation made above largely supports the hypothesis presented in the introduction 
of this study, i.e. that Western anti-communist propaganda in Finland in the 1950s, the most 
aggressive decade of the Cold War, was not restricted by self-censorship as much as I had 
previously concluded. Even if the most successful period for anti-communist operations were 
the immediate years after Stalin's death, evidence indicates that already in the early 1950s, partly 
as a reaction to the Korean War, even harder Western propaganda was finding its way to 
Finnish recipients. This was made possible by the more active position a large number of 
Finnish politicians and journalists took in the fight against communism and the close 
cooperation they had developed with British and American officials in Helsinki. The lines of 
self-censorship continued to determine what could be published in the northern country, but 
both Finnish and Western actors found several ways to go round them. While the British and 
Americans started to deliver the Finns with more press content that had the possibility of being 
reproduced, they also expanded their distribution of more covert material for the political battle 
on the grassroots level. Finnish newspapers supported the cause by attacking domestic 
communists and including a greater number of news articles of Western origin informing 
readers about injustices in Eastern Europe or explaining Western policies more thoroughly. The 
Finnish press's heavy reliance on foreign news agencies' international news reports only 
increased the use of Western government-led propaganda, even if the exact degree of official 
guidance to which these stories were subjected remains open.  
The more strict publishing policies introduced by many Finnish newspapers in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s formed another major turning point. This study agrees with previous research 
noting that the Night Frost Crisis was a definite turning point towards the practice of tighter 
self-censorship, but points out that particularly the British anti-communist campaign showed 
some signs of fading already a couple of years earlier. The Night Frost Crisis' impact on Finnish 
behaviour was not immediate or all-encompassing, but more of a beginning of the process that 
the Note Crisis and Urho Kekkonen's firmer hold on power enhanced. The new political 
 
 
348 
 
culture did not favour almost any criticism of the Soviet Union and its policies. From the 
perspective of Finnish newspapers' publishing policies regarding more controversial political 
content, the change taking place in the country was so forceful that one could argue that the 
political behaviour later labelled as Finlandisation had already taken its foothold in Finnish 
society in the early 1960s. As a result, the British and American anti-communist propaganda 
activities became extremely challenging, and a larger share of the informational activities started 
to focus on cultural matters and the promotion of economic interests, instead. This 
development was not entirely the result of the domestic situation in Finland, but also reflected a 
broader trend in the Cold War image battle, which was based more on cultural promotion than 
directly attacking the enemy. The changed propaganda environment in Finland and, in 
particular, its effects on Western operations in the country in the upcoming decades could offer 
a natural starting point for further study, as could the closer examination of a chosen Finnish 
medium, for instance the press, the radio or television, from a Western perspective.  
Although a reliable assessment over the true influence of the Western powers’ propaganda 
and cultural operations in Finland is all but impossible and beyond the scope of this study, 
some rather general observations can be made on this matter. Both British and American 
officials certainly felt that in addition to successfully reaching the Finnish masses and increasing 
their knowledge of the Western way of life, their operations also had the desired impact on 
Finland’s general development and the Finnish nation’s perception of the world. The 
Americans were particularly keen to stress the broader psychological effects of their campaign 
in Finland, especially in terms of Finns’ increasing sympathy to the West. Although US officials 
were also ready to recognise that any reliable measurement on the effects of cultural and 
informational work was hard to obtain, they did take some credit for having a decisive impact 
on preventing Finnish ‘political wavers’ from turning to communism. For example, the support 
given to the SAK was regarded as having played a key role in the successful campaign of 
blocking communist dominance in the trade union movement. The British only rarely 
speculated on their activities’ psychological and concrete impact but they, too, were convinced 
that what they were doing was highly effective and, for example, the BBC listener reports gave 
some justification for this belief.  
In retrospect, it is relatively easy to agree with the view that British and American efforts to 
influence the Finnish nation in the first Cold War decades hit their target. The Western powers’ 
considerable activity in a number of informational and cultural fields certainly gave Finnish 
politicians and the nation as a whole an expression that the country was not entirely left alone in 
its struggles. This obviously built Finland’s confidence in the long run and enhanced the Finns’ 
cultural affiliation with the West. Cooperation in the fields of culture, education, science and the 
media played its part in accelerating Finland’s post-war development and its rise into a 
prosperous industrialised country. Thanks to Western cultural and informational activities, the 
Finns certainly learnt a great deal more about other parts of the world than they would have 
done otherwise.  
One could also argue that the British and, in particular, the American goal of explaining the 
‘Western way of life’ through concepts like individualism, free entrepreneurship and equal 
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opportunity, was rather easily met in a country like Finland, whose people dominantly welcomed 
such ideas and were rather familiar with them in any case. Finland also provided fruitful soil for 
the ever-growing number of cultural products imported from the West. Indeed, the role Western 
films, literature, music and sports played in reshaping Finnish society, and catalysing the 
emergence of an altogether new kind of youth culture in particular, should not be understated.  
One could, of course, also ask whether an extensive informational and cultural campaign 
was necessary in a country like Finland, in which the nation was culturally orientated to the 
West and had a strong resentment of the Soviet Union. What was the point of spreading anti-
communist IRD material or introducing an exceptionally large Fulbright programme if Finnish 
people were in any case bombarded with Western culture through private firms and 
overwhelmingly pro-Western in their thoughts anyway? 
The answer has both a psychological and a political dimension. The first has to do with the 
main justification for Britain's and the United States’ engagement in such activities, i.e. to 
provide moral support to the Finns and enhance their independence and ties to the West. One 
could say that the British and American cultural and informational operations, which at their 
simplest meant ‘showing the flag’, built up to long-term investments in Finland’s future. The 
political dimension is, above all, related to the Western powers’ estimation that their work was 
essential for blocking the expansion of communism in Finland. Considering the Finns' pro-
Western sentiments and resentment of communism, this activity was always based more on 
preserving these attitudes rather than creating new ones. It would be too much to say that the 
Americans and the British restrained the popularity of communism in the country, but one 
could argue that without their active efforts in the fields of culture and information, and their 
support to Finnish non-communists, this task would have been more difficult.  
When examining the reasons behind the British and US governments' operations in Finland, 
one naturally has to keep in mind that the Western powers did not expand their cultural and 
informational activities in Cold War Finland only because of ideological reasons or merely as a 
gesture of goodwill, but mainly because it was in their political and economic interest to do so. 
Even though cultural and informational matters have traditionally been regarded as inferior to 
wider political and economic issues, their importance in supporting broader governmental 
policies and goals should not be underestimated. Indeed, the significance of the cultural and 
informational dimension in the implementation of the two Western governments' overall 
policies towards Finland was so great that I wholeheartedly agree with the increasingly common 
view presented on the first pages of this study that in the assessment of Cold War history, 
ideological and cultural matters should be given greater importance and examined further. In 
other words, Cold War Finland offers a perfect example of a situation in which the more 
indirect and long-term measures of influence were given a more decisive role in the protection 
of two foreign governments' interests than it has previously been understood.  
An examination of British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland in 
the early decades of the Cold War also endorses a number of earlier conclusions about the 
Western powers’ activities in these areas, as well as their general Cold War policies. Both 
governments saw it vital to use propaganda and other informational operations, as well as 
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various cultural activities, to enhance their support in the Cold War battle not only in 
communist satellites, but first and foremost in Western Europe, including neutral countries 
such as Finland. This study also supports the view that although the US and Britain were close 
allies during the Cold War, their cooperation in informational and cultural activities was based 
more on sharing information than ground-level collaboration. Indeed, the fairly limited 
cooperation between British and the Americans in informational and cultural operations in 
Finland suggests that the image of the West as a greatly homogenous Cold War bloc is 
somewhat misleading, especially as far as these kinds of ground-level activities go. The great 
number of, in particular, American actors operating in the field made the effective coordination 
of all operations such a challenging task that one also comes to suspect that at times it was to 
some degree neglected and that the various organisations acted predominantly according to 
their own strategies. 
Even if this made the execution of propaganda and cultural diplomacy a rather complicated 
affair, the Western powers’ activities in Finland also draw an image of their Cold War 
machinery being adaptable enough to come up with fresh methods for the distribution of 
suitable information and for having an influence on people’s opinions by using various cultural 
channels. The fact that both the British and the Americans were able, even if after a period of 
confusion, to present a strong but at the same time not too provocative an image of their 
countries complements the view that both Western governments were willing to invest strongly 
in the successful execution of their operations. The Western powers’ ability to run a 
considerable anti-communist propaganda campaign in such an exceptional environment as 
Finland shows that as the Cold War progressed, officials of the two governments rapidly learnt 
a great deal about the execution of propaganda and cultural diplomacy and about national 
characteristics. They also came to realise that methods in informational and cultural operations 
had become increasingly sophisticated, especially after the introduction of new media, in 
particular television.  
Although British and American officials were not always able to operate in Finland as broadly 
as they would have wanted, their campaigns followed closely the governments’ wider strategies in 
the ‘battle for hearts and minds’, which in turn were direct consequences of general international 
developments. An examination of British and American activities in the northern country also 
indicates that they followed the Western powers’ general policies in the sense that the importance 
of information and culture, more broadly the ideological and psychological dimension of 
international relations, in accomplishing the top priorities was strongly emphasised. 
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Abstract 
The study examines British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland during the first 
decades of the Cold War, more precisely between the years 1944 and 1962.  
As the Cold War intensified in the late 1940s, both Britain and the United States sharpened their 
informational and cultural activities throughout the world. The general goal of these operations was not 
only the promotion of culture and the ‘Western way of life’, but also the containment of communism. 
For the distribution of anti-communist propaganda and the projection of culture, the British used 
printed material prepared by a special Foreign Office unit, BBC broadcasts and operations executed by 
the British Council, while the Americans relied on material produced by the United States Information 
Agency (USIA, until 1953 USIE), including Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts. The United States also 
emphasised the importance of the exchange of people through, for example, the Fulbright Programme. 
The two Western powers’ operations were also conducted in exceptional environments such as 
Finland, in which the country’s complex relationship with the Soviet Union meant that the distribution 
of anti-communist propaganda, for example, through Finnish newspapers was always going to be a 
sensitive affair. Although the British and Americans knew that the majority of Finns resented 
communism, they were constantly worried about finding the appropriate methods to promote their 
message to the broader masses. In addition to informational and cultural activities, Britain, and in 
particular the United States, through the CIA, also supported the anti-communist work of some Finnish 
organisations. 
The general objective of this study is to discover the nature of British and American propaganda and 
cultural diplomacy operations in Finland. The focus lies on their breadth, closer traits and the channels 
used in their execution. Furthermore, the aim is to discuss how certain characteristics of Finnish society, 
such as the widely accepted practice of self-censorship, affected the Western powers’ operational 
methods. Some emphasis is also placed on examining the effects of these activities and comparing the 
two campaigns with each other. 
The study is predominantly based on archived documents of the British Foreign Office, the British 
Council, the BBC, the US State Department and the USIA. Furthermore, records filed at numerous 
Finnish archives provide valuable information about the Western operations' distribution processes, 
while certain Finnish newspapers and magazines make up essential sources for the examination of 
propaganda content. 
This study comes to the conclusion that both Britain and the United States carried out reasonably 
extensive propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations in Finland in the first Cold War decades, and as 
a consequence supported the country's independence and attachment to the West to a greater extent 
than has been previously recognised. The placement of British anti-communist articles in Finnish 
newspapers was especially successful in the early 1950s. The BBC Finnish Service broadcasts, which 
included anti-communist output, were also rather warmly welcomed by the Finns as were the operations 
of the British Council, despite its fairly slim resources. In addition to press operations, the Americans 
were able to influence a considerable number of Finns especially through USIA films, television 
programmes, the exchange of people and other cultural operations. The Finnish political crises of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s restricted Western activities and forced the countries to find new methods of 
operation. Despite this, the impact British and American informational and cultural activities had on 
Finnish society can be regarded as substantial.  
